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The Afncan Charter on Hunzun and Peoples' Rights is unique in its concephialization 
of rights. Among other things, it provides in a single document a cote of both economic, 
social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political nghts. However, the Charter's 
Prearnble clearly demonstrates where the emphasis of the document lies. The Afncan 
Charter asserts a belief that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. 
Given the grave economic problems facing Afnca, the ernphasis on economic, social 
and cultural rights as a precondition for the enjoyment of civil and political nghts is hardly 
surprising. It is justified in a continent where basic human survival needs are barely met. 
What is astounding today is the abandonment of such Charter ideals, by the marginalization 
of enforcernent of the economic, social and cu\turai rights under the Charter. 
This study analyzes the existing situation with respect to the observation, 
enforcement and implementation of the economic, social and cultural nghts under the 
African Charter by States Parties as a step towards rethinking the marginalization of these 
rights. It is shown that an holistic approach to human rights enforcement is indeed in 
consonance with African culture. Consequently, the current practice of enforcing civil and 
politicaï rights while ignoring economic, social and cultural nghts is antithetical to the 
importance traditiondly attached to these nghts. 
It is also revealed that while some States are more progressive in the protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights, others either are not doing enough to protect these 
rights, or maintain constitutions that render economic, social and cultural rights non- 
justiciable. For States Parties, it is argued that domestic constitutional provisions making the 
economic, social and cultural rights non-justiciable are invalid undcr the Afican Charter. 
Analysis of the newly established African Court of Human Rights discloses that the 
mere addition of a court is not likely, by itself, to sufficiently address the normative and 
structural weaknesses impinging on the enforcement of economic, social and cultural nghts 
iii particular, and on the Afncan human rights system in general. A fat-reaching amendment 
of the Chrirter is required. 
The problems hindering the redization of these rights in Africa are also explored. 
As a contribution to the rethinking process, alternative enforcement approaches - both the 
integrated and minimum threshold models of enforcement - are advocated as ways to 
overcome the constitutional limitations on the enforcement of these rights, as well as to 
ensure the realization of the eloquent declarations of the Afrcan Charter. The thesis 
emphasizes that human rights transcend merely restraining govemments from abusing their 
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The Universal Declaration of Humn Rights (UDHR) as adopted in 1948' contains 
in one consolidated text the whole range or corpus of human rights. This was borne out of 
the belief in the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of al1 nghts. 
However. in transforming the UDHR's provisions into legally binding obligations, the 
United Nations adopted two separate International Covenants: the International Covenant 
1 UN General Assembly Resotution 2 17A (m) of 10 ûecember 1948, UN Doc Al8 1 1. Reprinted in 
United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of lnternational Instruments, Vol. 1 [First Part], (New York 
and Geneva: United Nations, 1994) at 1-7, [hereinafter, "Compilation of International Instruments"]. See also 
P .  R. G h and hi, (ed. ) Blackstone 's International Human Rights Documents (London: B lac kstone Press Ltd., 
1995) at 2 1-25, 
'ïhis division of human rights into two main categories was a consequence of a controversial and 
contested decision made by the UN Generai Assembly in 195 1 d u h g  the dmfting stages of the International 
Bill of Hurnan Rights. it was decided that two separate covenants should be prepared, one protecting civil and 
politicd rights, and the other economic, social and cultural rights. See Sandra Liebenberg, 'The International 
Covcnant on Economic, Social and Culturd Rights and its Implications for South Africa" (1995) 11 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 359 at 361; Asbjom Eide "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human 
Rights" in Asbjorn Eide, et al, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: P, Textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nij hoff. 1995) 2 1 at 23. The controversy arose as a result of the perceived origins of these rights. Historicdly, 
Western political philosophers identified with civil and political rights, while economic, socid and cultural 
rights were viewed as socialist rights. Civil and political rights are traceable to the pronouncements of the 
American and French Revolutions, whilc the concept of economic, social and cultural rights is genenlly 
rissumed to have originated from the Russian Revolution of 1917. See Jason M. Waite, "The United States 
Supreme Couds Anomalous Approach to Discriminatory Alienage Classifications: International, Candian, 
and Dornestic Law Compared" (1997) 11 Emory Intl. L Rev. 697 at 704-705[The article may also be found at 
<http://www.law.emory.edu/ELIR/volumes/falI97/waite.h (visited 4:28 PM Jmuary 3 1,2000). Note: In 
this thesis, "visited" in Intemet citations :efers to more permanent materials in web sites, while "Accessed" 
refers to daily Newspapers and Magazines on the Internet]. See d so  Louis B. Sohn, 'The New International 
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States" (1982) 32 Am. Ci. L Rev. 1 at 32-33. 
Howevzr, it has bcen noted that despite the general view in the West towards economic rights, and the 
perception of the rights as 'socidist' righis, the first announcernent of economic rights came in the Constitution 
of Mexico in 19 17. Sce Johan D. van der Vyver, Book Review, (1994) 8 Emory Intl. L Rev. 787 at 80 1. It hm 
been pointed out that '"tlhis division has (undeniabty) influenced international activities in the field of human 
righis." See Preliminary Report of The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human 
Rights: Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Righrs, MEETING/ITEM at 5,  UN Doc. 
EICN.4/Sub.UI989/19, (lune 28, 1989)(Mr. Danilo Turk, Special Rapporteur); Final Report of the New 
International Economic Order and rhe Promotion of Humn Rights: Realization of Economic, Social und 
on Economic, Social and Cultural ~ i g h r s '  and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights4 which, taken together constitute the b e h k  of the international normative 
regime of humari rights.' The effect of this division on the levels of respect afforded to these 
different types of rights has been monumental in discourse, enforcernent and realization. 
Consequently, in the countries of both the North6 and the South7 as well as on the 
international and regionai scenes, the arena of human nghts discourse and practice has ken 
dominated by a hysterical attention to civil and political rights.' Econornic, social and 
Cdrrrral Rights, MEETING- at 3, üN Doc. JXN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992), cited in Daniel Warner, "An 
Ethics of Hurnan Kights: Two Interrelated Misunderstandings," (1996) 24 Denver J. Intl. L & Policy 395 at 
406 note 38. 
hdopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by Geneml Assembly Resolution 2200 
A (XXi) of 16 December 1966, it entered into force on January 3, 1976 in accordance with article 27, 
[hcreinafter ICESCR]. Reprinted in United Nations, "Compilation of International Instruments." supra, note 
I rit 8-19. 
4 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200 
A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, it entered into force on March 23, 1976 in accordance with article 49, 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. Reprinted in United Nations, "Compilation of International Instruments" 1 bid at 20-40. 
5 Sec Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context; Law Politics and 
Morals: Te-rr and Materials (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 996) at 256. 
%c Nonh here refen to the industndized or 'dcveloped' countries. 
7 The South here refers to the developing countries. For an exposition of the 'North9- 'South' concepts 
see Ivan L. Head, The Mutual Vulnerability of South a d  North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 199 1). 
11 Mario Gomez, "Social Economic Rights and the Human Rights Commissions" (1995) 17 Human 
Rights Quarterly 155 at 160 furnishes scveral reasons hampering the development of a strong global 
socioeconomic cuIture. He writes: "First, the modem human rights discourse has been strongly influenced by 
trriditiond natunl Iaw ideas; the result is that the focus of the discourse has been curbing the excesses in relation 
ta civil and political liberties. A consequence of this has been that h u m  cights are initidly addressed to states. 
Human rights have become a standard against which state conduct is evaluated. They have been used as a 
method of challenging smte action, especiaily when questions of liberty have k e n  involved. Secondly, while 
states. both in the North and the South, have incorporated civil and political rights in their constitutions, few 
states have similarly incorporated socioeconomic rights either in their constitutions or in domestic legislation. 
Socioeconornic nghts have remaineci at the ievel of non-justiciable principles of sute policy. See dso  Asbjom 
Eide & Allan Rosas, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge" in Asbjorn Eide, et al., 
supra, note 2 at 15. 
cultural rights have continued to be neglected and disrnissed: and have remained in the 
words of one writer, "the poor relation of their civil and political c~unterparts."'~ 
At its inception, the Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" took a radical 
approach by declaring its conviction that "it is henceforth essential to pay a particular 
attention to developrnent and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from 
economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the 
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil 
and political rights."12 One would have thought that such a seemingly radical posture would 
9 See Audrey Chapman, "A 'Violations Approach' for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Culturd Rights" (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23 at 26. 
1 O J. Oloka-Onyango, "Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigonting the StmggIe for Economic and Social 
Rights in Afnca" (1995) 26 Culifornia Western IntL LJ. 1. The article is also available at 
ch ttp://wwwI.urnn.edu/hum~~nrtslOIoka-Onygoh (visited 3:4 1 PM, September 27, 1999). 
I I  OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Govemment of 
the Orgmization of African Unity (OAU) in Nairobi, Kenya, June 27, 198 1. Reprinted in "Report of the 
Scçretary-General on the Draft Afiican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," OAU Doc. CM/1149 
(XXXVII) ( Annex il) 198 1. [hereinafter "the Ajkican Charter"]. It entered into force on October 2 1, 1986. The 
Africun Charter is also known as the "Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights." At the Thirty-Seventh 
Session of thc Council of Ministers, many states felt that the title 'The Afican Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights" would lead to a confusion with the Charter of the OAU. [See OAU Diary No. 6, June 2 1, 198 1, cited 
in Richard Gittleman, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis" (1982) 22 
Virginiu Journal of h l .  L 667, note 11. The African Heads of States and Govemments took note of this 
recommendation and subsequentiy changed the n m e  of the Charter to the "Banjul Charter on Human a d  
Peoples' Riglirs" after Banjul, the capital of The Gambia which hosted the two Ministerid Conferences that 
rcsuIted in the final draft of the Charter. See Chris M i n a  Peter, Human Rights in Africa: A Cornpurative Study 
of the African Human and People's Rights Charter and the New Tanranian Bill of Rights (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990) at 10. In spite of this recornmendation and change, the original title has been retained 
and subsequent pubtications of the Charter by the OAU and other intergovenunentril bodies have retained the 
original title. The Afncan Charter has been ratified by al1 member states of the OAU. Eritrea was the 1 s t  
member state of the OAU to ntify the Charter. With the exception of Morocco, d l  Afncan states are members 
of the OAU. Sec Frms Viljoen, "State Reporting Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
A Boost from the South" (2000) 44 Journal of Afican Law 110. The Afrcan Charter is reprinted in United 
Nations, Hrtman Righrs: A Compilation of International Instruments. Vol. 2 ,  (New York and Geneva: United 
Nations, 1994) at 330-346. 
I I ,  Sec the SL" paragraph of the Preamble to the African Charter. See infra, the Appendix, for a 
reproduction of the Charter's Prearnble and provisions on economic, social and cultural rights. 
have enhanced the practical implementation and I or enforcement of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the continent of Afnca more than in any other region of the world where 
such robust cornmitment and declaration are lacking. To date, such has not been the case. 
This apparently revolutionary step so far has not advanced the cause of economic, social and 
cultural rights in Africa. 
One of the reasons for this lacklustre performance is the ambivalence of African 
leaders and scholars. There is the tendency among African leaders to regard the fulfilment 
of civil and political rights as dependent on the economic and social rights and at the sarne 
time contend that their respective countries are too poor to realize the latter. This posture has 
been construed, rightly or wrongly, as an excuse to justiS, or rationalize the violation of the 
civil and political rights.13 
On their part, some African scholars also made the claim that the protection of civil 
and political rights should first await the implementation of economic, social and cultural 
rights and, in one and the same breath, they upheld the assertion that African States are too 
poor to realize the economic, social and cultural rights.14 In this way, they maintained the 
same rhetorical and ambivalent position as the African leadership.15 
Furthermore, African human rights scholarship shows a disnirbing disproportionality 
13 See Rhoda Howard 'The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Ovcr Civil and 
Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa' (1983) 5 Human Rights Quarterly 467-490. 
14 See for instance, Minasse Halie, 'Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the implications of 
Economic Priontyi (1986) 19 Varid J. Transnational h v  299 at 30-301. According to one writer, this group 
of scholars "in some ways followed the rhetorical position of the leadership." See, I. OIoka-Onyango, supra, 
note IOat5. 
1s See I. Oloka-Onyango, supra, note 10 at 5 where he also observed that "[cjontemporary African 
scholarship too, tended to be constricted by the respective ideological blinkers of the e s t  and the west." 
against the economic, social and cultural rights. While the literature dealing with the civil 
and political rights in Africa is quite considerable, that dealing with economic. social and 
political rights is quite scanty. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afnca dealing 
with economic, social and cultural rights are remarkable for their virtual non-existence. 
It is thus evident that notwithstanding the lofty ideals of the Afrcczn Charter in giving 
prominence to economic, social and cultural rights, these rights have not grown beyond the 
non-justiciable imprimatur placed on them in almost al1 domestic constitutions. Economic, 
social and cultural rights are still regarded as mere aspirations for African countries because 
of their often asserted "complicated economic circum~tances."~~ The situation has remained 
unchanged despite the escalation of civil and political strife in Africa, exacerbated by 
economic and social conditions of existence that have both rendered impossible the 
realization and enjoyment of the civil and political rights by the vast majority of the 
population and have cast doubt on the ability of African States to sustain the minimum 
standards of hurnan rights. This calls for a rethinking of the whole situation in order to lay 
emp hasis w here i t is due with the hope of realizing the objectives of the innovative" Afncan 
Cliurter as articulated by the founders. Such a rethinking process requires a thorough 
examination of the existing situation with respect to observation, enforcement and 
16see U. Oji Urnozurike. The Afican Charter on Humun and Pcoples' Righrs (The Hague: Martinus 
Nij hoff 1997) at 46. [hereinafter, 'Umozurike "Afncan Charter'"]. 
'?The A f m  Charter has been variously deshbed as 'unique' and 'innovative' by writers. Its 
uniqueness and innovativeness stem from its exposition of "Afiican conception of  human rights taking 
cognizance of Afncan culture [and incorporatingj other conventionai n o m  of human rights that are not 
typically or exclusively Afncan." See Ebow Bondie-Simpson, "A Critique of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights" (1988) 3 1 Howard h w  Journal 643 at 645; and by moving "beyond the traditional 
Western concept of individual rights by its quai emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights." See Carol 
M. Tucker "Regionai Human Rights Models in Europe and Afiica: A Cornparison" (1983) 10 Syracuse J. Intl. 
L 135 at 157. 
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implementation of the econornic, social and cultural rights under the Afncan Chu~er  by state 
parties. The aim is to lay bare the prevalent hypocrisy of African states in uphoiding a 
Charter that purportedly holds the key to integrated and interdependent human rights practice 
while at the same time practically ignoring the perceived esserice of that very Charter in their 
domestic jurisdictions. 
It will be show that integrated human rights practice, as sought to be reflected in the 
African Charter, is indeed in consonance with African culture and that the current practice, 
(as exemplified in a survey of certain domestic constitutions), of enforcing civil and political 
rights while ignoring econornic, social and cultural rights is antithetical to the "importance 
traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in ~ f r i c a ~ " ~  and projects the image of, in 
the words of Scott and Macklem, "a truncated h~rnanity."'~ The rethinking process draws 
attention to the econornic, social and cultural rights as the rejected comerstone on which the 
realization and enjoyment of human rights in Africa depend. This necessitates fashioning 
ways to realize economic, social and cultural nghts through active enforcement in the spirit 
of the integrated Aftican way of life without being constricted by Western ideological 
blinkers. 
It is contended that, given the present socioeconomic circumstances of African states, 
the realization of the economic, social and cultural rights in Africa holds the key to a 
meaningful enjoyment of al1 other rights in Africa, and that the realization of these other 
rights - especially civil and political rights - will remain illusory unless economic, social and 
'%ee the 1st paragraph of the prearnble to the Afrcan Chaner. 
19craig Scott & Patrick Mackiem, "Conîtinitionai Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees.. 7. Social 
Rights in a New South African Constitution" (1992) 141 University of Penltsylvania Law Review I at 29. 
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cultural rights are accorded due prominence in practical implementation and effective 
enforcement. The prevailing situation, as one Mter has argued, "demands a more nuanced 
and criticai reconsideration of both national policy and international practice that 
simultaneously transcends the rhetorical smokescreen erected by African leaders, and directly 
challenges the traditional ambivalence of the international cornrn~nity."~~ 
Furtherrnore, this thesis argues that a holistic approach to enforcernent is imperative. 
The traditional view that the enforcement of econornic, social and culturd rights depends on 
development is challenged with the argument that the enforcement of these nghts is a 
prerequisite for the creation of wealth, hence th * neglect of their enforcement in itself negates 
development and is, therefore. self defeating. Factors rnilitating against the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights in Africa are also examined. 
1.1. Research Objectives 
This study seeks to underscore the indispensability of the econornic, social and 
cultural rights under the Afncan Charter by an examination of the prevailing state practice 
with respect to observation, enforcement and implementation of the econornic, social and 
cultural rights under the African Charter by States Parties. It attempts to expose the 
mendacity of African states2' in adopting a Charter that is allegedly an embodiment of an 
'OJ. Olokû-Onyango, supra, note LO at 6-7. 
2 1 It should not be supposed, however, that only African States are guilty of rnarginaiizing enforcement 
of the economic, social and cultural rights. The internationai community (especially the developed countries) 
are united in their conternpnious attitude towards the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. See 
the "Final Report on the Question of hpunity of Perpeîraton of Human Righu Violations (Econornic. Social 
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integrated and interdependent hurnan rights practice while, at the sarne, time disregarding, 
in practice, the perceived essence of the Charter within their domestic jurisdictions. It is 
aimed at reasserting the relevance of the econornic, social and cultural rights under the 
African Charter as the rejected corner Stone of African human rights, which nonetheless 
holds the key to the Eldorado of African human rights. Also, it strives to highlight the 
problems or factors hampering the effective protection of these rights and to explore possible 
ways of overcoming such problems. 
1.2. Research Limitations 
In a work of this nature it would have been more appropriate to cover the whole of 
Africa in order to appropriately reflect the general attitude of states with respect to practical 
implementation or enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. However, since 
Africa is a continent - the second largest continent in the world - and not a country, it is 
difficult to cover the entire spectmm of its diverse socio-political traditions and culture. The 
complexity of the states, the intimidating cost of research, and the limitations of time and 
dis tance, among other reasons, make such an extensive research a virtual impossibility. 
Consequently, analysis is restricted in most cases to certain states. 
It is for this reason that the chapter on implementation / enforcement of the econornic, 
and Cultural Rights), prepsired by Mr. El Hadji Guisse, Special Rapporteur, pursuant CO Sub-Commission 
Resolution 1996124" E/CN.4ISub.U1997/8 of 27 June 1997, online at 
ch ttp://tvww.dercthos.ordnizkorïimnu/mri~~~.hniiI> (visited 425 PM, lanuary 3 1, 2000), particularly 
puagrriph 16. Nevertheless, AGrican states are peculiar and distinct in having committed themselves to a bindiig 
document containing dl these rights, as enforceabte rights, unlike other states. This reason, to a large extent, 
justifies the apparent 'singling out' of African states. 
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social and cultural rights under the Afncan Charter in domestic jurisdictions (Chapter Four) 
focuses only on Nigeria and South Africa. Given the conscraints of time and resources to 
conduct a country by counûy assessment of performance, the examination of governmental 
efforts towards practical implementation/enforcement is restricted to available legislative. 
judicial and executive measures. 
1.3. Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One, ûpart from its generai 
introductory nature, discusses the evolution of human rights protection in Africa. The legd 
frarnework of these nghts under the Afncan Charter is also highlighted, thus setting the stage 
for a proper appreciation of the Charter and the thesis. 
Chapter Two focuses on the evolution of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
international human rights system by tracing the evolution of these rights under the United 
Nations and regional human rights systems. Furthemore, the Chapter compares the place of 
these rights under the African, European and Inter-American human rights regimes, and 
stresses the importance of these rights. Essentially, this Chapter locates the African human 
rights system within the international human rights movement. As such, it undencores the 
fact that the African system is but a part of the international human rights movement, and 
therefore, still very much subject to the influences and predilections of the international and 
regional systems. 
The third chapter compares econornic, social and cultural rights in traditional and 
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modem Africa. After defining the concepts, the Chapter discusses these rights in traditional 
Africa starting with the controversy surrounding the existence of a concept of human rights 
in traditionai Africa In addition, the nature, substance and protection of these nghts in 
traditional Afnca are addressed. A discussion of the fate of these nghts in colonial Africa 
follows, focusing on the impact of colonialism on the protection and enjoyrnent of these 
rights as a prelude to discussing the nature and fate of these rights in modem Africa. 
Provisions of the Afiican Charter on economic, social and cultural rights are analyzed and 
the acute problem of impiementation I enforcement facing ihese rights in modem Africa is 
discussed. Chapter Three concludes by emphasizing that the indivisibility of rights, in theory 
and in practice, is the only way to keep faith with the past, considering the importance 
traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Afnca. By linking the past with the 
present, this chapter underscores the fact that even before the Charter came into being, 
economic, social and cultural rights had been protected in Africa. Therefore, to be relevant 
and meaningful to the people, the old foundation ought to be respected and improved upon 
in the light of modem realities and not discarded. 
Chapter Four is a comparative analysis of the implementation / enforcement of 
economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter in the domestic jurisdictions 
of Nigeria and South Africa. The choice of these two states is informed by their different 
constitutional approaches to economic, social and cultural rights which, to a certain extent, 
reflect the general attitude to these rights across Africa. This cornparison adds to the thesis 
by actudly showing the extent to which the States Parties are living up to their obligations 
under the Charter. 
r 1 
The prospect of enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights under the newly 
established African Court of Huma Rights forms the focus of Chapter Five and is exarnined 
against the backdrop of the euphoria that greeted the establishment of the Court and the 
belief in some quarten that the Coun holds the key to the intractable human rights abuses 
in Afnca. The Chapter examines the existing enforcement machinery under the Afncan 
Charter and the necessity of establishing a human rights court for Africa. It also traces the 
genesis of the African Coun, analyses its legal framework and the likelihood of its effectivity 
in the African human rights equation, especially with regard to the enforcement of economic, 
social and cultural rights under the Afrcan Charter. 
Chapter Six discusses economic, social and cultural rights as the comerstone of 
African human rights movement The Chapter opens by emphasizing the imperativeness of 
a holistic approach to human rights enforcement. It then discusses the vexed issue of hinging 
compliance to human rights enforcement on the level of development, and contends that it 
is not lack of development or the absence of development, but rather the lack of political will 
that is responsible for marginalizing the enforcement of these rights. Problems militating 
against the realization of these rights are brought into focus. The Chapter proposes 
alternative methods of enforcement in the form of minimum threshold, and integrated 
approaches to enforcement. They are offered as creative ways to effectuate economic, social 
and cultural rights even where the domestic constitution precludes the justiciability of these 
rights. Whereas the integrated approach envisages a system whereby economic, social and 
cultural rights are enforced by the courts using the insüumentality of civil and political rights 
and vice versa, the minimum threshold approach emphasizes the realization of the basic 
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minimum of al1 rights necessary to achieve the human dignity of al1 persons without 
discrimination. The thesis concludes by restating that economic, social and cultural rights are 
the only means of self defence available to the majority of Africans, hence the need for a 
rethinking of the present state of rnarginalized enforcement. 
1.4. Evolution of Human Rights Protection in Contemporary Africa 
Human rights promotion and protection have, for a long time, been a universally 
espoused ideal not only in Africa, but also in other parts of the world. Hence, this section is 
concemed with the evolution of a systematized body of noms geared towards the enjoyment 
and protection of human rights in the modem sense of the term in the African continent. 
Although the atrocities of World War II galvanized unprecedented interest in human 
rights that culminated in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) by the United Nations (UN) in 1948,= the birth of the UN in 1945 and the 
subsequent adoption of the UDHR in 1948 are generally accepted by most scholarsU as the 
starting points for any discussion of human rights in contemporary international This 
was followed by regional arrangements with the adoption of the European Convention on 
"Arthur E. Anrhony. "Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights Court in Africa" 
( 1 997) 32 Texas Intl. L J .  5 1 1. 
"sec for example. DJ. Harris. Cmes and MateriaLr on Inremntionaf Lcw, 3" edition (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1983) ac 470; T.O. Elias, New Horirons in International Law, 2& edition (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1992) at 89. 
'.'obijiofor Aginam. "Legitimate Governance under the Afncan Charter of Human and Peoples' 
Rights" in E.K. Qurishigah and O.C. Okafor (eds.), Legitimate Governance in Afica (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) 345 at 346. 
Human Rights in 1950 and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights in 1969. 
However, with regard to the African continent, the evolution of human rights 
protection in Africa can be located in the period even before the 1948 adoption of the UDHR. 
As oppressed and colonized people, the Africans' struggles against colonization and the 
subsequent movements for independence which took different fomis cm al1 be located 
within the context of human rights protection. According to Makau wa Mutua, "the stuff of 
rights animated Africans long before the emption of (the) spate of Western interest. Stmggles 
against (colonization and ) colonial rule ... fonn the unbroken chain of the quest for just 
~ociet ies"~ which started in traditional Africa, 
Accordingly, the period of African nationalism and pan-~fricanism~~ has been 
described as "[tlhe starting point for analyzing African human rights ... in contemporary 
~frica." '~ African resistance to colonial conquest, nationalism and Pan-~fricanisd' were 
" ~ a k a u  wa Mutua, 'The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africû" 
( 1 996) 1 7 Michigan J.  Intl. L 59 1-592, 
'6~frican nationalisrn is identified w i h  the sociai and political revoit ngainst colonidism, while pan- 
Africanism is rissociated with the aspirations for continental equality and justice. See M. Roberts, "A Socidist 
Looks at African Socialism'* in W.H. Friedland & C.G. Rosberg, (eds.), Afican Socialism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1964) 80 at 82. In its formative stages, the Pan-Aftican movement was led by Black North 
Americrin intellectuds. The most notable ones include, W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. However, Henry 
Sylvester Williams, a West Indian lawyer who was then practicing Iaw in London, is credited with coining the 
term "Pan-African Movement." See P. Mweti Munya, "The Organizrition of African Unity and its Regionai 
Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evduation'* (1999) 19 Boston College Third World Law 
Jo~~rnnl537 at 540. Williams aiso convened the first Pan-African conclaves in London at Westminister Town 
Hall in 1900, See J. Ayodele h g l e y ,  Pan-Aficanism and Nationalism in West Afrca 1900-1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973) rit 27. 
" ~ e e  E.A. El-Obaid & K. Appiagyei-Atua, *'Human Rights in &cû - A New Perspective of Linking 
the Past to the Present" (1996) 41 McGill LI. 819 at 823, 
2 %or a more detailed account of African resistance. nationaiism and piw-Africmism see. I. Ayodele 
Langley, supra, note 26; Basil Davidson, Modern Afica (London: Longman, 1983); N-E. Davis, AMca in the 
Modern World, (Nairobi: Oxford University fress, 1973); Robert W. July, A History ofthe Afican People 
(IIlinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1992); N. Sithole, Afncan Nationafism, 2"' ed. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968) outlines the various strategies adopted by African nationaiists in their frght against coionid rule. 
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al1 movements engaged in the fight against abuses of human rights in Africa and the 
plundering of Africa's resources by colonial auti~orities.~~ These abuses and plundenng 
animated the resolution of the Pan-African Congress of 1915, held in Paris, which resolved, 
inter d i a ,  that "the allied and associated govemments [should] establish an international 
code of laws for the protection of the natives of Africa and that a permanent secretariat in the 
League of Nations should be established to see to the application of these la~s."~O They dso 
demanded self-determination for the colonized peoples, holding of lands in trust for the 
natives, abolition of forced labour, circumspection in the granting of concessions to avoid 
exhaustion of the natural weaith of the natives, and the right to free ed~cation.~' 
At the London session of the 1921 Pan-African Congress, which has been described 
as "the rnost radical of al1 the congres se^,"^^ most of the speakers openly criticized aspects 
of colonial policy. The resolutions passed at the end of the session, which became known as 
" ~ e e  E.A El-Obaid & K. Appiagyei-Am, supm note 27 nt 823. See also Waiter Rodney. How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa (Washington: Howard University Press, 1974). In addition, Umozurike, b'Afii~an 
Churter," supra, note 16 at 21-22 points out that "[wlhatever the administrative philosophy of the colonial 
power, the riim and result were the sarne - the maximum exploitation of the human and material resources of 
the continent and the appropriation of Afncan peoples and temtories ...." He further notes that "[florced labour 
was rampant .... No frecdorns could be tolerated that chailenged colonial domination. The right to self- 
determination, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc. were cabined within the limits of colonial 
domination and exploitation. Nationaiist leaders .., were jailed for speaking up against colonial deniai of rights 
of self-determination. Political, econornic, social and cultural development was thus stultified ... CoIonialism 
cncouraged racism, for whiIe the traits and habits of the colonizers were glorified, those of the colonized were 
dcnigrated and despised. The destruction or denigration of African religion, culture, ianguage and traditions 
wcakened African roots .... Colonidism denied the basic right of a people to determine their politicai, econornic, 
and sociaI future. On selfdetermination rest the other h u m  rights. It follows that colonialism was antithetical 
to human rights." 
'O~uoted in J. Ayodele Langley, supra. note 26 at 65. 
the Declaration To The World or the London Manifesto." "were soberly presented but 
remarkably outspoken in their condemation of imperialism and ra~isrn.''~ These movements 
for freedom, equality and justice continued and gathered momentum. They inspireci other 
movements such as the National Congress of British West Afnca and contributed immensely 
to whetting Afncan desire for a larger share in their own affairs as well a to firing their ever 
growing quest for freedom and a just society." 
The zenith of the Pan-Afncan movernent was, however, the Fifth Pan-Afncan 
Congress of 1945 which provided the outlet for Afncan nationalism and brought about the 
awakening of Afncan political consciousness with its attendant human rights  implication^.^^ 
The Congress declared its belief that "the struggle for political power by colonial and subject 
peoples is the first step towards, and the necessary prerequisite to, complete social, economic 
and political emancipation."" Part of the Declaration of the Congress read: 
We are deterrnined to be free. We want education. We want 
the right to earn a decent living; the right to express our 
thoughts and emotions, to adopt and create forms of beauty. 
We will fight in every way we cm for freedom, democracy, 
and social bettem~ent.~~ 
African nationaiists were therefore persistent and consistent in their struggle. They 
33 For a full text, see J. Ayodele Langley, Ibid at 375-379. 
3 5 ~ e e  1945 Pan-Afncan Congres 'Dechration to the Colonhl Proples of the World' in K Nkuiwnah, 
Tuwardr Colonial Freedom (London: Heinemann, 1962) at 44-45(Appendix). [hereinafter "Towardc Colonial 
Freedom"] . 
" ~ e e  K. Nkunun;ih. Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkurumuh (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957) at 
53-54 [hereinafter "Arrtobiography"]. 
3 7 ~ .  Nkururnah. L b T ~ ~ ~ r d s  Colonid Frecdom," supra. note 35 at 44. 
"G.B.N. Ayittey, A m  Betrayed (New York: SL Miutin's Ress,  1992) ai 99. 
appealed to the colonial authontia and the international community conceming the need to 
respect the rights of colonized people,3g just as they made Africans aware of their rightsO4O 
Human rights were. as a result, an important basis for the struggle for independence of 
African states." In their struggles to free themselves from European colonialism, African 
nationalists brought to the forefront an important nght which was rnissing from the UDHR, 
that is, the right to self-determination, which entitles al1 "peoples" to freely determine their 
political status and freeiy pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, human nghts protection as it is commonly known in 
contemporary international law, evolved in Africa well after the independence of most 
African States. Political independence of African states from colonial mle started in 1957 
with Ghana's independence. Some other states followed in the 1960s? By the end of 1970, 
most African states were independent." To Africa, still under the yoke of colonialism, the 
1960s becarne very essential as the era of self-determination and decolonization. 
Consequently, at the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 the 
'9~. Sithole, African Notionalism. supra, note 28. 
M ~ . ~  EI-Obaid & K. Appiagyei-Atua, supra note 27 a 823. 
"lbidat 824. For the right to selfdetenninûtion see. I C E R .  supra, note 3, article l(1). and ICCPR. 
strprcz. note 4, article l(1). 
"3~mozurike, supra. note 16 a 22. Nigeria. Benin Republic. Cameroun. Chad, Gabon. Ivory Coast, 
Mali, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Zaire became independent in 1960. 
Others include Algena ( L962), Gmbiz ( 1965). Uganda (1962)- Zambia ( 1964). Kenya (1963)- and Malawi 
( 1964). 
" ~ e e  CC. Mojekwu et al. (eds.) Afrcan Society. Culture and Politics: An 1nrroduction to Afn'can 
Stitdies (Washington: University Press of America, 1977) at 28. Non-independent African states by 1970 
include, AngoIa (1975). Cape Verde Islands (194), Guinea Bissau (1974), Mozambique (1975). Seychelles 
( 1976). Sprinish Sahara (1976) and Namibia which remained under South Afnca until 1994. 
agenda was dominated by decolonization, elirnination of racism and the political 
ernancipation of ~f r ica .~ '  This does not however mean that the protection of other aspects 
of hurnan rights received no attention whatsoever. 
The Preamble to the OAU Charter mentions the UDHR as containing the principles 
to which al1 the state parties affm their adherence. In the first paragraph of its Preamble, the 
OAU Charter affirms that it is the "indienable right of al1 people to control their own 
destiny," while its second paragraph recognizes that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity 
are essential objectives for the achievement of legitimate aspirations of African peoples." 
The OAU's adherence to the principles articulated in the UDHR has been described as 
manifesting an "unwavering cornmitment to the punuit of human rights at the moment of its 
~reation?~ 
However, it has k e n  argued that, "[tlhe protection of human rights is merely 
peripheral in the scheme of priorities of the OAU. Conceived of pnncipally as a political 
organization, whose abiding, if not consuming, preoccupation is the unity of African states. 
... the OAU Charter recognizes the protection of hurnan rights only within the context of 
promoting African ~n i ty . ' ' ~~  This argument is hardly controvertible and has in fact been 
justified by massive human rights violations in most African countries, with the OAU 
J 5 ~ .  Gye-Wado. 'The Effectiveness of the Safeguard Machinery for the Enforcement of Human Rights 
in Africa" ( 1992) 2 JHRLP 144 at 150 
46 Arthur E. Anthony, supra. note 22 at 5 12 
47 B. Obinna Okere, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African C h m r  on Hurnan and 
Peopies' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems" (1984) 6 Human Rights 
Quarrerly 14 1 at142. See ais0 Edward Kannyo , 'The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis 
and Political Background" in Claude Welch and Ronald Meltzer, Human Rights and Developmeni in Afica 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1984) at f 28-129. 
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lacking the moral clarity and vision to do anything in that regard? Noteworthy also is the 
fact that the OAU itself was largely an association of heads of states and govemments whose 
primary concems "focus upon self preservation, regime security and the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of their states.'" 
Thus, it has been posited that it was the unspeakable atrocities and sadistic mayhem 
committed by Jean Bedel Bokassa of Central African Republic, the grotesque massacres of 
Idi Amin of Uganda, and the insensate and despicable murden of Macias Nguema of 
Equatorial ~uinea:' as well as the horrors of apartheid in South Afnca and Namibia that 
gave additional impetus to the undertaking of initiatives aimed at staving off future human 
rights vio~ations.~~ The attempt to articulate a methodology for promoting and protecting 
human rights in Africa culminated in the adoption of the African Charter. 
In an effort to improve the human rights situation in Africa, and to establish a focmal 
regional system of human nghts, the African Conference on the Rule of Law was held in 
Lagos, Nigeria, in 1961, under the aegis of the International Commission of Jurists. It 
attracted about 194 jurists from thirty-two countries - twenty-three of whom were Afncans - 
48 Sec U. O. Urnozurike, 'The Protection of Human Rights Under the Banjul (African) Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights" (1988) 1 African J. Intl. L 65 ai 66, [hereiniifter, "The Protection of Human 
Rights"], noting that notwithstanding the massacres cornmitted by Idi Amin in Uganda between 1971-79, he 
was given the accolade of chairrnanship of the OAU by his fellow heads of state. 
49 Olusola Ojo and Arnadu Sesay, 'The OAU and H u m  Rights: Prospects for the l98Os and Beyond 
( 1986) 8 Hiiman Rights Quarterly 89 at 92. 
5001usola Ojo and Amadu Sesay, Ibid at 92 observed that it was the emergence of these thcee 
contemporruy tyrants on the continent - Idi Amin of Uganda Francisco Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Jean 
Bokassa of Central African Republic- that inevitably compeiled the OAU to tum its attention to the serious 
human rights violations in AErica. 
" ~ e e  Arthur E. Anthony, supra, note 22 at 5 12. See dso B. Obinna Okere, supra, note 47 at 142. 
to consider questions of human rights eriforcernent in AfncaS2 Although the Conference did 
not go very far, yet it adopted some conclusions and recommendations under the title ' n i e  
Law of Lagos," declaring that African states should be committed to constitutionalism, the 
avoidance of tyranny and the rule of law. The Conference also suggested an Afncan Human 
Rights Charter with a court to which individuaïs and groups might have recourse." It thus 
declared: 
That in order to give full effect to the Universal declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, this Conference invites the African 
Govemments to study the possibility of adopting an African 
Convention of Human Rights in such a manner that the 
Conclusions of this Conference will be safeguarded by the 
creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that 
recourse thereto be made available for ail persons under the 
jurisdiction of signatory  tat tes." 
Many other calls to establish an African regional human rights system followed this 
initiative of the International Commission of Jitrists. Other conferences were organized in 
1967 and 1968 by the Francophone African Bar Association in collaboration with the 
International Commission of Jurists. Also, there were additional conferences such as the 
United Nations-sponsored study session in Cairo ( 1969), Addis-Ababa ( 197 1 ), Dar-es- 
52 Sec, Richard Gittleman, supra, note 1 1 at 670; Evelyn A. Ankurnah, The African Commission on 
Humari and Peoples ' Rights: Practice and Procedures (The Hague: Martinus Nij hoff, 1996) at 4; Anthony E. 
Arthur, supra, notc 22 rit 5 12; Obijiofor Aginam. supra, note 24 at 348; Umozurike, "AfnCan Charter" supra, 
notc 16 at 24. 
"journal of the International Commission of lurisrs. (1961) Vol. 1 13 at 2-28 cited in Umozurike, 
Ibid. 
%ternational Commission of Jurists. "Afiican Conference on the Rule of Law: A Report on the 
Proceedings of the Conference" 11 (1961) reproduced in M. Hamalengwa, et al., The Intematioml Law of 
Hrimrrn Rights in Afica: Basic Documents and Annotared Bibliography (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 
rit 37-38. 
Salaarn ( 1973) 
At the 
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Dakar ( 1978). and Monrovia ( 1979)." 
1978 Dakar conference, a comminee established to follow up on the 
conclusions and recommendations canvassed the suppoa of Francophone heads of state and 
succeeded in convincing President Sedar Senghor of SenegalS6 to present a resolution at the 
Monrovia summit of African Heads of State in 1979. It was at this surnmit that the OAU 
Secretary-General was instnicted to set machinery in motion for a draft charter. 
The Secretary-General appointed a committee of experts to prepare a draft charter and 
enjoined them to take cognizance of the "African concept of Human Rights" in drafting the 
charter. The objective, according to him, was to make the proposed charter distinct from 
other conventions already adopted in other regions." They were instructed to: 
(a) Give importance to the principle of non-discrimination; 
(b) Lay emphasis on the principles and objectives of the OAU as defined in Article 
II of the OAU Charter with particular emphasis on respecting the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of each state and each state's indienable right to 
independent existence and on reflecting the absolute dedication to the total 
emancipation of African temtories which are still dependent; 
S5~mozurike. "Afncari Chaner" supm. note 16 at 26. See also M u r  E. Anthony, supra, note 22 at 
512-513. 
5fIt âppem that the African experts who drafted the C h e r  gave a favourable considention to the 
views of President Sedar Senghor of Senegal who iidvised that: "Europe and Arnerica have construed their 
system of rights and Iiberties with reference to a common civilization, to respective peoples and some specific 
aspirations. It is not for us either to copy them or seek origindity for originality's sake. It is for us to manifest 
both imagination and skiil. Those of our traditions that are beautiful and positive may inspire us. You should 
therefore constantly keep in rnind our values md the real needs of Africa." Quoted in Ankumah, supra, note 
52 at 6, quoting O. Ojo, "Understanding Human Rights in Africa" Paper Presented for the Netherlands 
Commissions for üNESCO Confcrence of Hurriiin Rights: Individual or Collective Rights (June 1988) at 2. 
" ~ e e  Olusola Ojo and Amadu Sesay, supra, note 49 a[ 93 
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(c) Include peoples' rights in addition to individual rights; 
(d) Determine the duties of each person towards the community in which he Lives and 
more panicularly towvds the family and the state; 
(e) Show that Afncan values and mords still have an important place in our societies; 
a d ,  
(0 Give our economic, social and cultural rights the place they deserve? 
Meanwhile, a UN Seminar organized in Monrovia in 1979 had done some 
preliminary work on what it called 'Monrovia Proposals for Setting-up an African 
Commission on Human Right~."~ Relying on the proposals made by the UN Secretariat, 
Division of Human Rights, in Geneva, a working group set up under Justice E.K. Wiredu of 
Ghana produced the proposals which were used in part by the Cornmittee appointed by the 
OAU Secretary-General to produce the Draft Charter. 
The OAU ministerial conferences in Dakar (1979) and Banjul (1980 and 1981) 
discussed the Draft chartep' which was approved by the Assembly of Heads of States at its 
1 gth General Assembly meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya on June 27, 198 1 f2 This Charter 
5 '~epon of the Secretary-General on the Drdt African Charter on Human and Peoples* Rights 
(CM11 149) (XlOMU), 1. [Emphasis added]. 
5 9 ~  .G. Rahman. 'The Travaur Prepommires of the African Commission on Human Rights" ( 1992) 
13 Hrrman Rights Law Journal 307-413. 
60 See Umozurike, "Afncan Charter" supra, note 16 at 26; Ankumah, supra, note 52 at 4-8, 
61~hroughout theu discussions. emphasis seemed to have been concenûated on ensuring that the final 
document was distinctly 'Afncan' as reflected in some of the amendments made to the onginai ciraft, notably, 
locating and justifying individual nghts within the context of group, family and community rights. Thus, they 
advocated for the inchsion of peoples' rights. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra, note 58 at 3. 
62~nkurnah, supra, note 52 at 7-8. 
came to be known as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and it entered into 
force on October 2 1, 1986, three months after its ratification by a simple majority of OAU 
members in accordance with Article 63(3). 
Until 198 1, the OAU had neithec any specific Charter provision nor any constituted 
body to deal with the rampant cases of human nghts violations within member states. This 
deficiency was also compounded by the pnnciple of non-interference in the intemal &airs 
of member states in the OAU charteP3 which was constantly invoked as a shield by violators 
of human rights? Thus, the entry into force of the Charter has been described as marking 
"the point of depamire of African regional human rights system ... (and a) no rnean 
achievement in a continent whose history has been punctuated by massive and gross 
suppression of human rights, a continent sometimes referred to as human rights grave 
yard. "65 
With the appalling human rights record imputed to most African states at that time 
one would have thought that the rnove to estriblish a regional human rights machinery would 
have been a bold intemal move anchored on a strong human rights enforcement body. But 
that was not to be. Extemal influences played a tremendous role in the establishment of the 
African Charter and in the general development of human rights on the African continent.' 
%e Article 3 of the OAU Charter. 
&~dward Kannyo, supra. note 47 at 132. 
65~ar~son A yangwe. "Obligation of State Parties to the African Charter on Hurnan and Peoples' 
Rights" ( 1998) 10 i?,4DIC 625. 
66 See Urnozurike, "Afrcan Charter" supra, note 16 at 27; John K. Akpdu, Enforcing the African 
Cftarrer on Hurnan and Peoples' Rights: An Anolysis of the Legai and Institutional Framework (LLM. Thesis: 
Dalhousie Law School, 1992) at 11-17. 
Apart from the activities of the United Nations on human rights and the pressure of NGOs, 
especially Amnesty International, which popularized and strengthened the demand for 
respect and promotion of human rights, some donor co~n t r i e s~~  attached human rights strings 
to financiai aid? More particularly. foreign assistance programmes were linked with human 
rights records of prospective recipient ~ t a t e s . ~ ~  
For instance, President Carter of the United States cut off aid to Uganda and placed 
an embargo on the importation of Ugandan coffee as a sanction against Idi Amin's 
vio~ations.'~ This, arnong other things, drove home the point to most African countries that 
it  was no longer business as ~sual. '~ They were, thus, put in a position where they had to 
navigate between the Scylla of financial realities and the Charybdis of human rights 
irnperatives that offered very little manoeuvring space. Thus, caught in the route of a long 
overdue blazing human rights tomado, African States were roused from their lingering 
li or instance the United States and some countries of the European Economic Comunity (EEC). 
68 Sce A. Young-Anawety, " H u m  Rights and ACP-EEC Lome II Convention" ( 1980) 13 NYUJ Intl. 
L di Pol. Science 63. Umozuri ke, "African Charter" supra, note 1 6 at 27, notes that "[t] he Lomc DI Convention 
1984 contained human rights objectives and pnnciples, with some elaboration in the annex. The Lome IV 
Convention 1989 went further by including h u m  rights in substantive article providing that financial aid may 
bc channelled into activities that practically promotc human rights in ACP countries." 
6 9 ~ e e  Olusola Ojo and Arnadu Sesay, supra, note 49 at 92. 
70 See Umozurike, " A f h n  Charter" supra, note 16 at 28; Olusola Ojo and Amadu Sesay, Ibid. at 92. 
7 ' ~ i t h  dictatorial regimes (miliory and civilim) whose abiding, if not consuming, preoccupation was 
to douse the fires of Iegitimacy crisis, both at home and abroad, dotting African political landscape at that urne, 
the adoption of a human rights charter was seen as a way of stemming off the criticisms (at leait from abroad) 
and ensure the continued inflow of the much needed aids. Consequently, a balance was struck in adopting a 
Chuter  with flabby enforcement machinery, thus rtppearing compIiant to outside 'friends' while telling the 
'cnemies' inside that the only way out is to confonn or perish. It was therefore no surprise that when the Charter 
actually carne into being, it came as a weakling, without any strong enforcement body. The oniy enforcement 
or rather supervisory body was the Afican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Without an effective 
çnforcement body, the Afncon Charrer and the Afncan human rights system becarne no more than a toothless 
bulIdog - al1 bark, but no bite. 
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somnarnbulant inertia to adopt a charter that tumed out to be unique not only in its, though 
hardly surprising, emphasis on economic, social and cultural r i g h t ~ , ~  but also in the 
imposition of duties on the individual and in the provision of peoples rights. The following 
bief description of the structure of the Charter is necessary in order to highlight its various 
components. 
I .S. Framework of the African Charter 
The African Charter is divided into three parts in addition to its eleven paragraph 
preamble. Part I which deals with rights and duties has two chapters. The first chapter sets 
out the human and peoples' rights protected under the Charter: Articles 1-14 relate to the 
civil and political rights while Articles 15-17 deal with economic, social and cultural rights? 
Family rights and prohibition of discrimination against women are provided for in Article 
18. Rights of 'peoples' are delineated in Articles 19-26. The second chapter of Part 1 (made 
up of Articles 27-29) sets out the duties of the individual towards his/her family and society, 
the state. other legally recognized comrnunities and the international community. 
Part II of the Charter, dealing with the measures of safeguard for the rights set out 
in  Part 1, is made up of four chapters. The first chapter (Articles 3 0 4 )  establishes the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and outlines the structure of the 
72 See Carol M. Tucker, supra, note 17 at 16 1. 
73 Econornic, social and cultural rights covered in the Charter include tight to work (Article 1 S), right 
to herilth ( 16). right to education (Article 17(1), and right to freely take part in the culturai life of the community 
(Article 17(2). 
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Commission in detail. Chapter II with only one article (Article 45) elaborates the functions 
of the Commission, while the procedure of the Commission is dealt with in Chapter III 
(Articles 46-59)." Applicable principles by which the Commission will secure the protection 
of human rights in Africa are outlined in Chapter IV which is comprised of Articles 60-63. 
Lastly, Part III containing Articles 64-68 deals with the general provisions conceming 
the commencement of the Charter and the Commission, special protocols, and the 
amendment of the Charter. With these detailed and largely peculiar provisions of the Afrcun 
Charter, Africa grandiosely announced its appearance on the international human nghts 
centre stage, with a definite step on the divisive and polarized. not to say, extremely 
ideologized murky swamp of (international) economic, social and cultural nghts. 
is a hxther division of Chapter iiI into articles dealing excluively with communications from 
states (Articles 47-54) and chose deaiing with other communications, such as individuals and NGO 
çommunications (Articles 55-59). 
CHAPTER TWO 
EVOLUTION OF ECONOMXC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE 
INTERNATlONAL HOMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
2.1. Introduction 
The historical origins of the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights are 
diffuse. These rights appeared to Iiave found acceptance at the international level well before 
civil and political rights.' They have drawn inspiration. for instance. €rom the injunctions 
retlected in various religious traditions to care for the needy and for those who cannot look 
after themselves. Virtually al1 of the major religions manifest concems in different ways for 
the poor and the oppre~sed.~ There are also other philosophical sources which include 
analyses as diverse as those of Thomas Paine, Karl Max, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. 
Scholars also point to the politicai programmes of the nineteenth century Fabian socialists 
in Britain, and to Chancellor Bismark of Germany's introduction of social insurance schemes 
in the 1880s.~ 
The later part of the nineteenth century wimessed increased recognition of the 
importance of international cooperation and coordination in the improvement of working 
' ~ s b j o r n  Eide, "Econornic, Socid and Cultural Rights as Human Rights" in Asbjorn Eide, et al., 
Ecanornic, Social and C~iltural Rights: A Textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 21 at 27. 
' S e  Matin Shupack 'The Churches and Human Rights: Catholic and hiestant Human Righb Views 
as Reflected in Church Statements" (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Jountal 127. 
' ~ e e  Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Righu in Content knu. Politics, MoraLr - 
Texr and Materials (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 257. 
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conditions at the national level? In 1890, Gennany convened the first conference to adopt 
international agreements in this field. Recornmendations adopted at the conference did not, 
however, receive much follow-up. Also, the Swiss govemment convened conferences in 
Bem in 1905 and 1906 which adopted the first conventions in this field: The conferences 
fol lowed the preparatory work of the International Association for the Legal Protection of 
Workers which was founded by a group of scholars and administraiors. Even though these 
efforts were temporarily brought to a halt by the political turrnoil in Europe leading to World 
War 1. they were renewed with a much stronger impetus with the establishment of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919. aimed at abolishing the 'injustice and 
privation' which workers suffered and to guarantee 'fair and humane conditions of labour? 
Prior to the Treaty of Versailles of 19 19 under which the IL0 was established. there 
was already an impressive list of economic, social and cultural rights in the 1917 
Constitution of ~ e x i c o ?  There were also other constitutional precedents such as the first and 
su bsequent Soviet Constitution(s), and the 19 19 Constitution of the Weimar Rep~blic.~ Thus, 
it has been asserted that the IL0 was "conceived as the response of Western countnes to 
.a Asbjorn Eide, supra, note 1 at 28. 
6Virginia Leary. "Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization" in Philip 
Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Chrendon Press, 1992) 
580 rit 582. 
'lohan Ji. van der Vyver, Book Review of H u m  Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global 
Challenge by Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney ( 1994) 8 Emoty Intl. L Review 787 rit 801. 
ideologies of Bolshevism and socialism arising out of the Russian Revol~tion."~ 
Also, in his annual Stute of the Union Address to Congress in 1941, President 
Franklin Roosevelt made a significant contribution towards the unfolding economic, social 
and cultural rights by alluding to "freedom from want" as one component of the four 
freedoms which must be pur~ued.'~ Then, in his State of the Union message of 1944, he 
elaborated on the theme and articulated an impressive list of rights that clearly belong to this 
set of rights." His pronouncements no doubt influenced the inclusion of socioeconomic 
rights in the üDHR of 1948 which extended the human rights platfonn to embrace the whole 
field - civil. political, econornic, social and cultural. Subsequent to that, economic, social and 
cultural rights received special treatment in the Constitution of India of 1947 as matters of 
'state policy.' l2 
The emergence of the economic, social and cultural rights as rights in the 
international human rights system has been steeped in the controversy over the appropriate 
conception of human rights which emerged very eariy in the discussions for the creation the 
United Nations. The disagreement was, however, not confronted until the UN Commission 
'virginia Leary. supra. note 6 at 582. 
10 See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Message On State of the Union" (1989) 11 Human Rights 
Qiiurterly 173- 174. 
llT'he righu mentioned include: the right to a useful and remunerative job; the right to earn enough 
to provide ridequate food, clothing, and recreation; the right of every farmer to mise and sel1 his products; the 
right of every businessman to trade in an atmosphere of freedom fiom unfair cornpetition and domination by 
monopolies; the right of every family to a decent home; the tight to adequate medicd care; the nght to 
protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; and the right to good 
education. 
".Johan D. van der Vyver, supra. note 7 at 802. 
29 
for Human Rights convened in 1949." What followed was reflective of the ideological and 
socioeconomic standpoint of each group - whether socialist, capitalist "developed" or 
developing countries. 
Even though the UN official position which dates back to the UDHR and has since 
been reaffirmed in innumerable resolutions is that 'al1 rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated',14 this "formal consensus masks a deep and enduring 
disagreement over the proper status of econornic, social and cultural rights."" The impact 
of this apparent lack of unanirnity on the status of econornic, social and cultural rights has 
been mammoth, divisive and distracting. 
This chapter recasts the debate surrounding the proper status of these rights. It shows 
how the evolution and development of economic. social and cultural rights in the 
international human rights system have been a hostage of ideological wrangling between the 
East and the West. While various arguments have been canvassed to justiQ the inferior status 
of this category of rights to the civil and political rights, the veracity and cogency of these 
'*ony Evans, "Introduction: Power, Hegemony and the Universaiization of Human Rights" in Tony 
Evans (cd.), Human Rights Fifi Years on: A Reappraisal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998) 
2 at 8. See aIso UN Wigh Commissioner for H u m  Rights, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. I ) ,  The International Bill of 
Htiman Rights, available oniine at <http://~~~.unhchr.~IiniWnwnu6n/fs2,htm> (Visited 4:43 PM, lanuary 
2, 2000) [hereinafter "Fact Sheet"]. 
'"~ee  Vienrzu Declaration and Progranune ofrlction, U N  Doc AIConf. 157R4, Part 1. para 5 (October 
13, 1993). Reprinted in ( 1993) 32 ILM. 1661. The World Conference on Human Rights was convened by the 
UN in Vicnna, Austria, h m  June 14-25, 1993. It was attended by representatives of 17 1 States. At its plenary 
meeting on June 25, 1993, the Conference adopted, by acclamation, the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Actiori. This principle of interdependence was reemphasized in Guideline 4 of The Maastricht Guidelines 
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [Reprinted in ( 1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 69 1- 
7051. See also Victor Dankwa, Cees Flintman, and Scott Leckie, "Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines 
on Violations of Economic, Socid and Cultural Rights" (1998) 20 Humun Rights Quarterly 705 at 706 & 71 1. 
1 5 ~ e n r y  I. Steiner and Philip Alston, supra, note 3 at 256. 
arguments will be tested in the light of the real nature and relevance of these rights. 
The evolution of economic, social and cultural rights in the regional system is 
indubitably symptomatic, and in fact a replication, of the ideological altercations which have 
been the bane of these nghts in the international arena It depicts the ideologicd standpoints 
of the various regions and their different perceptions of these rights which is manifested in 
the relevance accorded to the economic, social and cultural rights in the various regiond 
human rights instruments. Four regional instruments - African, European, Inter-American 
and Middle East systems - are juxtaposed to draw out the relevance accorded to economic, 
social and cultural rights in these regional instruments. Additionally, the importance of 
economic, social and cultural rights to the actualization of the ideals of the international 
human rights system, and the realization of the dignity of the human person that actuated the 
human rights movement in its entirety are stressed. 
2.2. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MGHTS UNDER THE UNlTED NATIONS 
The United Nations Charter.16 which entered into force on 24 October 1945, 
established as one of the purposes of the United Nations and its members the promotion of 
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for al1 
16 892 U.N.T.S. 119 (Reflecting up to the last amendment of 20 December 197 1). Reprinted in Franz 
Knipping, et al., The United Nations System and its Predecessors, vol. 1 (Oxford: University Press, 1997) at 
6, Henry I. Steiner and Phiiip Alston, supra, note 3 at 1148. 
3 1 
without distinction ."17 The Economic and Social Council was set up as the Charter body 
with the primary responsibility for the promotion of these human rights and obligations.18 In 
1946 the Economic and Social Council established the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights whose first assignment was to draft an International Bill of Rights, comprising 
a declriration and a multilateral treaty.19 
The Commission on Human Rights' first major achievement was to draft the UDHR 
which was adopted by the Generai Assembly in 1948.'~ The UDHR integrates rights 
classified as civil and political as well as econornic, social and culnirai rights.*' Having 
accomplished that, the UN Commission on human rights shifted emphasis to the drafting of 
an international convention which would give legal force to a general range of human rights 
and provide a mechanism for supervision. The entire exercise was to be enmeshed in a 
contumacious controversy which finally saw the emergence of, not one but, two international 
covenants. As one writer rightly observed, "[i]deological differences between East and West 
made it impossible to produce a single treaty giving legal effect to the Univenal 
17~rt ic le  55(c) read together with Article 56, the pnamble and Article l(3) of the UN Charter. See 
M a c  Bossuyt, "International H u m  Rights Systems: Strengths and Weaknesses" in Kathleen E. Mahoney and 
Paul Mahoney, Hriman Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge (Dordrecht: Miutinus Nijhoff, 
1993) 47. 
18 Article 62, UN Charter, supra, note 16. See Sandra Liebenberg, ''The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for South Africa" (1995) 1 1 SAJHR 359 at 360. 
19 John Dugard, "International Human Rights" in Dawid van Wyk, et al., Rights and Comtitutionalism= 
The New South Afncan Legal Order (Kenwyn: Juta &Co, Ltd., 1994) 17 1 at 172. See also, Sandra Liebenberg, 
Ibid. 
"UN Genenl Assembly Resolution 217A(m) of 10 December 1948, UN Doc A18 1 1. 
2 t See William R. Slornanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 2& edn. (New York: 
West Publishing Co., 1995) at 500 
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~ec lan t ion . "~  Consequently, the UN Commission split on the question of whether there 
should be one or two covenants. The polarkation within the Commission set the stage for 
the birth of the non-identical twin covenants - one loved and favoured, and the other spumed 
and deprived. 
2.2.1. BirthoftheDeprived Child 
Following the division that arose within the UN Commission on Human Rights as 
to whether there should be one or two covenants, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution in 1950 emphasizing the interdependence of al1 categories of human rights and 
called on the Commission to adopt a single convention? The decision did not go down well 
with the Western states led by the United States who felt it was a triumph of socialist 
idrology and doctrine over the Western liberal conception of rights." Thus, the debate was 
a casualty of the then enraging and ferocious Cold ~ a r . ~  
The socidist states argued that human rights should express a "new bright future for 
"lohn Dugard. supra, note 19 at 174. See also Shadrack B. O. Gutto, "Beyond Justiciability: 
Challenges of ImpIementing/Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa" (1998) 4 Buffalo Human 
Rights Law Review 79 at 86-87 which states that "[tlhe bipolar ideoiogical divisions within the United Nations 
that intensified after 1948, the year of the adoption of the Universal Declriration, culrninated in the adoption 
of two instruments on human riphts and freedoms, civil and political, and econamic, social and cultural, with 
different implementation~enforcement mechanisms and institutional arrangements at the üN IeveI." 
" ~ e n e n l  Assembly Resolution 421 (V) of 4 December 1950. 
Z 4 See Tony Evans, supra, note 13 at 8. 
'S~ee  Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston. supra, note 3 at 257. 
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the individual in the vast field of social r ight~ , '*~~ not one that parailelled the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which, it was argued, represented a 
reactionary attempt to legitimate outdated, middle class, bourgeois values. At this extreme 
lies the view that the econornic, social and cultural rights are supenor to civii and political 
rights 'both in terms of an appropnate value hierarchy and in chronological The 
socialist states were joined by a small group of less developed states which supported a view 
of human rights that included economic, social and cultural right~.'~ 
On the part of the Western states, mirroring the views of Western political 
philosophen and their liberal conception of rights, it was argued that economic, social and 
cultural rights do not constitute nghts (as properly understood) at d l  and that treating them 
as rights would inevitably undermine the enjoyrnent of individual fieedom, justifj large-scale 
state interventionism and would provide an excuse to downgrade the importance of civil and 
political right~.'~ The nature of these rights, it was argued, justifies the creation of legal 
obligations of a different nature and a different system of supervision from the civil and 
political rights. 
It seems that the mutual fear and suspicion existing between the different ideological 
camps for the most part, dogged the consensus to establish one covenant. In this regard, the 
'6~enenl Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Yugodavia. 3" Session. Corn. m. 0 15, cited in Tony 
Evans, supra. note 13 at 20. 
27 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, supra, note 3 at 256. See also Daniel Warner, "An Ethics of 
Human Rights: Two Intenelated Misunderstandings" (1996) Denver J. Intl. L & Policy 395 at 406. 
28 See Tony Evans, supra, note 13 at 8-9. 
29~enry J. Steiner and Philip AIston, supra, note 3 at 256. 
socialist states were perceived to be totally against the liberal conception of rights because 
of their dictatorial tendencies and the repressive nature of their governments. Thus, their 
staunch stand for economic, social and cultural rights was seen as an excuse to suppress civil 
and political nghts. Already, the suppression of basic civil and political rights in pursuit of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the USSR and other communist states appeared to be 
a veritable example which put the Westem states on notice. The USSR's insistence on 
assigning prionty (instead of equality) to economic, social and cultural rights over civil and 
political rights worked against the adoption of one covenant since it was seen as a ploy to 
foster communist ideology. That drew the ire of Westem States who apparently had the upper 
hand in the negotiations and who were prepared to go to any lengths to checkmate the further 
spread of the communist virus. These ideologicd differences meant that it was impossible 
to agree upon a single document to protect the various right~.~' 
However, scholars have argued that what led to the ultimate decision to adopt two 
separate covenants, and the eventual emasculation of the economic, social and cultural rights, 
was the tremendous hegemonic influence wielded by the United States over the entire 
process and the need to satisw domestic pressures from the conservatives and the 
isolationists within the United States." Thus it has been opined that "[iln the face of the 
alternative conceptions of rights offered by the socialist and less developed states, the US 
30 Sce Peter Cumper, "Human Rights: History, Development and Classification" in Angela Hegarty 
& Siobhan Leonard, Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st Century (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 
1999), 1 at 6-7. 
'kee generaily Tony Evans, supra, note 13 at 7- 1 1, Jason M. Waite, 'The United States Anomalous 
Approrich to Discriminatory Aiienage Classifications: internationai, Canadian, and Domestic Law Compared" 
( 1997) 1 1 Emory Inrl. L Rev. 697 at 702-720; T. Evans, US Hegemony and the Projecr of Universal Human 
Righrs (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). 
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found it increasingly difficult to sustain domestic support for full engagement in the human 
rights debate."" In particular, the "sotalled economic and social rights ... were targeted by 
Amencan conservatives and isolationists as the greatest potential threat to the 
Constitution."'"hese groups (conservatives and isolationists) saw negotiations on the 
international covenants as promising socialism by treaty and a destruction of the 'Amencan 
~ a y . ' "  This 'socialism by treaty' was particularly viewed with overt suspicion because of 
its perceived potential to extend the conception of universal human rights to oblige the 
abandoning of "existing social practices - for example, racist and segregationist policies 
such as those thriving in the southem States of the USA" at that time. 
Consequently, any proposal to include economic, social and cultural rights in a 
binding agreement was seen as "an attempt to ensnare the United States into a complex 
international legal system that sought to penetrate, influence and finally bring down the 
tradi tional social and political freedoms for which America s t ~ o d . " ~ ~  Thus, for any process 
to receive the support of the United States, which was nearly indispensable at that time. it 
'?ony Evans. Ibid. at 9. 
33~rnerican Bar Association, Letter and A BA Report and RecommendarWn on H u m  Rights to 
Eleanor Roosevelt, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, Box No. 5487, undated, cited in T. Evans, Ibid 
34 See D.D. Eisenhower, The White Houe Years: Mandate for Change- 1953-1956 (London: 
Heinemann, 1963) rit 287. 
'%ony Evans. supra, note 13 at 8. A fact chat should not be overlooked is char the aversion towards 
giving concrete legd relevance to economic, socid and cultural rights was rooted in the fear and suspicion that 
taking those rights seriously would hply a cornmitment to sociai integration, solidarity and equality, including 
trickling the question of income distribution. This, no doubt, placed the rights in direct confrontation with the, 
yet to be rested, bludgeoning arms of racism and the then officially oiled segregationist policies and practices. 
3?ony Evans, supra, note 13 at 9. See generally D. Tananbatun, 7hc Bricker Amndment Cunîroversy: 




to the United States' constitutional model and vision of rights." It was, 
apparent inability of the proposed international covenant to meet this 
constitutional model and vision that made the division inevitable and the setting aside of the 
General Assembly resolution for one unified covenant inescapable. 
Accordingly, as a result of the domineering influence and seemingly indispensability 
of the United States, and under the overarching pressure of the Western-dominated UN 
Commission on Human Rights, the General Assembly regrettably reversed its earlier 
decision and decided that two separate Covenants shouid be prepared, the one predominantly 
protecting civil and political rights, and the other economic, social and cultural nghts." 
AIso. i t  was decided that the Covenants should contain 'as many similar provisions as 
possible' and to be approved and opened for signature simultaneously, in other to emphasize 
the unity of purpose." Drafting work on both Covenants was completed in 1966 when they 
were adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966.40 They entered into force only in 1976, after receiving the required thirty-fifth 
"1t ha been argued that the influence of American constituaonal rights on international human rights 
norms highlights more than just similarities. Thus, an andysis of this influence makes ctear not only the 
similarities with the civil and political nghts, but also the division that has occurred "between American and 
intcrnationril norms in the area of economic and social rights." See Jason Waite, supra, note 3 1 at 704. 
38 UN Gened  Assembly Resolution 5 4 3 0  of 5 February 1950. See Sandn Liebenberg, supra, note 
1 8 at 36 1. See ako, Yozo Yokota, "Reflections on the Future of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in 
Burns H. Weston and Stephen P. Marks, The Future of lntenuttional Hurnan Rights (New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 1999) 20 1 at 20; Pierre De Vos, "Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and 
Economic Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution" (1997) 13 SAlHR 67 at 68. 
39UN Gened Assembly Resolution 545 (VI) of 5 February 1952. See Henry J. Steiner and Philip 
Alston, supra, note 3 at 261; Sandra Liebenberg, Ibid. 
" ~ e e  "Facr Sheet," supra, note 13. 
ratification!' 
It has been contended that the "US opposition did not signib the rejection of 
economic and social rights per se.'42 In support of this contention, reference is made to 
President Roosevelt's nomination in 1941 of 'freedom from want' as one of the four 
freedoms that should characterize the future world 0rder.4~ Weighty as this might be. it is 
merely indicative of the inseparability and indivisibility of al1 rights rather than constituting 
a positive proof of United States' acceptance of the economic and social nghts. This is 
further reflected in what one writer regards as: 
Y.. the adamant refusal of the United States to view social and 
economic rights as human rights, let alone justiciable, in 
negotiations surrounding new human rights treaties and on 
votes on United Nations' resolutions.'* 
Even though the end of the Cold War appears to have formaily brought to a close. if 
not driven underground. the ideological struggle over human rights, it bas not in any way 
emancipaied the economic, social and political rights from their state of deprivation. Rather, 
i t  has been seen as the triumph of Western liberal conception of rights over the socidist 
"see John Dugud, supra, note 19 at 174; Sandra Liebenberg, supra, note 18 at 36 1. The international 
Coveiiant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force on January 3, 1976, thrce months after 
the date of deposit with the UN Secretary-General of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession, as 
provided in Article 27. On its own, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force 
on March 23, 1976, three months after the date of deposit with the Secretiuy-Genenl of the thirty-fifth 
instrument of ratification or accession, as provîded in Article 49. 
42 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, supra, note 3 at 258. 
'"se= Franklin Delano Roosevelt, supra, note 10 at 173. 
44 Craig Scott & Patrick MackIem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social 
Rights in a New South AFrican Constitution" (1992) 141 Universiiy of Pennsylvania Law Review 1 at 19. See 
also Philip Alston, "U.S. Ratification of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely 
New Strategy" (1990) 84 AM. J. I N 7 L  L 365 [hereinafter, "US Rat@cation"]. To date the US is yet to sign 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Jason Waite, supra, note 3 1 at 704. 
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conception, and, by extension, a reassertion of the supremacy of the civil and political rights 
over the economic, social and cultural rights." These historicd forces which shaped the 
birth/evolution of economic, social and cultural rights have continued to retard their maturity 
into adulthood. While economic, social and cultural rights are helplessly nurtured with the 
'feeding bottle' of international bureaucratic gibberish and ambivalence, their more favoured 
siblings, civil and political rights, have not only tnumphantly passed the stage of adolescence 
but have become full-blown adults and the unwitting acolytes of the hegemonic forces of the 
North. 
2.2.2. Indivisi bility and Interdependence of Rights 
The concepts of interdependence and indivisibility of human rights have remained 
a much vaiued commodity in international human rights discourse, but, more easily 
embraced than implemented. At the UN level, interdependence and indivisibility of rights 
have become more of a slogan which merely inspires platitudinous articulations. Yet, the 
reality of human rights protection in the contemporary world remains that one person's 
platitude holds the key to another person's protection and dignity. This holds true not only 
for African human rights, but also for human rights in the international system, hence the 
continued relevance of these concepts in international human rights discourse. 
The principle of indivisibility of rights holds that a strict distinction arnong al1 
45 Tony Evans, supra, note 13 at 1 1 States that "[s]ymboiic of this superiority is the USA'S ratification 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Politid Rigfits (ICCPR) [only], folIowing years of procrastination, 
and its continued refusal to sign the International Covenant on Economic, Socid and Culhuai Rights." 
classifications of rights, whatever its touted theoretical relevance, is not possible in practice? 
Since the essence of human rights is the respect for human dignity, the notion of inâivisibility 
presupposes that the totality of what it takes to be human and lead a meaningful life should 
be protected and upheld through the medium of equally potent enforcement mechanisms17 
Similarly, the pnnciple of interdependence of ail human rights holds that "the full and 
meaningful enjoyment of a particular right is dependent on the possession of al1 other 
rights."'18 It thus opposes the fragmentation of human rights, as well as the horizontai 
subdivision of rights according to their (supposedly) distinct levels of importance.i9 Viewed 
from this angle, interdependence encompasses, if not transcends, the notion of indivisibility 
The pnnciple of interdependence also presupposes that human rights are mutuall y 
reinforcing and mutually dependent. Craig Scott aptly explains it thus: 
interdependence suggests a mutual reinforcement of rights, so 
that they are more valuable together, as a complete package. 
than a simple sumrnation of individual rights would suggest; 
for exarnple, having civil and political rights but not 
economic, and social rights is not "half a loaf" but 
56 Sec R.M. D'Sa, 'The Africm Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Problerns and Prospects for 
Regional Action" ( 1987) 10 Atutralian Yearbook of lnrl. L 10 1 at 1 i 3 fn 75. 
47 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra. note 7 at 800.  
48 Ibid at 798-799. 
50 Craig Scott, 'The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights N o m :  Towards a Partial 
Fusion of the international Human Rights" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journi769 at 779 hiis noted that 
"[wlhile it might appear that 'indivisible' and 'interdependent' m u t  have distinct meanings, an oveMew of the 
reIevrint Generd Assembly resolutions warns against trying too much semantics." 
substantially less?' 
Underlying the pnmacy given to civil and politicai rights, and the apparent neglect 
of the economic, social and cultural rights is the assumption that the former group of rights 
is more important than the latter* A distinction between the former and the latter is usually 
based on the nature of interests they aim to protect. But, as Pierre De Vos points out, "[al11 
rights are aimed at guaranteeing each individual the freedom to live his or her life with 
dignity and respect?' This underlying philosophy has underpinned many UN resolutions, 
and official pronouncements dating back to the Universal Declaration. It was reaffirmed in 
General Assembly resolution 42 1(V) of 4 December 1950, and also formed the bais of 
inserting a common paragraph in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights iûfirming 
the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights. Both Covenants, in accordance with 
the UDHR. respectively declare in paragraph 3 of their Preamble that: 
[Tlhe ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear 
and want cm only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his [her] economic, social and 
cultural rights, as well as his [her] civil and political rights." 
52 Asbjorn Eide, supra, note 1 at 23 observes, wiih a benefit of hindsight, that "mmy of the wurnptions 
have been overstated or mistaken." 
53~ierre De Vos. supra, note 38 at 70. 
Ylnternationul Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Righrs, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, paragraph 3 of 
the Preamble; International Covenanr on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 17 1, paragraph 3 of the 
preamble. Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, supra, note 3 at 263 point out that "[tlhe interdependence 
principle (in the prearnble to the Covenants) was accepted as a nnecessary political compromise between the two 
principal competing visions. But it dso reflects the fact that the two sets of rights can neither logically nor 
praçtically be sepmted in entirely watertight compartments." See also Vladimir hîashkin, "Economic, Socid 
and CulturaI Rights" in Karel Vasak, (ed.) The Intemtioml Dimensions of Human Rights, vol.1 (Westport: 
Ever since the adoption of these Covenants, the pnnciple of indivisibility, 
interdependence and universality of rights have resonated in many UN human rights fora and 
declarations. Thus in Article 13 of m e  Proclamation of Tehran, 1968. delegates to the 
International Conference on Human Rights, reemphasizing the interdependence and 
indivisibility of human rights, proclaimed that: 
Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, 
the full realization of civil and politicai rights without the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is 
impossible." 
Supporting the validity of these principles was a main element of the agenda at the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June of 1993. The Declaration and 
Programme of Action adopted at Vienna states: 
Al1 human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated. The international community must treat 
human rights globally in a fair and equd manner, on the same 
footing, and with the same emphasis ..? 
Pnor to Vienna, a group of distinguished experts on international iaw convened to 
consider the nature and scope of the obligations of state parties to the International Covenant 
on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights adopted the Lirnburg Principles on the 
Greenwood Press, 1982) 1 1 1 at 1 12. 
" ~ h e  Proclamation of Tchron, 1968, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, 
Tehran, 13 May 1968, UN. Doc. AICONF. 32/41. Reprinted in UN, Human Rights: A Compilation of 
lnterrlational Instruments, Vol. 1 (First Part) (New York, UN, 1993) at 5 1-54 
'6The Viennn Declararion and Programme of Action. adopted June 24, 1993 by the UN World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, UN. Doc. AICONF. 157/24. Reprinted in (1996) 32 I.LM. 1661. 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Econornic, Social and Cultural ~ights." 
Principles 2 and 3 emphasize that economic, social and cultural rights are indivisible part of 
international law and should therefore be accorded the same promotion and protection as 
civil and political rights.'' Tn particular, Principle 3 idYimis: 
As human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible 
and interdependent, equal attention and urgent consideration 
shouid be given to the implementation, promotion and 
protection of both civil and political, and econornic, social 
and cul tu r d  rightd9 
Apparent in these eloquent declarations is the emergence of an international 
57 Sce The Limburg Principles on the lmplementarion of the Intemarioml Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultrird Rights, adopted 8 January 1987, üN. ESCOR, Commission on Humm Rights, 43d Session, 
Agenda Itcm 8, UN. Doc. WCN,4/1987/17/Annex ( 1987). Repniited in (1 987) 9 Human Righfs Quarterly 122- 
135. [hereinafter "Limburg Principles"]. A group of distinguished experts in international law, convened by 
thc International Commission of Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the University of Limburg (Maastricht, the 
Netherlands), and the Urban Morgan Institute for Hurnan Rights, University of Cincinnati (Ohio, United States), 
met in Maastricht on 2-6 June 1986 to consider the nature and scope of the obligations of state parties to the 
ICESCR, the consideration of States Parties' reports by the then newly constituted ECOSOC Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international cooperation under Part fV of the Covenant. The 
participants rigreed unanimously upon the principles which they believe reflect the present state of international 
law. For the background paper which served as the framework for the discussions on the Limburg Principles, 
sce Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) Human Riglits Quarterly 156. 
[ hcrei naftcr "The Nature and Scope of States Parties ' Obligations"] The Limburg Principles have been 
described ris constituting the first effort to substantiate the meaning of violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Sec Victor Dankwa, et al., "Commentary on the Maastricht Guidelines," supra, note 14 at 7 12. 
58 See E.V.O. Dankwa and Cees Flinterman, "Commentary by the Rapporteurs on the Nature and Scope 
of Statc Parties' Obligations" (1987) 9 Human Rights Qicarterly 136 at 137 [hereinafter "Commentary 6y the 
Rappo rte tr rs" ] . 
59The Limburg Principlrr, supra, note 57 nt 123. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
Limbrrrg Principles, a group of more than 30 experts met in Maastricht from 22-26 January 1997. The objective 
of the meeting was to ehborate on the Limburg Pnitciples as regards the nature and scope of violations of 
cconomic. social and cuIturai righîs and appropriate responses and remedies. The participants unanimously 
agreed on what became known as The Mc~zstricht Guidefines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Reprinted in ( 1998) 20 Humnn Rights Quarrer€y 69 1-705. The 4' guideline states as follows: "It is now 
undisputed that al1 human rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelatecl and of equal importance for hurnan 
dignity. Therefore, states are as responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural cights as they are for 
violations of civil and political rights." See generaHy Victor Dankwa. et ai., "Commentary on the Maastricht 
Grridelines." strpra, note 14 at 7 1 1. 
consensus that economic, social and cultural rights should enjoy the same level of attention 
and protection as civil and political rightdO This, in effect, is a recognition of the iùtility 
inherent in protecting one set of rights, at the expense. and /or to the total neglect. of the 
others. These frequent affirmations of the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights 
preclude any attachment of p a t e r  priority to one category of rights and undencore the 
absolute inevitability of a unified approach to human rights protection. This is further 
reinforced by the apparent impossibility and downright impotency of any definitive 
distinction or division of rights on the buis of the various interests they are designed to 
protec t Y  
Tragically, as Audrey Chapman points out. "[dlespite a rhetorical comrnitment to the 
indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, the international community, including 
the international human rights movement, has treated civil and political rights as more 
significant and has consistently neglected econornic, social and cultural right~."~' 
Consequentiy, in the debates panicularly under the item "violations of human rights." at the 
?%e Sandra Liebenberg. supra, note 18 at 363. 
6 ' ~ e e  Pierre De Vos, supra, note 38 at 7 1. See also El Hadji Guisse, The Realization of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report on the Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), EKN.4/Sub.U1997/8 of 27 June 1997, online at 
<hl tp:/lww ~ v . d c r e c I ~ o s . o r ~ ~ n i z i k o r i i m ~ i e . h t n I  (visited 425 PM, January 3 1, 2000). Some writers, 
howcver, insist on adopting a futile confession-avoidance approach to the issue indivisibility of human rights. 
Thus, while acknowledging the validity and powerfulness of the arguments for the indivisibility of rights, it has 
bcen asserted that "distinctions do have to be dmwn between absolute insistence on the protection of 
fundamental human rights and a more flexible approach to other rights ...." See Andrew Hune11 "Power, 
Principles ruid Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a Deeply Divided World" in Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, (eds.), Hunian Righrs in Global Politics (Cambridge: University Press, 1999) 277 at 28 1. This view 
is no longer in tandem with contempocary reaiities in the real world legal practice or human rights doctrine. Al1 
humm rights being fundamental, any selective hindamentality of human rights in contcmporary international 
human rights discourse and pnctice is both futile and otiose. 
" ~ u d r q  R. Chapman. " A  New Approach to Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and CuItural Rights" (1995) 55 Rev. Intl. Comm Jurists 23 at 24. 
Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, most accusations of serious human rights violations, often made 
by Western-based human rights NGOs are related to civil and political rights. The pleas made 
by delegates or experts coming from the developing world to focus more on the tragic 
situations of violations of basic economic, social and cultural rights are largely i g n ~ r e d . ~ ~  
Rather than a negation of the validity of the indivisibility and interdependence of 
rights, this seemingly fierce comrnitment to rhetoric and hypocrisy is merely indicative of the 
fact that the hegemonic and manipulative forces which undermined the adoption of a single 
Covenant still hold great sway. This has made one scholar disconsolately assert that "there 
is no reason to believe that those diverse forces which have hitherto ken  content to neglect 
economic, social and cultural rights will change their attitudes ~vemight."~~ 
While the above noted hypocrisy continues to offer credible evidence of the 
possibility of virtue," the irrepressible tmth, whose imrnortal signpost is the UDHR, in 
addition to al1 other relevant declarations, remains that "human rights constitute an 
indivisible whole reflecting the unity and uniqueness of the human beingWMAs Roosevelt 
63 Yozo Yokota. supra, note 38 at 205. 
M~hi l ip  Alston. "Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New WH. Cornmittee on 
Econornic, Social rind Cultural Righis" (1987) 9 Human Rights Quonerly 332 at 334 [hereinafter, "Our of the 
A byss"] . 
65~orn J. Farer, The  United Nations and Human Righu: More than a Whimper Less han a Roar" 
( 1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 550 at 585 
%I Hadj Guise. supra, note 61 at paragraph 1 1. See also Aiwine A. de van Steenwijk 'The Poorest 
Teach Us the Indivisibility of Human Rights" in Yael Danieli, et al., The Universal Declararion of Human 
Rights: Fift Years and Beyond (New York: Baywood Publishing Co., 1999) 4 1 1 at 4 13. The writer stresses 
the interdependence that exists between liberties, civil and political rights, and economic, social and culturai 
ones, and trenchantiy asserts that "[wlithout basic security, liberty is jeopardized. At the same time, when 
liberties are not exercised, basic security is not guaranteed." 
45 
pointed out in 1944, in his State of the Union Address, while advocating the adoption of an 
'Economic Bill of Rights,' ''me individual freedom cannot exist without econornic secunty 
and independence. 'Necessitous men are not free men.' .... In our day these economic truths 
have become accepted as self evident."" These 1944 'self evident' 'economic truths' remain 
patently so. 
2.2.3. Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Assumptions and 
Misconceptions 
The continued marginalization of economic, social and cultural rights has been 
generously encrusted with certain misconceptions and some, not well founded, overstated 
or mistaken assumptions. In the main, these misconceptions and assumptions served as the 
tool with which the death knell of a unified and enforceable covenmt were sounded. Ever 
since, t hey have remained hallowed instruments in the hands of those fervent1 y comrnitted 
to scuttling the emergence of any possible basis for a tmly fair world economic order where 
economic, social and cultural rights would have a chance of being realized. Most of these 
misconceptions are the offsprings of the, now triumphant and rarnpaging, Western Liberal 
conception of human rights. 
Indubitably, these misconceptions and facile assumptions have served as platfoms 
for questioning, and sometimes for outright denial of the legality and legitimacy of 
67 Fnnldin Delmo Roosevelt, supra, note 10 at 173-174. In 194 1 President Roosevelt had nominated 
'freedom from want' as one of the four fieedoms that should characterize the hture world order. The President 
defined freedom from want as "economic understandings which will secure to every nation a heaithy peacetime 
life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world." See Frank Newman & David Weissbrodt, International Human 
Rights: Law, Policy, and Process (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1990) at 36 1-363. See dso Johan D. 
van der Vyver, supra, note 7 at 801. 
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economic, social and cultural rights. In theu extrerne forms. either the position is taken which 
expressiy denies a legal binding character to economic. social and cultural rights, or these 
rights are alleged to so differ from civil and political rights in such fundamental respects as 
to make the conclusion that economic, social and cultural rights are inferior from a legai 
point of view largely inescapable." A methodology often adopted is to unduly exaggerate the 
alleged differences in nature and implications between these rights. 
This section examines some of the differences often prejudicially attributed to the 
nature of economic, social and cultural rights and discusses some widely held assumptions 
and misconceptions. It challenges the assumptions and confutes the misconceptions with the 
aim of unmasking the real nature and relevance of economic. social and cultural rights in 
contemporary international human rights discourse and practice. 
1.2.3.1. Positivity versus Negativity 
The more frequently touted difference and, in fact. the most common assumption 
andor misconception, is that civil and political rights involve negative rights6' or duties. or 
68 See G.J.H. Van Hoof, 'The Legal Nature of Econornic, Social and Culturai Rights: A Rebuttal of 
Some Traditional Views" in Philip Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.) The Right to Food (1984) at 97, cited in 
Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, supra, note 3 at 279. 
6 %e chief proponents of this view are E W Vierdag, 'The Legai Nature of the Rights Granted by the 
international Covenant on Economic, Social and Culturai Rights," (1978) 9 Netherfandr Journal of 
lnternational Law 103; Marc Bossuyt, "Lu distinction entre les droits civils et politiques et les droits 
economiques, sociau et cultureif (1975) 8 Human Rights Journal 783, cited in Van Hoof, Ibid, (arguing that 
civil and politicaI rights require non-interference on the put of the state, whereas the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights require active intervention by the state); and M Cranston What are Human 
Rights? ( 1973) cited in Nicholas Haysom "Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democncy and Socio-Economic 
Rights" (1992) 8 SAJHR 45 1. See also John Dugard, supra, note 19 at 177. 
as ~ohfe ld~ '  would describe them, liberties against which other parties with the polity 
(society) have no claim. Thus should A have a right to freedom of speech the balance of 
society has 'no right' against A and he/she cm express hidher views freely and hilly without 
hindran~e.~' Accordingly, civil and political rights are characterized as negative in that they 
supposedly require only govemments' abstention from activities that would violate hem? 
By placing negative obligations on the state not to interfere with the freedom and integrity 
of the individual, their implementation is said to be free or at Ieast inexpensive because they 
merely require the state to refrain from acting." 
On the other hand. economic, social and cultural rights are said to be positive rights 
which impose duties on States to provide certain resources. Or, put differently, require 
'positive govemmental action'74 as well as 'active intervention on the part of govemment and 
[therefore] cannot be realized without such interventi~n."~ Once a positive duty is imposed 
on a Party, it is argued, the nature of the right becomes conceptually different.76 
Scholars have found this ngid distinction difficult to uphold. Van Hwf maintains that 
'% N Hohfeld. Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press. 19 19) at 42-43. 
7 1 ~ o r  a more detailed explanation of the Hohfeldian analysis see R W M Dias. Jurisprudence 5" edn. 
(London: Butterworhts, 1985) at 28-33. 
n ~ e e  Philip Alston and G e d  Quinn, "The Nature and Scope of States Panier' Obligations." supra. 
note 57 at 159. 
7 3 ~ e e  Pierre De Vos, supra. note 38 at 69. 
74 Jason M. Waite, supra, note 3 1 at 705. 
'$ee Philip Alston and Gervd Quinn, " n e  Nature and Scop of States Parties' Obligations," supra. 
note 57 at 159. 
M Dans, * n i e  Case Against the Inclusion o f  Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except 
as Directive Principles" (1992) 8 SAJHR 475 at 478. 
"[tlthere are well-known examples of civil and political rights which in fact demand active 
intervention on the part of the state, such as the right to fair trial."" In relation to resource 
availability, especiaily to developing countries, he submits that the expenditure involved in, 
for instance, the holding of free and secret ballot elections or the setting up of adequate 
judiciary and legal aid systems may be quite c~nsiderable.~~ 
Echoing Henry Shue," Donnelly has argued that virtually al1 human rights are both 
'negative' and 'positive', entailing ('negative') duties to forebear and ('positive') duties to 
protect and to aid - although there may be no single duty-bearer who stands under dl three 
types of ~bligation.'~ This is especially evident when the varying actions which, depending 
on circumstances, may be required to discharge the obligation of the duty-bearer or guarantee 
the enjoyment of the right by the right holder are considered in exten~o.~'  Thus, "whether a 
particular right, as held by a particular person, is positive or negative depends, at least, as 
much on circumstances as on essential character of the righVa2 This makes the negative- 
positive distinction uncharacteristic of rights per se, but of particular nghts in real 
7 7 ~  J H Van Hoof, supra, note 68 at 97. 
79 Sce generall y, Henry S hue, Basic Rights: Subsisrence, Afluence and US Foreign Po Licy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980). 
"O. Donnelly. 'The Concept of Human Rights", (1995) at 89-96, excerpts in Esmeraida M A 
Thornhill, International Human Rights Law: Facing Race as a Factor (Course Materials, vol. II), (Halifax: 
Dalhousie Law School, 1997) at VTI - 8 1. 
112 Ibid. The author adds, as an example, that protection from torture will be Iiqely "negative" in 
Mexico or Costa Rica, but bwsitive" in Chile or Argentina Subsistence wiil kx IargeIy "negative" right in the 
wheat fields of Kansas, somewhat more "positive" in New York city and very "positive" indeed in Bangladesh. 
circumstances. since the character of any single nght may change with time and pla~e.8~ 
Shelton sees categorizing rights as problematic especially where such categorization 
purports to rely on a distinction between positive and negative obligations." Also, the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights set a significant precedent by rejecting this positive- 
negative distinction drawn in the Velasquez Rodriquez CaseeS5 In that case, the Inter- 
American Court held that article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. requiring 
States to respect and ensure the rights guaranteed in the Convention, imposes on each state 
a 'legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human nghts violations and to use means at 
its disposal to c q  out senous investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, 
to identify those responsible, and to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the 
victim adequate c~rnpensation.'~~ 
This decision takes the sand off the feet of the argument that civil and political rights 
impose negative duties and do not involve the expenditure of resources. It confirms that even 
civil and political rights can, and do, impose positive obligations. As Donnelly argues: 
Even such a quintessential "negative" nght as a right not to be 
tortwed, generally will have a major "positive" component. 
Simple restra.int on the part of government and its 
functionacies is necessary, but often insuffîcient in itself ...."" 
84 Dinah Shelton, "Human Rights, Environmental Rights. and the Right to Environment" (1991) 28 
Sranfird Journal of Inrl. Law 103 at 122-3, [hereinafter "Righr to Environment"]. 
'?3ee 4 Inter-Am. Ct H.R. (ser.C) at 155 (Judgement of 29 JuIy 1988). 
87 J. Donnelly, supra, note 80, The writer further observed that in many countries, major changes in 
law, administrative practice and personnel would be necessary to guarantee the right. Institutions with "positive" 
powers, are needed to investigate allegations and prosecute accused persons. See also Gregorio Perces-Barba, 
Furthermore, Trakrnan and Gatien have forcefully argued that "[o]bligations in 
international conventions, at least conceming human rights, require both non-interference in 
certain respects and positive action to ensure rights in other respects."" It would be too 
simplistic, if not naive, to assume that civil and political nghts correspond exclusively to the 
notion of negative rights or rights of abstentiong9 These simplistic assumptions do not 
adequately reflect contemporary redities in legd practice or human rights doctrine. and 
sbou Id, therefore, be jettisoned? 
In addition to counieracting the assumptions that only economic, social and cultural 
rights are "positive" rights while civil and political rights are "negative" rights, the foregoing 
arguments aiso undermine the resource-intensive:' (for economic, social and cultural rights), 
"Reflections on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1981) 2 H u m n  Rights Luw Journal 281 at 290; 
Etienne Mureinik, "Beyond A Charter of Luxuries: Econornic Rights in the Constitution" ( 1992) 8 SAJHR 464 
r i t  365-468. 
88 Leon Trakman and Sean Gatien, , Rights and Responsibilities (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1999) rit 24 1 fn. 1 16. See also Alexandre Kiss "Concept and Possible Implications of the Right to Environment" 
in Kathleen E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney, supra, note 17,551 at 552. The writer asserts that in the present 
cconomic, social and political context even the guarantee of most "traditionai" rights rnay necessitate the 
intervention of state to ensure their fuI1 observance. 
89 Sec Stephen P. Marks, "Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?" (198 1)  33 
Rutgers LAW Review 435 at 438 [hereinafter "Emerging Human Rights"]. 
*~ee .  Allm Rosas and Martin Scheinin, 'Categories and Beneficiaries of Human Rights" in Raija 
Hanski and Markku Suksi, An Introduction to the international Protection of Humcm Rights: A Textbook 
(TurkdAbo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Alcademi University, 1999) 49 at 50. 
91 See John Dugard, supra, note 19 at 177. This 'resource intensive' argument usually fin& expression 
in the analysis of Article S(1) of the ICBCR under which state parties undertook to take steps "to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights" recognized 
in the Covenant. While this is a limitation to the rights provided in the ICESCR, care should be taken not to 
distort its meaning. Discussions so far have shown that the availability of resources affects the reaiization of 
d i  rights. 'Progressive reaiization* was inserted as an escape hatch by those who interested in scuttling the 
effectivity of economic, social and cultural rights, The issue of 'progressive reaiization is discussed in detail 
below. Etienne Mureinik, supra, note 87 at 465-467 has ably trashed the 'expense argument' against economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
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and cost freeyz (for civil and political rights), arguments usually advanced for neglecting the 
enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. Therefore, any distinction. on this basis, 
between these rights is at best misconceived. 
Attempts have been made to further advance the difference in character between civil 
and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other 
hand by assigning an absolute character to civil and political rights: 'In recognizing civil 
rights, positive law can only protect those things that a man aiready possesses,' while 
economic, social and cultural rights can only be enjoyed 'to the extent that these rights have 
become subjective r i g h t ~ . ' ~ ~  This assertion cannot be supported in so far as it purports to 
ascribe absoluteness to, for instance, the right to life simply because it emanates from human 
dignity, and at the same time denying such absoluteness to, for instance, the right to health 
or food which is an insepanble component of any right to life. A distinction on this bais is 
feeble in attempt and futile in impact. It is neither accurate nor practical. Such an argument 
fails to recognize that abuse cm be both positive and negative. 
Admittedly, the right to life in the ICCPR is couched in a definite mannep while the 
rights to food9' and health* in the ICESCR are merely recognised. However, that does not 
91 Marc Bossuyt, supra, note 69. 
93 See Van Hoof, supra, note 68. 
w~r t ic le  6(1) of the ICCPR provides: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shrill bc protected by law. No one shall be arbitrariiy deprived of his life." 
g 5 ~ i c l e  1 1 ( 1 ) of the ICESCR States: 'The sw parries recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to continuous 
improvement of living conditions ...." 
96~rticle 12(1) of the ICESCR provides: 'The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the best attainabIe standard of physical and mentd health." 
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obliterate the inextricable link existing between them as essential components of human 
dignity. Other than regarding the right to life in the ICCPR as meant for only the rich who 
c m  afford the food and the resources to keep healthy, it is hard to deny the absoluteness of 
the rights to food and health, without, at the same time, denying the absoluteness of the right 
to life. Differences in the wording of the provisions of both K C P R  and ICESCR only 
demonstrate the perceptions of the cirafters and are not based on any actud differences in the 
nature of the various rights. 
2.2.3 2. Immediate Implementation vems Progressive Realizatioa 
Economic, social and cultural rights are also distinguished from civil and politicai 
rights by reference to the different language and teminology used in the two Covenants 
regarding the obligations of States parties. Whereas civil and political rights are described as 
being 'immediately enforceable,' economic, social and cultural rights are often described as 
'programmatic' or 'promotional'" in the sense that "they represent aspirations or policy 
objectives rather than justiciable rights whose violations can be remedied immediately."98 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that, "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
" ~ e e  Scott Lcckie. "AnMher Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations 
of Econornic, Socid and Cultural Rights" (1998) 20 Human Rights Quclnerly 81 at 88; E W Vierdag, supra, 
note 69 at 83. 
98yo~o Yokota, supra, note 38 at 202. See also Mario Gornez, 'Social EconoMc Rights and Human 
Rights Commissions" ( 1995) 17 H u m n  Rights Quarteriy 155 at 16 1. 
rights recognized in the present C~venant."~ The wording of this provision is usually 
contrasted with Article 2(1) of the ICCPR which stipulates: "Each party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to al1 individuals within its temtory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." 
Some scholars have posited that the 'progressive realiuition' clause in Article 2(1) 
of ICESCR calls into question the binding nature of the obligations created under the 
Covenant.lM In fact govemments and judiciaries in many countries still tend to view the 
entire ICESCR with clouded judgement, only giving priority to noms dealing with 
misguided notions of progres~ivity.'~' 
Nevertheless, Scott Leckie has convincingly argued that the determination of 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights should not be hindered by the progressive 
realization provisions.'" He maintains that it is "difficult to dispute that the full realization 
Imsee David Tmbek "Economic, Socid and Cultural Rights in the 'Ihird World: Human Rights Law 
and Human Needs Programs," in Theodor Meron, (ed.), Human Rights in International Law: Legal Policies 
and Issues, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 205 at 2 14. 
Io1see The Sliiomi Case, S u p ~ m  Court of Iapan (1989), cited in Scott Leckie, supra. note 97 at 92. 
In this case the court, relying on Article 2(1) rifgued that Article 9 of the ICESCR (on social security and social 
insurance) did not provide a concrete right to be granted to individuals immediately. See dso  Yuji Iwasawa, 
'The Relationship Between International Law and National Law: Japanese Experiences" ( 1993) 64 British Y. B. 
Intl. L. 333. 
102 Scott Leckie, Ibid. at 92-93. The Conunittee on Economic, Social and Culcurai Rights in The 
Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3, adopted 13-14 Dec. 1990, U.N. Doc. 
K. 12/1990/8, notes in pmgraph 9 that 'Wie fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, 
is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of al1 meaningful 
content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting realities of the real world and the 
difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, socid and cultural rights. On the 
other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d'eue, of the 
Covenant, which is to esttiblish clear obligations for State Parties in respect of the full realization of the rîghts 
in question." 
of al1 hurnan rights will invariably be a progressive undertaking."lo3 Even though the term 
'progressive' is utilized only in the ICESCR, it does not imply that no immediate obligations 
exist in the covenant.IW 
While there are inherent limitations implicit in the term 'progressive' it should be 
noted that it was inserted in the Covenant by those whose motive was to secure an 
ideological victory by undermining the enforcement of the economic, social and cultural 
rights. Thus, as Alston and Quinn have rightiy observed: 
"[It was] those states that, when the Covenant was king 
drafted, made the greatest effort to affirm that the obligation 
of progressive realization was indeed rnemingful, [who] are 
now often arnong those that cite the weakness of the 
obligation as evidence of the secondary, non-legal, or non- 
binding nature of economic, social and cultural rights. By 
contrat, those that were outspoken and damning in criticizing 
the weakness of Article 2(1) at the time of drafting, are now 
among those that insist most strongly on the importance of 
economic rights and the seriousness of the relevant 
obligations of states parties."10s 
It is. therefore. not as a result of any supenonty of civil and political rights over econornic, 
103 Scott Leckie, Ibid. at 93. See also Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role 
in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Polirical Rights (1994) at 346, cited in Scott 
Leckie, Ibid at 93, fn 39, who states tfiat "the Hwnsui Rights Committee has interpreted article 6 [of the ICCPR, 
the right to life] as encompassing wide-ranging positive obligations, some of which are clearty of a progressive 
nature" 
'%ke Principle No. 21 of the Lnnburg Principlc. supra. note 57 which provides that "[tlhe obligation 
'to achieve progressive redization of the rights' requires States parties to move as expeditiously as possible 
towards the realization of rights. Under no circumstances shail this be interpreted as irnplying for States the right 
to defer indefinitely efforts to enswe full realization. On the contrary, d l  States parties have the obligation to 
begin irnrnediately to take steps to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant." 
'05see Phi1 ip Alrton and Ge& Quinn. "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations," supra, 
note 57 rit 177. The Travaux Preparatoires to the ICESCR shows that the proponents of the 'progressive' term 
include, Dcnmark, France, Australia, and United Siates, while Soviet Union, Lebanon and Yugoslavia, among 
others opposed it. 
social and cultural rights. Using the 'immediate' and 'progressive' realization clauses as a 
basis of asserting superiority and/or priority of one set of rights over the other is not only 
unjustified but unjustifiable. 
In addition, the word 'progressive' used in Article 2(1) of ICESCR does not mean 
'indefinite.' It merely denotes that the rights enunciated in the Covenant will be hlly realised 
in a progressive manner.'" As such, 'progressive redisation' is a characteristic s h e d  by 
both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural nghts, albeit not stipulated 
in the ICCPR. As Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn have persuasively argued, "the reality is 
that the full realization of civil and political rights is heavily dependent both on the 
avai lability of resources and the developmeni of the necessary structures," l m  which makes 
them incapable of immediate realization in spite of al1 pretensions to the contrary. 
Moreover, there are certain rights in the ICESCR, such as trade union rightdo8 and 
cultural rights.lw that are not dependent on availability of resources (to any greater extent 
than, for instance, the right to freedom of expres~ion"~ or the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion"') and therefore should not have been subjected to the regime of 
'"E.v.o. Dankwa & Cees Fiinterman, "Commentary &y the Rapporteurs" supra, note 58 at 139. 
' " ~ h i l i ~  Alston & Gerard Quinn, "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obiigations," supm. note 
54 at 172. Note should also be taken of the fact that during the drafting stages, delegates generally agreed that 
"the notion of implementation at the earliest possible moment was implicit in article 2 (of ICESCR) as a whole." 
See, 18 U.N. GAOR (5655th Plenary Meeting) p m .  23, U.N. Doc. Al5655 (1963), cited in Philip Alston & 
Gerard Quinn, Ibid. 
'Ossee Article 8 of the ICESCR. 
lDgsee Article 15 of ICESCR. 
' 'O~ee  Article 19 of ICCPR. 
" ' ~ e e  Article 18 of ICCPR. 
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'progressive achievement.' The fact that such rights were not excluded from the regime of 
'progressive realization' as embodied in Article 2 of ZCESCR is an eloquent testimony that 
the tag of 'progressive realization' is rather arbitnry and. therefore, not a valid bais for 
asserting the superiority of one class of nghts over another. 
2.2.4. Relevance of Categorization of Rights: The Concept of %enerations9' 
Having affirmed the indivisibility and interdependence of al1 human nghts; and 
having dismissed, as neither accurate nor practical, any attempt to pnoritize rights based on 
any distinctive characteristics of the respective rights, it remains to establish the extent to 
which it is relevant to classify human nghts into different categories or generations. This is 
justified by the habitua1 categorization of rights into generations. Thus, civil and political 
rights are commonly classified as 'first generation right~, '"~ while economic, social and 
cultural and the so-called solidarity rights (such as the right to self-determination and 
development) are respectively categotized as 'second' and 'third' generation of human 
rights.'" 
Ever since the notion of three generations of rights was first put forward by Karel 
Vasak in 1 979,'14 it has k e n  habitually used in human rights discourse. Vasak distinguished 
II2  Jason M. Waite, supra, note 3 1 at 705. 
" '~ee Jennifer A. Doms, "A Heaithy and Ecologicd Balmced Environment: An Argument for a 
Third Generrition Right" (1993) 3 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L 351 at 358-62. 
114 See Karel Vasak's Inaugural LRcture to the Tenth Study Session of the International lnstitufe of 
Hriman Rights , July 1979, cited in Stephen P. Marks, supra, note 89 at 441. See also Asbjom Eide & AlIan 
Rosas. "Economic, Socid and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge" in Asbjorn Eide, et al., supra, note lat 
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the three generations of human rights as corresponding successively to each of the three 
elements of the mono of the French revolution, narnely, liberte: egalite', andfraternite? 
However, it has been opined that the present catalogue of human rights contained in the 
International Bill of Hwnan Rights can be traced to the three different revolutionary 
movements in world history: first the "bourgeois" revolutions, particularly in France and 
America, in the last quarter of the 18" century; second, the socidist, anti-exploitation 
revolutions of the first two decades of the 20"' century; and third, the anti-colonialist 
revolutions that began imrnediately after the Second World War and culminated in the 
independence of many nations around 1960."~ 
Given this historical origin, it may seem plausible and auspicious to categorize 
human rights into generations according to their evolutionary processes. Accordingly, it has 
been asserted that "[c]ategorizing rights into generations does demonstrate the dynamic and 
evolving nature of rights [and] aiso underscores the need to reconceive rights in response to 
changing needs ....""' Yet, as Eide and Rosas have insightfblly observed, "the history of the 
evolution of human rights at the national level does not make it possible to place the 
emergence of different human rights into clear-cut stages [as any] [elfforts to do so would 
in any case make it necessary to distinguish also between civil and political rights, since the 
' "sec Stephen P. Marks. Ibid at 44 1. 
' 161bid at 440. 
17~eon Trakman and Sem Gûtien. supra. note 88 at 241. 
political nghts were accepted much later than some civil rights."'l8 
Nonetheless, it has been contended that even though categories of rights represent 
rnere classifications for convenience rather than based on distinctive characteristics of 
respective rights, yet it is still useful to classify hurnan nghts into different groups 
(generations) for analytical con~enience."~ Persuasive as this contention may seem, it should 
be viewed with doubly-tinted spectacles of suspicion. The notion of 'generations' of human 
rights is not only deceptive but also problematic.'" It is most likely to concentrate on 
divergencies rather than convergencies, and rnay even be suggestive of the fact that the more 
established sets of rights are in some way less relevant today 
utility such categorizations might have. 
In lieu of classifying or categorizing human rights 
12' This undermines the little 
nto generations, it has been 
suggested that rights may be conceived in two dimensions: the nature of rights, and the 
extent and number of rights.I2* Under the 'nature of rights,' as canvassed, nghts are to be 
conceived depending on whether they are procedurd or substantive rights. The 'extent and 
number of rights' envision expanding rights within existing categories or extending them to 
"~sbjom Eide & Allan Rosas, supra, note 1 14 at 16. See also, Allm Rosas & Jan Hegelsen, (eds.), 
Human Rights in a Changing East-West Perspective (London: Printer Publishers, 1990) at 17. 
I l 9  Yozo Yokotri, supra, note 38 at 204. 
'"~ee Leon Tmkman and Sean Gatien, supra, note 88 at 24 1 .  
121 Allm Rosas "So-Cailed Rights of the Thiid Generation" in Asbjom Eide, et al., supra, note 1,243 
rit 244. See also Asbjorn Eide, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN Doc. 
ECN. Mu b. 2A 987/23. 
"'~eon Trahan and Sem Gatien, supra, note 88 at 24 1. 
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protect new categories and new recipients of nghts, such as the nghts of distinct peopies.'* 
Though seemingly attractive, the soçalled 'alternative' is not without its own 
problems. Legal noms do not readily yield themselves to easy classifications as to whether 
they are substantive or procedural. Thus, a garanteed right may exhibit a substantive as well 
as procedural character. ClassiQing such rights as either substantive or procedural in such 
a situation is bound to be problematic. Again, expanding rights within existing categories or 
extending them to protect new categories, may suffice to accommodate new or emerging 
rights. but it hardly offers any solution as to how to deal with the existing categories of rights. 
It is, therefore, a one-legged stool and, as such, cannot be expected to stand. 
The present writer is of the view that an unnecessary search for classifications, and 
actual classifications, are inimical to human rights protection and discourse. They are 
distracting, divisive and diversionary. If it is accepted that human rights constitute an 
indivisible whole reflecting the unity and uniqueness of the human being, categorizing 
human rights, with its attendant prioritization of rights, defeats the very essence of unity and 
indivisibility. It should be discarded or at best confined to the archives of international 
human rights discoune as a relic of historical antiquity. 
.- - 
"3 lbid at 24 1 -242. 
2.3. Economic, Social and Culturai Rights in the Regional Iastniments: A Cornparison 
Supplernenting the international globally-oriented human rights activity are the 
international human rights regimes operating regionally in Europe,'24 the ~rnericady 
~ f r i c a , " ~  and, lately, the Middle East,'" which the Arab League recently brought into k ing  
whcn it  adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994. No human rights system 
currently exists in Asia. Continuing efforts are, however, underway to create a regional 
system for ~ s i a . " ~  
Scholars have canvassed interesting arguments as to the necessity or desirability for 
the advancement of human rights on a regional b a ~ i s . ' ~ ~  Such arguments, interesting as they 
124 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, Eur0p.T.S. No. 5,213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter 'ECHR*]; and for 
our purposcs here, European Social Charter, October 18, 1961, E.T.S. No. 35 (entered into force, July 18, 
1978) (hercinafter European Social Charter]. 
"'Arnerican Convention on Humon Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36 a< 1, OAS Off. Rec. 
OEAlScr. W A i . 2 3  doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979). Reprinted in (1970) 9 1.L.M. 673 (entered into force, July 18, 1978) 
[ hercinafter, 'ACHR]. 
"6~friçan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 28, 198 1, OAU Doc. CABLEG/67i3iRev. 
5 ( 198 1 ). Reprinted in (1982) 2 1 LL.M. 58 (entered into force on October 21, 1986) [hereinafter 'African 
Charter' 1. 
1'7~rab Chnner on Human Rights, Septemberl5. 1994, Council of the League of Arab States. 102d 
Sessions, Res. 5437. Unofficial translation repnnted in (1997) 4 Intetnatioml Human Rights Repotîs 850. Also 
printcd in (1996) 56 Review of the International Commission of Jurists 57. See Dinah Shelton, 'The Promise 
of Regional Human Rights Systems" in Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks, supra, note 38, 351 at 356. 
[hereinafter "Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems"] 
178 Sce Vitit Muntarbhom, "Asia, Human Rights, and the New Millenniurn: T i e  for a Regiond H~umrin 
Rig hts Cbrte:" ( t 998) 8 Transnational Law & Conremp. Problems 407 at 4 13. In i 993, more than one hundred 
non-govemrnentril organizations adopted m Asian-Pacific Declaration of Human Rights supporting the creation 
of a regionaI system. See the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights (Asian Culturai Forum on Development), 
March 29-April3, 1993, W. Doc. A/CONF/93, reprinted in (1993) 14 Human Rights L w  Journal 370. In 
view of the non-existence of a human rights instrument for the Asia-Pacific region, no attempt is made in this 
thesis to examine the place of economic, socid and culturai rights in that region. 
lZ9see Burns H. Weston, Robin Ann Lukes & Kelly M. Hnatt, "Regionai Human Rights Regimes: A 
Cornparison and Appraisai" ( 1987) 20 Vanderbilt J. Transnl. L 585 at 588-59 1. 
may seem, are extraneous to the objects of this thesis, and thus, not explored herein. 
The purpose of this section is to give a brief overview of the place of economic, 
social and cultural rights in the different regional instruments, notably: African, Arab, 
European and Inter-American systems. The analysis rernains cursory, therefore, no attempt 
will be made, except where necessary, to do a comprehensive and in-depth anaiysis of the 
provisions of the instruments on economic, social and cultural nghts. It is also not the 
intention here to examine the historical evolution of the various regional systems, as that is, 
more or less, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
While the regional systems had elements of uniformity and diversity in their origins, 
each region had its own particular issues and concems. This is more marked in their varying 
levels of emphasis on, and attention to, economic, social and cultural rights, which oscillates 
in accordance with the region in question and its ideological standpoint. Consequently, while 
the regions appear to be thinking globally by having provisions dealing with economic, social 
and cultural rights, yet, they seem to be acting regionally by the level of importance attached 
to these rights. Nevettheless, in practical terms, no region has consistently followed up its 
rhetorical commitment with practical enforcement and sustained programmes of 
implernentati~n."~ Be that as it rnay, some regions have evolved, or are evolving, dynarnic 
and proactive approaches for the enforcement of economic, social and culturd rights. Some 
of these approaches are canvassed (in Chapter 6) and recommended for the African system 
as likely ways to overcome the rampant non-enforcement of economic, social and culturai 
C OC^. Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston. supra. note 3 at 267. 
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rights. As the fint regional system to be fully operational,"' the European system opens the 
discussion, followed respectively by the Amencan, African, and the Middle East systerns. 
2.3.1. The European System 
The European human rights system came into being following the adoption and entry 
into force of the ECHR.13' It was adopted as "the first steps for the collective enforcement 
of certain of the rights stated in the Universal ~eclaration."'~~ Thus, while protecting civil 
and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights were deliberately left out.'" It seems, 
however, that there was the intention at the outset to supplement the Convention with an 
instrument on econornic, social and cultural rights.'" But this plan was not fulfilled until 
1 96 1, when the European Social Charter'36 was adopted. 
131 Sce Dinah Shelton, "Promise of Regional Huntan Rights Systems" supra, note 127 at 356. 
132 See supra, note 124. 
'%ee J. G. Merrills, "Promotion and Protection of H u m  Righis Within the E m p a n  Arrangements" 
in Raijri Hanski and Markku Suksi, supra, note 90,275 at 279; Rosalyn Higgins, 'The European Convention 
on Human Rights" in Theodor Meron, (ed.) Humm Rights in International b w :  Legal and Policy Issues, vol. 
2 (Oxford: Clrirendon Press, 1984), 495 at 497; Burns H. Weston, Robin Ann Lukes & Kelly M. Hnatt, supra, 
note 129 rit 593. Sec also, "Lorna Woods, 'The European Union and Human Rights" in Raija Hanski and 
Markku Suksi, Ibid, 351 at 357. 
'%he Cornmittee for Legd and Administrative Affairs of the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe explained the intention as follows: "... Certainly, 'professional' iiberties and 'social' rights, which 
have themseIves an intrinsic value, must aiso in the future, be defined and protected." See T rava~ t  
Preparatoires 1 at 194, cited in Matti Pellonpaa, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in R. St. J. 
Macdonald, et aI., The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993) at 855. 
'36~uropean Social Charter. supra, note 124 [hereinafter. "Social Chaner"]. The Social Charter 
entered into force in 1965. In 1988 it was supplemented by an Additionid Protocoi, [Additional Prorocol to the 
European Social Charter, ETS No, 1281, which deais with, among other things, the nght of both sexes to equal 
C o n t r q  to the claim of some schcfars that the Social Charter was intended to 
provide an irnrnediate legal guarantee of economic and social rights comparable to that in the 
ECHR for civil and political rights,'" the Social Charter was not aimed at creating binding 
obligations on state parties in the form of enforceable rights. This is evident in the opening 
pangraph of Part 1 in which the "Contracting Parties accept[ed] as the aim of their policy, 
to be pusued by al1 appropriate means, both national and international in character, [to bel 
the attainment of conditions in which the following rights and principles can be effectively 
realised ..."13' The foregoing opening pangraph is followed by the enurneration of the rights 
in question in 19 paragraph~.'~~ None of these rights are binding on the Contracting States, 
for they may, within the limits defined by the Social Charter, choose by which articles they 
consider themselves bound.14' This has prompted some scholars to observe that "there is a 
somewhat vague legal obligation to promote al1 the 19 rights enumerated, and a stronger 
opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment. 
'"~ee David Harris. 'The Council of Europe (II): The European Social Charter" in Raijija Hûnski and 
Markku Suksi, supra, note 90 at 326 [hereinafter "The European Social Charter"]. 
1 3 8 ~ o n ~ t  this provision with the provisions of Article 2 of the ICESCR and Article 1 of the Afncan 
Cizarter under which States Parties assumed definite obligations with respect to al1 nghts therein provided. 
139 The rights enumerated in Part 1 are defined in detail in Part II. 
I JO According to Article 20 (I)(b) a Contracting State undertakes to considet itself bound by at least 
five of the following Articles of Part II: Articles I[right to work], 5 [right to organize], 6 (right to bargain 
collectively], 12 [right to sociai security], 13[1ight to social and medicd assurance], 16 [right of the family to 
social, l e p l  and economic protection], and 19 [right of migrant workers and their families to protection and 
assistance]. David Harris, "The European Social Charrer" supra, note 137 at 307, notes that a result of a 
combined reading of Article 20(l)(b) and (c) is that a state need accept only between a half and two-thirds of 
the substantive undertrikings in Part U- He M e r  notes that rnost of the 22 Contracting Parties have accepted 
frir more than this and that six states (Belgiurn, Fmce, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugai and Spain) have 
accepted al1 or virtudly al1 of the articles in Part II. 
obligation with respect to some of them."14' 
Unlike its civil and political counterparts enforceable under the ECHR, the economic, 
social and cultural rights are only subject to supervision. This is corroborated by Part IIi of 
the Appendix to the Social Charter. "It is understood that the Charter contains legai 
obligations of an international characier, the application of which is submitted solely to the 
supervision provided for in Part N thereof." The international supervision mechanism 
provided by Part IV is based on the Contracting Parties' duty to submit reports on the 
application of the Social Charter.lQ 
An assessrnent of the Social Charter shows that it protects most of the rights thought 
of as economic and social rights. But there are some omissions. notably, the nght to 
education, and a general guarantee to a right to housing, among others. Many of these gaps 
have been filled by the Revised Social Charter'" that entered into force on July 1, 1999. 
I J '  Matti Pellonpaa, supra, note 135 at 856. The writer further notes (at 857)that "[iln so Far as 
cconomic and social rights rue concerned, the substantive provisions have been spelled out as State obligations 
of ri somcwhat less straightforward nature, and international supervision is fm less effective than the system 
established by thc ECHR." Another scholar has pointai out that the obligation imposed is an obligation to use 
dl means rcasonably available towards the attainrnent of a result, but not a guarantee chat it will be attsiined 
sincc they are not enforceable individuid rights. See Khan-Freund, ''The European Social Charter" in F G 
Jacobs (cd.) European Law and the Individual (1976) at 181, cited in Matti PeIlonpaa, lbid See dso Burns H. 
Weston, Robin Ann Lukes & Kelly M. Hnatt, supra, note 129 at 597. 
'"~atti  Pellonpaa, Ibid. at 857. The state reports are studied by four organs. namely the Commîttee 
of Independent Experts, the Govenunental Cornmittee of the European Social Charter, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and, finaily, by the Cornmittee of Ministers. For detaiIs on the supervision 
system see D. J. Harris, 'The System of Supervision of the European Social Charter, ProbIems and Options for 
the Future," in L. Breton (ed.). The Future of European Social Policy, 2"' edn. (Deventer: Kluwer, 199 1) at 1. 
See genenlly, David Harris, 'The European Social Charter," supra, note 137 at 307-328; P. O'Higgins, 'The 
Europem Socid Charter" in R. Blackburn & J. Taylor (eds,) Human Rights for the 1990s (London: ManseIl, 
199 1 ) at 335-354. 
'"~evised Eurapem Social Charter, ETS No. 163. 
Except in a very marginal way, the Social Charter does not cover cultural rights." 
In all. the European human rights system, as in the United Nations system, reflects 
a basic distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, and 
social nghts on the other. The distinction, and their different regimes, reflect the traditional 
perception diat these rights are essentially distinct from each other. However, this distinction 
has not been consistently upheld even at the textual level of the ECHR and the Social 
~horter.'"' For instance. the right to education, which is not a traditional civil or political 
right, is regulated in Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. Also. there are some 
decisions of the Eitropean Court ofHuman Rights tending to show that there is an extent of 
overlapping between the ECHR and the Social Charter?' This, to a great extent, has 
enhanced the protection by enforcement of otherwise unenforceable economic and social 
rights under the Social Charter. To this extent, the European system, owing to the dynamism 
of the European Coim of H m n  Rights, has a perspective that other regional systems (which 
are hereinafter examined) cm borrow. 
' # ~ a t t i  Pellonpaa. supra, note 135 at 857, fn. 15. 
'%ee Matti Pellonpaa. Ibid. at 859. 
'%ee Young. James and Webster i case, Judgement of 13 August 198 1. Publications of Europan 
Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 44, and Airey's case, judgement of 9 October 1979, Publications of 
Europerin Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 32. Recentiy, a Commission has proposed the 
'individualization' of socid rights. 'The individualization of social rights would aim to hait the practice of 
taking account of persona1 links when ensuring social protection of m individual. It would contribute to 
hringing social protection in line with legislation governing employment contncts, which considers workers 
as individuals. See 'Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the European Union, Communication fiom 
the Commission' (1998), online at d i t t p ~ / e u r o p a e u . i n t l c o m m / d @ 5 / j o b s / f o ~ ,  sec. 
2.4.. cited in PhiIip Alston & J. H. K. Weiler, " An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights" in Philip Alston, (ed.) The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: University 
Press, 1999), 3 at 3 1-32. Cf. Silvania Sci- "From Strasbourg to Amsterdam: Prospects for the Convergence 
of European Social Rights Policy" in Philip Alston, 'The EU and Human Rights" Ibid. at 474-501. 
2.3 -2. The Inter-American Systern 
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights is anchored on the 
ACHR.'~' also known as the Pact of San José, which entered into force on July 18, 1978. 
Although the Bogota' Conference proclaimed the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man, 1948, it was generally acknowledged that the Declaration did not, and was 
not intended to, create contractual binding obligations and therefore lacked the status of 
positive substantive 1aw.14' It h a ,  however, been argued that the Declaration remains an 
important source of obligation for the parties to the ACHR inasmuch as it protects rights 
(particularly economic, social and cultural rights) that are not found in the AcHR.~~' 
Nevertheless, since the Declaration was not intended to create binding obligations, it seems 
that, Save to the extent otherwise provided for under the ACHR, the Declaration cannot be 
invoked as a source of obligation binding on state parties. The subsequent moves towards. 
and actual adoption of a Protocol on economic, social and cultural rights, show that the 
Declaration was really not intended to be a source of binding obligation.lM A possibility 
'"sirPra. note 125. 
'"~armen van der Wilt & Viviana Krsticevic. ' n i e  OAS System for the Protection of H u m  Rightsl' 
in Raijri Hanski and Markku Suksi, supra, note 90 at 371. 
149 David Harris, "Regionai Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievernent" in David 
J. Harris and Stephen Livingstone, The Inter-American Systern of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), 1 3t 6 [hereinafter "Regional Protection ofHuman Rights"]. 
150see interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Dutin of Man Within the 
Framework of Article 64 of American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion No. OC-10189, reported 
in (1990) 1 1  Human Rights Law Journal 118, [hereinafter, "Advisory Opinion"],where the Inter-Amencan 
Court conceded that the American Declaration was not a treaty under international law but a non-binding 
declaration of moral pt-inciples. The Court went on to note that the Declararion could be relevant in the 
interpretation of the Amencan Convention and the Charter of the OAS. See aiso, David Harris, b'Regional 
Protection of Human Rights," lbid at 4 arguing that "[a]lthough it still does not have direct legai effect, the 
Declarationhas corne to be indirectly legaily binding by virtue of human rights obligations in the OAS Charter, 
which incorporate the substance of the Amencan Declaration." 
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would be that it has corne to state the d e s ,  and acquire the status, of regional customary 
international law in the way that the UDHR has at the international level. But, as David 
Harris has noted. "this would appear not to have happened.""' Hence, the ACHR remains the 
source of binding legal obligations. 
Like the ECHR, (afier which it was pattemed),ls2 the ACHR clearly concentrates on 
civil and political rights, paying only peripheral attention to the observance of economic, 
social and cultural rights. In fact, it was agreed during the drafting stages that only a passing 
reference would be made to econornic, social and cultural rights.lS3 It contains only a single 
article on economic, social and cultural rights. In a very generally worded obligation. the 
states agreed to "adopt rneasures ... with a view to achieving progressively ... the full 
realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, education, scientific, and cultural 
standards set fonh in the Charter of the Organization of American a ta tes...."'" From the 
wording of this article, there appears to have ken a conscious effort not to provide a 
coherent enurneration of al1 the rights concemed. This is evident in the reference to the 
152 See Thomas Buergenthal, 'The Inter-Arnericsui System for the Protection of Human Rights" in 
Theodor Meron, supra, note 100,439 at 44 1. 
'%ee Matthew Cnven, 'The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Inter- 
Amcrican System of H u m  Rights" in David J. Harris and Stephen Livingstone, supra, note 149,289 at 307 
[hercinafter "Protection of Economic, Social arid Culturd Rights"]. In gened economic, socid suid cultural 
rights were regarded 'more as byproducts of econornic development than as values themselves' and were 
therefore treated as marginai and diversionary concern. See L. Leblanc, "The Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Protocol to the Inter-American Convention and its Background" (1992) 10 Netherlandr Quarterly of 
Human Rights 130. This is also a reflection of the utter contempt to which these rights were held in the region 
which overflowed into the international arena during the debates for the Coveniints. 
Charter of the Organization of Amencan States (OAS)."~ 
The ACHR does not provide a clear-cut system of supervision and control with a view 
to improving the observance of economic, social and cuiturai r i g h ~ . ' ~ ~  Article 42 merely 
enables the Commission to 'watch over' the promotion by taking cognizance of copies of 
reports which are to be submitted annually to designated organs of the OAS. Al1 these 
prompted a scholar to regard the economic, social and cultural rights provisions of the ACHR 
as a 'disappointment.' '57 
In 1988, a Profoc01 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the San Salvador 
c roto col)^^^ was adopted by the OAS General Assembly, in a bid to increase the prevailing 
scant attention to economic, social and cultural rights. The Protocol entered into force on 
November 16, 1999, after receiving the necessary 1 1 ratifi~ations.''~ It recognizes a number 
of economic, social and cultural rights comparable to the European Social Charter. Also, the 
Protocol recognizes farnily rights, rights of the child and the elderly. But it has been criticized 
for not appearing to have been specially tailored to suit the problems of the region?" 
%e Matthew Craven. "Protection of E m m i c ,  Sociul und Culturul Rights," rupro. nMc 153 at 299. 
lS6see Harmen van der Wilt & Vinana Krsticevic. supra. note 148 at 384. 
IS7see Matthew Craven."Rotection of Econornic. Social and Culturai Rights." supra. note 153 at 299. 
158~dditiona1 Prot~col IO the Anrerhn Convention on Humon Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
und Ctilfiml Rights. OASTS No. 69. OAS Doc. 0EAI.Ser. N42 (SEPF), reprinted in (1989) 28 LL.M. 156. 
'j91n accordance with Article 21(3) of the Protocol. it entered into force on the date it received the 
eleventh ratification. Costa Rica ratified as the eleventh state of November 16. 1999. Status of ratification is 
rivailable at dittp~/~~~.cidh.oas.org(Basicos/Ba~ic%2ODocuments/enb~.htm> . Aiso, at the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights web page at dittp://www.cidh.oas.or~asic.htm> (Both visited 2:34 PM, July 
7, 2000). 
'"OSee Matthew Craven,"Protection of Eco~~omic, Social und Culrural Rights," supra. note 153 at 301. 
The criticisrn is based on the fact that the Protocol gave no recognition to the rîgfits of indigenous populations, 
and the rights of migrant workers. 
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It is noteworthy that the Protocol mates a dichotomy in the catalogue of econornic, 
social and cultural rights by declaring a petition system applicable with regard to uade union 
rights (Article 8) and the right to education (Article 13), while preserving the reporting 
procedure for the other rights.16' This distinguishes it from the other regional instruments. 
While the adoption of the Protocol represents a step forward, even if belated, nothing 
further need be said about it, as it has yet to corne into force. It is, however, evident that, until 
now, economic, social and cultural rights were regarded either as contextual considerations 
in the implementation of civil and political rights or as interests that would be met once the 
civil a n d  political rights were ensured. Thus, in the Inter-American system respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights rernains largely haphazard, and, to some extent, lacking 
in direction. These rights have hitherto been "overlooked or treated as merely parenthetic 
c~ncems"'~'just like under the European system before the Social Charter, and very much 
unlike the African system. 
2.3.3. The African System 
Although the African Charter is very much like the ECHR and the ACHR in the way 
it seeks to protect civil and political rights, it moves beyond the traditional Western concept 
of individual rights by its equal emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights. The 
Charter provides in a single document a core of both economic, social and cultural nghts, 
'"sec Harmen van der Wilt & Viviana Krsticevic. supra. note 148 at 384. 
162~atthew Cnven. "Protection of Economic. Social and Cultural Righrs" supra, note 153 at 321. 
and civil and political nghts, in addition to other newlycodified rights. This sets it apart as 
the first international instrument to enshnne such r i g h t ~ , ' ~ ~  and distinguishes it from the 
~ u r o p e a n ' ~  and Inter-American system. In this regard it is comparable with the newly 
created Middle East system. 
Also, the Afncan Charter is outstanding in its belief in the indivisibility of rights 
given the Charter's stipulation that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from 
economic. social and cultural rights either in conception or in universality. It eloquently 
deciares that the satisfaction of the latter righis is a guarantee for the enjoyment of the 
former. However, like the other systems, the machinery of enforcement or supervision for 
the econornic, social and cultural rights under the African system is virtually n~nexistent,'~~ 
thus, reducing the so-called uniq~eness'~~ of the African system to little more than a mere 
1631ulia Swanson. 'The Emergence of New Rights in the African Charter" ( 199 1) 12 N. Y. L Schl. J. 
inri. & Comp. L 307 at 3 15-324. 
Iasee Carol M. Tucker, "Regionai Human Rights Models in Europe and Africa: A Comparison" 
( 1983) 10 Syracuse J. Intl. L & Commerce 135 at 156- 157. 
' 65~h i s  i  not to say that the African Charter does not provide for a machinery of enforcement. It 
created a machinery (th\: African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights) to supervise the implementation 
of the Charter. Regrettably, the Commission has not shown any serious consideration for econornic, social and 
cultural rights. Even though it has not been effective in the protection of other rights, its consideration for 
economic. socid and cuIturai rights has been, at best, marginal and peripheral. See O. Umomike, "The 
Protection of Human Rights under the Banjul (Afncan) Charter on Humm and Peoples' Rights" (1988) 1 
A frican J. Inrl. L 65 at 8 1 ; Obijiofor Aginam. "Legitimate Govemance under the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples' Rights" in E.K. Quashigah and O.C. Okafor (eds.) kgit imte Govemnce in Africa (Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999) 345 at 363-369. See also, Cees Fiinterman & Catherine Henderson, ''The 
African Charter on Human and PeopIes' Rights" in Raija Hanski and Mrirkku Suksi, supra, note 90,387 at 395. 
Some scholars, however, believe that the Commission has so far acquitted itself creditably. See Evelyn A. 
Ankumah, The AFrican Commission on Human and Peoples' Füghts: Practice and Procedures, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) at 9; George W. Mugwanya, "RealiWng Universal Human Rights Noms Through 
Regional Human Rights Mechanisrns: Reinvigorating the Miican System" (1999) 10 Indiana Intl. & Comp. 
L. Rrview 35 at 43. 
'%ee Rose M. D'Sa, "Human and Peoples' Füghts: Distinctive Featuree of the African Charter" 
( 1985) 29 Journal of African Law 72 [hereinafter "Disrincrive Fearures"]. 
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window dressing. No more need be said about the Afncan Charter here since it is the main 
focus of this thesis and sufficientiy discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Notw ithstanding the difficulties of implementation, the ideals of the African Charter 
make it distinct from other regional systems, notably the European and Inter-American 
systems. The Middle East system reflects some of these ideals. 
2.3.4. The Middle East System 
On September 15, 1994, the League of Arab States approved the Ara& Charter on 
Human Rights.'" Until then there were no Middle Eastern Regional institutions or 
procedures for monitoring human rights. The Charter will enter into force when it has been 
ratified by at least seven ~ t a t e s . ' ~ ~  
Comparable to the A f h a n  Charter, the Arab Charter embodies, in a single 
document, a core of civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. 
Again like the Afrcan Charter, there is no separate supervisory machinery for civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural nghts on the other hand. 
This distinguishes it from the European and Inter-Arnerican system. However, the system of 
supervision established by the Arab Charter seems largely bereft of any serious hinctions 
for the promotion and protection of the rights specified in the Charter.'69 The Cornmittee 
167~irpra, note 127. 
I6%e A n b  States appear CO be dngging their feet in catiwg the instrument. By the end of 1999 only 
Egypt had ratified the Charter. 
169 See Dinah Shelton. "The Promise of Regional Humun Rights SystemsP* supra, note 127 at 362-363. 
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merely has powers to receive periodic reporting from state parties. M e r  studying the report, 
it is enjoined to 'distribute a report accompanied by the opinions and cornrnents of the States 
to the Human Rights Cornmittee of the Arab League.'"' No other functions of human rights 
promotion or protection are specified in the Charter. 
The probable ineffectiveness notwithstanding. the Arab Charter is a commendable 
step fonvard in rnaintaining the indivisibility of human rights as in the Aman Charter. This 
Jistinguishes the Arab system and the African system from the European and Inter-American 
system. How this equality, (evident in the notion of indivisibility), is carried out in practice 
is a different matter. 
it is noteworthy that the regional systems seem to be unified in their realization of the 
importance of paying more than a marginal attention to economic, social and cultural rights. 
Even in the regions where these rights were regarded as peripherd concems, there seems to 
have been a rethink as it has become evident that there cannot be true freedom for those 
wallowing in abject poverty and destitution. What has happened so far is a greater 
recognition of economic, social and cuiturai rights, but it falls short of an equd treatment 
with civil and political rights. Desirable as it may be, it seems that the hiIl importance of 
economic, social and cultural rights, especially to the developing countries, is yet to be 
appreciated. This justifies reemphasizing (even though briefly) the indispensability of these 
rights. 
2.4. Importance of Econornic, Social and Cuihval Rights 
Human rights constitute an inseparable whole reflecting the unity and uniqueness of 
the human being. The concept of human rights itself is an acknowledgment of the inherent 
dignity and value of the human person. As the UDHR recites, the recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of al1 human persons of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the ~ o r l d . ' ~ '  A true foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace cannot, therefore, be built when the totalities of the rights of human persons 
are not protected, as tme individual freedom cannot exist without economic secunty and 
independence. 
One pertinent question that underscores the indispensability of the economic, social 
and cultural rights is: to what extent c m  civil and politicai rights be protected and realized 
without the equal protection and realization of economic, social and cultural rights? There 
is no gainsaying the fact that civil and political rights cannot be realized unless freedom from 
want, which encapsulates the totality of econornic, social and cultural rights, is guaranteed. 
According to Chandrachud C.J. of the Supreme Court of India, both sets of rights are nothing 
but the "two wheels of a chariot,"17' each indispensable to the other and both necessary for 
there to be any forward movement toward the realization of a progressive vision. 
It is trite but me that civil and political rights cannot be seriously respected without 
simultaneously respecting economic, social and cultural rights. Many traditionai civil 
17 1 UDHR, paragraph 1 of Preamble. 
"'~inerva Mill bd v. India [1980] A.LR. (SC.) 1789 at 1806, per Chandnçhud. C.J. 
liberties are illusory to those living in p~verty. '~~ Most others depend on some socioeconomic 
rights for their realization. Thus. it has been asserted that the denial of the right to education 
(a social right) amounts to a denial of other rights, since ignorance. which is the consequence 
of an incomplete (or total lack of) education deprives individuals of their dignity and of the 
means of achieving re~ognition."~ Moreover, civil and political rights, like freedom of 
expression, freedom of association or the right to political participation, only acquire 
substance and rneaning for persons who have k e n  educated.I7' This point is particularly 
apposite for developing countries (especially in Afnca) where the illiteracy level is 
overwhelmingly high. 
Furthermore, economic and social conditions of existence exacerbate civil and 
political strife which underlie many violations of civil and political nghts. This fact has 
remained a consistent theme for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In its 
1979-80 annual report, for instance, the Commission recognized the existence of an "organic 
relationship between the violation of the rights to physical security on the one hand, and the 
neglect of economic and social rights ... on the other."'" It declared that "the neglect of 
economic, and social rights, ... produces the kind of social polarization that then leads to acts 
'73~raig Scott & Patrick Mncldem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand" supra, note 44 at 85. 
'7"~uswpha Mehedi. 'The Realization of the Right to Education, Inciudiog Education in Human 
Rights" Working Paper Presented to h e  Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, Fifty-first Session, E/CN.4ISub.U1999/10 of 8 July 1999, (para. 1) online at 
chttp://www.unhchr.ch.H~docda/Hur=.,93edb802567cb0037fe9c?Opendocumen~ (Visited 538 PM, Januacy 
2. 2000). 
L7S~bid. See also. Manfred Nowak. 'The Right to Education" in Asbjorn Eide. et al., supm, note 1 at 
189. 
'7%nter-~merican Commission on Human Rights. Annual Report 1979-80 at 15 1, cited in Matthew 
Craven,"Protection of Econornic, Social and Cultural Rights," supra, note 153 at 3 12. 
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of terrorism by and against the govemment.""" The Commission reemphasized this point 
more than ten years later in its study on economic, social and cultural rights where it noted 
that "it is evident that in many cases poverty is the wellspnng of political and social 
con flic t."'78 
It is also beyond dispute that the deplorable and deteriorating economic and social 
conditions of existence in Africa have been the incubators hatching the eggs of endemic and 
sweeping violent internecine conflagrations which, in their stride, have swept away the 
already contorted frame of civil and political nghts. Perhaps, Afnca, more than any other 
region of the world, stands out as the lighthouse drawing attention to the fact that realizing 
civil and political nghts, and indeed any other human right, in a situation of extreme 
destitution occasioned by the unbridled neglect of econornic, social and cultural rights, is like 
playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. 
It might be worth stressing, even at the risk of overemphasis, that economic, social 
and cultural rights protect a substantial part of what it takes to be a full person. With 
discriminative enforcement, the international community is wittingly suppressing half of 
what it is to be a full person, thus "excluding those segments of society for whom autonomy 
means little without the basic necessities of life."179 Sadly, but tragically true for Africa, as 
the next chapter shows, it amounts to replacing cracked lenses with opaque ones. 
178 Statu of Economic, Socid and Culturai Rights in the Hernisphere, Inter-Amencan Commission on 
Human Rights Annual Report 1991,283 at 305. 
179~raig Scott & Patrick Macklem, "Connirutional Ropcs of S a d '  supra. note 44 at 29. 
C-R THREE 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN TRADITIONAL AM> 
MODERN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The African Charter sets up a system for the promotion and protection of human 
rights that is global in outlook but regional in orientation. It is tailored to be responsive to 
African needs and based on African legal philosophy.' In addition to emphasizing the 
importance of economic, social and cultural rights, the Charter fundamentally underscores 
the indispensability of economic, social and cultural rights to any meaningful realization of 
civil and political rights: "...the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rightC2 
The African Charter's bold declarations were anchored in, and inspired by, the 
necessity to promote and protect human rights in Afrîca, taking into full consideration the 
' ~ h e  stated objective of the draften of the Afncan Charter was to prepare a Charter which could be 
truly 'African' in its legal philosophy and in its response to the needs of the African peoples. See African 
Charter on Humun and Peoples' Rights, OAU. Doc. CABlLEG/67/3/Rev. 1 (1979) (draft prepared by a 
Meeting of Experts of the Organization of African Unity, Dakar, Senegai, Nov.23-Dec. 8, 1979). See also, 
Richard Gittleman, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legd Andysis" (1982) 22 Virginia 
J .  Inrl. L 667 at 668; R.M. D'Sa, ''The Afkican Charter on Humn and Peoples' Rights: Problems and Prospects 
for Regional Action" ( 1987) 10 Australian Yearbook of lntl. L 10 1 at 106. 
'~rearnble, paragraph 8. Osita Eze, 'Afncan Concept of Hurnan Rights' in Awa U. Kalu and Yemi 
Osinbajo (eds.) Perspectives on Human Rights (Lagos: Federd Ministry of Justice 1992) 8 at 19 fhereinafter 
'African Concept of Human Rights'] points out that this declaration marks a philosophical shift from ''the 
prcdorninant pnctice of ernphasizing civil and political rights at the expense of other rights." A.H. Robertson 
& J.G. MemlIs, Human Rights in the World (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989) at 216 observe 
thrtt, "the States concerned wished to put forward a distinctive conception of human rights in which civil and 
political rights were seen to be counter-bdanced by duties of social solidsirity, just as they are complemented 
by economic and social rights and supplemented by peoples' rights." 
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virtues of Afncan historical tradition and the values of African civilization.' In adopting the 
Charter, the States Parties saw as their duty the promotion and protection of human rights 
and freedoms in Afnca on the basis of the importance traditionally attached tu these rights 
and freedoms in ~frica.4 This amounts to a tacit acceptance of traditional Africa as the 
foundational basis of the African Charter and African human rights. 
The seemingly lacklustre performance of African States in the enforcement of 
economic, social and culturai rights5 vis-a-vis the expressive declarations of the Afdcan 
Charter. kindles a glimpse into the traditional protection of these rights. Put differently, since 
the African States Parties to the Charter were firmly convinced of their duty "to promote and 
protect human and peoples' rights and freedorns, taking into account the importance 
trczditionalfy6 attached CO these rights and freedoms in ~frica,'" the question then remains: 
to what extent is that which is currently obtainable a reflection of "the importance 
trczditionnliy attached' to economic, social and cultural rights. 
This question entails an inquiry into the past (the Afncan past), fint to expose 
whether and how economic, social and cultural rights were protected, and then to make a 
3~remble, pmgraph 5. See Cees Fiintemm &Catherine Hendemn. 'The Afncan Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights" in Raija Hanski and Mtirkku Suksi, An introduction to the International Protection of 
Htrman Rights: A Textbook (TurkdAbo: Institute for Human Rights Abo Akademi University, 1999) at 387. 
J Prearnble, paragraph 1 1. [Emphasis addedl. 
' ~ a r i o  Gornez, "Sociai Economic Rights and the Human Rights Commissions" ( 1995) 17 Human 
Righrs Quarrerly 155 at 160 observes that "violations of civil and poiiticai rights have continued to be treated 
as though they are more senous. and more patenily intolerable, than are massive i d  direct denids of economic. 
socid and cultural rights." 
kmphasis added. 
7 See Preamble. paragraph 1 1. 
cornparison with the present situation in contemporary Africa. It also involves a critical and 
incisive examination of the nature and quality of protection of economic, social and cultural 
rights during the various stages of African history which covers three distinct pends  - 
traditional or pre-colonial. colonial, and modem or contemporary Africa. These concepts - 
traditional, colonial and modem Africa - are definitively set within the appropriate histoncal 
contexts under which they are used and referred to in this Chapter. 
The existence of human rights in traditional Africa has been varïously asserted and 
denied.' Largely, the debate has been as divisive and controversial as it is distracting. At the 
risk of joining the debate, though not oblivious to it, it will be shown that economic, social 
and cultural rights were in existence in traditional Africa and were adequately taken care of 
by the traditional systems. This will be compared with the protection of these rights in 
modem Africa. The fate of these rights in colonial Afnca is highlighted to the extent it aids 
proper elucidation of issues. 
This Chapter contends that economic, social and cultural rights were better protected 
in traditional Africa than in colonial and modem Africa. Traditional African features which 
%ee genenlly. Abdullahi Ahmed An-na'im and Francis M. Deng, (eds). Human Rights in Africa: 
Cross Cdtural Perspectives (Washington: The Brookings Institution 1990); Claude E. Welch and Ronald 1. 
MeItzer, Human Rights and Development in Afrca (Albany: State University of N.Y. 1984); Okay Martin 
Ejidike, 'Human Rights in the Cultural Traditions and Social Practice of the Igbo of South-Eastern Nigeria* 
(1999) 43 Journal of African Law 71-98; Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, "Human Rights: A Western 
Canstruct with Limited Applicabiiity" in Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: Cultural and 
Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1980) at 1-18; Dunstan M. Wai, "Human Rights in 
Sub-Saharan Africa" in Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Ibid. For those denying see, Rhoda Howard, Human 
Rights in Commonwealth Afrca (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield 1986) [hereinafter 'Humun Rights in 
Commonwealth Afrrca']; Jack Donnelly, 'Hurnan Rights and Human Dignity: A Critique of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights' (1982) 76 American Polirical Science Review 303 [hereinafter 'Human Rights 
and Hllman Dignity' 1. Rhoda Howard has strenuously argued that "traditional Africa protected a system of 
obligations and priviIeges based on ascribed statues not a system of human rights to which one was entitled 
merel y by virtue of king human," see Rhoda Howard, 'Gmup versus Individual Identity in the African Debate 
on Human Füghts' in An-na'im and Deng, Ibid [hereinafter 'Group versus Individual Identity'], 
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ensured the enjoyment of these rights were relentlessly undermined and distorted by 
colonialism, and made vimially incongrnous to the p s t  colonial westphaliang mode1 African 
state. Thus, this cornparison does not, in any way, pretend to be ignorant of the existence of 
conditions making a wholesale reversion to the status quo ante impossible and impracticable. 
However, it is done in the belief that the past is, and has ken, a glowing lamp on the future's 
meandenng dark alley which may guide the prudent sojoumers within its sphere. While the 
past cannot be recreated, its lessons can be, and usually are, instructive. 
3 2.  DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
"[TJhere is ... rather too much talk about definitions. A 
definition, strictly speaking, i s  nothing but an 
abbreviation in which the user of the term defined may 
plcase himself. ."Io 
3 2 . 1  . Traditional Africa 
Defining the term "traditional Africa" has not really been of interest to African 
human rights scholars who have had to write about that epoch in African history." 
Consequently, although the term has been largely used without any attempt to define it or 
circumscribe its use, nevertheless there seems to be an implicit agreement as to the period 
covered by the use of that term. 
9 See infra, note 1 of Chapter Four, 
10~ollock. Book Review, (1931) 47 LBR. 588. 
" ~ e e  srcpra. note 8 for some of the work dealing with traditional Africa 
Traditional Africa is the first of the three phases under which the historicai, political 
and legal evolution of Afnca can be generally categorized. That is the pre-colonial, colonial 
and post colonial (independent) Afnca. According to Osita Eze. traditionai Africa refers to 
"pre-capitalist Africa (pre-colonial) comprising the primitive communal stage, the slave and 
feudal modes of prod~ction."'~ Why he chose to define the traditional society in ternis of the 
means of production is far from being clear. Besides, his definition is too nmow for the 
purposes of this analyses. 
In a nutshell, traditional Africa refers to that period in f i c a n  history before Europe's 
imperialistic conquest and consequent colonization of ~frica." The conquest and 
colonization of Africa occurred in different parts of Afnca at different times. European 
interest in Africa began to develop in the early 1 Sh cenniry. In 14 1 5, the Portugese succeeded 
in establishing their first foothold in North Africa. By the late 19" century, Europe had 
become the dominant factor in the political scene of Africa. By 1914, the whole of the 
continent waî under the control of one colonial power or the other. except Ethiopia, and to 
a lesser extent. ~iber ia . '~  
1'- Osita Eze, 'African Concept of Human Rights' supra, note 2 at 12. 
"~arol  M. Tucker. "Regionai Human Rights Models in Europe and Afnni: A Cornparison" (1983) 
I O Syracuse J .  Intl. L 135 at 15 1, in. 1 13, observes that "pre-colonial Afnca encompasses the period before 
1830, when European holdings consisted primarily of Portuguese enclaves, slave-trading opentions, and 
provisions posts dong the coast. The French annexation of Algeria in 1830 was the first European clairn to 
densety populated African lands." While it is true that French annexation of Algeria in 1830 was the first 
European claim to denseIy populated African lands, it is incorrect and misleading to set 1830 as the terminal 
date of pre-colonial Afnca By that date a significant portion of Afica was not under coionid rule. The 
annexation of Algeria, even though symbolic, is not enough to mark the terminal date of pre-colonial Afiica for 
the whole of the African continent. 
l"~adfrey E. K Ofomata, The Geography of Africa* in Christopher C. Mojekwu et a1 (eds), Afican 
S o c i e ~ ,  Culture and Politics: An lntroducrion to Afncan Studies, (Washington: University Press of America 
1977) 18 at 28; see also N. E. Davis, Afnca in the Modern World (Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1973) at 
Traditional African society was largely pre-literate" and this has made traditionai 
Africa a subject of undue romanticization and misunderstanding leading to hasty and 
unwarranted condemnation.16 Attempts to properly understand it has led to various and 
varying  classification^^^ the propriety of which is not of much relevance to this thesis. 
3 ; Basil Davidson, Modern Afnca ( London: Longman 1983) at 3. Ethiopia fell under Italian occupation and 
domination in 1936 but became free again in 1941. Liberia, ruled first by whites on behalf of the American 
Colonization Society and later by freed men, declared itself the independent Republic of Liberia in 1847. It 
cnjoyed recognition from Ewopean imperid powers because of its specid relationship to the United States. See 
Makua wa Mutua, "Why Redmw the Map of Africa: A Mord and Legai Inquiry" (1995) 16 Michigan J. Intl. 
L I 1 1 3 at 1 122 [hereinafter 'Map of Afnca']. 
I5~eing 'largely-pre-literate' in this context means that writing was not widely used. even though not 
wholly absent. Ir should not be tziken to mean a total absence of literature (written and/or orature). However, 
orature was more cornmonly known and this accounts for the absence of documentary evidence. 
16 See for example, P. MitcheIl, "Africa and the West in Historical Perspective" in C.G. Hainer (ed.), 
A frica Today, 1959, rit 12, citcd in U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peopler ' Rights 
(The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) at 12 [hereinafter 'African Chaner'].  
' 7 ~ e b a  M'Baye, 'Human Rights in Afnca' in K. Vasak and P. Alston (eds), The Intemtiond 
Dimensions of Human Rights, vol. 2 (Westport: Greenwood 1982) 583 at 588-589 , sees traditional Africa as 
hicrarchically divided by the caste system but unified by the mythical beliefs where the individual was not 
poised against the group but was indeed part of it. In this period according to him, "the purpose of law is to 
maintriin society in the state in which it had been tmsrnitted by the elders." This has k e n  challenged by Osita 
Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problerns (Lagos: Macmillan 1984) at 12-14, [hereinafter 
'Selected Problem'l who contends chat no society was satic and that the analysis basicaily ignores the fluid 
and dynamic nature of law in the evolutionaq society changing from one socioeconomic formation to another. 
Hc proffered a classification of traditional AKca into communal or primitive mode; slave owning mode and 
fcudd mode. On his own, Nguema divided traditional Ahican society into four, namely, the gregarious society 
madc up of bands living under the direction of pre-erninence of a man of worth - the group's chief such as the 
pygrnies of central AFrica; the familid society, in which d l  attitudes, behaviour, gestures and activities of the 
membcrs of the community are determined by the familial iink; the hierarchicd society in which the rules of 
conduct, attitudes, behaviour and activities depend upon where one stands on the socid ladder or what role one 
plrrys in society; and the society en route to statehood which adopted progressive and systematic application 
of rulcs to al1 subjects of the sovereign. See 1. Nguema 'Human Rights Perspectives in Africa' (1990) 2 HRU 
261 at 266. This classification has ken  rejected by Umozurike who argues that al1 societies are to some extent 
gregiuious or otherwise the individuals would not form a society at ail; that the subdivision of the "familial 
society" applies to ai1 societies and is not restricted to any particular one; that there was hierarchy in most 
organised societies for a11 people were not, and are not necessarily, equai in status. He went on to canvas a 
brorid division into those with "advanceci systems" and the "atomistic communities." See Umozurike, 'Afncan 
Charter' Ibid. rit 14. In choosing this ~Iassification, Umozurike used Western paradigm of advancement to 
classify traditional societies. This should be rejected. It is tantamount to mixing oil with water. Save for 
compmtivc purposes, it is illegitimate to use the culturai paradigm of one society to judge the other. Whatever 
its worth, Western notion of advancement should be regarded as king of lirnited applicability, and thus, an 
improper yardstick to determine the advancement of other non-Western societies. Traditional Africa can be 
properIy cIassified into centralized (those with established central administrative machinery) and non- 
3.2.2 Colonial Africa 
As earlier noted, Africa as a whole did not come under colonial mle at the same time. 
Although European interest in Africa began to develop in the early 1 5Lh century, it was not 
until the second half of the 19' century that Europe becarne a dominant power in ~frica." 
By 19 14, the whole of Africa (with the exception Ethiopia and, to an extent, ~iberialP) had 
come under one colonial power or the other?' Ethiopia fell under Italian domination in 1936 
but becarne free again in 1941 .2' Africn remained under colonial rule until the second half 
of the 20' century when some states started regaining their independence with Ghana biating 
the trail in 1957. Most other Afncan states regained their independence in the 1960s. 
Consequently, the second half of 1800 up to the second half of 1900 is generally regarded 
as the period of colonialism in African history? It is this period that is referred to in this 
thesis as colonial Africa. 
ccntralized society (chose with more communai and l e s  intrusive centrai systerns of administration). See M h u  
wa Muturi, ''The Banjul Charter and the Afncan Culturiû Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Langtiiige of Duties" 
( 1995) 35 Virginia J.  Int' l  L. 339 at 347. [hereinafter, "African Cultural Fingerprint"]. 
In See J. D. Fage, A History of Africa, 3rd edn. (London: Routledge, 1995) at 39 1. He observes that 
"[tlhe confrontation rit Fashoda in 1898 and the British conquest of the Afrikaner republics in the following 
thrcc years were the clirnatic acts in the European (conquest and) partition of Africs Thereafter there were only 
loose ends to be dealt with." 
I9~rige ruggests that Liberia did not suffer the fate of others because neither the British nor the French 
governments could intervene to add the indifferently governed territory to their adjacent territory adjacent 
colonies without offending the other and dso the United States, which increasingly - if hardIy willingly - was 
forced into the role of becoming a protectonte state. See, J. D. Fage, Ibid. 
20 See note 14 and the authonties cited. 
2 i Godfrey E.K Ofomata, supra, note 14 at 28; J. D. Fage, supra, note 18 at 39 1. 
" ~ e e  E. A. El-Obid and K. Appiagyei-Atua, 'Human Rights in AFnca - A New Perspective on 
Linking the Past to the Presen~' (1996) 41 McGill LJ. 819 at 822. But see Carol M. Tucker, supra, note 13 at 
1 37 which notes that "Colonial nile lasted from approximately L 83O- 1962." 
3.2.3. Modem Africa 
The term "modem Africa" as employed in this thesis refers to the p s t  independence 
era of African political history. However, it will be used in a restricted sense to depict the 
Afncan human rights era since the adoption of the Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights in 198 1. It is, therefore, used to cover the period from the adoption of the Charter to 
the present time. The choice is rather arbitrary and does not pretend to be an authority on 
what constitutes 'modem Africa* in African human rights discourse. It is informed by the 
writer's belief that the period commencing with the adoption of the Afrcan Charter actually 
represents a new (modem) en in  African human rights discourse and practice. 
3.2.4. Justification For Use of Terms 
Human rights debate in Africa has been identified as refiecting "the continent's 
political and legal history [and] therefore any discussion of human rights in Africa must be 
grounded in the political and ideological history of the ~ontinent,"~ a history which covers 
pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial Africa. In the context of the African Charter this 
becomes more meaningful in view of the much touted uniqueness of the Charter as a 
reflection of African values. This justifies the location of these values within their proper 
historical context. 
Moreover, the three stage classification of Afncan history is, and will continue to be, 
13 E.A El-Obaid & K. Appiagyei-Atua, Ibid at 821. The authors drew a distinction between post 
colonial and contemporary Africa. Their classification ofcontemporary Africa appears to be in tandem with 
its use in this thesis to depict the era of Afnciin human rights since the Charter. 
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a historical fact that dictates and shapes African attitudes and response to issues - regionai 
and international, The terms are therefore used to designate the historical realities which 
they represent in Africa's political and legai history as well as in human rights practices and 
discourse. 
3.3. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN TRADITIONAL AE;RICA 
3 -3.1. The Concept of Human Rights in Traditional Africa 
"A group of people bent on denying or ignoring 
one another's rights cmnot exist as a ~oc ie ty ."~  
Scholars of African human rights are not agreed on the issue of the existence of 
human rights in traditional Africa On the one part is the school of thought made up of those 
arguing that traditional Africa lacked any sense or notion of human rights? According to 
Jack Donnelly, "most non-western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice 
of human rights but the very concept. As a rnatter of historical fact, the concept of human 
rights is an artefact of modem Western Civili~ation."~~ He maintains that "the idea of human 
rights, as the term is ordinarily understood - namely, as rights / entitlements / claims held by 
"~mozurike. "Afncan Charter>' supra. note 16 at 17. 
" ~ h e  chief proponents of this school i-ue Jack Donnelly and Rhoda Howard. See Jack Donnelly, 
'Humun Rights and H r t m n  Dignity' supra, note 8 at 303, Jack Donnelly, ''The Right to Developrnent : How 
not to Link Human Rights with Development," in Claude Welch and Rondd Meltzer, supra, note 8 at 261-283, 
[hereinafter "The Right to Developrnenr"]; Jack Donnelly, What are Human Rights?: An Hisroncal and 
Conceptttal Analysis (Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 198 1) [unpublished] at 378-426; Rhoda Howard, 
'Hiiman Rights in Commonwealth Afnca' supra, note 8 at 16-33; Rhoda Howard, "Evaiuating Human Rights 
in Africri: Some Problems of Irnplicit Comparkons" (1984) 6 Humon Rights Quarterly 160-179 [hereinafier 
"Evalrrating Human Rights in Afica"]. 
"~ac k Donnelly, 'Human Rights and H w ~ n  Digniry ' Ibid. 
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al! individuals simply because they are human beings - is foreign to traditional African 
society and political c u l t ~ r e . ' ~  He further argues that even in many cases where Africans had 
personal rights vis-a-vis their govemment, those rights were not based on one's humanity per 
se but on membership in the cornmunity. social status, or some other ascriptive 
charactcri~tics.~~ Even though he admits that in traditional African societies rights were 
assigned on the basis of communal membership, family status or achievement, he denies that 
these were personal human rights. He is only prepared to concede the fact that 
"Africans ... have always devoted much of their best energies to attempts to realize human 
dignit~. '~ 
There are certain fundamental Baws inherent in Donnelly's argument. There are 
obvious contradictions in the assertion that African traditional society did not accord rights 
to individuals by the fact of their humanity but on the basis of their membership in the 
community. One is not sure whether this community k i n g  talked about is a community of 
beasts or of human beings. if it is a comrnunity of beasts then Donnelly's assertion can hardly 
be faulted because such a community must surely lack al1 attributes of humanity. But if it 
is a community of human beings, then it amounts to standing logic on its head to think and 
argue. as Donnelly attempts to do, that a people who granted rights on the basis of 
membership to their community did not recognize that they were al1 hurnan beings and so 
could not have done so on the basis of their humanity. 
17 Jack Donnelly, 'The Right to Development,' supra, note 25 at 268 
"tbid., at 269 
19~bid 
To take this argument further, if it is conceded, as Donnelly seems prepared to 
concede, that a people have the notion of human dignity, with al1 its implications to human 
existence. then it becomes a matter of stretching inelastic logic to argue that they are 
accorded rights, not in realization of their humanity but, on the basis of their community. 
People exist in a community because they are human, they are not human because they exist 
in a community. 
It is fundamentally wrong to deny the existence of the concept of human rights in 
traditional Africa on the bais of the absence of 'equal rights' among al1 members of the 
society. If equality of rights is the parameter for measuring the existence of the concept of 
human rights, al1 hurnan societies. including Western societies, would be marked out for lack 
of it." The history of the evolution of human rights in Western societies shows that it was 
founded on the fulcrurn of inequality. For one thing, the so-called 'rights of man' were. 
literally, only the rights of white men.3' It took a very long time, and a major political 
struggle, for the United States, which otherwise had been in the forefront in the elaboration 
of human rights as part of the constitutional order, to include black men in their concepts of 
equal rights." It took an even longer time to include women in this process and thereby move 
away from 'the rights of man' to human rights. History shows that the 'self-evident truth,' 
30 A. Belden Fields & Wolf-Dieter Narr, "Human Rights as a Holistic Concepty' (1992) 14 Humun 
Rights Qirarterly 1 at 4 posit that even though equality, as proclaimed in both the French and US historical 
rights texts, is fundamental, if not the most fundamental, component of human rights, yet "inequality not only 
persist today, but within most societies, and between the Western industridized countries and most countries 
of the third world, it has been increasing." 
31~s l jorn  Eide & Allan Rosas, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge" in 
As bjorn Eide, et al., Econornic, Social and Cultural Rightx A Textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 
15 at 25. 
which subsequently received "universal endorsement"" in the UDHR. was proclairned by 
persons who owned slaves. and who never intended to include the slaves in their concept of 
equality." Thus, the absence of 'equal rights' in traditional Africa while an evidence of 
human rights violation, is not evidence of the total absence of the very concept of human 
rights. 
On her own, Howard has contended that the "African concept of justice" unlike 
human rights, "is rooted, not in individual daims against the state, but in the physical and 
psychic secunty of group rnernber~hip.~"~ While adrnitting that both dignity and justice were 
served in these societies, she maintains that "[tlhese were cenainly not societies based on 
nghts, ... and to assert their humm rights as individuals would undercut their dignity as group 
rnember~."~' 
3 f ihe 'univena1 endonement' should be accepted with caution. Even though the UDHR has come to 
bc univcrsally accepted (endorsed), it came into k ing  when many Third World states, pmicularly African 
states, wcre under one fom of foreign colonial domination or the other. Those states did not make any input 
cven though thcy subsequently accepted it. Tu chat extent, it could not be said to have received 'universal 
cndorsement' at the time of its adoption. As Keba M'baye observed ". . .the African countries played but a 
minute pan in the prepmtion of the Universal Declaration. For a long time iifterwards, it w u  not applicable 
to the nationals of those countries. Neither civil and politicai rights, nor economic, social and culturd rights 
werc able to be applied to them without restrictions. And these restrictions were not necessitated eiiher by 
respect for the right of others or by the safeguarding of public order, security or morals." See Keba M'baye, 
srrpra, note 17 rit 586. Sec generally, A O Chukwurah, "The Cogency of International Law in Africa" ( 1976) 
1 Nig.  J.  R. 10-29. 
34 Asbjom Eide & AiIan Rosas, supra, note 3 lat 26. It is interesting to observe here that even Thomas 
Jefferson, one of the most enlightened of those who made the declaration and indeed the author of the 
universalistic clriims in the Declaration of Independence, not only owned slaves but did not cdl  for equal 
recognition of women. blacks and Native Americans. See Thomas Jefferson, Basic Writings (Garden City: 
Hrilcyon House, 1950). 
35~hoda Howard, *'Croup versus Individuai Idenrity" supra. note 8 at 166. 
36 Ibid. See also, Rhoda Howard, 'Human Rights in Common~vealth A@' supra, no te 8 at 1 8 where 
she argues that the so-called Afican concept of human rights is acnidly a concept of human dignity. In other 
words, those who daim the existence of an African concept of hurnan rîghts confùse human dignity (the end) 
with human rights (the means). 
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Howard seems to have an obsessive preoccupation with the Westem oriented statist 
paradigm as the only basis to found, and validate, any idea of human rights. While the 
Westem notion of human rights developed in response, and as a check, to the Westphalian 
statist model, extant international realities show that the state-centric ideology as envisaged 
in the UDHR has woefully failed to account for the constantly mutating power dynarnics that 
shape and reshape the daily lives of the individual in the societyn Hence, the shifting 
emphasis from the state to other sources of power affecting the individual in society. This 
demonstrates that the Westphalian sovereign temtorial state per se is not a conditio sine qua 
120)~ for the existence of a concept of human nghts," and thus invalidates the denial of an 
Afncan concept of human rights on the basis that the rights were not held against the state. 
Makau wa Mutua has pointed out that while it is probably correct to argue that 
traditional African societies did not emphasize individual rights in the sarne way that the 
European societies did, it is an incorrect presumption to claim that they did not know the 
conception of individual rights at This is because "a brief examination of the noms 
goveming legal, political, and social structures in presolonial societies demonstrates that the 
" ~ e e  Ken Booth, "Human Wrongs and International Relations" (1995) 7 1 International Affairs 103 
rit 123 which states that "the international system - in the guise of society of states - has not been normatively 
successful for 350 years .... In t e m  of spreading good life, Westphaiia is another of the West's failures." Cf. 
Richard Falk. 'The Challenge of Genocide and the Genocidai Politics in the Era of Globdization." in Tim 
Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler, (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: University Press, 1999). 
177 at i79-182. 
38 Cf. Jack Donneily, 'The Social Construction of International Human Rights" in Tim Dunne & 
NichoIas J. Wheeler, Ibid, 7 1 at 85 [hereinafter, "Social Constmction"], (insists that "[hlurnan rights ... are held 
with respect to, and exercised against, the sovereign territorid state." He however admit5 [at 963 that "[tlhe 
shortcomings of the state-centric systems of delivering internationdiy recopised human rights rire 
manifest...."). 
3 9 ~ a k a u  wa Mutua, 'Afican Cultural Fingcrprint,' supra. note 17 nt 348. 
concept of rights ... informed the notion of justice and supported a mesure of 
The other school of thought are those asserting that there is an African concept of 
human rights because no group of people cm exist as a society if they do not respect one 
another's right? According to Umozunke, "[tlhe existence of a scciety ...p resupposes the 
recognition of the rights of the members. This truism applies as much to human society as 
to the society of nations.'"' The concept of human rights is therefore not a prerogative of one 
society, notwithstanding terminological differences." As Ronald Cohen ably articulated. a 
right is an entitlement: 
At its most basic level, a human nght is a safeguarded 
prerogative granted because a person is dive. This means that 
any human being granted penonhood has rights by virtue of 
species membership. And a right is a daim to something (by 
the right-holder) that can be exercised and enforced under a 
set of grounds or justifications without interference from 
4 I For those belonging to this group see Umozurike, 'African Charter' supra, note 16; Kwasi Wiredu, 
'An Akan Perspective on Human Rights,' in An-na'im and Deng, supra, note 8 at 243-260; Lakshman 
Marasinghc, 'Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa' in Claude Welch and Rondd Meltzer, supra, 
notc 8; Dunstrin M. Wai, supra, note 8 at 16; Christopher Mojekwu, 'International Human rights: The Afncan 
Perspectives,' in J.L. Nelson and V, M. Green, eds., international Humart Rights: Contemporary Issues (New 
York: Human rights Publishing Group, 1980); Asmaron Legesse, 'Human Rights in African Poiitical Culture,' 
in Kenneth Thompson, ed., The Moral Imperutives of Human Rights: A World Survey (Washington: University 
Press of America, 1980) at 125; Okay Martin Ejidike, supra, note 8; M h u  wa Mutua, Ibid. See also B. Obinna 
Okerc, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Afnca and the Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A 
Comparative Analysis with the European and .herican Systems,' (1984) 6 H u m n  Righrs Quarterly 14 1- 159; 
Lone Lindholt, Questioning the Universality of Human Rights: The Afrcan Charter on Humun and Peoples' 
Rights in Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); Iosiah A.M. Cobbah, 'African 
Values and the Human Rights Debate: An Afiican Perspective' (1987) 9 Hiimun Rights Quarterly 309-33 1. 
JZ Urnozuri ke, 'Afican Charter' supra, note 16 at 17- 18. 
43 See Minasse Halie, "Human Rights, Stability, and Development in Africa: Some Observations on 
Concept and Reality" (1984) 24 Virginia J. Inr'l. L 575 at 584 - 585, [hereinafter 'Human Rights, Stability, 
and Developmenr']. 
others. The subject of the right can be an individuai or a group 
and the object is that which is king laid claim to as a nght?' 
it is thus deducible that each society evolves means of granting penonhood to 
members of that society. Even though human rights as presently espoused in the international 
fora and as contained in the UDHR is a surfeit of Western Liberdisrno each society has over 
the years evolved means of protecting the rights of its members? As individuals and groups 
differ, so also do their perception of human rights, even though convergencies may exist? 
For instance. the value and sanctity of human life is universally recognized and accepted 
even though different societies take different views on when life begins and ends and what 
respect for it entaildg 
Traditional Africa may have lacked the equivalent terminology to encapsulate the 
totality of rights today asserted as human rights, (like rnost societies that existed 
contemporaneously), but the substance of the practices today regarded as human nghts were 
%ondd Cohen, 'Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the Study of Hurnan Rights in Africa,' in Ronaid 
Cohen et al (cds.) H~iman Righa and Governance, 1993, at 3-4, quoted in Makau wa Mutua, "Afican Cultural 
Fingerprinr", supra, note 17 at 348. 
" 5 ~ e e  Makau wa Mutua, 'The Ideology of Human Rights' (1996) 36 Virginia J. Inr'l L. 589-657 
[hereinrifter 'Icieology of Human Rights']. 
36 Sce Richard Harries, "Human Rights in Theologicai Perspectives" in Robert Blackburn & John 
Taylor, Htmian Rights for the 1990s: Legai. Political and Ethical Issues (London: Mmsell, 1991) at 1, (states 
thrit "(a)Il tdk about human rights presupposes a recognition of the dignity and worth of the human person"). 
Sce dso Chris Brown, "Universal Human Rights: A Critique" in Tim Dunne Br Nicholas J. Wheeier, supra, note 
37 rit 120. He forcefully argues chat "[tlo overemphasise rights in isolation from their social context is counter- 
productive, potentially undermining the very factors which create the context in which rights are respected." 
47 See Antonio Cassese, Human Righrs in a Changing World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
I W O )  at 5 1 ; Bhikhu Pmkh, "Non-Ethnocentric Universalism" in Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler, Ibid., at 
f 28-159. 
48 B hikhu Parekh, fbid. at 150- t 5 1. 
not lacking.Jg Moreover traditional African beliefs and ideas were not compartmentalized and 
were therefore intenuoven in their institutions and practices. There were no forma1 
distinctions between the sxred and the secular, between the religious and non-religious 
andor between the spiritual and the material areas of life?' 
This state of affairs may appear to the uninitiated as an indication of the absence of 
a particular notion or concept. This cannot be correct for, as Osita Eze points out: 
African societies in their process of development have 
evolved ideas of right and duty, right and wrong, as well as 
notions of justice and fairness. These ideas and notions as in 
other societies, formed the foundations of what subsequently 
carne to be known as human rights in western jurisprudence 
which provided the framework for their conceptualization and 
doctrinal development? 
Consequently, if human rights consists in the attribution of certain rights to, and imposition 
of certain duties on the individual to enable himfher lead a full and meaningful existence, and 
to contribute as a usehil member of society, then it is not an idea dien to traditional ~ f r i c a ' ~  
as these are well founded in the traditional Afncan beliefs and institutions. Adrnittedly, there 
was complete absence of extreme individudism. The pursuit of human rights or human 
49 Asmarom Legesse, supra, note 41 at 127, notes that "[dlifferent societies formulate their conception 
of human rights in diverse cultural idioms." Keba M'Baye, supra, note 17 at 589 notes that "[traditiondl 
African society was boh socialist and humanistic. It could not fail to have respect for man and for al1 that 
attaches to him, including his rights." 
" ~ e e  John S. Mbiti, Afrcan Religions and Philosophy (London: Heinemann. 1909) at 2. See aiso 
Okay Martin Ejidike, supra, note 8 at 72. 
5'0sim Eze. 'Afn'can Concept ofHumon Rights' supra, note 2 at 8; For this view see genenliy T.O. 
Elias, The Nature of Afncan Custamory Law (Manchester: University Press, 1962). See also Max Gluckman, 
The Jndicial Process Among the Barotse of Northem Rhodesiu (Manchester: Livingstone Institute, 1955); Kofi 
Quashigah, 'Reflections on the JudiciaI Process in Traditional Africa* (1989-1990) 4 Nig. J. R. 1-15 
52 See B. Obinna Okere, supra, note 41 at 141. 
dignity was not, therefore, concemed with an individual asserting or vindicating hisher right 
against the whole world? It sought a vindication of the communal well-being. But the 
traditional system was one in which the individual was well protected within hisher group. 
Even though individualism was not entirely lacking, it was countered by a deep and 
lasting proclivity towards 'we-thinking', resulting in a conception of the self that is unlike 
the Westem conception, which encourages individuality, differences, cornpetition and 
independence." The resolution of a claim was not necessarily directed at satisfying or 
remedying an individual wrong. It was, as Mutua points out, an opportunity for society to 
contemplate the cornplex web of individual and community duties and rights to seek a 
balance between the competing claims of the individual and society? 
There is no doubt that those arguing against a "concept of human rights" in traditional 
Africa are doing so on the basis of a Westem conceived and defined "human rights" 
applicable universally without exception. Thus, while plainly admitting that the historical 
roots of human rights are Westem, Donnelly forcefully advanced the view that the concept 
has universal app~ication.'~ It was through his spectacles doubly-tinted with a "Westem- 
S310siah A.M. Cobbah, supra. note 4 1 at 322. 
"~bid. Also, B. Obinna Okere, supra. note 41 at 148 has pointed out that "Ahican conception of man 
is not that of an isolated and abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit of 
solidarity." Makau wa Mutua, "Afncan Cultural Fingerprinr" supra, note 17 rit 361, notes that 'this phitosophy 
of thc goup-centred individual evolves through a series of crirefully taught rights and responsibilities. At the 
root were smctures of social and political organization, informed by gender and age, which served to enhance 
solidruity and ensure the existence of the cornmunity into perpetuity." 
5 5 ~ a k a u  wa Mutua, "*Afican Cultural Fingerprint" Ibid at 344-345- 
56~ack Donnelly. " H u m  Rights and Human Digniry". supra. note 8 at 313. On her pan Rhoda 
Howard is so fixated with the Western notion of human rights attaching onIy to the atomized individuai that she 
surnrnarily dismisses arguments by African scholars that individual rights were, and are capable of king, held 
in ri social, collective context Consequentiy, she vehementiy refuses to acknowledge that pre-coionial Afncan 
Universal" concept of human rights that he looked into the African traditional societies and 
discovered nothing resembling a Westem notion of hurnan rights. A concept of human nghb 
need not be Westem in order to exist in Africa. To be located in African traditional societies, 
it has to be African. It is dierefore wrong to deny the existence of a concept of human rights 
in traditional Afnca based on alien characterization of rights. As Nobels insightfully 
observed: 
The world view, normative assumptions, and referential frame 
upon which the paradigm is based, must, like the science they 
serve, be consistent with the culture and cultural substance of 
the people. When the paradigm is inconsistent with the 
culture and cultural definition of the phenomena, the people 
who use it to assess and / or evaluate that phenomena become 
essentially conceptuall y incarcerated." 
soçicties knew human nghts as ri concept. See Rhoda Howard, 'Group versus Individual Identity' supra, note 
8 rit 167. 
57 W. Nobcls, "African Consciousness and Libe~tion Sûuggles: Implications for the Developrnent and 
Construction of Scientific Paradigms," Paper presented at Fanon Research and Development Conference, Port 
of Spain, Trinidad, 1978, cited in Na'im Akbar, "Africentric Social Sciences for Human Libention," (1984) 
13 Journal of Black Studies 396. See also, A d m t i a  Pollis & Peter Schwab, 'Western Construct with Limited 
Applicability' supra, note 8 at 8-17. Nobels' statements bring to the fore the old, but extant, debate about 
whethcr the concept of hurnan rights is universai or cuIturaily relative to each particular social setting. This 
dcbatc has been addresscd by many scholars which rnakes further rehashing here unnecessary. See Chris Brown, 
supra, note 45; Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Ibid.; Bhikhu Prrrekh, supra, note 47; Fernando R. Teson, 
"International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism" (1985) 25 Virginia J. Intl. L 869; Abdullahi Ahmed An- 
na' im, "Problems of Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights" in An-na'im & Deng, supra, note 8 at 33 1-367: 
Daniel A. Bell, 'The East Asian ChaiIenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East-West Dialogue" (1996) 
18 Hcirnan Righrs Qwrterly 64 1 ; Christina M. Cerna, "Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: 
Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts" (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 
740; Michael C. Davis, "Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian 
Values" ( 1998) 1 1 Harvard Human Rights J o u m l  109; Richard A. Fdk, "False Universalism and Geopolitics 
of Exclusion: The Case of Islam" ( 1997) 1 8 Third World Quarterly 7; Thomas M. Frank, '1s Personal Freedom 
a Western Value'? (1997) 91 Am J. Intl. L 593; Dianne Otto, "Rethinking the 'Universaiity' of Human Rights 
L w "  ( 1997) i Columbia Human Righrs L. Rev. 11; A d m t i a  Pollis, *'Cultural ReIativism Revisited: Through 
the State Prisrn" ( 1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 3 16; Burns H, Weston, 'The Universality of Human Rights 
in a Multicultured World: Toward Respecthl Decision Making" in Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks, The 
Ftirnre of Inremarional Human Rights (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999) at 65-99; Rhoda E. Howard, 
"CuItural Absolutism and the Nostaigia for Community" (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly 3 15. It suffices 
to point out here that while most scholars recognize that the contextual approach to human rights is the most 
appropriate means of promoting universai recognition of the concept of human rights, some others regard this 
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It is from this standpoint of conceptual incarceration that the existence of human rights in 
traditional Africa has been denied. 
Other than the widely recognized truculent intransigence with which some Westem 
scholars and opinion vendors unversedly regard Western ideals, ideas and belief systems as 
having univenal application, there is nothing universal about the Western notion of human 
rights." h fact, the Westem notion of human rights is inherently a denial of univer~alism?~ 
This is because, philosophicaily speaking, the Westem Libenl doctrine of individual human 
rights, (with its roofs in the 18th century British and French Enlightenment), excludes, if not 
denies, economic, social and cultural nghts which are widely recognised by other cultural 
 tradition^.^ Again, despite the 'great role' ptayed by some Western states in 1993 in getting 
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna to affirm the universality of rights, some 
have continued to deny the validity of, and have maintained their contemptuous posture 
ripproach as fostcring a relativism that is mtithetical to the universal chmcter of human rights. It is thus, argued 
thrit the concept of human rights would not account for much if it cmnot be equiilly applied to ail peoples. The 
uscfulness of adopting ri cross-culturaily sensitive approach to the conceptualisation and promotion of human 
rights cannot be overemphasised. M i l e  not rooting for extrerne relativism or rabid universalism, a human rights 
approach that cakes into considention the socio-cultural context is preferable to one which seeks the lock, stock 
and barre1 transplantation of unrnitigated Western Liberdism. The modem content of 'universal' human rights 
ought to be tempered by specific cultural experience of each society. 
5 8 ~ .  Belden Felds & Wolf-Dieter Narr, supra. note 30 at 2 apily captured the contradictions inherent 
in chancterizing the Western notion of human rights as universal by describing it as "the particular presented 
a s  the universal." See also Josiah A.M. Cobbah, supra, note 41 at 3 14-3 15 (noting, inter dia, the exportation 
and superimposition of Western concepts of human rights to non-western cultures through colonialism). But 
see. Guyorri Binder, "Cultural ReIativism and Culturai Imperidisrn in Human Rights Law" (1999) 5 Buflalo 
Hrinlan Rights Law Review 2 1 t -22 1. 
5 9 ~ e e  pnenlly, Nom Chomsky. 'The United States and the Challenge of Relativity" in Tony Evans 
(ed.), Htiman Rights, Fim Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 24-5 1. 
" ~ e e  Adarnantia PoIlis, supra, note 57 at 3 18-319. (noting that 'Wiis lack of consideration for 
cconomic and social rights is one of the major differences between the Western doctrine and other culturai 
traditions - traditions that are far more extensive than the ideologicd stance of the exsocialist states."). 
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towards econornic, social and cultural rights.6' One, therefore, wonders the basis of vaunting 
Western Liberalism as if it encompassed the univenal notion of human rights recognised by 
al1 the peoples of the world. 
Human rights as a concept derives its credibility from its function as a mechanism 
for proiecting human dignity and ensunng the enjoyment of certain conditions necessary for 
a good lifee6* This, it has been observed, "is vdid in the West where it provides a protective 
bulwark against the Western state system by limiting the powers of the state in its relations 
with the populace, whereas the traditionai systems rnay have developed sirnilar, albeit 
terminologically different, rneans of protecting the human person against institutional or 
other abuses."63 Attempts to show the existence of an Afncan concept of human rights are 
not necessarily relativist. Rather, such efforts demonstrate that, just as in the West and other 
societies, methods of confemng and/or protecting the entitlements and human dignity of 
rnembers of the society were not lacking in traditional Afnca. These means of protection 
existed in the form of noms or principles ngulating acceptable interpersonal relationships 
of the individual with the larger group and vice versa. They existed in the beliefs and ideas 
of the societies and were intimately interwoven in their way of life, practices, values and 
6 1 See Philip Alston, "Economic and Social Rights" in Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove (eds.), 
Hnrnan Rigizts: An Agenda for the Next Cetitury (Washington, DC: ASIL, 1994) 137 at 14 1. 
62 Okay Martin Ejidike, supra, note 8 at 72, The writer notes that "the concept of human rights is much 
older than the terminology of buman rights which originated in documents on post-war organizatîon produced 
in the US during the war years. Legitimacy, justice, integrity and dignity of the individual, safeguards against 
rirbitrary rute. fieedom from oppression, and perseeution and individuai participation in colIective endeavours 
(including govemment of the cornrnunity) are concepts found in sirnilar f o m  in al1 civiiizations." 
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 institution^.^ The manifestations of these rights in the values of the societies will now be 
examined. 
3.3.2. Human Rights as a Manifestation of Societal Values 
Having argued above that traditional African society did not lack a concept of human 
rights; that such a concept of human rights was inherent and discemible in the society, 
although a terminology that equates the traditional African concept to the current notion of 
human rights may be lacking, therefore, its existence, nature and manifestation in the 
traditional set up has to be located within the society. This is evident in the social values of 
tradi tional Africa. 
Every human society is characterized by certain sets of vdues be they economic, 
political. social. religious, moral or aesthetic values. The values in a society will, to a very 
large extent, determine the character and nature of the society. "A social system" according 
to Radciiffe Brown, "cm be conceived and studied as a system of values and a society cannot 
mighi be argued that the "practices. values and institutions" of a society may not necessarily 
support or uphold universal value of human rights. For instance, the practices, vdues and institutions of 
Germriny in the 1930s and 1940s towards the Jews in its midst. Be that as it may, the practices. values and 
institutions of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s against the Jews are not more relativist or more anrithetical to 
the universal values of human rights than the state sanctioned (until recently) racial discrimination against the 
blricks by other Western strttes. This underscores the fact that no society (traditionai or modern) has been ide4 
in its practices, values and institutions with regard to human rights. As such, no society cm justifiably lay claim 
to universalist principles in the sense of its practices, values and institutions being the quintessence humanity's 
aspirations for a just society. That the practices, values and institutions of traditional African societies rnay not 
tiavc been the ided, as it is known in contempocary human rights practices, is no sufficient reason to deny the 
vrilidity of the traditional African practices, values and institutions. 
exist except on the bais of [a] certain measure of similarity in the interest of the rnemberCa 
These values of the society are based on their ~ t i l i t y . ~ ~  The traditionai African society 
manifests values that evolved in response to the needs and well-king of the society and for 
the protection of the rights of the memben. Human rights in traditional African societies 
must therefore be sought in the value systems which are rooted in the social facts prevalent 
in these societies. It is the most basic of those values on whose protection hinges the very 
existence of the society6' that are termed human rights. As explained by David Ritche: 
If there are certain mutual claims which cannot be ignored 
without detriment to the well being and, in the last resort, to 
the very being of a community, these claims may in an 
intelligible sense be called rights. They represent the 
minimum of secunty and advantage which a community must 
guarantee to its members at the nsk of going to pieces, if it 
does not with some degree of efficiency maintain them? 
Notwithstanding the apparent divergencies in African human rights scholarship, there 
appears to be a consistent descriptive pattern that can be gleaned therefrom which points to 
the fact that "traditional African society embodies values that are consistent with and 
supportive of human rights, but the effects of colonialism and difficulties of nation building 
and development have contributed to an erosion of those values or, at least, bred disrespect 
65~adclitie Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen & West Ltd.. 1965) 
rit 130. 
" 6 ~ .  Stein and J. Shand. Lego1 Values in Western Socicry (Edinburgh: University Press, 1974) at 2. 
" ~ c c o r d i n ~  to Urnonirike. "Afncan Charter" supra, note 16 ût 17-18, "[tlhe existence of a society 
... prcsupposes the recognition of the members" since no group of people who are bent on denying or ignoring 
one rinother's rights can exist as a society. 
68 David G. Ritche, Natural Rights (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952) at 87- 
and abuse of human rights."" 
According to Howard, "...in many of the ... societies of pre-colonial Africa, both 
economic and political 'rights' were guaranteed, at least at the local level, by communal 
structures. Obligations to farnily and kin ensured sharing of resources, however scarce. Land 
was distributed on the basis of need: even domestic slaves were allocated land to support 
themselves. Even after a great deal of social change, this pattern of resource distribution and 
fmily-based sharing continues in contemporary ~frica."'~ She futther adds: "...on the civil 
and political level, many of the non-differentiated, ethnically homogeneous societies of nird 
Africa had effective rneans for guaranteeing what is now known as human right~.~' These 
values were inherent in the society and were society's antidote to existential challenges 
confronting the society. The well-king of members of the traditionai society was anchored 
on the health and stability of the society as a whole. 
Descnbing the values of traditional Afnca, Umozurike, notes that: 
African societies had stabilizing factors which included the 
sense of obligation to one's kith and kin. the fear of the deity 
that was omnipotent and omniscient, and accountability for 
Him for al1 human actions on earth. This had a restraining 
effect on human activities, since the good were expected to be 
appropriately rewarded and the wicked and their successors 
to be condemned? 
The obligation to one's kith and kin carries with it a bundle of rights and duties. The rights 
69~ames Silk, 'Traditional Culture and the Respect for Human Rights in Afiica,' in An-na'im and 
Deng, supra, note 8 at 292. 
70~hoda  Howard, 'Evaluating Human Rights in Afrca,' supra. note 25 at 174. 
77 Umozurike, 'Afican Charter' supra, note 16 at 19. 
claimer must be ready to cary out the obligations that go with them because these rights 
were intertwined with duties. It was a member's right to belong to a family, a compound, a 
village and age group or any other social unit. This entitled hirnher to support and assistance 
and s/he could not be banished from the group, village or clan except on commission of a 
serious offence such as murder? However, doing one's duty was a condition precedent to 
enjoying these rights in these societies where social order was ontologically oriented and 
which solved its problems through kinship, reciprocity and redistribution. Uchendu pub it 
succinctly thus: 
The kinship pnnciple provided the individual with a 
community whose moral order emphasized s h e d  values, a 
sense of belonging, security and social justice. In such social 
order duties preceded rights. The principle was clear: to enjoy 
your rights you must do your duty; and duty and nght have a 
reciprocal relationship, and stnicturally both were balanced." 
Unlike constitutions protecting rights in modem Africa which can be suspended, 
amended or abrogated by military adventurers, the kinship or the extended family on the 
other hand is not subject to the whims and caprices of any adventurer, no rnatter how suong. 
It is permanent and exists as long as the individuais who form it exist. There was no 
equivalent of a modem constitution which could be ovenhrown by a military despot 
enforcing his decrees even when such decrees conflict with human rights. This minirnizes 
the vulnerability of the traditional system? In addition, the system of kinship units is seen 
" ~ e e .  Umozurike. lbid at 18. 
7 %.c. Uchendu. 'Tradition and Social Order,' excerpt From inaugurai Lecture, University of Calabar. 
Calribar, Nigeria. January 1 1, 1990, quoted in Umozwike, Ibid. at 19. 
''~akshrnnn Marasinghe. supra, note 4 1 at 43. See dso Urnozurike. Ibid. 
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as belonging to three categories of members - the living, the dead and the unb~rn?~ This adds 
to its stability. 
Human rights in traditional Africa therefore are not located in the abstract but in the 
value system of the society which has inbuilt mechanisms to ensure their continued 
enjoyment and protection. It is the enduring values of this system that was sought to be 
reflected in the African Charter. The workability of such an arrangement is an entirely 
different matter, given the different and changed circumstances. A brief examination of the 
nature and contents of economic, social and cultural rights in traditional Africa is revealing 
especially to the extent it contrats with such rights provided in the A f h  Charter. 
3.3.3. Substance of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Traditional Africa 
Notwithstanding the organic and hoiistic nature of traditional African society and its 
rejection of compartmentalization of aspects of life, the contents of economic, social and 
cultural rights of the traditional society can still be discemed from the prevailing practices. 
Econornic, social and cultural rights were fully accorded to members of the society. 
However, al1 members of the societies were not accorded equal rights. As in most societies 
t hat existed contemporaneously with traditional African society, women and children were 
" ~ e e  Amodu Tijani v. Secretary to rhc Govemmenr of Southern Nigeria [192 11 2 A.C. 399 where the 
Privy Council quoted with approvai the testimony of Chief Elesi of Odogbolu before the West Afncan Land 
Commission (1908) where he said: "1 conceive that land klongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few 
rire living and countiess members still unbom." This implies that the ownership of the Iand is vested in the 
community as a corponte entity, every member of which has the right of sharing in the bounties which he helps 
to produce. Consequently not the individual but the family or clan or village h a  ise power to dienate Iand. See 
also Mbonu Ojikc, My Afnca, (New York: The John Day Company, 1946), particularly chapter viii. 
not accorded equal rights with adult males? In matrilineal societies, however, women had 
greater rights to property than men especially with regard to property inheritance. The 
economic, social and cultural nghts protected in traditional Africa include, rights to work, 
shelter, health. education and the right to participate in the cultural life of the community or 
society. 
Traditional African society guaranteed the right to work of its members. Agriculture 
being the main occupation of the people, every person was meaningfully engaged in the 
prevailing activities of hislher community. Land, however, has k e n  described as the central 
focus of any discussion on the socio-economic rights of traditional African s ~ c i e t y . ~ ~  ü 
broadly constmed, this may include grazing areas and fishing spots. Al1 these were shared 
on the basis of need?9 This ensured that on attainment of manhood, one was given one's 
entitlement as well as the resources to cultivate." According to M'Baye, in traditional 
African society "[w]ork was both a right and a duty .... In certain social units ... the division 
of labour according to age made it possible to cal1 on everyone so as to ensure, in the best 
conditions. the life and prospetity of a11."8' 
Through this way the society ensured that nobody was left without the means of 
sustenance. Ejidike has observed that the society "recognized its duty to provide both the 
n ~ e e  Okay Martin Ejidike. supra. note 8 at 94. 
78 See Mbonu Ojike, supra, note 76 at 1 11; Okay Martin Ejidike, Ibid. at 93 
7 9 ~ e e  Rhoda Howard, "'Evuluating Humon Righrs in Afnca," supra. note 25 a 174 (noting that even 
domestic slaves were ailocated portions to support thernselves). 
'Osee Ejidike. supra. note 8 at 93. 
" ~ e b a  M'baye. supra, note 17 at 590-59 1. 
means of economic well-king, .... and the right of its citizens to make such claims on their 
kin-groups. The right to land, work and shelter was assured ...."82 He argues that "[ilf the 
lineage (community) is duty bound to provide the necessary conditions for the enjoyment of 
the conditions in question, it is therefore not difficult to see that those to whom this duty is 
owed have a right to (them)"83 
The family and the communityg4 at large also ensured the provision of shelter to ail 
who desired to own one. Houses were provided through community e f fodS In some parts 
of traditional Africa, it was considered an abomination for a man to refuse his brother's 
request to assist in building or rehabilitating his ho~se.'~ in this way the society effectively 
dealt with the problem of houselessness and guaranteed shelter for all, inespective of 
financial status. 
Traditional African societies also guaranteed the right to heaith. Each family and 
community ensured that the sick received the best medical treatment available to the society 
at that point in time. As Mbonu Ojike rightly observed, "every (traditional) Afncan home is 
"~jidike. Ibid. See also Mbonu Ojike, supra, note 76 at 1 16-1 17: Umozurike, 'Afncan Ciurner' supra. 
note 16 at 15. 
84 Community is this context refers to the Iargest autonomous unity exercising control, as the modem 
state, over a group of people. In traditional African society, such cornmunities were either centriûized (those 
with cstablished central administrative machinery) or non-centraiized (i.e. those with more centraiized and las 
intnisivc centrai systems of administration). See Makau wa Munia "Afncan Cultural Fingerpniit," supra, note 
17 rit 347. It is pertinent to point out here that the centnlized and non-centnlized cornrnunities (states) of 
traditional Africa, were the equivalent of the modern m e ,  and possessed the full powers of a modem sovereign 
( Westphalian) state. 
aso. Equiano, nte  Interesting Narative of the Life of Ohudoh Equiano or Gustavus Vassa the Afncan. 
81h edition enlarged, (Norwich, 1794) cited in A.E. Afïgbo, The Warrant Chiefs (London: Longman, 1972) at 
18. 
'kjidike, supra. note 8 at 93. 
a medical school and every mother a doctor.'" The ability of  each farnily or kinship group 
to provide cure for their sick ones ensured ftee medical treatment for those in need. However, 
when it involved getting a d0ctor.8~ it ceases to be free.8' Nonetheless, it remained the duty 
of the family and I or the kinship group to pay when the person in question could not afford 
the fees. In this way, the traditional societies guaranteed not only the best attainable state of 
health but also the right to free health services to those who could not afford it themselves. 
Traditionai Africa guaranteed the right to education for al1 without exception. 
Education in traditional Africa was geared towards inculcating the right behaviour and 
attitude of the rnembers of the community on the younger generation, and also to equip the 
recipients with dl it takes to survive in the society and to be a good citizen." Thus, education 
in  tradi tional Africa was both formal and informaL9' It afforded the same philosophy and 
access to both the poor and the The right to education in traditional Africa involved 
8 7 ~ b o n u  Ojike, supra. note 76 at 154. 
'?raditional Africm docton were demgatorily referred to as 'rnedicine men' or 'blûck rnagicians' by 
Europcans and other Westerners who denigrated their practices becausc they lacked the trappings of Western 
'civilizcd' orthodox medicine. Even to date, some Westerners and westernized Africans still refer to African 
traditionai doctors as 'healers' and not doctors. But if docton are those 'trained in the heding arts ruid Iicensed 
to practicc' as defined by the World Wide Web dictionary, then there is no reason why traditional African 
doctors cannot, and should not, be addressed as such. 
X 9 ~ e e  generaily, Mbonu Ojike, supra, note 76 at 153-156. See also Mokwugo Okoye, Afrcan 
Resportses, (Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1964) at 260-26 1. 
90 Keba M'Baye, supra, note 17 at 591, writes: 'The right to education took the fonn of a duty to be 
borne by the community in order to rnake each chiid a fitting and usefui element of the group. Education was 
thc responsibility not only of the parents but aiso of grandparents, brothers, sistets, uncles and aunts, cousins 
and cven friends and neighbours. Everyone took active part in the training and supervision of young men and 
women with a view of turning them into 'good citizens'." 
" ~ e e  Mbonu Ojike. supra, note 76 at 150 - 153 (descnbes some of the pmcesses of fomai and 
informa1 education in traditional Africa). 
92~bid. ât 150; Mokwugo Okoye, supra, note 89 at 265-268. 
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not only the provision of facitities but also access to al1 without exception. Moreover, it was 
free for allY3 
The right to free participation in the cultural life of the community was one of the 
entitlements of the individual as a member of a community. It was simply taken for granted 
and it enured to the individual by virtue of the fact of hislher being a member of that 
comm~nity.~ It was not only a right to freely participate in the culturd life of the community, 
but dso a right to have the culture preserved which was the responsibility of the entire 
community. However, there were restrictions as to participation in some aspects that were 
exclusive1 y for a particular gende~~ '  
These economic, social and cuhrai rights enjoyed in traditional African societies 
were guaranteed by the system to the members by virtue of their being members of the 
community. Furthemore, these rights of members were integrated into the rights of the 
society as a whole and were not held against the society but were complementary with 
societal right~.~" person could not be ostracised or banished as to be denied these rights 
except for heinous crimes (abominations) like intentional killing of a member of the family 
or cornmunity." The mechanism by which these rights were protected in traditional African 
94 See J.S Mbiti, supra, note 50 at 102. 
' j ~ e e  Mbonu Ojike, supra, note 76 at 152. 
96 Umozurike, 'Afican Charter' supra, note 16 at 17. 
9 7 ~ e e  supra, note 73 and the authoriry cited. See also Ejidike, supra, note 8 at 83. Ostracisrn or 
banishment, if arbitraty, may, in contemporary international human rights law, violate Article 12(2) of the 
A fn'can Churrer and Article 1 î(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which prohibit 
rirbiuary deprivation of the right of entry into one's own country, but it appem to be more hwnruie than a 
lengthy prison sentence or outright executian. This is not to say, chat in ail cases murderers are banished. 
societies will now be considered. 
3.3.4. Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Traditional Africa 
The traditional African societies had not only the concept of human rights, but also 
al1 the rnechanisrns for ensuring their enjoyment. These are located in the traditional 
institutions, beliefs and practice as the discussion in this section will reveal. 
This section is not concerned with the protection of civil and political rights in 
traditional Africa. Rather, its focus is on the protection of the economic, social and cultural 
rights. It seeks to pose and answer the question as to what extent traditional Africa protected 
the economic. social and cultural rights and the mechanism or institutions through which 
their enjoyment were ensured. 
3.3.4.1. The Idea and Mechanism of Protection 1 Enforcement 
It is often asserted that traditional Africa lacked any formai or official body or 
mechanism for the protection of any form of human rights. That k ing  the case, how then is 
it possible to conceive of an idea of protection? Assurning, but not conceding, that there was 
the absence of a formal or official mechanism of protection, the economic, social and cultural 
rights of members of the society were protected al1 the sarne. Even the critics of traditional 
Revenge killings were not unknown, although largeIy obtainable when the victirn is from a different community. 
106 
African concepts of human rights admit that these rights were proie~ted.~~ The idea of 
protection is one grounded in people's beliefs and practices that evolved over time and have 
been intemalized as forming part of the system against which no derogation is permitted. 
Even though informal, (in the sense that it is not like a Human Rights Commission of the 
present time), the system was quite effective in meeting the demands of the time. The fear 
of a supernaturai king with pervasive powers and to whom al1 owe a duty of accountability 
had a very restraining and stabilizing effect on the system and ensured that everybody got 
what was due to him or her?9 
The order being maintained was not the order imposed by men but the order of a 
supreme being who was accepted and acknowledged as the uitimate custodian of law and 
order and the moral and ethical codes.[* Consequently, disobedience to, or the breaking of 
suc h order, whether by the individual or by a group was ultimately an offence against the 
supreme being and the corporate body of so~iety.'~' The fear engendered by the pervasive 
reality of the supreme being ensured societal order and balance, and compliance to noms 
98 Rhoda Howard adrnits that "in many of the relatively homogeneous, undifferentiated simple societies 
of pre-colonial Africri, both economic and political rights were guiuanteed, at least at the local level, by 
communal structures. Obligations to the farnily ensured sharing of resources, however scarce. Land was 
distributed on the basis of need: even domestic slaves were dlocated land to support themseIves." see Rhoda 
Howard, "Evaluaring Human Rights in Af~cu," supra , note 25 at 174. Osita Eze hm argued that at this stage 
there was no "legal obligation on society to provide the means of sustenance to the indigent except to some 
cxtcnt in societics that shared Islamic tradition." See Osita Eze, 'Afrrcan Concept of Human Rights* supra, note 
2 rit 15. This argument lacks merit because the haditional society did not d e  my distinction between legality 
and mordity or between the sacred and the secular. A thing was Iegd if it was morally prescribed. Mordit., 
and not legrility (though not distinct from it) was of the greatest importance in private and public life. 
99 See Umozuurike, 'African Charter' supra, note 16 at 18. See also V.C. Uchendu, supra, note 74. 
'"sec I.S. Mbiti, supra. note 50 at 206. 
without the necessity of human intervention or enforcement as punishment for non- 
cornpliance was visited not only on the individual but also on his farnily and community.lm 
In traditional Africa, the procedural diffxulties of modem legal systems, 
constitutional limitations, economic restrictions, or other debilitating and crippling 
technicalities are not present as whatever is available is meant for everyone. This ensured 
considerable success in realizing these rights.lo3 AS a member of a family unit or kinship unit, 
the individual in traditionai Africa enjoyed hisher econornic and social rights under the 
family as such member.lW Among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria for instance, land is not 
subject to private ownership. Any alienation of such land requires the consent of the principal 
members of that family including the head of the farnily, in the absence of whom such 
rilienation would be void.Io5 This ensured that the interests of members of the family were 
Iw?'he Gikuyu of Kenya for instance held the belief that the disobedience of one person brings h m  
to thc whole corpomte body of society. This appears to be a geneml belief of most traditional African societies. 
Thc Nucr of Sudan and various societies across West Africa held such beliefs. See J.S. Mbiti, Ibid. at 204-210. 
1 O. b i s  c m  be contrasied with modern Africui constitutions where, econornic. socid and culturai rights 
ruc confined to thc non-justiciable parts of the constitution, for instance under the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principie of state Policy as in the Nigerian Constitution, [See Chapter II, sections 13-21of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. For a discussion of the non-cnforceability of the 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles under the Nigerian Constitution see, G.G.I. Ojiako, In the 
Ncxnie of Justice (Owerri: Judiciary Cornmittee, 1997)l. 
'OLsec T W Bennett. Hurnan Rights a d  Afncon Customary Luw under the South Aj%can Constitution 
(Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd., 1995) at 5 (notes chat "at the hem of the African socio-political order lay the 
family, a unit that was extended both vertically and horizontally to encompass a wide range of people who could 
bc crillcd 'kin'. This large riccommodating group provided for al1 the individuai's material. social and emotional 
needs ...."). 
105 See Angaran v. Olushi (1908) 1 N.L.R. 78. See generaily, G. B. A. Coker, Family Properry Among 
the Yunibas, Zd edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966). This is also tnie of the Igbos of South Errstern Nigeria 
Under the Igbo land tenure, land belongs to the community and cannot be alienated without its consent. The 
individual has security of tenure in respect of land for houses. farms and gardens and there were no landless 
adult member. However, while some parts do not give land to women, in others, women are part of the sharing 
process and even get more than the men, for instance in matrilineal societies of Abiriba and Ohafîa in the 
present Abia State of Nigeria. 
not jeopardized without their consent thereby depriving them of their economic rights and 
means of sustenance. This institutionalized mechanism of protection, king an essential part 
of their social organization guaranteed the existence of these rights and made it less 
vulnerable and more permanent than is currently obtainable in modem ~ f n c a . ' ~  
But this is not the case in modem Africa where land is now owned by the state and 
the citizens are only granted occupancy rights in the form of long term leases which can be 
revoked at the pleasure of the g~vemment. '~ This is in addition to those deprived and 
dispossessed of their own land through colonial greed and by white settlers. 
In addition to economic rights, sociai and cultural rights were secured and enforced 
through the instrumentality of the family and the society at large. The right to education was 
guaranteed for both the nch and the poor and safeguarded by both the family and the 
cornmunity. Also, the family and the community ensured that there was the sarne philosophy 
of education for the poor and the nch.Io8 Full responsibility for the sick, the handicapped and 
the elderly was taken by the family and the society at large. Both the family and the 
community stopped ai nothing to provide cure and succour to the afflicted member.Iw 
Housing (shelter) was not left out. It was the responsibility of the family and the entire 
community to help a member to build his own house. Among the Igbos of South Eastern 
'"~akshman Marasinghe. supra note 4 1 at 44. 
Io7~or instance. Section 1 of the Nigerim Lund Use Act. 1978 confers the radical title in land to the 
governor of the state who has the power to gram right of occupancy to applicsuits. Existing titIes are deemed 
to have been granted under the Act, Section 28 gives power of revocation to the governor. Under Section 34 
riny alienation, lease, mortgage, sale or any other transfer without the prior consent of ihe govemor is void. 
108 Mbonu Ojike, 'Afican Charîer' supra, note 76 at 150. 
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Nigeria, it has been noted that "the whole neighbourhood afford their unanimous assistance 
in building (h~uses)'"'~ - a practice that was so strong that it was considered an abomination 
for a man to refuse his brother's request to assist in building or rehabilitating his house."' 
The various families, and to a very large extent the society at large, as well as the fear 
of a pervasive supreme being, were therefore a major mechanism that ensured the protection 
and en forcement of economic, social and cultural rights. They ensured that everybody 
received what was due to him/her and that none was deprived because whatever belonged 
to the farnily belonged to al1 its rnembers. 
3.3.4 2. Holistic Nature of Traditional Society and Interdependence of Rights. 
Traditional African society did not compartmentalize or isolate any aspect of life, be 
it  social, political, religious, economic or cultural and treat it in contradistinction to others. 
This is as a result of the organic and holistic nature of traditional African society."' Religion 
was not dissociated from other aspects of life and there was no distinction between the social 
and sacred life. Social order and peace were regarded as essential and sacred. Social, political 
and economic aspects of life were part and parce1 of the religious life and were given sanctity 
by it. Consequently, it has been observed ihat, "social life derives its force and validity from 
"0. Equiano. supra, note 85. 
I I 1  See O h y  Martin Ejidike, supra, note 8 at 93-94. Brother in this sense is not defined restrictively 
to mean just one blood brother. It has iin extensive connotation and embnces every member of the comrnunity. 
'"~heresa N. Nwokorie. A Socio-Political and Emnornic Hûtory of Unuuiumo Community in Ehitne 
Mbuno rip to 1960 (B.A. Thesis: University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1995) [Unpubiished] at vi. 
religion. Political decisions are legitimized and validated by religious forces (and) econornic 
life find meaning and relevance only when given religious connotations."' l3  
Given the largely informa1 nature of the traditionai society, where social order was 
ontologically oriented, and emphasis was laid on the community rather than on the 
individual, rights were not categorized in any form whatsoever. The traditional social and 
political organizations and institutions did not admit any compartmentalization. Their beliefs 
and ideas were most intimately interwoven."' The fact of membership of a farnily or 
community conferred upon one ail the rights that were necessary for his/her living a 
meaningful life - whether civil and political rights, or economic, social and cultural rights, 
or the rights to developrnent and self-determination. Al1 rights were interdependent. 
It should, however, be pointed out that the fact of the interdependence of rights, their 
non-categorization and the importance placed on al1 rights without distinction do not imply 
that there were no violations of some of these rights. Traditional societies recognized slavery 
and there were other forms of discrimination. In most societies women and slaves were 
excluded from decision making bodies. There were human sacrifices, the killing of twins and 
existence of a caste system in some societies.'*' Nonetheless, this was not peculiar to African 
If3 Theresa N. Nwokorie, Ibid.,at p-vi-vii. See dso John S. Mbiti, supra, note 46 at 1-5. See generally 
E.G. Prurinder, African Traditional Religion (London: Sheldon Press, 1962); A.O. Iwuagwu, 'The Ogu Corpus 
and the Igbo Concept of the Moral Law' (1982) 1 Alvana Journal ofthe Social Sciences 13-25. 
Il4 See Okay Martin Ejidike, supra, note 8 at 72, 
li51n Igboland for instance, the Osu caste system was recognized. Intermamage with them was 
forbidden and social interaction was kept to the barest minimum. With regard to human sacrifice, the atonement 
or deansing for senous offences or to prevent a major calamity rcquired hurnan sacrifice. Sorne dipitaries were 
buried with human heads. However, this could not be done with a member of the community. Also, a fellow 
rnember of the community could not be ensiaved by another member OF the comrnunity. This was regarded as 
an abomination- Thus, rights and pcivileges were community bound and defined. Osita Eze observed that even 
though human rights were observed and protected in traditional Afiica the "categories ofrights protected as weIl 
1 1 1  
traditional society. Injustice has been a feature of ail human societies. Manipulation and 
exploitation of the weak and the poor have been existing in human societies since the advent 
of humanity. 
3.4. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHI'S IN COLONIAL, AFRICA 
For a better appreciation of the econornic, social and cul tural rights in modem Africa, 
it is germane to highlight, even if bnefly, the state of these rights under colonial rule as well 
as in post colonial Africa before the Afrcan Charter. As earlier stated, African states came 
under colonial mle at different times. However by 1914 almost ail African states were under 
one European power or another.lf6 
It is really oxymoronic to taik about econornic, social and cultural rights, or indeed 
any other rights, in colonial Africê Colonization is itself a denial of rights. since the right of 
peoples to self determination is the supreme human right on which every other right 
de pend^.''^ Colonial Afnca was notonously remarkable more for the absence of econornic, 
social and cultural rights than for its presence, for as Jeanne Hersch observed, "[tlhe 
colonialists' prime object was io go on exploiting their victims, and they justified their 
ris their scope and uitimately who enjoys any of these rights are in the end determined by the nature and 
charrictcr of the society that is king examined." See Osita Eze, 'Afncan Concept of Human Rights' supra, note 
2 at 16. While this is crue to some extent, it should be reaiized that the situation is dmost the sarne in modem 
Africci notwithstanding the provisions of the Afncan Charrer. Some countries have better human rights records 
than ohers. One cannot but agree with Ejidike that in "both traditional and modern perceptions, one's rights 
have meaning and context within a certain social unit, a specific iocality." See Okay Mrirtin Ejidike, supra, note 
8 rit 97. 
li6see supra, note 14 and the authonties cited therein. 
" '~eba M'Baye, supra. note 17 at 584. 
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exploitation by an appeal to racial prejudice - the claim that those they were exploiting were 
intellectually inferior."'18 
Contrary to ail pretensions that the fundamental purpose of European colonial 
expansionisrn was the irnprovement of the moral and material well-king of  frica ans,"^ it 
remains a fact that whatever the administrative phiiosophy of the colonial powers were. the 
aim and the result dovetailed and manifested in the maximum exploitation of the human and 
material resources of the continent.120 Apart from massive violations of civil and political 
rights,"' there was aiso the despicable dislocation, depredation and despoliation of economic 
rights;"' and the bastardization and truncation of social and cultural rights. In some parts 
of Africa, hundreds of thousands were expelled from their lands to make way for white 
settlers. and most others were forbidden to grow profitable crops in cornpetition with the 
whites. "' 
I l 8  Jeanne Hersch, 'The Concept of Race," Diogenes, 1967, No. 59, at 1 17. 
' 19~ucas, The Partition and Colonization of Afnro, 1992 a< 97, cited in Urnozurike, 'A  f h n  Charter' 
sicpra, note t 6 at 20. 
1 'Osce Umozurike, Ibid, at 21. 
111 For an insight into some of these violations see Michriel Crowther, (ed.), West African Resistance: 
The Militan, Response to Colonial Occupation (London: Hutchinson, 197 1); A scholar rightly observed that 
"the riuthoritarianism marking Europem colonid rule ... was mammoth in its impact. These abuses of individual 
and collcçtive rights echo to the prescrit. H&l effects of the penods of slavery, partition, and colonial rule 
have yct to be totally overcome." See Claude E. Welch, Protection of Human rights in Afka: Roles and 
Srrategies of Non-Govemntental Organizations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1995) at 3 
[hereinafter 'Protection of Human rights in Af~ca']. See also Claude E. Welch, 'The ACncan Charter and 
Freedom of Expression in Africa," (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Revim 103 at 108-109 [hereinafter 
' A  frîcan Charter and Freedom of fipression']. 
i-" -See E. Wayne Nafwger, Inequality in Afnca: Political Elites, Proletariat, Peasants and the Poor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 36-38. 
123 Rhoda Howard, "Evaluating Human Rights in Afica," supra, note î5  at 171. 
Culturally, the introduction of Christian churches and mission schools, though well 
intended, constituted the greatest assault to African cultural values. As Howard observed: 
Cultural difision. in which Africans might have made their 
own choices about what aspects of Western mores they 
wished to adopt, was accompanied by cultural compulsion: 
the price of schwling was conversion to Christianity. Newly 
Westemized "young men" challenged the authority of their 
elders, while the traditional relations between the sexes were 
distorted by the imposition of Western patriarchal ide al^.'^^ 
The imposed religions, languages and educations systems demonized and exorcized the 
African equi~alents.'~~ Colonialism also muddled up African law - its rules. institutions. 
procedures, and meanings, as well as the way African peopies perceived and understood 
law , 126 and thus, ushered in the most contradictory transformations in Africa. 
It was in this state of economic exploitation, social disorientation, and cultural 
bastardization and traumatization that African States gained their political, if not flag, 
independence. The process started with Ghana in 1957 and was followed by most others in 
the 1960s. Notwithstanding the high hopes for the protection and promotion of human rights 
as well as the restoration of African dignity, the economic, social and cultural nghts did not 
frire any better, as the leaders who took over from the colonial powen conducted their affairs 
as if their govemment was an extension of the colonial rule. The privatization of state affairs, 
massive corruption, ineptitude, political instability and foreign neo-colonial manipulations 
permanently structured the lack of meaningful progress towards the realization of these 
II4 Rhoda Howarci, Hurnan Rights in Comrnoriwealth Africa, supra, note 8 at 1 O. 
125 E A El-Obaid & K Appiagyei-Amri, supra, note 22 at 822. 
'%-istin Mann & Richard Roberts (eds.), Low in Colonial Africa (Porstmouth: Heinemann. 1991) 
rit 5 .  
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rights.12' It was in this state of affaia that the Afncan Charter was bornIa with its, perhaps, 
not unexpected emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights. 
3.5. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AFRICA 
Modem African human rights, as encapsulated in the Afn'can Charter on Human und 
Peoples' Rights, include the recognition and 'protection' of economic, social and cultural 
rights. The exercise and enjoyment of these rights are made a condition precedent to the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights.'" However, in practice more importance has been 
attached to the civil and political rights, thereby creating problems not only for the material 
well being of those who are supposed to enjoy these rights but also for the actual realization 
of the civil and politicai rights. In the face of such dilemma, civil and political nghts, and 
economic, social and cultural rights suffer almost the sarne fate notwithstanding the 
preferences. As earlier noted, this preferential enforcement varies with the situation in 
traditional Africa. An examination of economic, social and culturd rights under the Charter 
underscores this fact. 
127 See Umozurike, 'A fkan  Charter' supra note 16 at 22-24. 
'''sec Chapter One for the history of the Chmer 's  adoption. 
"'The A f h i n  Chaner in its 8'" prembulv paragraph swtes: Convinced that ... civil and political 
rights cannot be dissociated from econornic, social and cultural rights in their conception as wel1 as universality 
and that the satisfaction of econornic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee For the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights. 
3 S. 1. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Charter. 
Since its inception, the Afncan Charter has been showcased as an embodiment of 
traditional African values. It embraces al1 spheres of, and places equal emphasis (at least on 
paper) on all, human rights. Also, the Charter imposes duties on holders of rights. These 
attributes make the Afncan Charier peculiar and "the most authoritative rendering of the 
African tradition in the fields of human r ight~." '~~ 
The Charter contains several provisions on the economic, social and culturai rights. 
It clearly demonstrates in its preamble an emphasis on these rights. While recognizing the 
interconnectedness of the civil and political nghts with the economic, social and cultural 
rights both in conception as well as in universality, the Charter declares that "the satisfaction 
of economic, social and cultural nghts is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights."'" This emphasis is hardly surprising given the peculiar legal and political history of 
the Continent having passed through the triple scourge of slavery. colonialism and neo- 
colonialism, and the consequent grave economic problems now facing the various states.'" 
1 XI Osita Eze, 'African Concept of Human Righrs' supra, note 2 at 2 1. But see E.A. El-Obaid & K. 
Appiagyei-Aturi, supra, note 22 at 846, (criticizing as 'bn-African" the prionty and importance given to civil 
and politicd rights in practice and the virtual emculation of econornic, social and cultural rights in domestic 
constitutions). According to hem, "[a] truly AFncan conception of rights wouid not identiQ civil and politicd 
rights as distinct from economic, social and cultural rights." Their contention cm hardly be fauited in view of 
the d l  inciusive nature of African traditional society. 
' 3 1 ~ e e  para. 8 of the Preamble to the Chmer. 
132 See Carol M. Tucker, supra, note 13 at 161. 
3.5.1.1. Analysis of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Charter 
The African Charter embodies a number of economic. social and cultural r i g h t ~ . ' ~ ~  
These include the right to work and equal pay for equal work (Article 15), the right to health 
(Article 16), the right to education (Article 17(1)), and the right to take part in the cultural 
Iife of the community (Article 17(2)). Given the emphasis of the Charter, one would expect 
that the substantive aspects of the instrument would amplify the focus on the economic. 
social and cultural rights. However, a critical examination of these specific rights in the 
Charter raises questions about the manner in which they were couched and the cornmitment 
of the States to their reali~ation.'~~ 
Article 15 provides that "every individual shall have the right to work under equitable 
and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equai work." From this provision, 
it is clear that the Charter does not guarantee the right to work per se.I3' It merely provides 
for the right to "work under equitable and satisfactory conditions" and to "receive equal pay 
For equal work." Thus, it is not the responsibility of the state to provide jobs but to provide 
good working conditions. 
The present writer is of the opinion that this particular provision fails to meet the 
eloquent declaration of the Charter with regard to emphasis on economic rights. h a 
continent with few viable industries and a limited wage system, where the bulk of the 
1 3 3 ~ e c  inftu. the Appendix, for the Charter's provisions on economic. social and cultural rights. 
134 J. Olokri-Onymgo, 'Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the StruggIe for Economic and Social 
Rights' ( 1995) 26 California Western Int'l L. J. 1 at 48. 
135 See U. O. Umozurike, "The Significance of the Afican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" 
in Awa U. Kalu & Yemi Osinbajo, supra, note 2 at 46 [hereinafter 'The Significonce of the African Charter']. 
population are peasants combining fanning with petty trading, or are cattle rearers, rnerely 
providing for equitable and satisfactory conditions of work rings hollow. What satisfactory 
condition of work does a worker have when sacked because of the non-viability of his 
~ompany?"~ What equitable and satisfactory condition will the State provide to the cattle 
rearer who spends al1 his time in the grazing field? Does a farmer whose land has been 
acquired by the govemment for 'development' projects have any satisfactory conditions of 
~ o r k ? ' ~ ~  
It is the opinion of this writer that such provisions are best suited to the industrialized 
countries. The Charter's provision on the right to work is not meaningful to the people, as 
it is not relevant either to the existing type of work or to their unemployed state. States 
Parties to the Charter ought to have assumed a greater obligation to provide work by 
undertaking to lay the necessary foundations to reduce or eliminate widespread 
unemployrnent. Where a large majority of the people are unemployed, 'equitable and 
satisfactory conditions' of work or 'equal pay for equal work' remain esotenc, if not 
meaningless. 
This provision differs from what was obtainable in traditional Africa where, as 
previously seen, econornic rights were guaranteed by the communal structures. There was 
13%e high level mismanagement of governrnentd affairs across Africa has led to the closure of many 
companies and the laying off of staff. Also, as a result of devaluation of currencies in the wake of stnicturril 
adjustrnent policies, many companies have been shut down because of their inability to meet up with spird 
inflation or their inability to meet the high cost of imported mw materials. At the same time, the expected infiow 
of foreign capital as a result of deregulation of the economy seem too distant in corning. 
1 37 U. O. Umozurike, 'Signifcunce of the Afncan Charter' supra, note 135 at 46, states that "[tlhe bulk 
of the populaùons are peasant farmers and it is for governrnent to ensure an efficient marketing system, 
preservation of produce, credit facilities and unnecessary inputs at subsidized prices." It is doubtîül if this 
satisfies the rcquirement of the Charter. It is submitted that the availability of dl these neither guarantees 
equitablc nor satisfactory conditions of work. 
118 
no unemployment as a result of the ability of the prevailing system to adequately provide for 
the people. Land was distributed on the basis of need"' and, as a result, traditionai Afnca 
ensured the right to work whereas the substance of such a right is lacking in modem Afnca. 
Article 16( 1) provides for the right of every individual "to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental heaith." Paragraph (2) obligates the state to "take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medicai 
attention when they are sick." This provision is heedlessly vague. It is by no means clear 
precisely to what individuals are entitled nor is it clear what the resulting obligations are on 
the part of states.'" Akpalu is of the opinion that the operative word in this is article is 
"attainable" which means that the extent of State obligation with regard to the provision of 
health facilities would depend on available financial resources.'" It is doubtful if this 
represents the correct interpretation to this provision. Under Article 16( 1), it is the right of 
the individuai to enjoy the "best attainable state of physical and mental health." This implies 
the highest state of health to which the individual can reach in order to maintain a heaithy 
mind and body, and does not refer to the ability of the state to provide, as Akpalu seems to 
suggest."" 
As a right, this provision has been honoured more in breach than in fuifilment. 
'%hoda Howard, "Evaluating Human Rights in Afica." supra, note 25 at 174. 
IJ9~rigit Toebes. 'Towards an hproved Understanding of the international Human Right to Health" 
( 1999) 2 1 Hman Rights Quarterly 661 at 661-662. 
'?%e JO hn K. Akpalu. Enforcing the Afncan Charter on Humon and Peoples ' Rights: An Analysis 
of the Legal and Institutional Framework ( U . M  Thesis, Daihousie Law School 1990) [unpublished] at 105. 
'"cf. Urnozurike, 'Afican Choner' supra. note 16 at 46. 
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Accordingly, it has been observed that the presence of the sick and mentally disturbed 
persons in the streets of African toms and cities is a negation of the right to health and 
exposes the irresponsibility of their g~vernrnents.'~~ In most dornestic junsdictions the right 
to health does not exist as a justiciable right but as a non-justiciable objective of state 
poiicy. Ia3 
A cornparison with traâitionai Africa reveals the contrary. The right to health of the 
members of the community was not only guaranteed, it was dso observed in filfilment. 
Every sick person was the responsibility of not only hisher immediate and extended family, 
but also that of the community at large.IJ4 Both the family and the community stopped at 
nothing in search of a cure for a member even when such remedies are beyond the bordes 
of the comrnunity. This ensured that the individual never lacked proper and adequate 
medicare available in hisher time. 
The Charter in its Article 17(1) guarantees the right to education. This has k e n  
interpreted to mean "right to unlimited education up to any level" and includes "the right to 
primary , secondary, vocational, adult and tertiary education, and, for illiterate adults, the 
right to speciai ed~cation."'~~ However, another scholar has contended that it is a matter for 
determination as to whether what is granted is a right of access to education or right to state 
1"3~or  instance see Chapter II. Section 17(3)(c) of the Constitution of the Fedenl Republic of Nigeria, 
1999; Section 13, Constitution of Malawi, 1994. Cf. Lone Lindholt, supra, nate 4 1 at 216-2 18. 
1 U ~ b o n u  Ojike. supra, note 76 a 154. 
1'5~mozuri ke, 'A f ~ c a n  Charter' supra, note 16 at 47. 
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sponsored education? In the absence of any express provisions regarding free education 
it is doubtful whether this particular provision c m  be interpreted to signify the right to state 
sponsored education. The article does not mention free education - not even free primary 
education. One is therefore inclined to hold the view that it is not the right to unlimited state 
sponsored education but the right of access that is provided for in the Charter.'" This is 
likely to make education open only to those who can afford it. 
In traditional Afnca the right to education was guaranteed and open to dl. There was 
the same philosophy of education for both the rich and the poor.lJS Not only was education 
accessible to al1 without exception, it was free. This applies to both the formal and infornial 
edu~ation.'"~ There were, however, some exceptions with regard to formal education. Where 
it involved the acquisition of professional experience, it was not always free. Because of the 
different objects of formal education in traditional and modem Afnca. there seems to be no 
practical basis for comparing the levels of education for the two periods. 
The Charter also guarantees the nght of every individual to freely cake part in the 
cultural life of histher cornm~nity.*~~ It appears that this article is aimed at obviating the 
'"'~ee Ebow Bondzie-Simpson. "A Critique of the African Charter on Human an Peoples' Rights" 
( 1988) 3 1 Howard Law Journal 643 at 647. 
I J8 See Mbonu Ojike, supra, note 76 at 150. 
149 Ibid. at 150-153. 
150 See Article 17(2). 
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elimination of a people's culture "' through the imposition of alien cultures. But Akpdu has 
suggested that it might mean the right of individuals to take part in ethnic or ethnic national 
activities thereby reinforcing the aim of states to protect traditional African values.1s2 This 
view is reinforced by the further provision in Article 17(3) imposing a duty on the state for 
the "promotion and protection of mords and traditionai values recognized by the 
cornm~nity."'~' Both interpretations seem equally valid. It is hoped that this provision should 
be construed accordingly so as to make it more meaningful. 
Culture being the totality of a peoples' way of life,'" the right to freely participate in 
the cultural life of the community or society was guaranteed and almost taken for granted in 
traditional Afnca. It was the responsibility of each society to maintain its cultural values and 
to transmit it from generation to generation.ls5 Consequently, there was no need for the 
individual to fear any cultural imposition since the society cannot work against the continued 
survival of its identity. 
The African Charter contains no provisions regarding the right to shelter. This is so 
notwi thstanding the prevalent homelessness in most African countries, especially among 
urban dwellers. Not only has the cost of building materials gone beyond the reach of even 
'5'~ulrure has been defined as "the fabric of ideas. beliefs. skills, tools. aesthetic objects, rnethods of 
thinking, of eating and irilking as wetl as customs and institutions into which each member of society is bom .... 
[I]t includes the way each individual makes si living, the music he plays, celebration and festivals, modes of 
communication and transportation, the house we live in and the food we eat." See N.S.S. Iwe, Christianity, 
Culture and Colonialism in Afica, (Port Harcourt: Dept. of Religious Studies, C.O.E., 1985) at 55. 
157 John Akpalu, supra, note 140 at 106. 
'*'se= Article 17(3). 
15''see N.S.S. Iwe. supra, note 15 1 at 55. 
lS5see T.N. Nwokorie. supro. note 1 12 at 43-44. 
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the middle class, but also the majority of the population cannot afford to pay for decent 
accommodation in most of the cities across Africa. While traditional Africa developed 
mechanisms towards ensuring that every member of the society had hisher own shelter,lS6 
the individual in modem Africa is left without such protection. 
It is noteworthy that the obligations undertaken by African States with regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights are freed from the asphyxiating phrase of "to the 
maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized ..." as contained in Article 2(1) of the International 
Covennnt on Economic, Social and Cultural Right~,"~ which has, no doubt, blunted the 
cutting edge of the Covenant. Having ken  freed from the panlysing grip of this phrase, one 
might be tempted to conclude that the African Charter ensures a better protection and 
enjoyment of economic, social and cu~turd rights than the Covenant. But this appears not to 
be the case. 
Taking the provisions of the Afncan Charter on econornic, social and cultural rights 
as a whole, it could be seen that there seem to be no certainty and clarity as to the real content 
and scope of these provisions. The vagueness of the Afrcan Charter's provisions on 
economic. socid and culturd rights makes it difficult to actuaily appreciate the exact extent 
of what they are supposed to be pr~tecting.'~~ This is distinguishable from traditional Mica  
'%ee Okay Martin Ejidike, supra, note 8 at 93. 
157 For ri detaited andysis of this Article see Phitip Alston & Gerard Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope 
of States Parties Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culturai Rights" (1987) 
9 H~tmntt Rights Quarterly 156 at 164- 18 1.  
lS8see infa, Chapter 6 for a more decailed discussion of the vaguemess of the Chorrer's provisions on 
cconomic, social and cultural rights. 
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where, as explained earlier, no one was in doubt as to what was due to h i d e r  with regard 
to these rights as a result of any uncertainty. Accordingly, the Charter's provisions do not 
reflect the promise of the Prearnble with regard to the place of economic, social and cultural 
rights in the scheme of African human rights. Given this uncertainty, the contents of the 
articles cannot but be a huge betrayal of the hopes of equality and interconnectedness of al1 
rights. As one scholar puts it: 
...[ T]he content of the articles is a significant let down from 
the promise of the Prearnble, and Mies what could have been 
an altogether novel and radical approach to the 
interconnectedness of the two categories of right~."~ 
The scant regard for these rights is apparent not only in al1 these provisions and the 
Inngunge of the Charter but also in the actual implementation of its provisions. States Parties 
to the Charter have not really shown any willingness to fully implement these provisions. 
Even the Commission charged with the irnplementation of the Charter has not done much 
to encourage peti tions relating to these rights. The problems and attitudes surrounding 
the implementation of these rights will now be examined. 
'5'~.~loka-0nyango. supra, note 134 at 5 1. 
1 6 0 ~  former Chairrnan of the Commission, Prof. U. Oji Umozurike of Nigeria. was reponed to have 
said while in office, in a rather pointed explicit reversal of the phifosophy of the Charter, that the Commission 
would concentrate on civil and political rights. He argued that any attempt to ded with economic, sociai and 
cultural rights would "result in too m m y  cases and in too many countries" for the Commission to cope with. 
See O. Umozunke, "The Protection of Human Rights under the Banjul (African) Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights" ( 1988) 1 African J. Int'l. L 65 at 8 1 [hereinafter 'Prorecrion of H u m n  Righrs']. 
3 . S .  1.2. Problem of Implementation 
The Charter in its Article 30 created the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection.16' The 
mandate of the Commission as set out in Article 45 shows that the Commission does not 
make binding resolutions, even if, on the ment of a cornplaint against a State Party to the 
Chnrter, it finds that a violation of human or peoples' rights has actually o~curred . '~~  in 
addition, al1 proceedings are confidential and only the OAU Assembly of Heads of States 
rnay authorize the publication of a Commission report. This puts the actual protection of 
human rights in the hands of a self-serving political body which itself has a proven track 
record of prizing state interests more highly than the protection of human r i g h t ~ . ' ~ ~  The 
weaknesses of the Commission united scholars in their rejection of the Commission for its 
impotency. Makau wa Mutua was perhaps echoing the frustration of scholars with the 
Commission when he said: 
We cannot and should not, continue to delude ourselves that 
we have a human rights system. What we have is a facade. a 
I6'see infra Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the performance of AFrican Commission in 
discharging in the protection and promotion of human rights in Africa. 
162 Obijiofor Aginam, "Legitirnate Governance under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights" in E.K. Quashigah & O.C. Okafor (eds.), Legitimate Govemance in Africa (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
Internarional, 1999) 345 at 367. See also Eveiyn A. Ankumah, The Africun Commission on Human and 
Peaples' Rights: Practice and Procedures (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) at 74 where the author states 
that "...unlike the other human rights systerns, once the Commission reaches ri decision on the merits, its final 
authority is to make recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of States and Governrnent. If the Assembly 
so decides, the Commission niay publicize violations of human rights by State parties .... The Afican 
Commission does not have the power to enforce its decisions against states that have violated the provisions 
of the Charter." 
16)see Cees Rinterman & Catherine Hendenon, supra, note 3 at 394. The respected weekly magazine, 
West Africa, noted that the "congenitai defects [in the African Charter] in no s d l  way account for the neac 
irrelevance of the Charter and its institutions to Africa's poIitical [and socio-econornic] life," See West Africa, 
Editorial, "Strengthening a Weak Edifice" March 1 1-17, 199 1 at 37. 
yoke that Afncan States have put amund our necks. We must 
cast it off and reconstruct a system that we can proudly 
proclaim as ours.lW 
The weaknesses of the Commission and the deficiencies of the Charter apart, there 
has also been unwillingness on the part of the Commission to enforce econornic, social and 
cultural rights.16' Besides, there is nothing to show that the Commission is paying any 
significant attention to economic, social and cultural rights compared to civil and political 
rights. 
While the Charter has been hailed for its novel approach in giving equal emphasis 
to al1 rights, the problem has remained that of implementation of these rights. In practice. the 
civil and political rights have received more prominence whereas the economic, social and 
cultural rights have been largely ignored. The excuse often given for the non implementation 
of these rights is the econornic situation of most African c~untr ies . '~~ However, this raises 
a question as to the objective behind their inclusion as rights in the Charter and the eloquent 
declarations of the Prearnble. 
144 Makau wa Mutua, "The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective" (1993) 3 
R r v i w  of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1 1. To Munia's view one should add that 
of ri retired Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court to wit: "with the greatest respects CO the founding fathers of 
the Charter and the eminent personditics that serve in the Commission, what we have set up is, in appropriate 
metriphor, a toothless bull-dog." See P. Nnaemeka-Agu, "Constitutional and Human Rights Proceedings," 
Continuing Legal Education Lecture Series (Lecture 4A) 7 March 199 1. It has Curther bcen observed that the 
ribilities of the Commission are restricted by the fact that it was envisaged aimost exclusively as a body to 
promote rather than protect human rights. See Claude E. WeIch, 'The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: A Five Year Report and Assessment" (1992) 14 Human Rights Quanerly 43 at 43-44 
[hereinafter 'African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights"]. 
%ee supra. note 160. 
1 66 Sce for instance, Richard Gittieman, supra, note lat 687; John K. Akpaiu, supra, note 140 at 103; 
Umozurike, 'African Charter' supra, note 16 at 7. 
3.5.1.3. Implementntioa / Enforcement Problem as a Manifestation of Misconceiveà 
Objectives. 
Given the eloquent declaration of the Charter in its Preamble that "it is henceforth 
essentiai to pay a particular attention to the right to developrnent and that civil and political 
rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as 
well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of the civil and political rights";16' the fact that the African 
states at the time of making these declarations were in no better condition than they presently 
are; the fact that these economic, social and cultural rights were actually enshrined as rights 
in the Charter, and the virtual opposite that is obtainable in practice, the actuai objective that 
animated the inclusion of these rights in the Charter requires a critical examination. 
Even though the African Charter, to a great extent, truly reflects the traditional 
African philosophy and conception of rights, yet, it seems that at the time of adopting the 
Charter ( 1  98 1) the Afncan states were still not really certain as to who was supposed to fulfil 
the obligations in the Charter.'" African states were unrnindhil of the fact that they were 
creating obligations which they would be required to fulfil for their citizens. Had the contmy 
been the case, the Charter would, perhaps, have been less flamboyant in its provisions on 
economic, social and cultural rights in view of their often touted severe economic 
circumstances. Rather, their focus for the satisfaction of these rights was extemal rather than 
"'~ee pangraph 8 of the PrearnbIe to the Afican Charter. 
1 6 8 ~ ~ .  James W. Nickel, WOW Human Rights Gewrate Duties to Protect and Provide" (1993) 15 
Hurnan Rights Quarterly 77 (noting that "[a] common Enrstration with human rights instruments such as the 
Univrrsal Declaration of Hurnan Rights is that they do not clerirly define who is obligated to ensure the 
enforcement and irnpkmentation of the rights they declare"). 
intemal. These rights were consequently addressed, not to African States themselves but, to 
the extemal elements of their historic exploitative and extractive past16' and the entire 
sympathetic world before whom they were, (and still are), lying prostrate begging for alrn~."~ 
Thus, Urnozunke warned that "the influence of extemal forces on the development of human 
rights on the [Afncm] continent must not be underestimated."' 
As Oloka-Onyango rightly noted, "...the focus of these rights (economic, social and 
cultural) is pnmarily the extemal dynamic - the elements of historical exploitation and 
conternporary maldevelopment - without a parallel approach to the inequities of the domestic 
arena. Apart from what the Charter contins, what it fails to mention speaks even iouder of 
the actual position of the African leaders on these rights."'" It was, therefore, not clear to 
them (African leaders) whether they were creating a political instrument or a legally binding 
one. 
169~laude E. WeIch, "African Commission on Humon and Peopler' Rights," supro, note 164 at 44 
rightly obscrvcd that "ftlhe OAU, ... historicaily, has considered human rights liugely in the guise of self- 
determination, through the ending of alien or settler rule." This perhaps beclouded OAU members' sense of 
judgcment to properly appreciate the practicai implications of the normative human rights regime adopted by 
thcm. It was also the basis of their illusion that by adopting such a Charter they would be mtlking a resounding 
claim for the redressing of past (colonial exploitative and 0 t h  related) wrongs. 
17 %e Chaner was adopted at a time when donors were no longer blowing muted munpets about the 
cgrcgious human rights situation in the continent and moves were made to not only channel financial aid into 
rictivitics that promote human rights, but aiso to deny aid to countries who were seen to be doing nothing to 
promote hurnan rights. Thus, when President Carter of the US cut off aid to Uganda and placed an embargo on 
the importation of Ugandan coffee as a sanction against Idi Amin's violations, most African States needed no 
other prompting to 'fdl in linc' in order to escape the dangling 'Sword of Danocies' and to be seen to be 
'committed' in order to maintain the vital sources through which the much needed aids trickfed in to 
momentarily. if at d l ,  quench the thirst of their Oliver Twisted economy. See A. Young-Anawety, "Human 
Rights and ACP-EEC Lome II Convention," (1980) 13 NYUl Intl. L & Pol, Science 63, (describing the attempt 
to incorporate human rights into the EEC-ACP Pact, Lome II Convention). 
"'~mozurike. supra. note 16 at 27. 
172~ .  Oloka-Onyango. supm, note 134 at 5 1. 
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This point is supported by the fact that the Charter appears to be a compromise 
between those who wanted to promote human rights and those who were more concemed 
with protecting their sovereignty but who had to bow to extemal pressures.'" Consequently, 
there appears to be a tacit agreement that the Charter was actually to satisfy the extemal 
elements other than the intemal ones. The Charter was thus a trade-off.'" It was, therefore, 
no coincidence that many important r i g h t ~ ' ~ ~  granted by the Charter are massively and 
unduly restricted by the use of clawback clauses'76 which give states unqualified power to 
infringe upon certain rights with the implication that national laws take precedence over 
charter granted rights. '" 
This misconception led to the creation of an instrument that was the first of its kind 
not only in content, but also in non-implementation, and non-enforcement. And this goes to 
the mot of al1 the implementation problems facing the economic, social and cultural rights 
under the African Charter. 
173~rnozurike, 'Afican Chnrter' supra. note 16 at 8 1-82 states that "[tlhe Charter was a compromise 
bctween the few states that genuinely wanted to promote human righis and many that were more concemed with 
cntrenching non-interference with what they considered to be rnatters of interna1 affairs or indeed the 
cnlargement of exciusive state jurisdiction." 
'"%ut see Edward Kannyo, 'The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples* Rights: Genesis and Political 
Background" in Claude E. Welch and Ronald 1. Meltzer. Human Rights and Development in Afnca, supra, note 
Y ,  rit 128- 15 1 which described the politicai and diplomatic background to the Afn'can Charter, indicating the 
factors that influenced its development, and considerations that limited its scope and content. 
17'sorne of the provisions unduly restricted by clawback clauses include. Articles 6(2); 9(1); iO(2); 
12( 1); 13( 1 )  and 14(1). These provisions are in the foliowing form: "Every individual shall have the X- right 
or Y- freedom provided he abides by the law or in accordance with the law." 
17%ee infra, Chapter 5 for a discussion of the clawback clauses in the Charter. 
i n ~ e e  Cees F l i n t e m  and Catherine Hendenon. supra, note 3 at 390. 
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3 S. 1.4. Indivisibility a d  Interdependence of Rights: Keeping Faîth with the Past 
Axiomatic to the idea of human nghts is the respect for human dignity. As such, 
discriminatory enforcement of human rights is bound to produce a human rights regime with 
a distorted or mangled face. Indivisibility of rights is embedded in, and in fact, the bedrock 
of. traditional African praciice and conception of human rights. It also foms the 
philosophical underpinning of the Afrcan Charter and has k e n  emphasized by the UN 
General Assembly in a resolution adopted in 1950 that asserted the interdependence, 
interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights.17* As was noted in the preceding chapter, 
this interdependence has continuously resonated ever since in United Nations fora, and, most 
recently, it was reaffirmed at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Right~."~ 
The fact of interdependence and interconnectedness of rights implies that human 
rights cannot be observed or enforced in parts. This ideal recognized in the African Charter 
obligates states to cany it out. The practicai recognition of the indivisibility of rights and the 
effectuation of these (economic, social and cultural) rights as enforceable rights in dornestic 
constitutions will likely improve the quality of life and the general human rights situation in 
Africa. 
As has been shown, traditional African conception and practices regarding economic, 
social and cultural rights were rooted in the peoples' way of life and the socioeconomic and 
political systems of that time ensured their enjoyment, not in isolation but as a collectivity 
17'~eneral Assembly Resolution 421 (V) of Decernber 4, 1950. 
179~ee United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declarafion and Programme of 
Action, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157f23, 12 Iuly 1993, para. 5. 
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with other rights. This contrasts sharply with present realities in modem Africa where righis 
are categorized and divided into enforceable and unenforceable ones. 
Whereas in modem Africa there are provisions (in the Afrrcan Charter) protecting 
economic, social and cultural rights, these provisions are not only vague and lacking clarity 
both in content and scope, but also they are not as far reaching as the rights in traditional 
Africa. In addition, while traditional Africa had effective in-built mechanisms and 
institutions for the protection and enjoyment of these rights, the mechanisms and institutions 
for the protection and enjoyment of these rights in modem Africa are weak and ineffective. 
While traditional Afnca recognized the importance of these rights, (both in practice and in 
theory), for the continued existence of society, modem Africa rnerely pays lip service to 
them. Thus, while trying to reflect these traditional values in the Afrcan Charter, it was done 
in such a way as to distort their red meaning and content. Whatever value the inclusion of 
these rights would have had is also lost in the fact that these rights are not accorded hiIl 
relevance in practical tems, hence there relegation to a second (and non-justiciable) position 
in most domestic jurisdictions, as the next chapter reveals. 
A reality often overlooked today is that, although the traditional system hinctioned 
within a given set of social and legal relationships different from the contemporary African 
social and legal systems,'" to a great extent, albeit subservient to the existing politico-legal 
structures, the traditional system is still in existence. Even though one need not look too far 
to see that it has largely cushioned, and is still cushioning, the monstrous ineptitude of 
"O~akah S. Mahmud. 'The State and Human Rights in A b  in the 1990s: Perspectives and 
Prospects" ( 1993) 15 Humun Rights Quarteriy 485 at 489. 
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African states in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, much of the traditional 
African community no longer functions in the old ways.lsl The traditionai community 
structure that concretizes the relationship between the individual and the farnily at a broader 
level has Iost much of its bonding in the wider structure of the modem state due, arnong other 
things. to increased popuiation growth and urbanization. the emergence of the professional 
political class, and the consequent "subordination of the basic needs of the wider community 
to the imperative of personal advan~ernent."~~~ Needless to add that the virtual weakening 
of the traditional system has increased the socioeconomic I political stakes and peoples' 
ex pectations of their governments whose achievements so far, as the next c hapter shows, 
seem not enough to scratch the surface of the enormous problems. 
'"~ee Ali Mmui. m e  Afncan Condition (1980) iit 59. cited in Rhoda Howard, "1s there an Afncan 
Concept of Humm Rights?" in R. J. Vincent, (ed.), Foreign Polio, and Human Rights: Issues and Responses 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 13. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
IMPLEMENTATION / ENFORCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS UNDER THE GFRICAN CHARTER IN DOMESTIC 
JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARISON OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary international human nghts regimes are anchored on the imperative of 
regulating the activities of the Westphalian statel in its relations with its citizens by 
prescribing certain acceptable rules of conduct. The need for such regdation is rooted in the 
recognition of the intrinsic worth. and the equal and indienable rights. of al1 members of the 
human family to a dignified existence.' It is appreciated that the observance of human rights 
is a necessity for the promotion of social progress and better standards of life for dl 
humanity.' The ability of the state to fulfill its international obligations, especially those 
freely entered into, determines how it is viewed among "civilized nations.'"' These 
' ~ h e  modem state system b d  on the principle of iemtotini sovereignty which was ushered in by the 
Pcacc of Wcstphalia of 1648. The Westphalian state is a West European arrangement necessitated by the 
conspicuous lack of unifying influences as no central power replaced the former authorhies of Emperor and 
Pope. See Charles S. Rhyne, International Law: The Substance, Processes, Procedures and Institutionsfor 
World Peace With Justice (Washington, DC: CLB Publishers, 1971) at 16-17. 
%ce Isa Hayatu Chiroma. "Human Righis under the Military Rule in Nigeria" (1995) 5 Revue 
A fricaine des Driots de 1' Homme 9 1 at 92 [hereinafter, "Military Rule"]. 
O. Etc. *'Dernocracy. Human Rights, Dictatonhip and the Nigerian ludiciary" (1993) 3 JHRLP 5 1 
at 52. 
4 Thc tenn 'civilized nations' is used cautiously here generically to refer to ail rnembers of the 
international cornmunity, though not oblivious of its misuse in the p s t  to exclude nations considered as barbaric 
( i n  the cyes of some self-appointed civilizing agents) and chus in need of being civilized. Some writers in 
discussing the development of international law use the t em 'civilized nations' to refer to Western Christian 
nations at the turn of the 19th Century and to those non-Christian scates which had shown themselves worthy 
of being adrnitted to their limited family of nations. See H. triuterpacht, (ed.) Oppenheim 's Intemational Lmc 
A Treatise, vol. 18th edn. (London: Longman, 1955) at 48. To this end, Africans and others, like the Chinese, 
were regrirded as barbarians. Indeed, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, international society led by the 
obligations require certain positive and negative steps toward their actualization. Besides its 
international image, the success or failure of a state in fulfilling its human nghts obligations 
has increasingly become a major determinant of its legitimacy? While noms prescribing 
state conduct are an indispensable component of an effective human rights regime, some 
legal scholars are of the view that such noms, notwithstanding the extent of their 
platitudinous articulations, cannot, of themselves, produce results unless they are backed up 
with meaningful action towards enforcement or irnplementati~n.~ 
Consequently, the Afrcan Charter's extolled unique conceptualization of the notion 
of human rights7 by its emphasis on economic, social and cultural tights can only be 
meaningful if it is translated into practice by States Parties to the Charter. Hence, the 
grcat powers assumed hat  public international law did not extend to nations which could not be described as 
'civilized.' This exclusive character of public international law, as Elias has observed, resulted in a country like 
China, with probribly a much longer historical tradition of culture and enlightenment than many states of 
Western Europe at that time being, excluded from the purview of international law, See T. O. Elias, 'The 
Expanding Frontiers of International Law" (1963) at 99, cited in A. O. Chukwurah, 'The Cogency of 
International Law in Africa" (1976) 1 Nig. J.R. 10 at i 1. Ironically, the Chinese, in their extemal relations 
during the 16th and 17th centuries, viewed the selfsame Western powers as 'barbaians' and thernselves as the 
defenders of an çnlightened civiIization. See Rosalyn Higgins Conflict of Interest: International Lav in a 
Divided World (London: The Bodley Head, 1965) at 48-50. Historically, most great civilizations of the worid 
took this contemptuous posture in their relations with foreigners and this phenornenon understandably 
determined, in large measure, the European attitude to Afnca. See A. O. Chukwufah, Ibid. 
' ~ h e  rneaning and contents of the concept of legitimate governance are slill intensely debated in 
international law. Scholars appear to be divided on the processes of measuring the legitimacy of governance. 
Sec Obiora C. Okafor, 'The Concept of Lcgitimate Govemance in the Contemporary international Legal 
System" (1997) 44 Netherlanh International Law Review 33-60. See also, Obijiofor Aginam, "Legitimate 
Governance under the AfÏican Charter of H u m  and Peoples' Rights" in E K Quashigah Br O C Okafor (eds.) 
Legirirnate Goventance in Afnca (Netherlands: Kiuwer Law Internationai, 1999) at 345. However, the extent 
to which a government (and by extension the state) respects the hurnan rights of the citizens has increasingly 
bccome the yardstick for determining its Iegitimacy. 
'sec Makau Mutua, 'The African H u m  Rights Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?" (1999) 21 
Huniun Rigkts Quarterly 342 at 35 1. 
 o ose M. D'sa. " H u m  and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter" (1985) 
Jorcrnul of Africari Law 72. 
obligations imposed on States Parties, in addition to their generd undertaking, to carry out 
the provisions of the Charter? Unlike the ICESCRP the obligation of States Parties to the 
African Charter on economic, social and cultural rights are not stated to be dependent on 
availability of resources or as achievable progressively. Accordingly, the Afncan Charter 
prescribes an identical form of state obligation for al1 rights therein provided. In practice, 
however, States Parties' obligations in connection with economic, social and cultural rights 
are perceived, treated and performed as though they are qualified and progres~ive.'~ It is 
therefore oecessary to examine the implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights 
in the municipal domain of various States Parties in order to ascertain the extent to which 
States Parties have discharged, or are discharging their obligations. 
Owing to the virtual impossibility of covering the domestic domain of al1 States 
Parties, this Chapter assumes a modest task of comparatively examining the irnplementation/ 
enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights in the domestic jurisdictions of Nigeria 
? l e  obligations assumed by States Parties to the C h n e r  may conveniently be classifed into two 
broad categories, each consisting of other layers of obligations. Some obligations are of generd nature while 
othcrs exist only with respect to certain specific rights. Under obligations of a gened  nature, four types of 
obligations cm be distinguished: an obiigation to perform the Charter in good fith, an obligation to give effect 
to the rïghts in the Chaner, an obligation to address a communication, and an obligation to submit periodic 
reports. Prirticular obligations are specific obligations, apart from the general obligations, assumed by virtue 
of the rule of pacra sunt semarida and aiso under Articles 1,25, and 26 of the Charter. See Carlson Anyangwe, 
"Obligations of States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples* Rights" (1998) 10 RADIC 625 
at 627-642. See, rilso Obijiofor Aginam, supra, note 4 at 352. The Charter subrnits ail the rights therein 
proclaimed ta an identicai form of state obligation. Consequently, as Anyangwe rightly observed, "none of the 
strite obligations in the Charter is expressed as k ing  dependent on avdable resources and so achievable only 
progressively." See Carlson Anyangwe, Ibid at 642. Thus, Sieghart was right in suggesting Lhat the Charter 
imposes on States parties absolute and immediate obIigations to take action to ensure that the rights it guariuikes 
are fuily respected. See P. Sieghart, The Intemational Law of Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 
57. 
9 See Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
' '~ee Carlson Anyangwe, supra. note 8 at 642. 
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and South Africa. Nonetheless, where possible, the position in other States Parties, and not 
just Nigeria and South Africa, will be highlighted. To this end, the Chapter examines the 
relationship between the Charter and the domestic constitutions of the two states with the 
aim of portraying, among other things, the Charter's application in domestic jurisdictions. 
The constitutional protection of economic, social and cultural rights is exarnined to show the 
adequacy or otherwise of the juridical measures taken by States Parties in fulfilment of their 
Cllarter obligations. Also. the vaiidity of constitutional provisions inconsistent with the 
Charter is examined in the light of a State Party's responsibility to live up to its international 
obligations as embodied in international agreements freely entered into by such a State Party. 
The Chapter concludes with a brief inquiry into govemmental efforts, legislative or 
otherwise, deployed towards the redization of the economic. social and cultural nghts. the 
essence of which is to show the extent of the govemment's cornmitment towards the 
irnplementation of these rights. In addition, some relevant cases entertained by the courts are 
analysed to show the various courts' attitude to the enforcement of economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
4.2. RATIONALE FOR COMPARISON 
A keen observer's rnind may be agitated as to the rationale behind the comparison 
of, or the cnteria used to select, these two states - Nigeria and South Africa - of al1 the states 
in Africa. The choice is as infomed as it is arbitrary. It is infomed by this writer's belief that 
Nigeria and South Africa's juridical and practical implementation / enforcernent of the 
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economic, social and cultural nghts under the Afican Charter are, in one way or the other, 
typical of other African states. Whereas, South Afnca syrnbolizes a more progressive regime 
recognizing constitutionally enforceable economic, social and cultural rights, Nigeria 
represents the ultra conservative regime (of the majority of states) that constitutionally 
discriminates against the enforcement of econornic, social and cultural nghts. 
The fact that there may be other states sharing the above characteristics, wholly or 
partly, with either of the two chosen states underscores the arbitrary nature of the choice. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that analyses of the practices of these two states will establish a 
pattern, and thereby provide an insight into the attitude to, and performance of other African 
states of the obligations undertaken by them, in respect of economic, social and cultural 
rights. as state parties to the Afncan Charter. 
4.3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHARTER AND DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONS 
The question of the proper relationship between international law and municipal 
laws in Africa is an interesting jurisprudential issue which is reflected in the opposing 
doctrines temed the monist and the dualist theones." While a detailed exploration of these 
" ~ e e  Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law in Post-Colonial Afnea (The Hague: KIuwer Law 
International, 1999) at 3 1-5 1 [hereinafter "Post-Colonial Afnca"]; Tijanyana Maluwa, 'The Incorporation of 
International Law and its Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal Systerns in Africa: An Expioratory Survey" 
( 1998) 23 SA YIL 45-64 [hereinafter "Incorporation of Intentational Law"]; Tiyanjsina Maluwa, lnternational 
Human Rights Norms and the South African Interim Constitution 1993" ( i993/94) 19 SA YlL 14 at 27-40 
[hereinafier "Inrernational Human Rights Norms"]; U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Righrs (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) at 107-1 12 [hereinafter "African Chorter"]. See 
generdly, [an Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) at 32-57; 
Louis Henkin, International Law= Politics and Values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nij hoff, 1995) at 64-95; D. P. 
O'ConnelI, International Lawfor Shtdents (London: Stevens & Sons, 1971) at 15-25 [hereafter "International 
Law for Strtdents"]; D. P. O'Oconnell, International Law, 2nd edn. vol.1 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970) at 
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well-known theories. or an examination of their historical and philosophical origins, lies 
outside the scope of this thesis, a bnef examination is, however, apposite. For one thing, in 
spite of their little practical utility in actuaily inspiring any remarkable differences among 
states in their application of international law. the opposing doctrines provide a theoretical 
basis for understanding the major propositions regarding the relationship between 
international law and municipal law in Africa Besides, the ghosts of the opposing doctrines 
still lurk in the shadows of some notable decisions involving the application of international 
law in the domestic jurisdictions of some African States." 
Monism holds that both international law and municipal law belong to one unified 
legal science that transcends national boundaries. In this scheme of things, international law 
and municipal law are regarded as "related parts of the same legal str~cture"'~ and "the legal 
system of every state is a single system consisting of international law and the state's own 
domestic law, with international law ~upreme."'~ Thus, under this theory, international law 
has prirnacy over municipal law within the same sy~tem.'~ And the state's constitutional 
38-79 [hereinafter "Intema:ional Law"]; D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International l a w  5th edn. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 68-98; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 2nd edn. (Cambridge: 
Groitius Pubticsitions, 1986) at 97- 123. 
12 For instance see the recent Supreme Court of Nigeria decision in General Sani Abacha & Ors. v. 
Chief Gani Fawehinmi [20ûû] 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228. 
I3~ijanyana Maluwa, "lncorpomrion of International Law" supra, note I 1 at 49. 
"kouiouis Henkin. supm. note i 1 at 64. 
"u. Oj i Umozuruike, "Afrcan Chnef' supm. note 1 1 at 107- 108. 
system must recognize the supremacy of international law.I6 
The origins of monism can be traced to the medieval unity of western Europe, which 
then fell under the twin hegemony of Pope and Emperor and, in the natural law philosophy 
of the Schoiastics, which proposed an ultimate authority for al1 law." It was subsequently 
embraced by both Kantian philosophy (which favours a unitary conception of law) and 
Kelsenian positivi~m.'~ A variant of monism, 'inverted monism', concedes primacy to 
municipal law. It is associated with ~ergbohm." According to O'Oconnell, due to its 
exaggerated emphasis on the state will, inverted monism never found favour in international 
tribunals. and therefore, remains "no more than an abstract possibility."" 
On its own, dualism maintains that the question of the pnmacy of the two legal orders 
is relative, depending on the forum in which the matter mises, whether it is a domestic coun 
or international tribunal." Dualists argue that whereas municipal law is a manifestation of 
internally directed sovereign will, international law is a manifestation of sovereign will 
16 Louis Henkin, supra, note 11 at 64. The further implication of constitutional recognition of the 
suprcmacy of international law, according to Henkin, is that the national legislature is bound - constitutiondly 
bound - to respect international law in enacting legislation; the national executive is constitutiondly required 
to take care that international law be faithfully executed, even in the face of inconsistent domestic law; and the 
national judiciary must give effect to internationai Iaw, notwithstanding inconsistent domestic law, even 
domestic law of constitutionai character. 
"~iyanjana Maluwa, bbPosr-Colunial Afica" supra, note 1 I at 34. 
"~iyanjana Maluwa. Ibid. See also D. P. OTConnell. "InternurionaL h w "  supra, note 1 1 at 39. Ian 
Browniie, supra, note 1 1 at 34 observes that "[wlhile KeIsen establishes monism on the formal bases of his 
own theory, he does not support the 'primacy' of international Iaw over municipal law: in his [Kelsen's] view 
the question of 'primacy' c m  only be decided on the buis of considerations which are not legai." 
"u. Oji Umozuruike, "Afican Charrer" supra. note 9 at 108 (citations omitted). See dso  D. P. 
O'Connell. "International Law" Ibid. at 42, 
'OD. P. OPConneI1, "lnteniatiorial Law" lbid 
2 1 See Tijanyana Maluwa, bblncurporation of International Law" supra, note 1 1 at 49. 
directed extemally and exercised in comrnon with other sovereigma The dualists, therefore, 
contend that the two legai orders are. in origin and purpose, separate and self-contained 
systems," only having contacts with each other and requiring the recognition of one by the 
other." For the dualist, international law can never automaticaily be assumed to form part 
of municipal law. Where a conflict arises between international law and municipal law, the 
dualist would assume that a municipal court would apply municipal law? 
Di fferences between the rnonist-dualist positions seem very theoretical and appear 
not to have inspired any significant differences between States in their application of 
international law. International law and international political system are mainly concemed 
with only the result: whether the state complies with international law? The monist-duaiist 
controversy notwithstanding, most scholars agree that the theories are relevant only in the 
specific context of customary international law.*' The cardinal principle in most legal 
systems is that the interna1 application of treaties. which is our main concem here, is 
"sec D. P. O'Connell. "International Law" supra, note I 1 at 42; U. Oji Urnouuuike. "Afncan 
C/inrrer" supra, note 1 l at 108. 
23 1. A. Shearer, Starke's International Law, 1 lth edn., (London: Butterworths, 1994) at 64. 
24 See Tijanyana Maluwa, "Post-Colonial Africa" supra, note t 1 at 34-35. 
75 See Ian Brownlie, supra, note I l  at 33. Some scholars view the entire rnonist-duaIist controversy 
ris highly "unreai, artificid and strictly beside the point" because it assumes a non-existent precondition for a 
controversy - "namely a comrnon field in which the two legal orders ... both sirnultaneously have their spheres 
of rictivity." See D. J. Harris, supra, note 11 at 68. Some others argue that between the extreme versions of 
monism on the one hmd, and dualism on the other, as opposing approaches or doctrines, lies, in reaiity, a whole 
range of intermediate relationships which do not lend themselves to ready classification. See Tijanyana Maluwa, 
"Incorporation of ln temat io~l  Law" supra, note 1 1 at 50. 
%ee Louis Henkin. supra. note 11 at 65 (notes that "[iln modern international life, the political system 
has largely proved uninterested in the monistduaiist debate"). 
27 See supra, note 11 and accompanying texts. 
govemed by domestic constitutional law. 
4.3.1. Application of the African Charter in Domestic Jurisdictions 
The application of the Afrcan Charter in the domestic jurisdictions of African states 
follows the general rules for the application of treaties, which are govemed by specific 
constitutional provisions? In this regard, the practice of African states has been determined 
in part by their respective colonial expenences and the inherited colonial legal cultures and 
systems. Consequently, there is a distinction between the approach followed by the comrnon 
law countnes (former British colonies). and the civil law countries (mainly former French 
colonies and former colonies of some other continental European powers, such as Germany, 
Portugal. Ital y and S~ain). '~ 
In the civil law jurisdictions following the approach of France, treaties to which the 
state concemed is a party and which have been duly ratified or approved and published in the 
official gazette, have force of law in the domestic jurisdiction, even if they are in conflict 
wi th domestic legi~lation.'~ 
28 See Dermott J. Devine, 'The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law in the 
Light of the Interim South African Constitution L993" (1995) 44 1. C.L.Q. 1 at 14. 
29 See Tiyanjana Maluwa, "Posr-Colonial Afhca" supra, note 1 1 at 36. See also P. F. Gonidec, 'The 
Relationship of International Law and National Law in Afnca*' (1998) 10 RADIC 244 at 245. 
'O~ee P.F. Gonidec, supra, note 29 at 245; Urnozurike. "Afican Chonef' supra, note I l  at 109. 
Tijanyana Maluwa, "Incorporation of Intemarional Law" supra, note 11 at 54; Tiyanjana Maluwa, "Post- 
Colonid ilfnca" supra, note I 1 at 39. With the exception of Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(former Zaire). countries in this category are al1 former French colonies. Most of them adopted a verbatim 
formulation of Article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958, which provides: "Treaties or agreements duly 
ratified or approved shnll, upon rheir publication. have an authority superior to that of [domestic] legislation, 
subject, for each agreement or treaty, to [reciprocal] application by the other party." See: Article 123 of 
By contrat, in the comrnon law countries, to which Nigeria and South Africa belong, 
any international agreement has to be first incorporated into the national legd order as an 
enactment of the National Assembly in order to become part of the law of the land." To this 
end, section 12( 1) of Nigerian Constitution provides: 
No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall 
have the force of law except to the extent to which any such 
treaty has been enacted into law by the National ~ssembly." 
By virtue of this provision the Nigerian Court of Appeal held in the case of Fawehinmi v. 
 bach ha" that where there is no enactment to give effect to the spirit of a treaty, 
notw i thstanding i ts adoption, recognition and due regard by a sovereign govemment, it 
cannot be justiciable in the Nigerian municipal court." 
With regard to South Afnca, section 231(4) of the South African Constitution 
provides: 
Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic 
Constitution of Algeria, 1989; Article 147 of Constitution of Republic of Benin, 1990: Article 151 of 
Constitution of Burkina Faso, 199 1 ; Article 69 of Constitution of Centrai African Republic, 1995); Article 1 O6 
of Constitution of Chad, 1993; Article 176 of Constitution of Congo, 1992; Article 56 of Constitution of Cote 
d'Ivoire, 1960; Article 109 of Constitution of Democratic Republic of Congo (former aire) ,  1978; Article 37 
of Constitution of Djibouti, 1992; Article 9 of Constitution of Ethiopia, 1994; Article 79 of Constitution of 
Guinca, 1990; Article 1 16 of Constitution of Mali, 1992; Article 80 of Constitution of Mauritania 199 1 ; Article 
120 of Constitution of Niger, 1992; Article 79 of Constitution of Senegal, 1963; and Article 32 of Constitution 
of Tunisiti, 1996. See Tiyanjana Maluwa, "Post-Colonial Afn'ca" Ibid at 40. In 1993, Zimbabwe amended its 
1980 Constitution and adopted a typical transformation approach by providing thrit treaties shall not forrn part 
of the Zimbabwean law unless they have been expressly made piut of the municipai laws by or under an Act 
of Parliament. 
' ~ e e  P. F. Gonidec, Ibid. 
32 Constitution of the Federai Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The provision was the same under the 1979 
Constitution (coincidentally the same section 12) which was in existence when the A f k a n  Charter was 
adopted. 
33 [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 475), 710. See infra, at 153-156 for facts of the case. 
34 Ibid. rit 756 per Pats-Acholonu, J.C.A. 
when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self- 
executing provision of an agreement that has been approved 
by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of ~arliament? 
Even though a measure of uncertainty exists about the definition of a self-executing 
agreement under the South Afncan  la^,'^ it is clear that an international agreement of the 
nature of the African Charter is not self-executing." A legislative enactment is, therefore. 
required in South Africa, as in Nigeria, for the Charter to become law in the municipal 
sphere. This is so notwithstanding the provisions of section 231(2) of the South African 
~ons t i tu t ion .~~  It is submitted that the legislative approval does not, ipso facto, make an 
international agreement applicable in South Africa's domestic jurisdiction. Subsections 2 and 
4 must therefore be read together, as providing a 'two-step' transformation procedure which 
must be followed in order to make an international agreement applicable in the municipal 
35~onstitution of the Republic of Souda Africa, 1996. The Constitution can alro be found online at 
~http:llwww.hsrc.ac.zrilçonstitutions/rsh1 .html> (Visited January 26,2Q00). 
36 See Andre Stemrnet, "A F u m  Afncan Court for H u m  and Peoples' Rights and Domestic Human 
Rights N o m "  (1998) 23 SAYfL 233 at 244. According to the South African Constitution, section 231(4), a 
self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by the Parliament is law in the Republic unless 
it is inconsistent with Constitution or an Act of Parliament. The Constitution did not, however, define 'a self- 
cxecutinp provision of an agreement.' The courts are yct to define or pronounce on it, thus leaving it enmeshed 
in uncertainty. 
37 The state parties to the African Charter recognized the non-self-executing nature of the Charter. 
Thus, Article I of the Charrer states: 'The Member States of the Orgmization of African Unity Parties to the 
present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake 
ta adopr legislarive or other measures to give Gect ro them." (Emphasis added). This provision has k e n  
interpreted as creating an 'outcorne-based system' by which states are expected to give effect CO the rights 
cnshrined in the Charter, but have a fiee choice in how to achieve this. See Andre Stemmet, lbid 
38 Section 23 i(2) provides that: "An internationd agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the Nationai Council of Provinces, unIess it is an 
agreement referred to in subsection 3." Section 231(3) refers to an international agreement of a technical, 
administrative or executive nature, or to an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession. 
system of South ~ f r i c d ~  It follows that for the Afncan Chnr?er to be incorporated into South 
Afncan domestic law, legislation will be required in accordance with section 23 l(4) of the 
~onstitution?' 
However, the Charter may be made applicable in a state's municipal junsdiction 
otherwise than by express legislative incorporation, in view of the provisions of the A f d n  
Charter, Article 1 ," which envisages an 'outcorne-based system' 42 of effectivity. Thus, 
where a state has signed and ratified the Charter and has taken other measures, (other than 
through legislative incorporation) to apply the Charter's provisions in its municipal law, ihat 
state is not in breach of its international obligations under the Charter." Accordingly, by 
3 %or a contnry view, see Tiyanjann Maluwa, "Post-Colonial Afnca" supra, note 1 1 at 162 (arguing 
that once a treaty has been ratified by parliament, it would fom part of South Ahican law without any need for 
ri further specific act of legislative incorporation). But see Dennott J. Devine, supra, note 28 at 15 for a different 
in~erpretation, namely that a legislative enactment would be required to translate treaties into municipal law. 
It has been rugued that section 23 f (4) "is qualification or modification of the dualist approach pioneered by 
British jurisprudence, according to which a treaty signcd and ratified by the executive is binding at the 
international level, but it is not part of municipal or domestic law until it has been incorporated into such law 
by Icgislation." See G.E. Devenish, A Commenrary on the South African Constitution (Durban: Butteworths, 
1998) rit 324. This supports the view that, unless incorporated into domestic law by legislative enactment, a 
trcaty does not form part of the municipai law in South Africa. 
'%ee Andre Stemmet supra, note 36 at 244. 
"sec supra. note 37. 
42 Andrc Sternmet, supra, note 36 at 244. 
" 3 ~ u t  see ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh. 'The African Regional System of Human Rights: Notes and 
Comrnents" in Pearson Nherere & Marina d' Engelbronner-Kol f, ( e h ) ,  The I~~stitutionalisation of Human 
Rights in Southem Afnca (Copenhagen: Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1993). iOlat 105, arguing that 
"national implementation requires basically a IegisIative action to enable individuals to invoke relevant national 
legislation in t!be domestic courts in defence of their rights." El-Sheikh's argument fails to recognize rhat Article 
1 of the African Charter makes legislative action optional. On his own, Andre Stemmet, Ibid. at 245, has 
opined that as a way of avoiding conflicts between its court and the African Court on Human Rights, South 
Ahica should not incorporate the Afncan Charter into its domestic law, since that does not amount to a breach 
of its obligations under the Charter so long as effect is given to the rights, duties and freedoms enshcined in the 
African Charter. This argument is at best misconceived. By signing and ratifymg the necessary instruments, 
South Africa would be violating its international obligations if it fails to abide by the decision of the Afncan 
Court even though the Charter was not incorporated into its domestic law. Non incorporation in the domestic 
Iriw merely renders the provisions of the Charter unenforceable in the South Afiican court, but neither 
integrating the major provisions of the Charter into its Constitution, as an enforceable bill 
of r i g h t ~ , ~  the provisions of the Afncan Charter are fully applicable in South ~ f r i c a , ~ ~  the 
absence of a separate incorporating legislation46 notwithstanding. As Frans Viljoen ably 
International law can be incorporated into local legal systerns 
in one or two ways: by explicit reference, or through 
reception. Explicit reference entails the enactrnent by name, 
as part of domestic legislation, of an international agreement. 
Reception takes place if the provisions of an international 
agreement ;ue reproduced in national legislation, or if national 
legislation is amended or repealed to conform to international 
noms, without explicit reference king made to the source of 
these noms?' 
The advantage of this reception approach adopted by South Afnca is that the process 
of inclusion into the constitution, affords the oppominity to, w here necessary, elaborate upon 
invalidrites nor rcnders the decisions of the African Court non-binding on South AFrica. Where an aggrieved 
party has obtained a judgcment against South Afiica, it (South ACnca) cannot reIy on its interna1 constitutional 
arrangements to evade its international obligations. See Article 27of Vienna Convention on the Law of Trearies 
( 1969) 8 I.L.M. 679; 1 155 U.N.T.S. 33 1 ; 63 A.J.I.L. 875. See also Article 13 of the Drafi Declaration of the 
Ri& and Dtiries of States, 1949, adopted by the International Law Commission, quoted in D.J. Harris, supra, 
note 1 1 at 7 1; Alabama Claims Arbitration [United States v. Great Britain] (1872) Moore 1 Int. Arb. 495; 
Erchange of Creek and Turkish Populations Case (1925) P.C.I.J. Reports, Series B, No. 10 at 20. 
JJ Sec Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afnca, 1996. 
JSThis is, however, hught  with problems, especially where thece are righis provided for in the Churter 
but not in the Constitution. It would be difficuit for a claimant to invoke the portions not in the constitution 
bçfore municipal courts. Sec Pearson Nherere, 'The Limits of Litigation in Humiui Rights Enforcement" in 
Pearson Nherere & Marina d' Engelbronner-Kolf, supra, note 43, 1 17 at 122-1 27. 
J $ooysen.  hi^^ persuasively argued that "[tlhe method of giving effect to international human cighis 
through legislation does not necessarily ensure that international human rights are impiemented in a uniform 
manner (as) [njationd legislation can differ both fiom one state to another, ... (and) [sjlight differences in 
wording can mean different results in practice." See Hercules Booysen, "The Dilemma of International 
Economic Human Rights: Their Application Through an Integnted System Approach" (1998) 23 SA YIL 93 at 
94-95. 
"~r;ins Viljoen. "Application of the African Charter on Human and PeoplesT Rights by Domestic 
Courts in Africa" ( 1999) 43 Journal of Afican Law 1. [Citations omitted]. [hereinafter, b'Application"]. 
more vague provisions." It is, nonetheless, open to misuse. The state might use the 
opportunity to dilute an international agreement49 or provide for itself escape routes which 
it was unable to secure duting the negotiation processo A fortiori, reception inflicts extrerne 
hardship on the citizens who would not be able to invoke the provisions of the Charter 
before municipal courts. A bener way of implementing international human rights 
agreements appears to be through the direct application of the original documents by national 
courts? 
Unlike South Africa. the African Charter has been expressly incorporated into the 
Nigerian municipal law by legislation?* with the treaty appearing as a schedule to the 
incorporating statute. Even though this mode of incorporating a treaty is suitable for some 
treaties, it has certain disadvantages which tend to make it unsuitable for human rights 
treaties;j especiaily the African Charter with its vague provisions on economic. social and 
cultural rights. Such a procedure leaves no room for redefining the vague provisions in such 
a way as to make them more meaningful and more user fnendly. This is especially so where, 
48 See Pearson Nherere, supra, note 45 at 125. 
" 9 ~ e e  Hercules Booysen. supra, note 46 at 95. 
"see for instance. section 27(2) of South Afiican Constitution. 1996 under which the state is to adopt 
'rcclsonrible legislative and other mwures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation' 
of rights therein provided. Such a provision is not only absent in the Afican Charter but has, in effect. provided 
an escape route unavaihble in the Charter. 
5 '~ercules Booysen. supra. note 46 at 95. 
*'sec The Afrcun Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratifcation and Enforcement) Act. Cap 
10 Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. The incorporation of the Afrcan Charfer into Nigerian law was 
rather clumsy. For a brief history of the incorporation into Nigerian domestic hw,  see infia, at 152. 
* ) ~ e e  Pearson Nherere, supra, note 45 at 124. 
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as in the case of Nigeria, there are apparent conflicts between the provisions of the scheduled 
Charter and the Constitution, and without the constitution being amended to bring it in line 
with the Charter, or a legislation to that effect passed. In spite of the Charter's application 
as dornestic law, the Nigerian Constitution still maintains a dichotomous relationship 
bet ween (en forceable) civil and political rights and (unenforceable) economic, social and 
cultural rights contrary to the provisions of the Charter. 
Also, in the event of military intervention, as is often the case in Africa and 
elsewhere, the laws and the constitution of the affected state are usually suspended, wholly 
or partly. and I or made subject to military decrees. Suspension of the constitution also 
implies the suspension of al1 the schedules, including the Charter. The application of the 
Charter and its incorporation into domestic Iaw, therefore, raise some hindamental 
jurisprudential questions regarding its status in relation to domestic laws and constitutions. 
4.3.2. S tatus of the Charter Vis-a-vis Domestic Laws and Constitutions 
The question of the status of the Afkican Charter in the domestic jurisdictions of state 
parties is one that does not lend itself to straightforward and easy answers. h al1 African 
countries, as a general nile, the constitution is sacrosanct and is considered the supreme and 
fundamental law of the state. The supremacy of the constitution is guaranteed by a system 
that controls the constitutionality of the laws and which voids, to the extent of their 
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inconsistencies, al1 laws inconsistent with the constitution? This seemingly unbounded 
supremacy of the constitution. gives rise to a conflict of status in the application of the 
African Charter. 
Obviously, where the domestic jurisdictions accord the same or higher levels of 
protection to the rights provided for in the African Charter, the issue of status or supremafy 
of the Charter over the national constitution ceases to be a pertinent one. The issue arises 
where a right is either not provided for in the Constitution of a state or where the Charter 
provides a greater protection. A survey of the constitution of some African States is bound 
io reveal some discrepancies existing in the rights provided for in the Charter and the 
constitution, with the Charter offenng greater protection in some cases.5s 
Even though the South African Constitution accords a prominent role to international 
law in the interpretation of the Bill of ~ ights :~  the status of international human rights 
agreements is not defined. Section 1 affirms the Constitution as the supreme law of the 
Republic and invalidates al1 inconsistent laws or conduct. By virtue of section 231(2), an 
in temational agreement binds the state only after it has been approved by the legislature. 
Gonidec has suggested that any problem of conflict which may arise between an international 
agreement and the Constitution may, ai this stage, be settled by the iegislature, and, if 
54 See for exampIe, section 2 of Constitution of the Republic of South Afkhz, 1996; section I ( 1 )  & (3) 
of Constitution of the Federai Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Article 9 of Ethiopian Constitution, 1994. 
Ss~ornpare The A-n Chuner (Articles 2-20) with Chapter 2 of South Africa's Constitution and 
Chaptcrs 2 & 4 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
" ~ e e  Section 39(1)(b). Constitution of the Republic of South Afiica, 1996. 
necessary, the Constitution may be amended to comply with the international agreement." 
Nevertheless, the Afncan Charter passed through this legislative process of adoption:' 
notwithstanding the differences between some of its provisions and the provisions of the 
Constitutiodg It, thereby, left the question of the stahis of the Charter in South Africa still 
unresolved. 
It has been argued that the question of status becomes material only when an 
international agreement has been made part of the municipal law since an unincorporated 
international agreement merely creates obligations at the international plane? For this 
reason, as a generd rule, domestic courts ordinarily apply domestic statutes even when they 
are in conflict with treatie~,~' (except for aspects of the treaties that have become part of 
international customary law) while leaving the question to be senled at the international level 
"sec P. F. Gonidec. supra. note 29 at 247. 
5S~outh Africa acceded to the Afncan Charter on Humn and People's Rights on July 9, 1996. 
According to Mr. Sam Kotane of the South Afncan Foreign Office, "there was no need to incorporate the 
Charter into domestic legislation as the South African Constitution incorporates the attributes of the Charter." 
Quoting Ms. Lerato Mashile, Communications Officet, South African Information Centre, GCTS (Head Office) 
Johannesburg. Information suppiied via e-mail on Friday, May 12,2000. [Hard copy on file with the writer]. 
See also Frans Viljoen, "State Reporting under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Boost 
from the South" (2000) 44 Journal ofAfncan Law 1 10 at 1 13. [hereinafter, "State ReportingWj. 
59 One of such differences is the propeq clause in the Constitution (section 25). While the right to 
property finds strong protection in Article 14 of the African Charter, the property clause in the South African 
Constitution makes provision for redressing the unequal distribution of land that resulted fiom past racidly 
discriminatory laws and practices. Also, the Charter (Article 16) guarantees the right of every individual to 
enjoy 'the best state of physical and mental hedth* which is not subjected to availabiiity of fùnds and 
progressive realization, while the Constitution (section 27) merely provides for the right of access to health c m ,  
to be achieved progressively subject to available resources. 
W ~ e e  Pearson Nherere, supra, note 45 at 123. 
"1n the case of Chakufwo Chihana v The Republic [1996] 1 LRC 1, the Malawi Supreme Court of 
Appeal uphetd the application of the provisions of municipal statutes inconsistent with provisions of the Aficun 
Charter of which Mdawi is a Party. For a discussion of the case see, T. Maiuwa. "The Role of Intemationai 
Law in the Protection of Human Rigfits under the Malawi Constitution" (1995) 3 A.Y.B.I.L. 65 mereinafter, 
"Protection of Human Rights"]; Tiyanjana Maluwa, "Post-Colonial Afica" supra, note 11 at 154-157. 
through diplomacy or other means." It is. however, arguable that in South Africa, an 
international agreement, approved by the legislature in accordance with the constitution, 
prevails over a conflicting constitutional provision. This may be deduced from a combined 
reading of sections 39(l)(b) and 233." Unfominately. these provisions appear to be merely 
useful for purposes of interpretati~ns,~~ and do not confer any supremacy. In fact, in S v 
~ n b v n n y n e ~ ~  while constming similar provisions in the 1993 Interim Constitution. 
Chakalson P, reminded the courts to "bear in rnind that [they] are to constme the South 
African Constitution. and not an international instrument. [Therefore, they] can derive 
assistance from public international law ... but are in no way bound to follow it."66 
Nevertheless, the Constitution expressly prohibits the application of any rule of 
customary international law inconsistent with constitutional provisions6' without containing 
any similar provisions with regard to international agreements (like the Afrcan Charter) to 
which South Africa is a Party. Using the principle of inclusio unius est exclwio alterius, it 
is hardly unreasonable, even if unsafe, to submit that inconsistent international agreements 
prevail over constitutional provisions. After d l .  as Mohamed DP stated in Azania Peoples 
62 Sec U. Oji Urnozurike, "African Chaner" supra, note 1 I rit 109. 
63 Section 39(l)(b) provides: 'When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court ... must consider 
international law.' Section 233 provides: 'When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
rcasonable interpretation that is consistent with international law over and above any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.' 
64 See the dictum of Mohamed DP, as he then was, in Atanian Peoples Organiution (AZAPO) v 
Prrsident of South Afnca [ 19961 8 BCLR 1015 (CC) at 103 1-1032. 
19951 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 
67 See Section 232 of the South African Constitution. 
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Organization (AZ4PO) v President of South ~frca," "the law makers of the Constitution 
should not lightly be presurned to authorise any law which might constitute a breach of the 
obligations of the state in terms of international I ~ w . " ~ ~  
The problem with the above-stated position is that it probably opens a wide gate 
through which the judiciary may embark ofi a very controversial exercise in search of the 
highly elusive and hardly determinate intentions of law makers, even if legitimately entitled 
to do so. Be that as it may, there is nothing strange about the courts embarking on an exercise 
to discover the intentions of the legislature, especially in the face of conflicting or arnbiguous 
provisions. Besides, the South African courts have a very strong constitutional backing to 
lean in favour of international law. Section 233 of the South African Constitution empowers 
the courts to prefer any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with international law as 
against any alternative interpretation." Hence, there is little doubt that the courts in South 
Africa are not only entitled to, but also would, in al1 probability, lem in favour of advancing 
the African Charter. As Professor B.O. Nwabueze erninently observed, "the court's task is 
to tty to strike a balance between the individual's [rights and] freedoms and the right of the 
state to self-preservation.'*7' There is nothing contained in the African Charter that 
constitutes a threat to, or violates, or is likely to violate, the right to self preservation of 
South Africa, and indeed of any other State Party to the Charter. Per contra, respecting and 
' O ~ e e  sipra. note 63. 
7 1 ~ .  O Nwabueze. Judicialirm in Commonwealth Afnca: The Role of the Courts in Governmenr (New 
York: St. Manins Press, 1977) at 139. 
promoting recognised international human rights nom,  as embodied in the Charter, would 
enhance, instead of undermine, a state's nght to self preservation. After d l ,  the protection 
of the rights of the citizens is the raison d'etre for the continued existence of the  tat te.^' 
Nonetheless, the foregoing argument does not seem to provide a strong enough 
platform on which to categorically assert the higher status of the Afkan Charter over the 
Constitution. Therefore, in the absence of express constitutional provisions, and judicial 
decisions directly in point, it is difficult to say with any certainty that the provisions of the 
Africatr Charter will prevail over South Africa's constitutional provisions. 
In Nigeria, the Constitution, as amended by military decrees, was until recently, held 
to be of a higher status than the Af~can Charter. This stems from the clumsy and haphazard 
manner in which the Charter was incorporated into the domestic system. The Nigerian 
National Assembly passed an Act incorporating the Charter into domestic law in March 
1983, and empowered the then civilian President to appoint a date for it to take effect. 
Unfortunately, the President was overthrown in a coup d'etat before he could set the date? 
No action was takeo on the Act until 1990 when the A f h n  Charter appeared in the Revised 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria with its commencement backdated to March 17, 1983. 
Section 5(2) of the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Decree No. 20 of 
1990, the enabling Act provides: 
77 T o  this effect, a scholar has nghtly observed that "[i]t is not a coincidence that Afncan states 
chrirricterized by .,. gross and systernic abuse of human rights ... have found thernselves enmeshed in civil 
conflicts." See Ikechi Maduka Mgbeoji, Collective Security and the Legality of the ECOWAS htewention in 
the Liberian Civil War (LL.M. Thesis: Dalhousie Law School, 1999) at 207, citing Sean Murphy 'The Security 
Council, Legitimricy and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War" (1994) 32 Colun J. 
Trcznsnat '1. L 2 10. 
7 3 ~ e e  U.Oji Urnozurike, '*AfncBn Chmer" supra, note I I  at 1 1  1 .  
Nothing in this section shall be construed to imply the validity 
of any enactment included in the revised edition where such 
enactment is inconsistent with the Constitution . . . as 
amended. 
In a view shared by many scholars, the Constitutional Rights Project of Nigeria 
unimpeachably elucidated the implications of this provision thus: 
The implication of the above provision therefore, is that 
where the African Charter is inconsistent with the 
Constitution as arnended, its provisions will to the extent of 
its inconsistency be void and inapplicable. The African 
Charter being an enactment included in the revised edition, 
would apply only in so far as it conforms with the 
Constitution of Nigeria as amended." 
In fact, section 1 of the A f h n  Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act, lends credence to the above view by further subjecting the Charter to the 
Constitution, which is itself subject to military decnes by virtue of section 1 of nie Federal 
Mil ira r-y Go vemment (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 1 of 1 984. 
It was this subordination of the A f m n  Charter to the Nigerian Constitution and, 
worse still, military decrees that becarne the bone of contention in the cause celebre of Gani 
Fnwehinmi v. Suni Abacha & Ors.75 in that case, the appellant, who was arrested and 
detained indefinitely under the infamous Decree 2 of 1984,'6 sought to obtain his release by 
rel ying. inter alia. on the African Charter. The respondents objected to the action arguing 
74~onstitutionol Rights Project Jouml (1991) Vol. 1 No. 4, [October-December] at 6; U. Oji 
Umozurike, Ibid See also, U. O. Umozurike, "The Application of international Human Rights Instruments and 
Noms to Nigeria" Lecture Presented at the Human Rights Training Seminar for Law Students at Nike Lake 
Hotel, October 8, 1997, at 14. [On file with the writer] [hereinafter, "Human Rights Instruments"]. See 
generally, 1. H. Chiroma, "ludiciai Review: Sweeping Changes Brought in by the Military Rule and their 
Ostensible Effects on the Roles of the Courts in Nigeria" (1995) 5 U J U  6. 
7s [ 19961 9 NWLR (Pt. 475) at 7 LO CA. [ 12 December 19961. 
 tate te Security (Detention of Pcrsons) Decree No. 2 of 1984. 
that they were immune to any legd liabilities in respect of anything done pursuant to the 
Decree. On that b a h ,  they challenged the jurisdiction of the court to enteriain any action 
relating to the enforcement of the Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act. It was argued that the Charter cannot override the 
Constitution since the Constitution itself is subject to decrees." The court of first instance 
upheld their contention and declined juri~diction.~' 
Among other issues, the Coun of Appeal was asked to decide whether the Articles 
of the A frican Charter are inferior or subject to municipal laws, particularly Decrees made 
by the omnicompetent Federal Military Government. In a unanimous judgement allowing the 
appeal, the Court of Appeal held: 
The provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights are in a class of their own and do not fa11 within the 
classification of local legislation in Nigeria in order of 
supenority. in the instant case, the learned triai judge acted 
erroneously when he held that the African Charter ... is 
inferior to the Decrees of the Federal Military Govemment?' 
Elaborating further on the status of the Afrcan Charter, Musdapher, J.C.A. affirmed: 
It is commonplace that no Govemment will be allowed to 
contract out by local legislation, its international 
obligations .... [Nlotwithstanding the fact that Cap. 10 
(incorporating the African Charter) was pmmulgated by the 
National Assembly ..., it is a legislation with international 
flavour and the ouster clauses contained in Decree No. 107 of 
?%e Constitution was subjected to the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement 
of Poivers) Drcree No. 12 of 1994 and the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 199.3, 
and al1 other decrees made chereunder. 
'%ee Suit No: FHC/LfCPf IOïI96 (Unreponed). Ruling delivered on Tuesday. March 26, 1996 by 
Nwaogwugwu. J of the Federai High Court, Lagos, Nigeria. 
79 See supra, note 75 at 7 18. See dso Labjli v Anretiola [ 19921 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 139, where Bello 
C.J.N made a similar observation. 
1993 or No. 12 of 19% cannot affect its operation in ~iger ia"  
Pats-Acholonu, J.C.A., further underscored the matter when he stated: 
By not merely adopting the African Charter but enacting it 
into Our organic law, ... it has been elevated to a higher 
pedestal .... [Blecause of its genesis it has an aura of 
inviolability unlike most municipal laws and may as long as 
it is in the statute book be clothed witb vestment of 
invioiability8' 
Dissatisfied with the judgernent of the Court of Appeal, the respondents appealed to 
the Suprerne Court of ~igeria.'* While dismissing the appeal on other grounds, '4he Supreme 
Court of Nigeria curiously held that: 
The Afncan Charter is not superior to and does not override 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria." 
In reassening the supremacy of the Constitution, the Court emphatically heid that: 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land; it is the 
grundnom. Its supremacy has never been called to question 
in ordinary circumstances. Thus any treaty enacted into law in 
Nigeria by virtue of section 12(1) of the Constitution is 
X 1 Ibid. at 758-758. Cf. Bello, C.J.N. in Ogugu v State 119941 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1. 
"sec General Sani Abacha & O n  v. Gani F m h i n m i  [2ûûû] 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228. 
'3The appeal wûs dismissed while the cross appeal was upheld on the ground rhat section 4 of State 
Secitrify (iletenrion of Persons) Act which suspended the fundamental rights section of the Nigenan 
Constitution did not mention the Africun Charter (Ratifcation and Enforcement) Act. The appeal was disrnissed 
by a split decision of four to t h e .  Apart From minor differences bordering mainly on choice of words, al1 the 
Justices unanimously agreed on the issue of the status of the African Charter vis-a-vis the Constitution. Most 
of their Lordships upbnided the Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal for ever suggesting that the Afiican 
Charter may be higher in status than d l  the laws of the land. 
%ke supra, note 82 at 255. [Ernphasis added]. This represents a direct opposite of the press reports 
of the case. See, for instance Gbolahan Gbadamosi, "Suprerne Court Aiiican Charter's Supremacy" The 
Guurdian (Nigeria), Saturday, April 29, 2000, available online at 
<http://www.ngrguardiannews.comlnews2inn783903.h. (Visited 10:26 am, 29 April2000)- See dso Eze 
Anaba, "Nigeria's Constitution and the African Charter" Vanguard, May 9, 2000, available online at 
<http://www.vanp;irdngr.com~OV 109050.htm> (Accessed 10:2 1 AM, May 9,2000). 
circumscribed in its operational scope and extent as may be 
prescribed by the legislat~re.~' 
As if to clear any scintilla of doubts, the learned Justices of the Supreme Court went 
on to define a treaty to include the Afriçon Charter.86 The implication is that the scheduled 
African Charter is circurnscribed in its scope since, as will be shown shortly, the Nigerian 
Constitution expressly renders economic, social and cultural rights unjusticiable. 
What is perhaps more startling is the position of the Court on the status of the 
Charter vis-a-vis other domestic legislation. On this issue, the Nigerian Supreme Court 
approbated and reprobated when it held that: 
[IJf there is a conflict between it [African Charter] and 
another statute, its provisions will prevail over those of that 
other statute for the reason that it is presumed that the 
legislatue does not intend to breach an international 
~bligation;'~ 
and at the same time holding that: 
The validity of any other statute cannot be affected by the 
mere fact that it violates the African Charter or any other 
treaty, for that matter? 
More disturbing is the conclusion of the learned Justices that the A f k a n  Charter's 
'international flavour' cannot "prevent the National Assembly, or the Federal Military 
%ce supra, note 82 ai 258 and also at 3 15-316. 
"lbid at 340. 
"lbid at 289. per Ogundm . JSC (delivered the leading judgement. Other Justices concumd on this 
point). 
88/bid. Achike, JSC saw it as 'rather stanling' ''that a law passed to give effect to a treaty should stand 
on a 'higher pedestal' above al1 other municipal laws, without more in the absence of any express provision in 
thc law that incorporated the treaty into municipai Law." Ibid at 3 16. 
Govemment before it [to] remove it [the Charter] from our body of municipal l a~s ."~ '  In
making these sweeping conclusions, the learned justices of the Supreme Court, with due 
respect, failed to advert their minds to the actual nature of human rights treaties and the 
implications of ratiQing and incorporating them into the municipal law. Their Lordships 
appeared to have been led into error by their misleading supposition of the Afican Charter 
as a mere treaty like any other bilateral or multilateral treaty. This is evident in their undue 
reliance on the definition of treaty contained in Article 2 of the Viennu Convention on the 
Law of T r e d e s ,  1 969.W 
By adopting a sirnplistic definition of treaties as mere agreements between states, 
their lordships failed to recognise that human rights treaties are not just like any other 
bilateral or multilateral treaties. Because of their nahire, human rights instruments belong to 
a special "category of obligations ergu omnes, which do not create a series of parallel 
bilaterd relationships, but only a omni-directional, non-bilateral. relatiod"" which binds al1 
states. For this reason, except to the extent reservations are allowed. and duly entered at the 
time of ratification or accession, it is patently absurd to suggest, as their lordships tend to do, 
'9~bid. While further advancing the proposition. Mohammed. JSC stated that "a state is always at 
liberty if it deerns desirable due to domestic circumstances or international considerations to legislate a law 
inconsistent with its treaty obligations." See Ibid at 301. For this proposition he retied on Lord Denning's 
staternent in the case of Macarthys Ltd. W. Smith [1979] 3 Al1 ER 325 at 329. In that case, Denning was not 
dcaling with an international human nghts instrument but with an ordinary treaty. It is submitted that Lhe 
position would, probably, have k e n  different if he were dealing with an international human rights instrument. 
To the extent that Mohammed. JSC seemed to have genedized his statement to include international human 
rights instrument, his view appears unsuppombIe. 
90 See supra, note 82 at 3 14 where Achike, JSC, simplistically defined treaties as mere agreements 
between states. 
" ~ e e  International Law Commission, Drufi Anicles on State Respomibility, Report of International 
Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Session, CM Doc. A/51/10 (1996), G.A.O.R., 5 1st Sess., Supp. No. 
IO, rit 125. 
that a state c m  de-rat@ or withdraw from a human rights treaty by just repealing the Act 
authorking the ratification or repeaiing the scheduled Act. Moreover, some of the rights 
protected in the Afncan Charter have acquired the status of jus cogens in international law, 
and are, therefore, binding on al1 states irrespective of their will. 
Also, as a result of the erga omnes character of the obligations created by human 
rights treaties, they ought not be ranked pari passu with other laws of the lands. and are, for 
that reason, of a higher pedestai than the provisions of the Constitution. Section 12( 1) of the 
Nigerian Constitution, on which their lordships relied heavily, does not justify the 
subordination of the African Charter, but in fact reinforces its higher status. For clxity 
purposes, that a11 important section merits being requoted. It states: 
No treaty between Nigeria and any other country shail have 
the force of law ercept to the extent to which any such treaty 
has been enacted into law by the National ~ssembly?' 
A close reading of the above section shows that it is merely referring to a treaty 
between Nigeria and any other country (bilateral treaty). It does not refer to 'countries' and 
therefore excludes multilateral treaties, especially human rights treaties which are 
multilateral treaties with a distinct character. If the lawmakers had intended that provision 
to include multilateral treaties, like human rights treaties, they ought to have, as their 
lordships expressly recognisedP3 siated so in no uncertain ternis? In the absence of that. any 
92 Emphasis ridded. 
93 See supra, note 82 at 303, per Iguh, JSC. 
94 See Pyr Granire Co. hd .  v- Ministty of Horuing and Local Government [ 19601 A.C. 260 at 286, 
where Viscount Simonds, delivering the judgement of the House of Lords expressed the principle of Iaw as 
folIows: 
It is a principle not to be whittled down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts 
1% 
doubts or ambiguities should be resolved in favour of international law, as the lawmakers 
cannot lightly be presumed to enact a law that will defeat the country's international 
obligations. 
Moreover, since the 'treaty' (Afncan Charter) has ken enacted into law without any 
arnendments or alterations, its provisions have the force of law to that extent. Accordingly, 
so long as the 'treaty' (Afrcan Charter) remains in force, and in addition to its international 
flavour, any legislation, including the Constitution, that conflicts with it shall be void to the 
extent of the incon~istency.~' To this extent, the learned justices of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court, with respect, erred when they purported to subordinate the Charter to the Constitution 
and other municipal laws on the basis on section 12(1). 
The Court of Appeal decision is to be preferred% to the Suprerne Court's decision, 
not only for being more progressive, but also because it is more consistent with international 
for the dcterrnination of his rights not to be excluded except in clear words. [Ernphasis 
ridded] . 
95 See U. O. Umozurike, '*Human Rights Imtruments" supra, note 74 at 14-15, (arguing that once an 
international agreement has been incorpomted into the municipal systems, its provisions prevail over any 
inconsistent constitutional or other municipal law provisions). 
?II the wake of the jubilatory ecstasy set off by the 1996 Court of Appeal decision, Umotunke, after 
rcflecting on its implications in the face of governmentai intransigence, warned that the "remedy lies not in 
judicial activism but in political and international action to enforce pacta sunr serva&." See U. O. Umozurike, 
"Hunuzn Rights Instruments" Ibid at 16. This highly instructive waniing underscores the daunting nature of the 
challenges ahead in the banle to snatch the economic, social and cultural rights in the AFrican Charter from the 
crushing jaws of non-justiciability under the Nigerian Constitution. However, an activist judiciary is 
indispensable if  the masses will ever be extricated from the vice grip of an unconscionable executive and a 
somnambuiant legislature. See 1. C. Pats-Acholonu, "Human Rights in the Next MilIennium: The Nigerian 
Experience - A Judicial View Point" Paper Presented at the 1999 Annuai Lecture of Nigerim Bar Association 
(Lagos Branch) Human Rights Conunittee, May 27, 1999, at 12. [On file with the writer]. The decision of the 
Supreme Court, more than justify the need to intensify intemationai action, 
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law. Apart from king  very conservative,* the Supreme Court's decision introduces a very 
dangerous dimension into human rights protection in Nigeria If the decision is not ovemled, 
it may tum out to be a judicial instrument for the suppression of human rights. The decision 
is so sweeping that it makes a mockery of the very essence of incorporating the Charter into 
municipal law, since, as their lordships stated, laws contrary to the Afrcan Charter, even if 
by implication, remain valid. Regrettably, while states like South Africa are adopting a more 
progressive approach towards international and international human rights, Nigeria is further 
retreating into an ultra conservative cocoon. Analysis of the constitutional protection of the 
economic. social and cultural rights in Nigeria and South Africa not only reveals more 
g laring di fferences, but also a contemptuous marginalization of en forcement. 
4.4. CONSTfl"UT10NA.L PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AM) CULTURAL 
RIGHTS 
Economic, social and cultural rights are al1 provided for in the Constitutions of both 
Nigeria and South Africa. However, fundamental differences characterize the protection of 
these rights in the two constitutions. A juxtaposition of the two Constitutions to the Afnccin 
Charter shows that while one constitution reflects greater similarities than differences, the 
other is notoriously remarkable for its dissimilarities. 
9 7 ~ t  is worth noting that the Nigerian Suprerne Court has been, in recent times. remarkably 
conservativc. In another case, Badejo v. Federal Minister of Education [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 475 ) 15, the 
Court jolted the human rights community when it held that dthough a fundamental right is cectainly a right 
which stands above the ordinary Iaws of the land, its enforcement should not stand above the country, the state 
and the people. The Court used that statement to camouflage its effeteness to redress apparent injustice merely 
becriuse the act irnpugned has been completed by an agency of the SE. Meanwhile, available evidence showed 
that the act was completed when litigation was pending. 
4.4.1. Extent of Protection: Rights Versus Objectives 
As has been demonstrated in the previous section, accession to international 
agreements does not necessarily guarantee its applicability in municipal systems. A lot still 
depends on the constitution?' Even where an international agreement, such as the Afrcan 
Cliarter, has been incorporated into the municipal system, there may still be extant 
constitutional provisions clogging the wheels of its enforcement. As a result, it is pertinent 
to examine the extent to which the economic, social and cultural rights are actually protected 
in domestic constitutions. This is aimed at ascertaining a country's seriousness or otherwise 
in canying out its international obligations, as undertaken under the Afrcan Charter, at least 
on paper. 
South Africa's constitution protects a number of economic, social and cultural rights 
which are interspersed with other rights under a justiciable 'Bill of Rights? The South 
African Bill of Righrs is more comprehensive than the Afrcan Charter in the economic, 
social and cultural rights it parantees. One example is the inclusion of a provision on the 
right to adequate housing which the African Charter does not address. Section 26 protects 
the right of everyone to have access to adequate housing and also prohibits arbitrary 
evictions.'" What is recognised is 'a right to have access to adequate housing' as opposed 
to 'a right to adequate housing.' This distinction is significant because "it makes it clear that 
'%ee Peanon Nherere. supra. note 45 at 123. 
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See Chapter 2 of Constitution of the Republic of South Afrca, 1996. 
'Oosee Section 26(1)&(3) of South African Constitution. As noted in Chapter 3, the Afican Charter 
does not provide for the right to shelter. However. the right to adequate housing is recognised in a nurnber of 
internationai human rights declarations, such as the UDHR (Art. 25) and ICESCR (Art. I I )  to mention a few. 
there is no unqualified obligation on the state to provide free housing on demand for al1 
members of the public."'0i There are also certain other dimensions of the right: 'The state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its availabie resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of this right.' l m  This inevitably rnimrs the conditional nature of 
the obligations undertaken by the state, and constitutes a tacit acknowledgement that the right 
ro adequate housing cannot be immediately hilfilled by the state.lo3 No doubt, it provides an 
escape hatch for a govemment so minded to utilise it, while leaving high and dry the 
purported guarantees of the nght.lW 
Another example of a more extensive right is found in section 27 which provides for 
the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health c m ;  sufficient 
food and water; and social security and social assistance.'" Again, only the right of access 
'O'G.  E. Devenish, supra, note 39 at 73. 
102 Sce Section 26(2) of the South Afncan Constitution. This qualification is comparable to Article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR which subjects ail rights provisions of the Covenant to the same measure of "maximum avaiIable 
rcsourccs, with a view to achieving progressively the full redization ...." Further to that, ArticIe I l(1) of the 
srimc Covenant (on rights to food, clothing and housing) further reinforces the 'progressive realization' by 
rissurning a somcwhat indefinite obligation. This is evident in its assertion rhat the "States Parties wili take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right." 
'O'BU~ see Pierre De Vos, "Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and 
Economic Rights in South Afnca's 1996 Constitution" (1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 93. 
'D<~cholars and the Cornmittee on Economic, Social and Culturd Righis. involved in the inrerpretation 
of the Covenant on Economic, Socid and Culturd Rights, have made it clear that very definite obligations are 
èngendered by rights even when they are subject to 'progressive realisation'. See Sandra Liebenberg, "The 
Intcrnationd Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Righis and its Implications for South Africa" (1995) 
1 1 SAJHR 359 at 365-366; Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, "The Nature and Scope of States Parties Obligations 
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" ( 1987) 9 Humun Rights Qriarterly 
158 at 172-177. It has been suggested that the same is tme for the obligations engendered by the state under 
the South African Constitution. See Pierre De Vos, Ibid. at 93. Nevertheless, the pncticd effect of section 26(2) 
of South Africa's Constitution is to undennine the effectivity of the granted right. 
IO5 See Section 27(1) of the South African Constitution. Cf. Article 16 of the African Charter which 
guarantccs the 'best attainable state of physical and mentai health.' In this regard, the ICESCR has an identical 
provision with the .4frican Charter. But unlike the Charter which confers the right, Article L I ( 1 )  of the ICESCR 
is provided here and not the right to any of the stipulated services. The right of everyone to 
emergency medical assistance is protected.lo6 A set of social and economic rights 
engendering more or less the same obligations are bundled together in this section.'* As in 
section 26, this section has another dimension which limits its impact and effectivity. It 
obligates the state to take reasonable legisiative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights granted.lo8 However, under the 
section. the right to 'emergency medical treatment' is not subject to the qualification of 
progressive realization and resource constraints, unlike other rights in the same section.'* 
Funher. and without prejudice to the rights guaranteed under section 27, section 28 
provides for the right of every child to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social  service^."^ A child's right to be protected from exploitative labour practices and not 
mcrcly 'rccognizcs' the right of "everyone to the enjoyment of the highest standard of physical and mental 
hcalth." But unlike the Afiican Charfer, the ICDCR (Article 9) provides for the right to social sccutity in the 
samc way ris the South African Constitution, 
1 O6 Sce Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution. By this provision, the South African 
Constitution may seem to have gone beyond boîh the Afican Charter and the ICESCR. Howcver, by providing 
for the "highcst attainable standard of physicd and mental health" these two instruments seem to equally cover 
the right to emergency medical treatment. 
lo7see Pierre De Vos. supra, note 103 at 73. 
108~ection 27(2) of the South Afiican Constitution. Cf. Article 16(2) of the African Charter which 
States: 'States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the heaIth of their 
people and to ensure that they receive medicd attention when they are sick.' This does not make the right 
granted subject to availability of resources or to progressive dization, thus offering better protection than the 
South African Constitution. Even though dl rights under the ICESCR are subject to progressive redization. the 
provisions of h c I e  12, by outlining the various steps the parties are expected to take in order to achieve the 
full realization of the right to health, seem to be more redistic than both the Afican Charter and the South 
Africm Constitution. 
109 See G. E. Devenish, supra, note 39 at 74. 
"O~ee section 28(l)(c) of the South Afican Constitution. Section B ( 3 )  defines a child for the 
purposes of the section as 'a person under the age of 18 yem.' 
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be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that place at risk the child's 
well-being, education, physicd or mental heaith or spintual, moral or social development are 
guaranteed."' This section is neither dependent on the availability of resources nor made 
subject to progressive realization. It afTords a better protection, (ai least on papa), albeit to 
a section of the population - children - and by so doing underscores the inadequacies of the 
protection offered under section 27. 
Section 29 guarantees the right to basic education, including adult basic ed~cation."~ 
What constitutes basic education is open to debate as it is not defined by the Constitution. 
There is dso a right to 'further education' which the state, through reasonable measures, 
mut  make progressively available and accessible.ll"he framing of section 29(l)(b) shows 
that it is only the right to further education that is dependent on progressive availability and 
'' 'section 28( l )(e)&(f)(ii) of the South Afncan Constitution. The ICESCR has comparable specific 
provisions protecting the rights of children. (Article lO(3). However, the provisions of the South African 
Constitution are more encompassing than the ICESCR in this regard. Unlike the former, the latter nierely 
protects children from economic and social exploitation, as well as from exploitative labour practices. See 
Anton J. S t e e n h p ,  'The South African Constitution of 1993 and the Bill of Rights: An Evaluation in the Light 
of  International Human Rights N o m "  (1995) 17 Human Right Quarrerly 10 1 at 1 17- 1 18. The Afncan Charter 
mçrciy enjoins States Parties to ensure the protection of the rights of the child without stipulating the 
dimensions of the protection. (Article 18(3). There is, however, the Afncan Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
clf the Chifri [adopted at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 1 1 July 1990, reprinted in United Nations, A Compilation 
of International Instruments, vol. II,  (New York: United Nations, 1997) at 3471 which covers dl aspects of the 
rights of the child. Section 28 of the South African Constitution seems to be an abridged version of the said 
c hsuter. 
"'~ection 29(l)(a) of the South Afiican Constitution. The Constitution does not define 'basic 
ducation.' While interpreting a similar provision in the 1993 Interim Constitution, Cachalia, et, ai. have 
suggested thrit the meaning to be given to the tecm 'basic' will be either elementary or primary education, if not 
ri lower standard. See Azhar Cachalia. et al., Fundamental Rights in the New Comtitution (Kenwyn: Juta & Co. 
Ltd, 1994) at 104. 
'13see Section 29(l)(b) of the South African Constitution. 
ac~essibility."~ Basic education and basic adult education are thus freed from any 
qualifications of measure laden progressive availability."' It is noteworthy that this section 
does not require that education be free and compulsory. Thus, it does not preclude the 
charging of schools feed l6 
Also protected are the rights of people to use the language and to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice in a manner not inconsistent with the Bill of ~ i g h t s . " ~  The rights 
of cultural. religious and linguistic communities are protected. Consequently, persons 
belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with 
other members of that cornmunity to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their 
~anguage. ' '' 
With regard to the economic, social and cultural rights constitutionally guaranteed 
1 t4 Tt is noteworthy that Art. 17 of the Af~can Charter which guarantees the right to education does 
not contain any qualifications either as to the level of education or to its availability. The [CESCR contains a 
more detailed provisions on the right to education. Under Article t 3(2), it recognizes the right to free and 
cornpulsory pr i rnq  education; available and accessible secondary as well as vocational education, with 
provision for them progressively free for all; and accessible higher education, a t o  to be made progressively 
frcc. 
' " ~ e e  G. E. Devenish. supra. note 36 a 76. 
Il6 Ibid. 
' "sec Section 30 of the South ACrican Constitution. 
' " ~ e e  section 3 I( l)(a) of the South African Constitution. The right to form. join and maintain cultural, 
rcligious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society are also protected. See section 3 l(l)(b). 
By section 3 l(2). the rights in subsection 1 m y  not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provisions 
of the Bill of Rights. The importance of section 3 1, as Devenish observes, lies in the fact that "South Africa 
is ri kdeidoscope of cultural, linguistic and religious heterogeneity, which is a source both of infinite richness 
as welI as intense historical, contemporary and potential conflict" See G. E. Devenish, supra, note 39 at 77. 
Comparable provisions of the African Charter and ICESCR on culture are not as detailed as the provisions of 
the South Afiican Constitution. Article 17(2) of the African Charter rnerely provides that everybody may tdce 
part in the cultural li fe of hidher community. Article 1 S(l)(a) of the ICESCR recognizes the right of everyone 
to "take part in cultwat Iife." Nonetheiess, it seerns îhat the provisions of the ICESCR and the Afncan Charter 
cover the same field as the provisions of the South African Constitution. 
under an enforceable 'Bill of Rights,' South Africa remains a mode1 for other African States. 
Ostensibly, this is attributable to the political history of the country. Given that freedom and 
democracy are mere shibboleths without due provisions for people's basic material needs, 
as one scholar points out, "a constitution of South Africa supposedly marking the transition 
from apartheid to freedom while imposing no duty on the state to see to the matter of relief 
from the privations of gross histoncal injustice, would be a tra~esty.""~ ironically, some of 
the rights pnncipally meant to provide relief from such 'privations of gross historical 
injustice' also contain deliberate latches to facilitate govemmental inertia. and ensure the 
useful inactivity of the rights provided.'" 
Unlike South Africa's, the Nigerian Constitution provides for economic, social and 
cul t u n l  rights, not as (fundamental) rights, but as fundamental objectives. These objectives 
are provided for under Chapter two of the constitution entitled 'Fundarnental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy.'lZ1 They are not couched in the form of rights, nor do 
they entitle the citizens to any claim. As the name shows, it is only an objective - a mere 
directive pincipie of state policy recognised as only long term affirmations of government's 
" 9 ~ n n k  Michelman, T h e  Constitution, Social Righîs and Reason: A Tribute to Etienne Mureinik" 
( 1998) 14 SAJHR 499 at 500. See also Etienne Mureinik, "Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic, Rights 
in the Constitution" (1992) 8 SAJHR 464 at 465, 
'"~otable rights such as rights to housing. health care, food, and water as well as education which 
rnrissively violated during the apartheid era are al1 subjected to 'progressive reaiization to the extent of available 
resourccs. In this way, they are subject to the vicissitudes of policy and therefore vulnerable. 
"'~undamentd Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy made its fmt appearance in Nigeria 
in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. The Constitution Drafting Committee of the 1979 Constitution explained 
the concept thus: "By Fundamentai Objectives, we refer to the identification of ultimate objectives of the Nation 
whilst Directive Principles of State PoIicy indicate the pahs which lead to these objectives. Fundarnental 
objectives rire iderils towards which a Nation is expected to strive. whilst Directives Principles lay down the 
policies which are expected to be pursued in the efforts of the Nation to reaiize nationd ideais." See Report of 
the Cotrsrirtition Drafing Committee, vol. 1, 1976 at (xvi). See dso B. O. Okere, "Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles Under the Nigerian Constitution" (1978-1988) 3 Nig. 1. R. 74. 
moral obligations to provide basic amenities for the citizens. It merely imposes a non- 
enforceable duty on al1 those exercising legislative, executive and judicial powerd* 
As part of the economic objectives, the state is enjoined to "hamess the resources of 
the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant 
economy" and also to "control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the 
maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and 
equality of statu and ~pportuni t~." '~  By virtue of section 16(2)(d), the state is to direct its 
pol ic y towards ensuring that 'suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, 
reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, unemployrnent, sick 
benefits and welfare of the disabled are provided for al1 citizens.'lu 
Section 17 provides for the social objectives of the state. It requires the state, to focus 
its policy towards ensunng that: 
conditions of work are just and humane, and that there are adequate facilities for 
leisure and social, religious and cultural life;lu 
'"~ee section 13 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999. See also, G G 1 Ojiako. 
hi the Name of Justice (Owerri: ludges' Cornmittee, 1997) at 9. An eminent Nigerian scholar, Prof. B. O. 
Nwabueze. writing about the fundamentai objectives under the Nigerian constitution, succinctly observed, to 
wit: "Thcse are worthy declarations of objectives. But it is necessacy that their nature as declarations of 
objectives ... and not as declarations of justiciable rights should be appreciated. The state is enjoined as a matter 
of constitutional duty to observe and apply the objectives and directives - although this confers on the individual 
no right to go to court to enforce their observance." See B. O. Nwabueze, The Presidential Comzitution of 
Nigeria (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers. 1982) at 456. 
"' See section 16(l)(a)&(b) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
124 See 31~0 section 16(2)(b)&(c) of the Nigerian Constitution which further exhorts the state to ensure 
that "the materid resources of the nation are distributed as best as possibIe to serve the cornmon good [and] that 
the economic systern is not opented in such a mamer as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of 
production in the hands of ri few individuals or of a group." 
'" Section 17(3)(b) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
8 the health, safety and welfare of ail persons in employment are safeguarded and not 
endangered or a b u ~ e d ; ' ~ ~  
that there are adequate medical and health facilities for al1 persons;ln 
there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or on 
any other ground what~oever.'~~ 
Whereas the South African Constitution guarantees rights which, if breached, are 
actionable in the courts, the Nigerian Constitution leaves no one in doubt that al1 these 
provisions are merely high sounding directives addressed to the state, to be enforced at the 
propitious disposition of individuai go~ernments.'~~ Embittered by the absolute emptiness 
of the constitutiond provisions on economic, social and cultural rights, Onyema lamented 
that: 
It is indeed repugnant to the human conscience that in a 
country that can boast of abundant materiai resources, a 
poverty-ridden and dehumanised majority with no shelter, no 
employment and little food to eat rub shoulders with a few 
pot-bellied compt public officers and ovemight millionaires. 
Yet there is no constitutional protection to give the common 
man [and woman] the ground to question the basis of his [or 
her] sub-human exi~tence."~ 
Also, Kachikwu and Ozekhome, bewildered by this constitutional anomaly, angrily asked: 
1 %  Section 17(3)(c) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
'"~ection 17(3)(d) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
138 Section 17(3)(e) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
1 29 Section 6(6)(c) of the Nigerian Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate on any 
aspect of the Fundamentai Objectives and Directive Pnnciples as set out in chapter two of the Constitution, 
"O Ezeugwu Christian Onyema. "The Fundamental Objectives and Dùective finciples of Shte Poiicy: 
A Case for Justiciability" ( 199 1) 1 8 The Barrister 54 at 57. 
With the abundant resources available to govemment, why 
shouidn't a citizen who sleeps under Eko or Cater bridge in 
Lagos for lack of shelter and means of livelihood be free to 
walk into a court of law and corne out smiling with an order 
that the government should rehabilitate him?"' 
Even though the concem of many seems to be the non-justiciability of the 
constitutional provisions on econornic, social and cultural rights, it is arguable whether there 
is indeed any economic, social or cultural right conferred on individuals under the Nigerian 
Constitution. Unlike the definite economic, social and cultural rights provisions in the South 
African Constitution which inhere in the individual, the surfeit of econornic, social and 
cultural directives in the Nigerian Constitution are not addressed to the citizens. To this 
extent, one c m  safely subrnit that economic, social and cultural rights are not protected under 
the Nigerian Constitution. 
Regrettably, the Nigerian attitude to economic, social and cuiturai rights is not 
uncornmon in Africa, though hardly restricted to it. For exarnple, while the Zûmbian 
Constitution guarantees civil and political rights, it does not accord the same significance to 
economic, social and cultural rights and the state cannot be sued for failure to provide 
them.'" In the same vein, apart frorn the right to work, the Tanzanian Bill of Rights does not 
accord any relevance to economic, social and cultural rights.lf3 MSO, the Constitution of 
"'E. Kachikwu & M. Ozekhome. "Extending the Frontiers ofConstitutionalism: Should a Constitution 
Contain only Lcgnl Rules Stricto Sensu?" (1978-1988) 3 Nig. J. R. 86 at 98. 
'"sec The Monitor (Zunbia). 6-19 Novernber, 1998. See generaily, The Zonibia Human Rights 
Report 1998 (Chsipter 3 ,  online at ditt~:l/~.zamnet.zm/zamnet/afronetlre hrirrhts 1998.htm 
(Visited l2:% PM, May 2,200). 
IJ3see Chris Maina Peter, Human Rights in Africa: A Comparative Study of the Afncon Human and 
Peoples' Rights Charter and the New Tanzanian Bill of Rights (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) at 35, see 
particularly Appendix 1 at 95 -102 for a text of Tanzanian Bills of Rights. 
Botswana contains no provisions on economic, social and cultural rights.lY The Narnibian 
Constitution devotes Chapter Eleven to Principles of State Policy in which provision is made 
for certain social and economic goals without pretensions of creating justiciable rights.13' 
This pattern is also replicated in most other African Commonwealth states with the 
unsavoury effect that "the scope of rights and freedoms in their national Bills of Rights 
[constitutions] is [to a very large extent] lirnited to civil and political rights ~ n l y . " ' ~ ~  
What is curious in non-constitutionalisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
in most African states is that these constitutions came into king after the Afdcan Charter 
entered into force. As Lindholt points out, " ... a question which can still not be answered 
clearly is whether it [African Charter] did serve as the primary mode1 for the drafters of 
the[se] constitutions ...."'" It goes to show that the ideals of the African Charter are largely 
not reflected in the constitutions of most Afncan countries given their apparent disinclination 
towards constitutionalising econornic, social and cultural rights. Where these righis are 
included at al1 in the constitution, they are not subject to judicial adjudication or 
134 Sec Lone Lindholt, Questioning the Universality of Human Rights: The African Charter on 
Humun and Peoples' Rights in Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) at 2 13. 
"%ce Benus De Villiers. "Social and Econornic Rights" in Dawid van Wyk. et. al., Rights and 
Cortsriturionalism: The New South Afrcan Legal Order (Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd, 1994), 599 at 613 
[hercinafter "Social and Economic Rights"]. 
136 Lone Lindholt, supra, note 134 at 247-248. The Constitution of Malawi, 1995 only provides (in 
scction 29) for the right to economic activity which can hardly be classified as economic, social or cultural right. 
I t  should be noted that the practices of French speaking Gfrican Countries are no better with regard to 
constitutionalizing economic, civil and potitical rights. For instance, even though Togo took immediate steps 
in 1982, shortly after ratifying the Afican Charrer, to implernent it, it did not constitutionalize justiciable 
economic, social and cultural rights, neither did it include these rights within the mandate of the Nationai 
Human Rights Commission (Commission Nationales des Droits de l'Homme) established in 1987. According 
to Umozurike, the Commission was set up "as an autonomous body with the objectives of protecting civil and 
political righ ts.." Sec U. Oji Umozurike, "Afican Charrer" supra, note I I  at 1 IO, 
determination. 
1.4.2. Justiciability of Rights 
The term 'justiciability' broadly means the extent to which a matter or issue is 
suitable for adjudication. Justiciability "refers to the ability to judicially determine whether 
or not a person's right has been violated or whether the state has failed to meet a 
constitutionally recognized obligation to respect, protect or fulfill a person's right.""' To Say 
that an issue is justiciable means that it is real, substantial and appropriate for judicial 
detemination. 
Constitutional provisions are not meant to be hollow shibboleths or cosmetic window 
dressings. Essentially, the main point of protecting a right in a constitution is to identiS, and 
underscore its fundarnentality by putting it beyond the depredations and predilections of the 
temporal forces of the day.I4* This is mainly achieved by subjecting any infraction of such 
rights to judicial adjudication. Excluding certain constitutionai provisions from judicial 
adjudication is plainly to declare them worthless and illegitimate aspirations of modem 
govemance. In fact, non-justiciable rights are hardly wonh the paper on which they are 
138 Cnig Scott & Patrick Mackiem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?: Sociai 
Rights in a New South Afncan Constitution" (1992) 141 Universify of Pennsylvania Law Review 1 at 17. 
139~ee  Shedrack C .  Agbakwa, Application of the Doctrine oftocus Stundi with Particuiar Reference 
ro Constirritionai Lirigarion (LLJ. Thesis: Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, 1997) at 16. 
' * ~ e e  Etienne Mureinik, supra, note 1 19 at 468. 
written. Marshall C.J. put this fact beyond dispute in Mardbury v M~dison'~' where he stated: 
To what purpose are powers lirnited and to what purpose are 
these limitations committed into writing, if these lirnits can, 
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained. The 
distinction between government with lirnited and unlimiteci 
powers is abolished if these limits do not confine those upon 
whom they are imposed, thereby making acts allowed and 
acts prohibited of equal obligation. 
Indeed there is no sense. as Mureinik points out, "in including economic. [social and 
cultural] rights in the constitution in a form short of which rnakes them constitutional rights. 
just for the sake of being able to say that they are in the constitution."'" Yet, this is the 
method usuaily adopted by many African States and other States in the international 
community. The Nigerian Constitution itself is anything but silent on the legal unviability 
of these rights. As highlighted above, econornic, social and cultural rights (that is, if they can 
be properly so regarded under the Nigerian Constitution) are provided for in Chapter 2 of the 
Nigerian Constitution on Fundamental Objective and Directive Principles of State Policy. 
Regarding its justiciability, section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution provides: 
The jridicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing 
provisions of this section - shall not. except as otherwise 
provided by this Constitution, extend tu any issue or question 
as to whether any act or omission by any authority or person 
or as to whether any l m  or judicial decision is in conformity 
with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
142 Etienne Mureinik, supra, note 119 at 469. It has been observed that the main ntionale for the 
inclusion of directive principles is that they provide a code of conduct according to which the governance of 
a country should take place. See Bertus De Villiers, "Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamentai 
Rights: The Indian Experience" (1992) 8 SAJHR 29 at 32 [hereinafter 'Directive Pnitcipies'], However, owing 
to the unenforceability of the directive principles, Seervai described them as "rhetorical language, hopes, ideals 
and goals rather than actuai reality of govemment." See H M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (1984) at 
1577, cited in Bemts De Villiers, "Directive Principles" Ibid. 
State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Con~titution.'~~ 
In spite of the fact that what is provided under the sotdled Fundarnenial Objective 
and Directive Principle of State Policy are not rights which inhere in any person or group of 
persons, the above constitutional provision effectively forecloses any constitutionaYjudicial 
review, even a review for the sincerity and rationality of govemmental actions or inactions 
towards these provisions. By forbidding the justiciability of economic. social and cultural 
rights. the Nigerian Constitution. like the Constitution of rnany other Afncan states, l" "under 
the guise of false libertarianism, [became] an instrument of human abandonment. 
heartlessness and neglect."'" Also. the provisions of the Nigerian constitution fly in the face 
of the Africon Charter which recognises the equal enforceability of di rights therein 
provided. 
Unlike the Nigerian constitution which demeans the underpinning values of 
economic, social and cuîturai rights with its fervent cornmitment to non-justiciability, the 
'43~rnphasis added. Compare Section 46(1) which provides for a 'special jurisdiction' of Ihe High 
Court to adjudicatc cases of violation of Chapter iV of the Constitution (on civil and political rights). 
144 See Nicholas Haysom, "Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democmcy and Socio-Economic Rights" 
( 1992) 8 SAJHR 54lat 462, (noting Nmibia as one of the African countries that relegated econornic, sociai and 
cultural rights to non-justiciable 'directive principles of sute policy'). Other African States upholding the non- 
justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights as directive principles of state policy include, but are not 
limited to, Ghana, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia, India is usually cited as a mode1 for adopting the non- 
justiciability approach. 
' J S ~ l b i ~  Sachs, AJimmtive Action and Gwd Govemance (1991) at 13, cited in D M Davis, 'The Case 
Against the Inclusion of Socio-Ecanornic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles" ( 1992) 
8 SAJHR 475 at 476. Scot and Macklem persuasively argues: "If there is no forum that is socially recognized 
as riuthoritative and in which individuais or cornmunities of people similarly disadvantaged can make 
submissions about the profound barriers they face in attempting to lead meaningful lives, those dificulties will 
increasingly be deemed irrelevant, and the underlying values that social rights are designed to protect will 
diminish in rneaning and importance ..., Denying an individual or group the ability to malce constitutiond claims 
rigainst the state with respect to nutrition, housing, hedth, and education excludes those interest from a process 
of reasoned interchange and discussion, and forecloses a useful forum for the recognition and redressing of 
injustice. See Craig Scot & Patrick Mackiem, supra, note 138 at 28. 
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South African Constitution distinguishes itself witb its declared dedication to the 
justiciability of these rights. Its 'Bill of Rights' not only "enshrines the rights of al1 people"" 
in South Afnca without theoretical distinctions, but also obligates the state to "respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the[se] ~ights."~" By ensuring the justiciability of al1 rights, the 
constitution underscores the hindamentaiity of rights and also the particular institutional 
advantages of the courts as an important forum for not only the accountability of the 
leadership for al1 its actions and inactions, but where the stories of those whose humanity and 
place in the community have been, or would be, marginalized are told.'" 
The irnperative of making economic, social and cultural rights justiciable is that it is 
only when they are so recognised that the question of other non-judicial or quasi-judicial 
remedies, such as administrative boards adjudication, commissions, ombudspersons, etc, 
would aise. Before these non-judicial or quasi-judicial avenues can be exploited, there 
should first be an acknowledgement by the state that these rights are capable of k ing  
violated, which is the bone marrow of justiciability. Non-judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, 
such as human rights commissions have been relatively successful in the case of civil and 
political rights because these rights are, in the first place, justiciable. If they are non- 
justiciable, and therefore mere discretionary privileges, a non-judicial or quasi-judicial body 
1 J6 Section 7( 1 ), South African Constitution, 1996. 
"'~ection 7(2). L has been observed that chis provision is of bbconsiderable operational significance" 
since it is clear that the Bill of Rights is not just mereiy a "negative enforcement mechanism shielding subjecis 
against the abuse of governmental power, but also imposes a positive duty on the state to protect, promote and 
fuifil the entrenched rights." See G. E. Devenish, supra, note 39 at 45, citing Du Plessis & Gouws. 'The Gender 
Implications of the Final Constitution with particuiar Reference to the Bi11 of Rights" (1996) SAPL 473 at 475- 
"'~ee Craig Scot & Patrick Macklem, supra, note 138 at 147. 
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will be as helpless, and estrangeci as the judiciary is presently with regard to economic, social 
and cuhrai nghts. Govemments al1 over the world hardly admit violations of entrenched and 
justiciable rights, let alone when they are non-justiciable. 
To the extent of its non discriminatory justiciability of rights, the South African 
Constitution conforms with the spirit of the Afncan Charter. With this, the South African 
Constitution seems to be standing head and shoulders above the constitutions of most 
African states. This constitutional non-compliance of most Afncan states with regard to 
justiciability of economic, social and cui~rai  rights raises a very pertinent issue. namely, the 
validity of the provisions in the states parties' constitutions that are inconsistent with the 
Ajkican Charter. 
4.4.3. Validity of Constitutional Provisions Inconsistent with the Charter 
The issue of the validity. or otherwise, of constitutional provisions inconsistent with 
the Africnn Charter is more or less tied to the issue of the status of the Charter in its 
relations with domestic constitutions. As noted earlier, in Africa, the constitution is 
sacrosanct and, as a d e ,  considered as the supreme and fundamental law of the state.lJ9 One 
of the consequences of this is that the application of international agreements in municipal 
systems depends on whether they have become part of the law of the land in accordance with 
'"9~or instance. Article 2 of the 1984 Liberian Constitution, proclaim the Constitution as 'supreme 
and fundamental' with its provisions having binding force on dl authorities, and any "treaties ... found to be 
inconsistent with it shalI to the extent of (the) inconsistency, be void and of no effect." See P. F. Gonidec, supra, 
note 29 at 247. 
the provisions of the constitution. This is largely because, as noted earlier. international law 
and municipal law of a given country are believed to be two different systems operating on 
two different planes.lM Thus, a breach of duty created by, and owed under international law 
does not. of itself, give rise to a remedy in municipal law, unless such breach is aiso 
constitutive of a breach under the relevant municipal I ; ~ W . ' ~ ~  In the main, this springs from 
the exercise by the state of its sovereignty. 
Be that as it may, by becoming a party to an international instrument creating a supra- 
national legal system, a state accedes to the establishment of a new level of jurisdiction 
which demands the proper accountability of the state. Such a higher level of jurisdiction 
should hold sway regardless of a state's intemal constitutional arrangements. The Africon 
Charter imposes on States Parties absolute and immediate obligations to take action to 
ensure that the rights it guarantees are fully respected.lS2 To this end, the Charter provides 
for justiciable economic. social and cultural rights which are immediately enforceable and 
not dependent on the availability of resources. It thereby obliges States Parties to take 
necessary measures to give hiIl effect to the provisions of the Charter, such as adapting their 
municipal laws, including their constitution, to conform to the Charter. Consequently, any 
constitutional provision that renders econornic, social and cultural rights non-justiciable (as 
in the Nigerian Constitution), or make them progressively redisable. depending on 
"O~ee Pearson Nherere, supra, note 45 at 123. 
'5'~earson Nherere, Ibid See dso. A.G. for Canada v. A G .  for Ontario [L967] AC 326; R. v Chief 
Immigration Oflcer (Heathrow Airpori) &Atioï., Ex Parte Sakamat [1976) 1 WLR 969; Ra v Secretary ofState 
for the Home Department. ex parte Brind [1991] 2 WLR 588; Mclain Watson v Depanment of Trade [1989] 
3 ALI ER 523. 
152 See P .  Sieghart, supra, note 8 at 57. 
availability of resources (as in the South African Constitution) cannot be valid since it is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter."' 
However, it has been argued that the eflect which an international agreement. such 
as the African Charter, may have on an inconsistent constitutional provision depends on 
whether the Charter has been incorporated into the constitution or not.'" Thus, where the 
Charter has been incorporated, it prevails over any inconsistent constitutional provision.155 
But. Andre Stemmet would appear to suggest that even when an instrument has k e n  
incorporated into the municipal law, and a conflict develops, the municipal system will 
prevail.'56 Stemmet's position is in tandem with the ment decision of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court in the case of Abacha v. ~awehinrni."~ 
The present writer is of the opinion that any constitutional provisions inconsistent 
with an international agreement ought to be void, whether or not the international agreement 
is incorporated into the municipal system, provided it has been ratified. It is well established 
that an international obligation is not obviated by intemal legislative  arrangement^.'^^ A state 
Is31n making ihis submission, the present writer is not obliviour of the rule that a conflict between a 
stritc's municipal law and its international obligations does not necessarily affect the vdidity of that law on the 
municipal plane. However, it is the present writer's contention that a municipal Iaw, even if the constitution, 
or its provisions thereof, that has k e n  invalidated at the international level, attrricts little or no Iegitirnacy before 
the citizcns who are called upon to obey the said law. Where it involves human rights, the opprobrium, local 
and international. that follows a govemment's insistence on continuing with its internationally unlawful act, is 
capable of adversely affecting the iegitimacy of such a recdcitrant government. 
' " ~ e e  U.O. Urnozurike, "Humon Rights Instruments" supra. note 74 ai 14-15. 
Is6~ndre  Stemmet. supra, note 36 at 244. 
lS7see supra, note 82. 
I5%ee Nonvegion bans Case (1957) I C I  Reports 9 at 37. See dso Ruben Brown's Claim [United 
States v. Britain] (1923) 6 RLAA 120. 
cannot plead the provisions of its own law, not even its c ~ n s h ' h t t i ~ n , ~ ~  or deficiencies in that 
law or even the absence of any legislative provision or of a rule of internai law in answer to 
a daim against it for an alleged breach of its obligations under international law.IM Thus, in 
Alnbnma Claims ~rbitration,'~' the Tribunal rejected the British attempt to rely on 
deficiencies in its constitutional law to escape its intemationai obligations. It stated: 
... the govemment of Her Britanic Majesty cannot justiw itself 
for a Mure in due diligence on the plea of insufficiency of 
legal means of action which it po~sessed.'~~ 
In the Free Zones case,'63 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCU) 
authoritatively observed that "it is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to 
limit the scope of her international obligations."lM Also, in the advisory opinion on the 
159~ee  United Nations Headquarters Agreement Case (1988) M Reports ai 12. See also, the Case 
cg Free Zanes of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex ( 1932) PCU, Scries A/B No. 46 at 167. 
%ee Article 27 of the Vicnna Convention on the k r w  of Treaties (1969). supra. note 43. See also 
1. A. Shearer, stipra, note 23 at 78; Malcolm N. Shaw, supra, note I l  at 104-105. 
161[u.s. v Britain], Moore. (1872) 1 Int. Arb. 495 
Iwlbid. This point was also succinctly put in the course of proceedings in the FinnLrh Ships 
A rbitration, Vol. 3 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral A wardr, 1484; ( 1934) 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, 
to wit: "As to the manner in which its municipal law is h e d ,  the state has under international law, a complete 
liberty of action, and its municipal law is a domestic matter in which no other state is entitled to concern itself, 
provided hat the municipal law is such as to give full effect to al1 internationai obligations of the state." Also, 
in 1 949 the International Law Commission adopted the Dr@ Declarations of Rights and Duties of States, 
Article 13 of which provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from 
ucaties and other sources of international law, and may not invoke the provisions in its constitution or its laws 
ris an excuse for failure to perform its duty." Emphasis added]. The UN Generai Assembly in G.A. Resolution 
375 (IV), G.A.O.R., 4th Session, Resolutions, (1949) at 66, quoted in D.J. Harris, supra, note 9 at 7 1, noted 
the above Draft Dedaration and cornmended it to members and jurists as a "notable and substantial 
contribution towards the progressive development of international law and irs codification." 
Gracco-Bulgarian Cornmunities Case,'" the PCU stated: 
It is a generally accepted pnnciple of international law that in 
the relations between powers who are conincting parties to a 
treaty, the provisions of municipal Iaw cannot prevail over 
those of the treaty. 
The same court affirmed this principle in the Advisory Opinion on the Treainzent of 
Polish Nationals in ~ a m i g ' ~ ~  where it declared that: 
... a state cannot adduce ... its own constitution with a view to 
evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law 
or treaties in force. 
The foregoing import a duty on the state, to bring its constitution in line with, and 
where appropriate, pass the necessary legislation to fulfil, its international  obligation^.'^^ In 
doing this. unless to the extent reservations are permitted, where applicable, a state is not 
allowed to pick and choose between the obligations created under an international agreement. 
Therefore, fanciful barriers erected to diminish the full impact of obligations assumed under 
an international agreement cannot stand.168 
16? 1930) PCIJ Reports. Series B. No. 17 at 32. 
166( 193 1 ) PCIJ, Series NB. No. 44 at 24. It has also been observed that "[a] state cannot plead that 
ia domestic law exonerated it from performing obligations imposed by an international treaty, unless in giving 
its consent to the treaty, a fundamental nile of municipal Iaw conceming constitutional cornpetence to conclude 
the treaty concerned was broken, and this breach of municipal constitutionai Iaw was manifest. See I. A. 
Shearer, supra, note 20 at 78-79. (Citations omitted). 
'67~ee Advisory Opinion on the Exchange of Greck and Turkish Populations (1925) PCIJ Series B, 
No. I O  rit 20. See also, 1. A. Shearer, lbid. at 78. 
I6'8ut see Andre Stemmet supra. note 36 at 245 who argues bat: 'While any conflict between a 
statc's international obligations and its domestic law is undesirable and should be avoided at al1 costs, such a 
situation has the advantage that the state's domestic iaw will remain unaffected while it is afiorded an 
opportunity to reflect on how to solve the problem." In view of the undertaking executed by sutes parties to 
the African Charter in Article 30 of the Protocoi establishing the Afican Court of Human Rights by which they 
rigreed to cornply with, and g u m t e e  the execution of, the judgement of the court, it is subrnitted that short of 
refùsai to comply with Article 30, there is no way domestic Iaw will remain unaffected if declared inconsistent 
with the Charter. 
Whatever may be applicable in municipal systems where municipal courts apply 
local statutes and uphold the municipal system, even when in conflict with the provisions of 
an international instrument,169 the existence of a supra-national court to enforce international 
agreements certainly means that such agreements will be enforced notwithstanding the 
provisions of municipal constit~tions."~ As such, the Afncan Court of Human ~ights."' it 
is submitted, should apply the provisions of the Charter and ought not to be hamstrung by 
intemal constitutional arrangements. Moreover, as a supra-national court. in the absence of 
any limitations in this regard, it has the powers to decide on the validity or otherwise of 
states parties' constitutional provisions vis-a-vis the Afrctz Charter. It is noteworthy that 
neither the Charter nor the Protocol establishing the African Court contains the equivalent 
of Article 60 of the European Convention which regulates the relationship between the 
Convention and national constitutions.ln The implication of this is that the States Parties to 
the African Charter have no such protection as that which the European Convention accords 
to their European counterparis. As such, the intemal constitutional arrangements of African 
169 Sce U.Oji Umozurike, "Afican Charter" supra, note 1 1 at 109. But see, 1. A. Shearer supra, note 
23 rit 78, who observes that "[tjhe fact municipal courts musc pay primary regard to municipal law in the event 
of conflict with international law, in no way affects the obligations of the state concerned to perform its 
international obligations. A municipal court which defers to municipal Iaw, notwithstanding an inconsistent nile 
of i ntetniitionat law, itself acts in breach of international law, and will, as an organ of the state, engage the 
international responsibility of that state." 
"'U.O. Umozurike. b b H ~ m u n  Rights fnstrun:ents" supra, note 74 at 13 notes: "As between 
internationai courts and municipal courts, the former generally give primacy to international law. Municipal Iaw 
to an international tribunal is a question of fact, even a constitution has not speciai sanctity." 
"'sec infra Chapter 5 for a discussion on the Afncan Court. 
172 See Article 60 of the European Convention which provides that the Convention shail not be 
constnted as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamentai freedoms which rnay be 
ensured under the laws of the contracting states or any agreement to which such states may be a party. 
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states do not have any privilege or special sanctity and cannot escape k ing  declared invalid 
where it is inconsistent with the Charter. 
Given that the Afncan Charter provides for absolute, immediate and justiciable 
economic, social and cultural rights, any State Party's constitution which does not recogiiise 
the justiciability of econornic, social and cultural rights or regards them as a non-justiciable 
fundamental objectives and directive principles or treats these rights as though they are 
qualified and progressive, cannot but be inconsistent with the obligations assumed by the 
state under the Charter. As a fact, the constitution of many states parties have not been 
lacking in inconsistencies in this regard. What appears to be lacking is the proper forum 
where they cm be so deciared. Even if a supra-national, court such as the African Court, may 
not directly declare a State Party's constitutional provisions nul1 and void, a decision to the 
effect that such a provision negates the State Party's obligations under the Charter indirectly 
invalidates such provisions even without expressly so declaring. 
A direct consequence of the discriminatory constiniti~nalisation"~ of economic, 
social and cultural rights by States Parties to the African Charter is the abysmal and shabby 
protection of these rights in practical terms. In the absence of accountability owing to non- 
justiciable or other forms of discnminatory constitutionalisation, economic, social and 
cultural rights are marginally - where at al1 - implemented. 
173 Discriminatory constitutionaIisation may be as a result of rendering some rights justiciable while 
others are not, or introducing conditions, such as 'progressive redization to the maximum available resources' 
to qualify onIy some rights in the constitution. 
4.5. PRACTICAL IMPLEMFNTATION / ENFORCEMENT 
The account of the practical implementation/enforcement of the economic, social and 
cultural nghts enshrined in the Afncan Charter is. with al1 probability, an account of States 
Parties' acute economic and social crisis as well as of their lack of politicai will. For states 
without a justiciable economic, social and cultural rights provisions, it has not gone beyond 
the imtüting rhetorical verbiage of 'heaven and earth' promises during political campaigns, 
which are usually confined to the garbage bin of unfulfilled electoral pledges soon after the 
election (or consolidation of power base, in the case of unelected military politicians). While 
such a scenario is not absent in those states with a justiciable Bill of Rights, the justiciability 
of rights affords their citizens the opportunity to assert their rights, at least to the extent 
allowed by the relevant provisions. Nigeria and South Africa are illustrative of these patterns 
of enforcement/implementation. 
Because of the welfare nature of some economic, social and cultural rights, it is 
difricult to embark on a meaninghil assessrnent of a state's performance in the 
implementation lenforcement of its economic, social and cultural rights obligations under the 
African Charter without reducing the evaluation to an analysis of the conditions of living in 
a state. Although some general comments may be made on the conditions of living in a state. 
emphasis will be on judicial, legislative and executive measures affecting economic, social 
and cultural rights. 
As a practical measure of implementation/enforcement, South Africa incorporated 
economic, social and cultural rights into a justiciable Bill of Rights. It is a singular act of 
great import having empowered the citizens to challenge any perceived violations of their 
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rights. The case of Suobramoney v Minister of Healfh (Kwazulu-Natal)'" represents the fmt 
where this constitutional right was effectively exercised under the South African Bill of 
Rights. 
In this case, the appellant was in dire need of rend dialysis in order to stave off death 
from acute kidney disease. When he ran out of funds to pay private providea, he sought 
service at a state hospitai. He was rehised treatment at the state hospital because his physical 
condition as a whole did not qualify him for dialysis services according to the standards used 
by the hospital to ration limited resources. The appellant chdlenged the hospital's rehisal, 
basing his claim in part on section 27(3)17' of the Constitution which provides that 'no one 
may be refused emergency treatment'. Finding the hospital's standards well wiihin the 
bounds of reason and fairly applied to the applicant, the Constitutional Court unanimously 
held that the appellant's nght to emergency medical treatment was not violated as his case 
did not qualify as an emergency treatment. The court, in effect, held that the appellant had 
no legal claim to relief under the Bill of R i g h t ~ . ' ~ ~  
Even though not necessary for the determination of the case before it, the court 
17J[1998] 1 SA 765 (CC). 
"'~he appeal was based on two sections of the Constitution: section 27(3). pmviding that 'no one may 
bc refused ernergency medical treatment' and section 1 1, grariting everyone 'the right to life'. 
"?II rejecting the daim under section 27(3). the court held hat  ernergency does not refer to chronic 
illness at an advmced or criticd stage, but to "sudden catastrophe which cdls for immediate medicd attention" 
that ought not be refused, when otherwise available, 'by reason of bureaucratie requirements or other 
formalities'. It further held that the appellant's right to life was not infnnged by a state hospitai's application 
of reasonabte rules for apportioning scarce resources arnong many who urgently need services when it is not 
possible to serve them ail. See supra, note 15 1 at pan. 20. 
ventured an opinion, in construing the respective subsections 2 of section 26 and 27,'" which 
tends to suggest sections 26(1) and 27(1)'" confer no claims on anybody beyond the claim 
to have the state perform the obligation to take reasonable positive measures, within 
available resources to provide everyone with access to the listed services. The Court per 
Chakalson P remarked: 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations 
imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in regard to access 
to housing, health care, food water and social security are 
dependent upon resources available for such purposes, and 
that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason 
of lack of reso~rces.'~' 
If the above statement actually meant what it says,'" then al1 the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights on economic, social and cultural rights with such qualifications as in, and 
including, sections 26 and 27 are no more than decorative appendages to the Bill of Rights. 
It is perhaps a sign of reluctance on the part of the Constitutional Coun to enforce the 
economic, social and cultural rights as provided in the Constitution without the shackles of 
resource availability and the manacles of progressive realisation. 
In d l ,  the case shows that under the right circumstances, an individual can have his 
'"~ubsection 2 of sections 26 and 27 provides: 'The state mut  take reasonable legislative and other 
meuures, within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this right," 
"'~ection 26(1) provides: "Everyone has the right to have access to reasonable housing." Section 
27( 1 ) provides: "Evetyone has the right to have access to (a) h d t h  care services, induding reproductive heaith 
care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependents, appropriate sociai assistance." 
179 See supra, note 174 at para. 11. 
18 Vrmk Michelman, supra, note 1 19 at 503-504 States: "... such a reading m y  not be at al1 what the 
Court intended to convey, and the remark is at any rate open to future dismissal as dictum not required for 
decision of the case before the court that uttered it, But in any event, such a casual intimation by the Court of 
an answer to such a crucial question m u t  be counted as unfortunate." 
or her economic, social and cultural rights under the South African Constitution vindicated 
in a court of law just as any other right. Save for the qualification of some provisions with 
the 'resource availability and progressive redization' clause, which is not in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Afrcan Charter, there would appear to be a propitious 
atmosphere for judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights in South 
  fric a. 18' 
Apan from judicial enforcement, South Africa has already taken some legislative 
measures towards the implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights. And, as a 
sequel to the obligations imposed by section 26 of the Constitution, the parliament passed 
the Hoitsing ~ c t . ' "  The object of the Act is, inter alia, to lay down general ptinciples 
applicable to housing development in order to facilitate a sustainable housing development 
process and to provide for the financing of national housing programmes. This is in 
recognition that "housing, as adequate shelter. fulfils a basic human neeâ" and is "vital to the 
socio-economic well-being of the nation.""' Other legislative measures taken to effectuate 
the right of access to housing include the Housing Consumers Protection Measures ~ c t ' "  
i 8 1 Sec generally, Pierre De Vos, supra, note 83 at 93. 
Ig2see Housing Act No. 107. of 1997. published in Government Gazette No. 18521 of December 19, 
1997. The Act is dso available online at itttp://www.gov.za/acts/97index.html>. Paragraph t of its preamble 
States: "Whereas in t e m  of section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afiica, 1996, everyone has 
thc right to have access to ridequate housing, and the state must take remonable legidative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the redisation of this right." This is perhaps the best evidence of the 
essence of the Act. 
183 Para. 2 of Preamble to the Housing Act. lbid. 
' " ~ e e  Housing Consumers Protection Memures Act No. 95 of 1998. as amended by the Housing 
Conslimrrs Protection Amendment Act No. 27 of 1999. 
and the Rental Housing Act,'" al1 aimed at making shelter available to those in need. 
in addition, in hirtherance of the obligations imposed by the right to education and 
to further education, the parliament has enacted the National Student Financial Aid Scheme 
 AC^'" to provide for, arnong other things, the granting of loans and bursaries to students at 
public higher education institutions and for the administration of such loans and bursaries. 
There is also, the Higher Education ~ c t ' "  which was passed in order redress past 
discrimination and ensure representivity and equal access to higher education for dl ,  
especially to the historically disadvantaged group. 
Indubitably, South Africa has taken some impressive legislative measures in 
furtherance of the economic, social and cultural rights under its Constitution and in the 
African Charter. However, laws are not self-executory and usually require even more 
involving measures before they can achieve desired positive results. Short of the 'normal' 
bureaucratic shuffling, nothing tangible seems to be happening in this regard. 
More importantly, the people for whose benefit these laws are enacted must be made 
aware that such laws are actually in existence for their benefit. This underscores the 
usefulness of effective human rights education to enlighten the masses on their economic, 
social and cu i~ra i  entitiements under the constitution and the Africun Charter. The paucity 
of litigation to enforce socioeconomic rights under the South African Constitution points to 
" ' ~ e e  Rental Houring Act No. 50 of 1999. 
1136 See National Student Financial Aid Scheme Act No. 56 of 1999, published in Government Gazette 
No. 20652 of 19 November 1999. AIso available onIine at dittp.J/~~~.gov.zalacts/99rindex.htmI> (visited 2:35 
PM, ApriI 18,2000). 
Higher Education Act No. LOI of 1997, published in Government Gazette No. lS5 15 of 19 
Dccember 1997, as arnended by Higher Education Amendment Act No. 55 of 1999. 
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the absence of such awareness by the majority who are k ing  seared in the flarnes of 
w i thering poverty and helplessness. 
South Africa is understandably a new entrant in the scheme of Africa's Regional 
Hurnan Rights regime. Having writhed for a long time under the crushing heels of the 
apartheid system, known for its negation of humanity, South Africa's efforts so far, no matter 
how modest, argue in its favour. The same, however, cannot be said of Nigeria and rnany 
other States Parties to the African Charter. 
Unlike South Africa, Nigeria has no enforceable economic, social and cultural rights 
under its Constitution. These rights are provided for under the non-justiciable directive 
principles of state p o l i ~ y . ' ~ ~  Consequently, judicial enforcement of such rights is non- 
existent, as is arnply demonstrated by the case of Adeyinka Badejo v. Federal Minister of 
Ed~ication & Ors.Lm9 In this case the applicant sat for the entrance examination into the 
Federal Govemment Colleges. Notwithstanding her very high score, she was denied 
admission because her score was not up to the cut-off mark set for her state of origin, even 
though people with lower scores, but from different states were admitted. On an application 
to enforce her right to, inter alia, education under the 1979 Nigerian Constitution (which is 
substantially the same as the 1999 Constitution), the court held that education being under 
the directive principles of state policy, it is not justiciable and cannot be enforced by the 
courts. 
With regard to legislative measures, none has, so far, been taken since the coming 
%e section 6(6)(c) of the Nigerian Constitution. 1999. 
189 Suit No. M/500/88 of High Court of Lagos State (Ruling delivered on November 4, 1988). 
into force of the present Constitution.'" Prior to the corning into force of the present 
Constitution, there were virtually no legislative measures taken in the area of econornic, 
social and cultural rights apart from demes making workers' strikes illegal and empowering 
employers to dismiss stnking workers.lgl The military administration neither allowed for the 
enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights under the Charter, nor actively initiated 
meaningful programmes under the directive principles or state polic y, to improve the 
socioeconomic lot of ~ i ~ e r i a n s . ' ~  Successive govemments in Nigeria have conducted their 
affairs in a manner that suggests that the citizens are not entitled to any economic social and 
cultural rights.19> Since the failings of the Nigerian state and leadership for the past two 
decades have been arnply documented elsewherel% any efforts to rehearse it here will be 
'%e Constititrion of the Federaf Republic of Nigeria, 1999 came into forcc on May 29, 1999. 
' 9 '~ee  for instance, Decrees 4 of 1996; 26 of 1996: 29 of 1996 and Public ODcers (Retirement from 
Of ic r )  Decree No. 17 of 1984 under which the Military Administrritor of Kaduna state, on July 10, 1997, 
dismissed ail striking workers (34,000) of the state. See Civil Liberties Organisation, Annual Report 1997: A 
CL0 Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organisation, 1999) at 157- 162; 
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, 1997 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in Nigeria 
(Lagos: CDHR, 1998) at 100- 105 [hereinafter "1 997 Annual Report"]. 
19? With regard to programmes to aileviate the sufferings of the masses, one's attention may be drawn 
to programmes tike Family Economic Advancement Programme and Better Life for Rural Women respectively 
initiated by Mrs. hlaryam Abacha and Mrs. M q a m  Babangida (wives of two former rnilitary heads of state). 
But, as the Civil Liberties Organisation pointed out in their 1997 Annual Report, these were '"are-brained, 
cxtra-constitutionai and extra-budgetary prognmmes designed to accommodate the ego of the wives of miiitary 
hcads of state in Nigeria." See Civil Liberties Organisation, Ibid at 166. 
19%ie Cornmittee for the Defence of Human Rights in iis 1998 Annual Report observed thus: "One 
of the main obligations of a govemment to its people is to create an enabling environment for the people to 
cnjoy thcse [economic, social and cultural] rights. Economic and politicai policies are the main instruments 
through which government[s] promote the welfare of the citizens. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, govemment's 
economic and political policies and decisions are designed to foster the abridgement and deniai of human 
rights." See Comrnittee for the Defence of Human Rights, 1998 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation 
in Nigeria (Lagos: CDHR, 1999) at 1 18 [hereinafter "1998 Annual Report"]. 
194 See generally Omotoye Olorode, et al., Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Crises of the Nigerian State (Lagos: 
CDHR, 1998); Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, "1998 Annual Report" Ibid at 117-171; 
Committee of the Defence of Human Rights " 1997 Annual Report" supra, note 190 at 82- 1 17. 
unnecessary. 
The impact of those failures and neglects on the enjoyrnent of the economic, social 
and cultural nghts of the people is, however, worth noting here. Momoh and Adejumobi have 
summaiised the decadence in the educational sector due to prolonged neglect thus: 
Facilities and social infrastnicture are in a decadent state of 
disrepair from primary school to university level. Worst still, 
teachers' salaries especially at the primary and secondary 
school levels, are not paid on time, often months late. 
Univenities have had to rely on World Bank loans to import 
books .... The result of the loans has been ihat meaningless 
books have been imported without consulting the individual 
universities or lecturers. Many of these books lie unshelved in 
libraries."' 
Although education may seem to have improved its standing recently in ternis of the 
actual amount allocated to it in the nation's budget, much of the allocation was earmarked 
for recurrent expenditure and very little designated for capital expenditure and research.lS 
Even at that, teachers at al1 levels of the educational system are poorly renumerated and 
motivated with the effect that most teachers have to look elsewhere for survivai, including 
unwholesome practices which impact negatively on the quality of ed~cati0n.l~~ 
Health wise, the people have not fared better. Budgetary allocations to the health 
sector, as at 1999. remained short of 5 percent of national the budget as recommended by the 
'95~bubaka r  Momoh & Said Adejumobi. The Nigerian M i h r y  and the Crisis of Dernocrotic 
Trcmition: A Study in the Monopoly of Power, (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organisation, 1999) at 207-208. 
1 97 In ri study conducted by the Acadernic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities, the pay of university 
t e x  hers w u  shown to be the worst among AErican States. See Attahiru Jega, Nigetian Academics Under 
Mil i tuq Rule, University of Stockholm, Department of PoIitical Science, Report No. 1994:3, cited in Abubakar 
Momoh & Said Adejumobi, Ibid. 
World Health Organisation. Equipment and facilities in government owned hospitals, 
including specialist ones, have broken down or are virtually non existent. Hospitals which, 
before then, had degenerated into consulting clinics appear to have "becorne helpless 
abattoirs and antechamben to the cemetery due to the appalling state of neglect and the 
irresponsibility of successive government~."'~~ 
Similarly, there has been serious deterioration in family diets as a result of low and 
u nt imel y wages, hyper-inflationary trends and anti-people economic polices, such as 
structural adjustment programmes. The attendant implication of this for the health of the 
people is vividly captured in the following words of Deji Popola: 
Deteriorating diets have led to lowered resistance to diseases 
among wide sectors of the population. Indeed, ailments that 
had been declared completely eradicated, such as small pox 
and guinea wom infestation, have appeared in recent years. 
Recorded cases of malaria increased from 1.2 in 1984 to 1.8 
million in 1988, and most other notifiable diseases have 
shown yearly increases as we1P9 
As appalling as the Nigerian performance in the enforcement/implernentation of 
economic. social and cultural rights may be. its case appears to be not peculiar. Some other 
States Parties to the Africizn Charter are also cornmitted to the total neglect of the economic, 
social and cultural rights of their c i t i ~ e n s . ~ ~  It has been observed that the spate of conflicts 
engulfing most African States are the peoples' response to, or direct consequences of, the 
lg9~cji  Popoola. "Nigeria: Consequences for Hedth" in Aderanti Adepoju. (ed.), The Impact of 
Srrttcrtrral Adjusrments on the Population ofAfica (London: James C m y ,  1993) at 93. 
'%e for instance. Afronet - The Z<rrnbion Human Rights Report 1998. Chapter 5, online at 
c h t t p : / / w w w . z r u n n e t , n n l m e 1 1 a f r o n e ~  l998.hm (Visited May 2,2000) for an account 
of the failings of the Zarnbian state to live up to its economic, socid and cultural rights obligations. 
various govemment's failures to implement effective socioeconomic prog~arnmes.~~' 
Perhaps, one might amibute the failures of States Parties in fulfilling their obligations 
under the African Charter to the hitherto absence of a supra-national coun to enforce the 
provisions of the Charter. In most cases, the municipal courts were either alienated by 
military or civilian dictatorships, or the judges were too temfied to go against the wishes of 
the 'omnipotent' political lords of the day. Perhaps, this accounts for the euphoria that 
greeted the adoption of the Protocol establishing the Afncan Court of Human Rights. The 
extent to which the Afncan Court, as presently established, cm effectively change the status 
quo is the subject for the next chapter. 
'O 1 See Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.), Comprehending and Masrering Afncan Confticrs: The Search for 
S~rstainable Peace and Good Governance (London: Zed Books, 1999) at 1 18. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ENFORCEMENT PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS IN TEE NEW AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The quest for a human rights court in Afnca predated the establishment of the Afncan 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. It existed contemporaneously with the demand for 
the creation of an African regional human rights system or instrument.' However, when the 
regional human rights system was established, the adjudicative body of enforcement was 
jettisoned under dubious and questionable circumstances. African states, still jealous of their, 
then, newly acquired sovereignty, and run by governments with doubthl validity and limited 
moral clwity, couid not come to ternis with conceding the adjudication and enforcement of 
human rights issues to an international judicial orgm2 
Ever since the Afncan Charter came into force, there have been unrelenting demands 
for the creation of an effective enforcement machinery under the Afncan Charter to 
1 As far back as 1961, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in the Law of Lagos recommended 
the establishment of an African regionai human rights systern which would be "...safeguarded by the creation 
of a court of appropriate jwisdiction and recourse thereto made avdable for ail persons under the jurisdiction 
of the signatory states." For a text of the resolution see M. Hamalengwa, et. al., The International Luw of 
Hiiman Rights in Africa: Basic Documents and Annotated Bibliography (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988 j 
at 37-38. 
' ~ e e  B.Obinna Okere, 'The Ehtection of Hurnan Rights in Africa and the &cm Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and Amencan Systems" (1984) 6 Human 
Rights Quarterly 14 1 at 158. 
strengthen the African human rights system.' This is due to the apparent ineffectiveness of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission) which was 
entmsted with the responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights under the 
Charter. It is fair to Say that the Commission was not, ab initia, meant to be very effective 
in the enforcement of human rights. It was merely the tnincated image of an effective 
protector of human rights. 
At the 36"' Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Govemment of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU)~ a Protocol' was adopted establishing the African 
Coun on Human and Peoples' Rights. This was done with the apparent, though belated, 
conviction that the "attainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights requires the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' 
Rights to complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' ~ igh ts . "~  
The signing of the Protocol has generated a lot of interest in human rights circles and 
attracted a few scholarly cornmentaries. However, there appears to be no detailed inquiry into 
3 For carlier demands for the creation of an effective enforcement system see, P. Nnaemeka-Agu, 
"Consti tutional and Human Rights Proceedings" Continuing Legal Education (Nigeria) Lecture Series (Lecture 
4A) 7 Mrirch 1991; E.O. Eiemokhai, '"ïowards Adequate Defence of Human Rights in Africa" (198 1) 21 
Indian Jortmul oflntl. Law 141; T.O. E h ,  New Horizons in International knu, 2"" ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 199 1); Ebow Bondie- Simpson, "A Critique of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" 
( 1988) Howard L J. 643. 
me Session was held in Ouagadougou. Burkina Faso on June 9, 1998. 
5 0 ~ ~ / ~ ~ ~ / ~ X P f ~ ~ C H P R / P ~ ~ ~  III - Protocol to the AfneBn Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of an Afnran Coun on Human and Peoples' Rights 1998; adopted at the 36b 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Govemment of the OAU on June 9, 1998 at Ouagadougou. 
Burkina Faso. For a full text of the Protocol see (1999) 6 IHRR 891-897. 
' ~ e e  the lut  paragraph of the preamble to the Protocol. Ibid. 
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the real likelihood of this Court, as presently established under the Protocol, ensuring the 
effective protection of hurnan rights in Africa. While the Court constitutes a welcome 
development to the African human rights system, there is a need to look beyond the euphoria 
that heralded the signing of the Protocol. This is ail the more necessary in view of certain 
emboldened overstatements already made by some cornmentators as to the efficacy of the 
new Court in protecting human rights in Africa under the Afncan Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights. Consequently, it has become irnperative to critically examine the Court as 
esiablished under the Protocol and the African Charter with the aim of ascertainhg the 
extent to which the Court can strengthen the African human rights system and ensure the 
effective enforcement of human rights, especially violations of econornic, social and cultural 
rights. 
This Chapter, therefore, discusses the mechanism of enforcement under the Charter 
prior to the signing of the Protocol. It also examines the rationale or justification for a 
human rights court for the African Human rights system. The various arguments for and 
agains t the establishment of the Court are highlighted. While relevant provisions of the 
Protocol will be considered, the analysis will focus rnainly on the jurisdiction, nght of access 
and enforcement powers of the Court. Lastly, it evaluates the prospects of effective human 
rights protection under the Coun in the light of the Protocol and the provisions of the Afican 
Charter as they affect, or are likely to affect, the effective performance of the Court. The 
Chapter concludes that the African Human Rights Court, as presently established, holds little 
or no promise for effective human nghts protection in Africa. 
5.2. ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY UNDER THE AFRXCAN CHARTER 
In order to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in Afica, the Afrcan 
Charter established the African Cumniission on Human und Peuples' Rights7 as the basic 
rnachinery for the enforcement of human rights in Africa. The Commission is made up of 
eleven8 members who serve in their personal capacitg with not more than one national of 
the same state.1° Members have a six-year term of office and they are subject to reelection." 
The Chairperson of the Commission and his or her deputy (vice) are elected by the members 
of the Commission and the OAU pays the emoluments and allowances of the rnembers? 
Article 45 sets out the functions of the Commission which includes the promotion 
and protection of human rights in diverse ways. In the exercise of its promotional functions. 
the Commission is mandated to: 
(a) collect documents, undertake studies and research on African problems in the 
field of human and peoples' rights; organize seminars, symposia and conferences, 
disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concemed with 
' ~ e e  Article 30 o f  the Charter. 
8 See ArticIe 3 l(1). Members are chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, 
known for their high monlity, integrity, impartiality and cornpetence in rnatters of human and peoples' rights, 
particular consideration being given to persons having legd experience. Given the subjective and relative nature 
of most of these quaiities, the extent to which these can be effectively applied in the practical selection of 
rnembcrs is subject tc? serious doubts. Cornpetence in mtters of human and peoples' rights does not mean that 
the person will be a h u m  rights activist, s/he might as well be rnerely competent by vime of his involvernent 
in human rights as an academic interest. 
'*Article 32. States may however, nominate a person who is not a national of the nominating state. Sre 
Artiçlc 34. 
' 'Article 36 
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human and peoples' rights, and should the case arise, give its views or make 
recommendations to Governments;" 
(b) formulate and lay down pnnciples and rules aimed at solving legal problems 
relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African 
Governments may base their legislation; 
(c) cooperate with other African and international institutions concerned with the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples' rightd4 
In addition to its promotional functions, the Commission must ensure the protection 
of human and peoples' rights under the conditions laid down by the present Charter. It also 
has responsibility for interpreting the provisions of the Charter at the request of a State Party, 
an institution of the OAU or an African organization recognized by the OAU. The 
Commission must also perfonn other tasks which may be assigned to it by the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Government~.~~ 
The Commission has powers to resort to appropriate methods of investigation to 
1 3 ~ h e  duty of the Commission to give its views here does not mean the s m c  thing as giving an 
ridvisory opinion. See Emmanuel Bello, 'The Mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights" (1988) 1 African J. IntL L 31 at 34. 
"sec Article 45(1). The promotional activities of the Commission are hugh t  with problems. 
According to Umozurike, "[tlhe sheer size of the continent and the numbet of countries that the Commission 
has to work in make the present human and material resources inadequate for effective promotion. With one 
Commissioner working part time and responsible for promoting the Charter in three to five countries, the 
chances of effective promotion are few." See U. Oji Urnozurike, The Afican Charter on Hurnan and Peoples' 
Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) at 7 1-72 [hereinafter "Afican Charter"]. 
"sec Article 45(2),(3) & (4). See dso Dinah Shclton. T h e  Romiw of Regionai Human Rights 
Systems" in Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks (eds.) The Future of International Human Rights (New 
York: Transnational Publishers, 1999). 35 1 at 361. 
investigate human rights violations16 and may also hear from the Secretary-General of the 
OAU or any other person capable of enlightening it." It is also authorized to review periodic 
reports which states are required to subrnit every two years from the date the Charter comes 
into force, on any legislative measures the states have undertaken to give effects to the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charteda 
The Charter also provides for the filing of communications to the Commission. 
Communications are receivable from States Partiestg and from entities other than State 
Parties including, individuals and NGOs. Such communications are, however, subject to 
more stringent scmtiny than those from State Partiedo 
I6ln the exercise of its investigative powen, ihe Commission has undertaken a number of missions in 
relation to communications received, including missions to Senegd, Mauritania, Sudan, Nigeria and Togo. See 
Tmh Annual Acriviry Report of the Ajhcan Commission on Human and Peoples' Righrs, ACHPRfRPTIlOth 
at 6. Some of these missions ended up with unsatisfactory results because of the Commission's lack of boldness 
to pronouncc on violations of the Charter, preferring instead to adopt amicable settlement which did not work 
givcn the insistencc of the complainants on apportioning blame. For an assesment of the Commission's on-site 
visits, espccially to Mauritania and a cornparison with the Inter-American Comrnission, see, Rachel Murray, 
"On-site Visits by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Case Study and Cornparison with 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights" (1999) 1 1 RADIC 460 [hereinafter, "On-sire Visits'*], 
" ~ e e  Article 46. 
19 See Article 62. See dso Obijiofor Aginarn, "Legitimate Governance Under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights" in E. K. Quashigah & O. C. Okafor (eds.), Legiiimate Govemance in Africa (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 345 at 365. Evelyn Ankumah, The Afncan Commission on Humun 
and Peoples' Rights: Pracrice and Procedures (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) rit 25 notes that most states 
have not triken their reporting obligations seriously. As of the 17" Session of the Commission in 1995, only 
fifteen states had subrnitted their reports. These failutes to submit reports no doubt put the entire supervisory 
editlce of the Commission under threat. See Carison Anyangwe, "Obligations of State Parties to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (1998) 10 RADIC 625 ar 637. State reporting procedure is not a 
mechanism for examining and remedying specific violations of human rights by a state. Its utility lies in the fact 
that it enables the Commission to monitor a State's implementation of the Charter. It dso enables the 
Commission to assist states, through CO-operative and constructive dialogue to enhance their human rights 
standards and practice. See Evelyn Ankumah, Ibid. at 79-8 1 for other purposes of reporting. 
19see Article 47 
" ~ e e  Article 55 M 6 .  See also Umozurike, "African Charter" supra, note 14 at 75. 
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Where a State Party has good reasons to believe that another State Party has 
committed a breach of the Charter, it may, by written communication, cal1 the attention of 
that state to the breach and send copies to the Secretary-General of the OAU and the 
Chairperson of the Commission. The state against which a cornplaint is lodged is required 
to give written explanation or statement elucidating the matter? The matter may be referred 
to the Commission if there were no satisfactory  solution^.^ Article 49 ûuthorizes States to 
file a communication against another state directly to the Commission. The Commission is 
authorized under Article 5 1 to request information from the state concemed. M e r  obtaining 
ail relevant information. the Commission prepares a report of its findings which is sent to the 
concemed state and communicated to the Assembly of Heads of States and ~ove rnmen t ,~  
and the Commission may make such recommendations as it deems useful to the Assembly 
of Heads of  tat tes,^" 
The usefulness of this state communication procedure to the protection of human 
rights in Africa remains doubtful and questionable. As Obinna Okere rightly points out, 
"[elxperience has show that Afncan heads of state comport themselves like a club or vade 
union in their solidarity. Political, ideological, and diplomatic considerations might well (and 
have been known to) assume pnmacy over, and rnight well frustrate, the need for ju~t ice ."~ 




' S ~ .  Obinna Okere. supra. note 2 at 159. 
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African states are not known to have initiated any communications against other states 
notwithstanding the widespread massive violations of human nghts going on in ~fr ica. '~ 
Thus, this provision, so far as it remains unutilized, is superfluous or at best a window 
dressing designed to give the appearance of seriousness on the part of African states in 
promoting and protecting human rights while in actual fact they look the other way in the 
face of grave violations, prefemng to sacrifice human rights on the altar of non-interference 
and di plornatic goodwill. 
Furthemore, the Commission has no power to make any binding resolutions, even 
if, on the merits of a cornplaint against a State Party to the Charter it finds that a violation 
has occurred. The Commission can only make such recommendations as it deems usehil? 
It has thus been observed that without any sanctions attaching to a State Party which fails to 
abide by the recommendations of the Commission, and with the Commission unnecessady 
tied to the apron strings of the Assembly of Heads of States, the "state of human rights under 
the Charter is therefore what the Assembly wants it to be (and the) Commission is therefore 
far from being inde~endent."~ With this overbearing influence and the role of the Assembly 
of Heads of States and Govemment, the Commission is incapacitated in relation to 
%velyn A. Ankumah. supra. note 18 at 24 has noted that [t]o date. the Commission h u  not received 
communications submined by a Sute against the other. This is hardly strange, inter-state procedures are hardly 
used ... as a mechanism for human rights protection. Therefore one is left with individual and NGO cornplaint 
procedure as the major mechanisrn for human rights protection." 
"~bijiolor Aginam, supra, note 18 at 367. Evelyn Ankurnah. supra note 18 ai 74 has observed that 
"... uniike other human rights systems, once the Commission reaches a decision on the merits, its final authority 
is to make recommendations to the Assernbly of Heads of States and Goverment. ff the Assembly so decides, 
the Commission may publicize violations of human rights by State parties." 
211 Obijiofor Aginam, Ibid. 
i ndependent decision .2g 
The extent to which the Assembly of Heads of States and Govemment will act on the 
Commission's report has remained a source of concem to scholars and other observen of 
African human rightsM Those running autocratic and dictatorial regimes (military or civilian) 
lack the requisite moral high ground and vision to indict another 'colleague' because it may 
be their own turn the next time. Thus, while the masses reel under the most atrocious 
violations, the Assembly engages in a symbiotic game of "you scratch my back, 1 scratch 
your back." 
The barriers erected by the Charter for non-state communication merit close 
examination and scrutiny. Under Article 56 such non state communications are subjected to 
more stringent scrutiny than those from state parties." First of d l ,  the Commission has to 
determine by simple majority whether or not to consider the particular re~ommendation.~~ 
To be considered the communication must: 
(a) indicate their authon, even if they request anonymity; 
290. Gye-Wado, 'The Effectiveness of the Safeguard Machinery for the Enforcement of Human Rights 
in Africri" (1992) 2 JHRLP 144 at 165. According to CM. Peter, "[tlhe mandate of the Commission is limited. 
At most rifter investigating a reported violation of human nghts, the Commission cm only report to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Govenunent (Article 52). This is why there have been cornplaints that the 
Commission has no teeth." See C.M. Peter, 'The African Court of Justice: Jurisdictionai, Procedurai and 
En forcement Problems: Some Thoughts" in MA. Ajomo & O. Adewale, (eds.), African Economic Treafy 
Issues: Problems and Prospects, (Lrigos: Nigerim Institute of Advmced Legai Studies, 1993) 322 at 324. 
'Osce Obijiofor Aginam. s u p .  note 18 at 367-368. 
3'~mozurike, "Afican Charter" supra, note 14 at 75, 
" ~ e e  Article 55. See also Edem Kojo. 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (1990) 
1 1 Hirman Rights Law Journal 271 at 280 (notes that it is difficult seeing 'members of a govenimental 
Commission agreeing easiiy on petitions from individuals). 
(b) be compatible with the Charter of the OAU or with the African Charter;" 
(c) not be written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State 
concemed and its institutions or to the OAU; 
(d) not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media; 
(e) be sent after exhausting local remedies. if any, unless it is obvious that this 
procedure is unduly prolonged; 
(f) be submitted within a reasonable petiod from the time the local remedies are 
exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter; and 
(g) not deal with matten which have been settled by other rneans (in accordance with 
the Charter of the UN or the OAU or the provisions of the African Charter)." 
Reflecting on the above provisions, Benedek has argued that the Commission lacks 
the mandate to rernedy individual human rights  violation^.'^ Similarly, Murray argues that 
the power of the Commission to address non-state communications is not clear on the face 
of the Charter since the Commission is only required to make a list of such cases which it 
will consider if the majority of its members agree and if certain admissibility conditions are 
" ~ h e  requirement of cornpatibility with the OAU Charter seems to be patently absurd. It tends to 
suggest that the OAU Charter is a source of rights guarantees which it is ctearly not. Again, it appears to be 
suggesting that both the OAU Charter and the A w n  Charter are covering the same subject matter which is 
d e d y  not the case. 
35 Sec, Wolfgang Benedek, 'The African Charter and Commission on Hurnan and Peoples' Rights: 
How to Make it More Effective" (1993) 1 1 Neth. Q. Human Riglits 25 at 3 1 [hereinaftcr "Afican Chaner and 
Cornrnissiori"]. See aiso Peter R. Baehr, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1994) at 76, noting that the Commission was "envisaged as a body to promote rather than to protect 
human rïghts." 
satisfied under Article 56, in addition to such communications pertaining only to special 
cases which reveal the existence of a senes of senous or massive violations of hurnan 
rights? 
Also, Umozurike has pointed out that some provisions of Article 56 seem largely 
unnecessary. According to him, "[tlhe language test for a communication is supeffluous .... 
Frequently the information about events in other lands cornes from the media and victims of 
human rights violations may be incarcerated and unable to communicate their plight to the 
outside world. The only eye-witnesses rnay be the very perpetrators of the human rights 
violations, or their agents."" One need not look too far to discover that dl these barriers 
were erected as obstacles in the path of the victims. 
For instance, relying on the requirement that communications must not be written in 
disparaging or insulting language directed against the state, its institutions, or the OAU, the 
African Commission, at its Twenty-Fiat Ordinary Sessi~n,'~ declared Communication 65/92 
Ligiîe Camerounaise des Droits 1 'Homme v. camerom," inadmissible. The Communication 
alleged, arnong other things, the existence of serious and massive violations of human rights 
in Cameroun, and listed at least forty-six cases of torture and depnvation of food, repression 
%ee Rachel Mumy, "Decisions by the African Commission on Individuai Communications Under 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (1997) 46 Inri. & Comp. L Q. 412 at 413 [hereinafter 
"Decisions"]. 
37~mozurike. "'African Charter" supro, note 14 at 76. 
" ~ h e  Session was held in Nouakchott. Mauritania, in April 1997. 
3g~ommunication 65/92 Ligue Cameroumise des Droits l'Homme v. Cameroun, African Commission 
on Hurnan and Peoples' Rights (1997) at 47, cited in Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, 'The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: The Deveiopment of its Non-State Communication 
Procedures" ( 1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 235 at 243. 
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of free expression, denial of fair hearing, ethnic discrimination, and massacres of civilian 
population. Although the Commission found that the allegations constituted a "series of 
serious violations of the Charter," it held that statements contained in the Communication 
such as: 'Paul Biya (the President of Cameroun) must respond to crimes against humanity,' 
'regime of torturers,' and 'govemment barbarisms' were insulting." The Commission, 
therefore, declared the Communication inadmissible owing to what may, in the first place. 
be syrnptornatic of the depth of revulsion aroused by t!!e violations alleged in the cornplaint. 
In addition to al1 these restrictions, most rights in the Charter are further curtailed 
by clawback clauses4' that allow states considerable discretion in restricting rights and 
freedoms protected under the Charter provided that such activities are in accordance with 
the dornestic law of the state involved." There is no provision in the Charter imposing any 
standard or test of reasonableness which such domestic law must meet. Nor is there any 
reference to circumstances that may lead to the limitations of those rights curtailed by 
'O~ee  Chidi A. Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen. Ibid. at 255. 
" ' ~ e e  for example, Articles 6(2); 9(1); lO(2); 12(1); 13(1) and 14(1). Thcse provisions are couched 
in the following form: "Every individual shall have the X- right or Y- fieedom provided he abides by the Law 
or in accordance with the law." 
%ee Richard Gittleman. 'The Afncan Charter on H u m  and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis" 
( 1982) 22 Virginia J.  Intl. L. 66'7at 691-692 [hereinafter "Legal Analysis"; Richard Gittleman, 'The Banjui 
Charter on Human and Peoples* Rights: A Legai Analysis" in Claude Welch and Ronald Meltzer, Human Rights 
and Development in Afnca (Albany: State University of New York, 1984), 152 at 157-159; [hereinafter "The 
Banjul Charter"]; Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 3 at 660-661; R.M. D'sa, 'The M c a n  Charter on 
Human ruid Peoples' Rights: Problerns and Prospects for Regional Action" (1987) 10 Australian Yearbook of 
Inr '1. L. 1 10. A clawback clause is one which pennits a state, in its most unbounded discretion, to restnct its 
treaty obtigations or rights guaranteed in the Chaner. It cm be applied even in normal situations so long as a 
national Iriw is passed to that effect. It has no time lirnit so long as it is pennitted by domestic law. See Ebow 
Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 3 at 660. 
clawback clauses." Unlike derogation clause* clawback clauses provide a rneans for 
member states to permanentiy circumvent the restrictions imposed by the charter." As 
Flinterman and Henderson have rightly pointed out the "clawback clauses severely limit 
supposedly protected rights by granting governments the power to infringe upon thern,'* 
thereby making the Afncan Chrter to fa11 short of a truly effective human rights protection 
instrument. 
Umozurike has, however, argued that the effects of the clawback clauses are "not as 
grim as some authors put it, if the Charter is read as a whole, including Articles 60 and 61 
Both articles 60 and 6 1 enjoin the Commission to draw inspiration from international law 
on human and peoples' rights. Relevant sources of inspiration include, but are not limited 
to, the UN Charter, üDHR, OAU Charter, and other instruments adopted by the UN and 
Afncan countries in the field of human rights as well as other general or special international 
conventions laying down mles recognized by member states of the OAU. In consequence, 
" ~ e e  Emmanuel Bello, supra, note 13 at 55. 
%erogation clauses allow mereiy for tempo- suspension. The effect is to carehilly define the liMts 
of state behaviour towards its nationds during times of national emergencies. While derogation clauses permit 
suspension of previously granted rights, clawback clauses testrict rights ab initia See Gittleman, "Legal 
Antripis" supra, note 42 at 692. Umozurike, "Afican Charter" supra, note 14 at 29, in differentiating between 
derogation and clawback clauses scates: "The difference between the two is that a derogstion states the 
circurnstances in which the rights may be lirnited, for exarnple, by Iaw reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society; the ciawback clause, however, confers a wider discretion to excludc the enjoyment of the right totally. 
Further, the right m y  be limited by law, the standards of which are not specified." See dso  Rosdyn Higgins, 
"Derogations under Human Rights Treaties" (1978) 48 British Yearbook of international Law 28 1. 
'5~rdiur E. Anthony, "Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights Court in Alrica" 
(1997) 32 Texas Intl. L J. 51 lat 518. 
46 Cees Fiinterman &Catherine Henderson, "The Afi-icm Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" in 
Rriija Hanski & Markku Suksi, An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, 
2nd edn. (TurWAbo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Ahderni University, 1999). 387 at 395. 
"~rnozurike, "Afncon Charîer" supra. note 14 at 29. 
it was argued that, "[c]onsidered dong with international customary law and civilized state 
practice, there are implicit grounds for judging the reasonableness of laws that detract from 
rights. [Therefore,] [tlhe absence of a provision in the Charter that such laws should be 
reasonably justified in a democratic society is not necessarily fatal.'"* 
In support of Umozurike's contention. the Commission may, for instance. subject any 
state legislation curtailing rights and freedoms to standards of reasonableness by drawing 
from various international human rights instruments or the decisions of other regional human 
rights courts or commissions. In this regard the vast jurisprudence of the European system 
may be very useful. Again, the Commission may draw from the municipal constitutional law 
analogy requiring laws curtailing rights and freedoms to be no more than are 'necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national secunty or public safety."19 Regrettably, the 
Commission's decisions so far have woefully failed to reference jurisprudence from both 
national and international tribun al^.^' 
It might well be that in interpreting the provisions of the Charter the Commission 
will take into consideration international customary law and civilized state practice. It is also 
conceded that, as a recognized principle of international law, a state cannot rely on its 
domestic or intemal arrangements as a defence for its failure to live up to its international 
49 There is nothing striinge about an international body Iike the Commission applying municipal law 
ansilogy. As part of the general principles of law, the International Court of Justice has applied principles of 
municipal law on several occasions. See for example, the Temple of Preah Vihear Case [1962] 1-CJ. Reports 
6 rit 26, where the ICJ drcw a municipai Iaw of contract anaiogy. Also in the Gulfof Maine Case (Canada v. 
U.S.) [ 19841 I.C.J. Reports 246, the ICJ drew a municipal law sinalogy of acquiescence and estoppel. See also, 
the Ct~orzow Factory Case (1928) P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17 at 29, 
" ~ e e  Makau Munia, 'The Aftican Human Rights Court: A Two Legged Stool?" (1999) 21 Humn 
Righrs Qrctrrrerly 342 at 348. 
 obligation^.^' However, it has not been shown that the Commission has not, in practice, given 
undue deference to these limiting clawback clauses in the Charter? Also, given the fact that 
ihese international instruments and noms were in existence pnor to the adoption of the 
Charter, it is arguable that the Afican states wanted a more restrictive enjoyrnent and 
exercise of these rights, hence the insertion of these clauses. The extent to which the 
Commission has made successhil use of the provisions of Article 60 and 61 remains 
questionable? 
In the face of al1 these, any little effect which the Commission may have on the 
protection of human rights in Africa is rendered illusory. Consequently, scholars have 
expressed their pessimism, indignation and frustration regarding the impotency and near 
irreievance of the African Commission. Edem Kojo, Secretary-Generd of the OAU at the 
time of the adoption of the Charter, believes that, compared with other regional human rights 
regimes in Europe and the Americas both of which were in existence before the African 
"See  Article 27 of Vienna Convention on the L i w  of Treaties.1969 [II55 U.N.T.S. 331; (1969) 8 
I.L.M. 6791; see also Alabama CIaims Arbitration (1872) Moore 1 International Arbitration 495; Greco- 
Bulgurian Commlrnities case, PCU, Series B, No. 17, at 32. This principle hm been reaffinned in the 
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement 
case, ICJ Reports, 1988, at 12, 34-35. See also Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 3"' edn. (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications Ltd., 1991) at 590; D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5" edn. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 7 1 .  
"~n Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Communication Nos. IO5i93, 
f 28/94, 130194 and 15296, reported in (2000) 7 IHRR 265, but for the lack of response of the defendant state, 
the Commission appeared willing to defer to the clawback clause in ,e t ide 6 of the Charter permitting 
deprivation of freedom "for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law." See particularly pans. 83-86. 
Under the peculiar circurnstances of the defendant, that law might be a decree hurrîedly prepared and back 
dated. 
53 For more critical views on the effect of cIawback clauses to the enforcement of the Charter see, 
Richard Gittlernan, "The Banjul Charter" supra, note 42 157-165. 
Charter, the protective mandate of the African Commission "appears very elernentary ."" 
Echoing a deeper frustration, Makau wa Mutua, sees the entire human rights system 
on the bais of which the Commission was established as "a facade, a yoke that African 
States have put around our necks.'"' He urges the collective action of African scholars and 
intellectuals in order to "cast it off and reconstruct a system that we can proudly proclaim as 
AIso commenting on the lacklustre performance of the Commission, a former Justice 
of the Nigerian Supreme Court has declared: 
... 1 am not unaware of the fact that the African Charter ... 
contains provisions to safeguard human rights. It sets up a 
Commission, enjoins it inter alia, to ensure the protection of 
human and peoples' rights. Its procedures were spelt out. For 
these see Articles 30-61. With the greatest respects to the 
founding fathers of the Charter and eminent personalities that 
serve in the Commission, what they have set up is, in 
uppropriate metaphor, a toothless bull-dog? 
SJ~dern Kojo. supm. note 32 ot 280. 
%vlnkau wa Mutua, 'The Ahican Hurnan Rights System in a Comparative Perspective" (1993) 3 
Review of the A fican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 5 at 1 1 (hereinafter "Afn'can Human Rights 
Systeni"]. 
5 7 ~ .  Nnaemcka-Agu. supra. note 3 [Emphûsis added]. Evelyn Ankumah. supra, note, 18 at 9 is 
optimistic and believes that in spite of the weaknesses of the Commission, it still has the potential to become 
an effective protector of human rights in Afnca However, by the mid- 1990s. it had become clear that the 
African system was a disappointment, if not an embarrassrnent for the continent. This was even clear to the 
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government that in 1994, it risked the Secretary General to convene a 
meeting of government experts to "ponder in conjunction with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights over the rneans to enhance the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights." See Report of Government EXperts Meeting, AHG/Res 
230(xxx), 30Lh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of He& of State and Govenunent, Tunis, Tunisia, June 1994, 
cited in Ibrahim Ali Baldwi El-Sheikh, "Dtlift Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: introductory Note" (1997) 9 RADIC. 
943. 
In spite of the foregoing deficiencies of the Charter and the Commission, it is 
noteworthy that the Charter's provisions on economic, social and cultural righd8 are 
themselves free from the clawback clauses. Besides, in m e n t  tirnes, the Commission appears 
to have been stirred from its slumber and has actually pronounced on the violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights provisions of the Afncon Charter. In Annette Pagnoulle 
(on behauof Abdoulaye Mazou) v. ~ameroon:~ the Commission found that the M u r e  of 
Cameroon to reinstate Mazou, a magistrate, who had been unlawfully detained and, 
thereafter removed from his former position constituted a violation of the right to work under 
equitnble and satisfactory conditions as stipulated by Article 15 of the Charter. 
Likewise, in Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. N i g e r i ~ , ~  and 
Interncztional Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro- Wiwa Jr. 
and Civil Libertics Organisation v. Nigeria:' the Commission held that denying a detainee 
access to doctors, and not giving him any rnedical help, even though his health was 
deteriorating, constitutes a violation of Article 16 of the African Charter which guaranteed 
the individual the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. 
Similady, in the Free Legal Assistance case:* the Commission held that, as a result 
' ' ~ e e  Articles f 4- 17. 
59~ommunication No. 39/90, reported in (1999) 6 IHRR 8 19. 
60 Communication Nos. 105193, 128194, 130194 and 152196, reported in (2000) 7 IHRR 265. 
6 1 Communication Nos. 137194, 154/96 and 161197, reported in (2000) 7 IHRR 274 (decided 31 
October 1998). 
' ' ~ r e e  Legal Assisronce Croup et al. v. Zaire. Communication No. 25/89, m e r s '  Comrninee for 
Humnn Rights W. Zaire, Communication No. 47/90, Les Temoins de Jehovah v. Zaire, Communication No. 
56/9 1, Union Inferafieaine des Droits de ['Homme v. Zaire, Communication No. 100193, reported in (1997) 
4 lHRR 89. 
of proven mismanagement of resources, the failure of govemment to provide basic services 
necessary for a minimum standard of health, such as safe drinking water and electricity and 
the storage of medicine amounted to a violation of Article 16 of the Charter.63 In addition, 
it held that the closure of universities for two years and the non-payment of teachers' salaries 
so as to prevent them from holding classes, constituted a violation of the right to education 
under Article 15 of the C h ~ r t e r . ~  
Notwithstanding these commendable and progressive decisions. the Commission has 
been treating economic, social and cultural rights rather dismissively.bs An in-depth inquiry 
reveals that the pronouncements prove to be merely incidental to the real issues under 
consideration in those cases which border on civil and political rights, and. therefore, cannot 
be said to represent an emerging pattern of greater attention to economic, social and cultural 
rights? Consequently, one would be justified to regard the above noted pronouncements 
''AS per Communication No. 10193. See (1997) 4 IHRR 89 at 93. 
@lbid. 
"ln 1988. a former Chairman of the Commission (Urnozurike) disclosed that it (the Commission) had 
decidcd to concentrate on civil and political rights. He claimed that the Commission would easily became 
overwhelmed with too many crises from many countries if it attempted to encompass economic, social and 
cultural rights within its imrnediate priorities. See U.O. Urnozurike, "The Protection of Human Rights Under 
thc African Charter on Wuman and Peoples' Rights" (1988) 1 African J. Intl. L 82. 
66 It might be argued in favour of the Commission that it cm only entertain cases brought before it, 
While the Commission has no mandate to be an errant knight in shining amour going about to fight the cause 
of haplcss and helpless Africans, one of its prim;iry mandates as provided for in Article 45(1)(a) is to ''undertake 
studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, organise seminars, 
symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned with 
human and peoples' rights ...." That it has not been receiving cases exclusively on the massive violations of 
cconomic, social and culturai rights in a c a  shows that it has not done enough to encourage or sensitize the 
people or even the NGOs within and outside Africa to lay such communications before it. Moreover, it is within 
its mandate to undertake studies and researches on the viotations of economic, socid and cultural rights, 
Therefore, it is the Commission's responsibiiity to ensure due respect and observance of al1 the rights provided 
for in the Charter without distinction. 
no more than flashes in the pan." 
Some scholars seem to be united in the view that the Commission's overall 
performance has been less than satisfactory." Andre Stemmet has attributed the 
Commission's inadequacies to its "lack of powers and the strong politicai influence wielded 
by the Assembly [of Heads of States] through the procedure of appointing members of the 
~ommission."~~ The Commission appears to have seen its principal objective as that of 
creating dialogue between parties, leading to the arnicable settlement of the dispute in 
que~tion.'~ For example, the Commission has been only too willing to conclude that amicable 
settlement has been reached in cases as serious as those that come before it, without even 
recording the tenns of such settlements or instituting any mechanisms to monitor the 
compliance of the state parties with the presumed ~ettlement.~' Additionally, as Odinkalu and 
Christensen observed, the Commission readily accommodates "the tardiness of [defendant] 
6 7 ~ h e  Commission's decisions have been criticized as "formulait" and neither referencing 
"'jurisprudence from nationai and international tribunals," nor firing the imagination. 'They are non-binding and 
zittract littlc, if any, attention from govemments and the human rights community." See Makau Mutua, "Two 
Legged Stoor' supra, note 50 at 348. 
" ~ e e  Obijiofor Aginam. supra, note 18 at 367-369; 0. Gye-Wado. supra, note 29 at 165: Wolfgang 
Benedek, supra, note 35 at 216; Edem Kojo. supra, note 32 at 280; C.M. Peter, supra, note 28 at 324; P. 
Amorth, 'The African Charter of Hurnan and Peoples' Rights: An Effective Wesipon for Human Rights?" (1992) 
4 African Jor<rnul of h l .  & Comparative Law 226 at 234-236. 
69~ndre  Stemmet. "A Future Afncan Court for Hurnan and Peoples' Rights and Domestic Human 
Rights N o m "  (1998) 23 SAYIL 233 at 235. 
7 0 ~ e e  Makau Munia, "Two Legged Stoof' supra. note 50 at 349. 
 or instance see Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria. Communication 67/91. where the 
Commission interpreted the failure of M e r  contact with the author of the communication as Iack of desire to 
pursue the communication, and relying on the information supplied by the defendant, inferred the likelihood 
that the complainant considers the case ssitisfactorily resolved. See also Henry Kalenga v. Zambia, 
Communication 11/88, where the Commission interpreted the author's silence as a wish to withdraw his 
communication, even though the complainant never expressed or communicated a wish to do so. See Chidi 
Anslem Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, supra, note 39 at 279. 
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states, in many cases resulting in considerable delay in the consideration of the 
communications [but] has failed to tolerate similar failings on the part of NGOs and authors 
of  communication^."^^ 
Furthemore, as pointed out earlier, the Commission does not make any binding 
resolutions. It only makes such recommendations as it deems usehil. Apart fiom the fact that 
there are no sanctions for failure to abide by its recommendations, the Commission has been 
unnecessarily apologetic (and not assertive and forceful) in its rec~mmendations.~~ Again, 
its power to criticize human rights violations is harnstrung by the requirement of 
confidentiality and delayed by the procedure of reporting first to the Assembly of Heads of 
State and ~overnrnents.~' 
The Commission's numerous shortcomings have been attributed to de ficiencies 
inherent in the A f h n  Charter and the Commission's rules of procedure. According to 
Odinkalu, "the very text of the Afrkan Charter itself, ... like the rules of procedure, is opaque 
73 In Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l'Homme, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits 
cie l'Homme, Rencontre Africain des Droits de l'Homme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de  L'Homme au 
Senqal and Association Malienne des Droits de l'Homme au Angola v. Angola, Communication No. 159/96, 
rcported in ( 1999) 6 IHRR 1 139, after finding that the defendant violated many provisions of the Charter by 
its illegril and mass expulsion of West African nationais without giving hem the opportunity CO pl& their cases 
bcfore the national courts, it failed to make any consequential orders with regard to damages suffered by the 
victims. It merely "urge[d] the Angoian governrnent and the cornplainants to draw al1 the legd consequences 
iuising from the present decision." Sirnilarly, in International Pen, Constinrtiunal Rights Project, Inrerighrs on 
belialf of Ken Saro- Wiwa Ir. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, supra, no te 54, it merely declared 
that "in ignoring its obligations to institute provisional measures, Nigeria has violated Article I", without issuing 
any necessary consequential directives. See ais0 Amnesry International v. Zambia, Communication No. 212t98, 
(of May 5 ,  1999), reported in (200) 7 IHRR 286. 
74 Urnozurike, supra, note 14 at 83. 
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and difficult to interpret."75 In the same vein, Benedek asselts that "the rules of procedure of 
the African Commission suffer from a number of inaccuracies and deficiencies which 
unnecessarily restrict the African Commission in the execution of its tasks?' 
Whatever may account for the Commission's ineffectiveness, it justified and 
sustained the demands for establishment of an African Human Rights Court as many 
believed (and still do believe) that the Commission is not suited to solve the multifarious ills 
afflicting the African Human Rights system. There were, therefore, calls for the creation of 
a court, in the hope that such a supra-national body would be better placed to transcend the 
crippling shortcomings of the Commission, The extent to which the African Human Rights 
Court, as established, will meet these expectations remains to be seen. 
5.3. RATIONALE FOR AN AFRICAN COURT OF ESUMAN RIGHTS 
The importance of effective judicial remedy in the enforcement of human rights 
cannot be overemphasized, especially, as noms prescribing state conduct are not meaningfùl 
unless they are anchored in hnctioning and effective institutions. In fact, a corpus of human 
rights noms, in itself, is not self-executoryn Just as in domestic legal systems, effective 
" ~ e e  Anslem Chidi Odinkalu. 'The Individuid Cornplainu Procedures of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Preliminary Assessment" (1998) 8 Transnational Law & Contemporary 
Problems 359 at 398 [hereinafter 'ïndividual Complaints Procedures"]. 
'%enedek Wolfgang, 'The 9th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights" 
( 199 1 ) 12 Human Rights L J. 2 15 at 2 16 [hereinafter "9th Session"]. See genedly, Anselm Chidi Odinkaiu, 
"Proposals for the Review of the Rules of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights" (1993) 15 
Hurnnn Rights Quarterly 53 3 [hereinafter "'Proposals for Reviav"] . 
'"~akau Mutua, "Two Legged StooP' supra, note 50 at 35 1.  
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obedience and cornpliance to d e s  depend very much on the effectivity of the enforcement 
machinery and apparatuses. The weaknesses of the Afncan Commission and the entire 
African human nghts system fostered the belief that a strong enforcement system was 
necessary if the human rights system in Africa were to be salvaged. The performance of other 
regional systems - European and Inter-American systerns - with judicial enforcement argued 
strongly in favour of the indispensability of a human rights court in Africa where flagrant 
violations of human rights have been (rightly) attributed to the absence of such an institution. 
The importance of a human rights court for the African human rights system had k e n  
recognized long before the adoption of the Charter. In one of the first moves to establish an 
African human nghts system, the International Commission of Jurists in its "Law of Lagos" 
called upon African governments to "study the possibility of adopting an African Convention 
of Human Rights in such a rnanner that the Conclusions of this Conference will be 
sr#egiicrrded by the creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that recourse thereto 
be made available for al1 persans...."'' This proposal was, however, rejected. The experts 
who drafted the Charter contended that they favoured negotiation, diplomatic and bilateral 
settlement of disputes in an amicable manner instead of adj~dication?~ 
It was further argued that since African culture does not allow, but seriously frowns 
upo n, 1 i tigation, a system w hich enthrones negotiation and conciliation rather than 
78~nternational Commission of Jurists. "Afncan Conference on the Rule of Law: A Report on the 
Proceedings of the Conference" 11 (1961) reprinted in M. Hamalengwa, er al., supra, note 1 at 37-38, 
[Emphsisis added]. 
7 9 ~ b o ~  Bondzie-Simpson, supra, note 3 at 662. See also P. Amoah, supra, note 68 at 237. 
adversarial open confrontation approach, would better serve the African p u r p o ~ e . ~ ~  This 
view h a  been articulately echoed by Keba M'Baye thus: 
According to African conception of Iaw, dlsputes are settled 
not by contentious procedures, but through reconciliation. 
Reconciliation generally takes place through discussions 
which end in consensus leaving neither winners nor losers. 
Trials are always carefully avoided. They create animosity. 
People go to court to dispute rather than to resolve a legal 
difficulty.8' 
Buttressing the point further, Umozurike has argued that: 
African traditions in dispute settlement draw no strict lines 
between legality and morality. It is not an all-for-one-and- 
nothing-for-thesther affair. An individual refusing to talk to 
members of his family causes concem, and that would be a 
good cause for a dispute as would be stealing. Both disputes 
are settled with a view to restoring g o d  relations between the 
parties .... The inclusion of a court systern will necessitate a 
demarcation between the two ...."82 
While it is correct to assert that traditional Africa favoured amicable settlement of 
disputes" and preferred negotiation and arbitration to litigation, it is not correct to assume 
that traditional the African system totally excluded litigation. As Van Velsen has pointed out, 
"aithough reconciliation was an important value, it was not an 'ultimate, almost mythical, 
%ee Evelyn Ankurnah. supra. note 18 at 9; Ebow Bondrie-Simpson, Ibid. 
X 1 International Commission of lurists, supra, note 78. See dso Arthur E. Anthony, supra, note 45 at 
5 19. 
82 Umozurike, "African Charfer" supra, note 14 at 104. 
 or an insight into the nature of judicial process in traditional Afnca see Kofi Quashigah. 
"Reflections on the Judicid Process in Traditional Afnca" (1989-1990) 4 Nig. J. R. 1. Dispute senlement in 
traditional Akita favoured a greater degree of reconciliation rather cigid adjudication. The judge in traditional 
Africa strove to let the law take iis normal course but in a mcuiner as not to estrange the parties. 
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value' of [traditionai] African courts to which legal noms were sacrificed.'" Consequently, 
"judgement by agreement" and "judgement by decree" were not mutually exclusive 
 alternative^.^^ It is therefore emneous and misleading, in the words of Quashigah, "to view 
the traditional process as wholly arbitrative in nature.*'86 
Assuming, but not conceding, that traditional Africa eschewed litigation, yet it is 
instructive to point out that the situation under which that system worked and the 
contemporary systems are no longer the sarne. A fortiori, these African states which rejected 
litigation and a court system at the regional level do have them in their domestic level. If the 
traditionai system is adequate and effective in contemporary African dispute resolution. why 
have these states not abolished the colonial legacy of a coun system? If the desire is to 
maintain a unity between legality and mordity, as it has been argued, then why do they not 
start at home by demolishing dl domestic court structures. Besides, it was not shown that 
settlernent of disputes through reconciliation ensures greater unity between legality and 
mordity than adjudication. 
Perhaps the most cogent reason for the rejection of a court system is "the fear that 
African states would not want to be subjected to the jurisdiction of a supra-national body."'' 
They were guarding their newly acquired sovereignty jealously and any idea of an 
"van Velsen, "Procedurai Informalit.. Reconciliation. and False Comparisons" in Max 
Gluckrnan,(ed.), Ideas and Procedures in Afican Cusromary LAW (Oxford: University Press, 1969) at 144. See 
also Max Gluchan, The Judiciai Process Amng the Barotse of Northem Rhodesia (Manchester: Livingstone 
Institute, 1955) at 55 [hereinafter "Judicial Process"]. 
Y 5 ~ a n  Velsen, Ibid. 
'6~of i  Quashigah. supra. note 83 at 4. The emphasis had been to snike a balance beween maintaining 
family and group cohesion by reconciliation and doing justice according to the laws of the land. 
"€velyn Ankurnah. supra, note 18 at 9. 
international judicial organ to arbitrate human rights questions was loathed and seen as 
derogating from the exercise of the full amplitude and plenitude of the powers of a sovereign 
However, when the ineffectiveness of the Commission in protecting and promoting 
human rights became so glaring, and in the face of widespread demands for a human rights 
court by different interest groups, it became clear to African States that a human rights court 
for Africa was an idea whose time could no longer be delayed. Nnaemeka-Agu, a retired 
Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court. ably articulated the imperativeness and urgency for 
a court thus: 
Upon a calm view of the factors militating against human 
rights proceedings in Nigeria, I am convinced there is only 
one viable solution. Nigeria, in fact the whole of Africa needs 
a supra-national court on human rights on the pattern of the 
European Court of Human Rights. a court whose decisions 
will be binding on various national courts on such matten. An 
efficient and functional African or regional court on human 
rights will eliminate political pressure and enforced delays in 
such proceedings. Judging from the content and extent of 
violation of international human rights noms in many parts 
of the African continent, the need for such a coun is not only 
imperative but also urgent..."" 
- - 
Y8 See B. Obinna Okere, supra, note 2 at 158. 
"P. Nnaemeka-Agu. supra. note 3. 
5.4. HISTORICAL GENESIS OF THE AFRICAN COURT 
The movement for the establishment of the African Court of Human Rights produced 
"two polar v i e w ~ . " ~  On one end are those who favoured the immediate creation of a court 
as the only way to put some teeth and bite into the African human rights system so as to 
effectively keep the States in check. To this group, "the deficiencies of the African system, 
both normative and institutional. are so crippling that only an effective human rights court 
can jump-start the process of its redemption?" 
On the other end are those who hold the bbgradualist" view. This group holds the view 
that the major problem facing African human rights is the lack of awareness by the general 
populace of its rights and the process of vindicating those r i g h t ~ . ~ ~  This view sees the 
establishment of a court as less urgent than the education of the public, and that even if 
established, the court might still be crippled by the same problems that have beset the 
Cornrnis~ion.~~ It was thus urged that the "potentialities of the Charter in its present form 
should first be maximized and fully tested"" instead of creating another institution that will 
end up not being effective." The adoption of the Protocol establishing the African Court of 
Human Rights is a clear indication that the views of the "gradualists" did not prevail. 
90 Makau Mutua, "Two Legged Stool," supra, note 50 at 35 1 .  
9 1 Ibid. Proponents of this view include, Mdcau wa Mutua, "Affican Human Rights System," supra, 
note 55; P. Nnaemeka-Agu, supra, note 3; Arthur E. Anthony, supra, note 45. 
92 M h u  Mutua, "A Two Legged Stooi", supra, note 50 at 35 1 .  The chief proponents of this view are 
Eveiyn Ankumah, supra, note 18 at 194-195; Umozurike, "Afican Charre?' supra, note 14 at 9 1-92, 104. 
93 Evelyn Ankumah, Ibid. 
94 Umozurike, "African Charter" supra, note 14 at 104. 
95~velyn Ankumah, supra, note 18 a< 9. 
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The history of the African Court of Human Eüghts can be traced to 1993, when the 
International Commission of Jurists, under the auspices of President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, 
then Chairman of OAU, convened a small group of African jurists and other human rights 
experts to brainstorm on the possibilities of establishing a court of human rights? This was 
followed by other meetings of experts and reinforced by strategic lobbying to convince 
African leaders to fully subscribe to the idea and to take the necessary steps towards its 
rea1 i ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  
However, the actual joumey for the establishment of an Afiican Court was started by 
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State in its 30h Ordinary Session in Tunis, Tunisia via 
Resolution No. 230/30 of June 1994 in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General 
of the OAU to "convene a meeting of Governments Experts to ponder, in conjunction with 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, over the means to enhance the 
efficiency of the African Commission in considering particularly the establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples' ~ights."'' 
Following this directive, the OAU Secretary-General convened, in collaboration with 
the government of the Republic of South A . c a ,  a meeting of Govemment Legal Experts in 
k ce M. Ad- Dieng. "Interface Between Globd and Regional Protection and Promotion o l  Human 
Rights: An African Perspective" in Yael Danieli et ai., The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights: Fifjl Yeats 
and Beyond (New York: Baywood Publishing Co.,1999) 27 1 at 282. 
98 AHGIRes 230 (XXX), 30h O r d i n q  Session of the Assembly of Heûds of State and Goverment, 
Tunis, Tunisia, June 1994. 
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Cape Town, South Africa fiom September 6 to 12,1995." The Govemmental Legal Experts 
meeting adopted a Dra3 Protocol to the Afncan Charter on Humun and Peoples' Rights, 
known as the Cape Town Draft.lm 
At its 64' Ordinary Session held in Yaounde', Cameroon, between July 1 and 5,  1996, 
the OAU Council of Ministers deferred the consideration of the Dr@ Protocol in order to 
allow more time for extra observations and comments from States. The Council decided, 
however, at its 65" Ordinary Session in Tripoli, Libya, between 24 and 28 February, 1997, 
that a second meeting of Govemmental Experts be convened in Apd 1997 to finalize the 
Draft Protucul so as to reflect the comments and observations made by OAU member 
states."' The meeting was convened from April I l  to 14, 1997 at Nouakchott, Mauritania, 
and it adopted an amended text of the Drafr, The Nouakchott Draft, which was to be 
presented to the Council of Ministers for consideration and adoption. 
At its 66"' Ordinary Session, the Council of Ministen directed that a third meeting of 
Govemment Legal Experts, which was enlarged to include diplomats, be convened to 
examine and finalize the Drafi Protocol to be submitted to the Conference of Ministers of 
JusticelAttomeys-General for consideration and adoption. The third meeting held in Addis- 
99 See, Ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh, supra, note 57 at 944; Gino 1. Naldi and K. Magiiveras, 'The 
Proposed African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Evaluation and Cornparison" (1996) 8 RADlC 944 
rit 945. The meeting conducted its discussions on the bais  of a draft prepared by the OAU General Secretariat 
in collaboration with the African Commission and the Intemationai Commission of Jurists, who dso met in 
Cape Town on September 4 and 5. 
l m ~ ~ ~ / L ~ ~ / E X P ~ ~ ~ C H P ~ (  1)  Rev. 1 ,  reprinted in ( 1996) 8 RADIC 493. 
101~l-~heikh,  sirpro, note 52 at 944. 
Ababa, Ethiopia adopted an arnended text, the Addis-Ababa Draft,lm which it recommended 
for adoption by the conference of the Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General. On 
December 12, 1997, the conference held in Addis-Ababa adopted the text with minor 
changes.'" 
The Drap Protocol was adopted by the Council of Ministers in Febmary 1998. The 
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Govemment gave its final blessing, by adopting the 
Proto~ol , '~  at its 36"' Session on June 9, 1998 at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The Protocol 
will come into force thirty days after fifteen instruments of ratification or accession have been 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the OAU.'*' However, for those States ratifying or 
acceding subsequently, it shall come into force, with regard to such state, on the date of the 
deposit of its instrument of ratification or acces~ion.'~~ 
The Protocol suggests in its Prearnble that the African Court of Human Rights, 
designed to cornplement the protective mandate of the Afncan Cornrni~sion,~~ will make the 
'"~ee. Report of Third Government Legal Expert Meetings, Addis-Ababa. Ethiopia. 
OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/RPT (IIi) Rev. 1, cited in El-Sheikh. Ibid. 
103~l -~he ikh .  Ibid. at 945. The te* of the Drufi Protocol adopted at this meeting is reproduced in 
( 1997) 9 RA DIC 953.. 
l M ~ ~ ~ / L ~ ~ ~ / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I U P ~ ~ ~  m. For the text of the Protocol, see ( 1999) 6 IHRR 89 1-897. 
1°%e Article 34(3). By the end of 1999. only Burkina Faso and Senegd had ratified the Prorocof. See 
Paul J .  Mrignarella, "Achieving H m  Rights in Africa: The Challenges for the New Millennium" (2000) 4(2) 
African S tudies Quarterly, online dittp~/web.zifricaufl.edu/asq/v4/~4 1 2 a 2 . h ~  (visited 12:37 PM, August 12, 
2000). Unless otherwise indicated, references to articles in this part refers to the Protocol, Ibid. 
'071n the 7" preambular pûragraph the Protocol recites the conviction of the OAU memben that "'the 
attainment of the objectives of the Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights requires the estabIishment 
of an African Court on Hurnan and Peoples' Rights to complement and reinforce the functionc of the Afiïcczn 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Article 2 of the Protocol reitentes that "the court shall ... 
complement the protective mandate of the Afiicun conunission on Hurnan and Peoples' Rights .,. (Emphasis 
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promotion of human nghts in Afica more effective. Although a significant development, it 
is doubtful whether the mere addition of a court is "likely by itself to address sufficiently the 
normative and structural weaknesses that have plagued the Afncan human rights system since 
its incepti~n."'~~ Analysis of the framework of the Court will reveal its structural strengths 
and weaknesses, and provide the basis for assessing the extent to which it will positively 
affect the status quo. 
5.5. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE COURT 
5 S. 1. Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Court can be broadly divided into three categories, namely, 
contentious, advisory and conciliatory jurisdiction~.'~~ The contentious jurisdiction of the 
Court extends to al1 cases and disputes subrnitted to it conceming the interpretation and 
application of the Africun Charter, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights 
instrument ratified by the States con~emed. '~~ 
It has been suggested that this provision extends the jurisdiction of the Court to, for 
example, the OAU Convention on Refugees, and the A f k a n  Charter on the Rights and 
ridded). 
10S~akau Mutua, "Two Lcgged Stoof", supra. note 50 at 343. 
Iogsee El-Sheikh, supra. note 57 at 946. 
' 'O~ee Article 3( 1). 
Welfare of the Child."' A close reading of the provision shows that it is wide enough to 
cover not only the suggested instruments but also d l  other relevant human rights instruments 
ratified by the OAU members, either at the regional level or at the international level. This 
seems an appropriate interpretation to be given to "...any other relevant human rights 
instrument rutified by the States concerneà" forming the concluding part of the Article 3(1). 
It is submitted that the provision covers al1 international human rights instruments so long 
as they have k e n  ratified by the states involved.'12 The Court is therefore urged to adopt this 
broad interpretation of its jurisdiction in order to give as much protection as possible to al1 
victims of human rights violations. "In order to entrench itself as a protector of international 
human rights," according to Mutua, "it is important that the Court's jurisdiction not be 
circumscribed or limited to cases and disputes arising out of the African Charter."'" 
Perhaps, reliance on relevant international human rights instruments ratified by States 
Parties io the Protucol will enable the Court to overcome obstacles posed by clawback 
clauses and other provisions of the Afncan Charter that may prove to be more limiting than 
those other binding international instruments. In this way, the Court rnay be able to stnke 
down clawback clauses that unduly restrict the scope of the rights stipulated in the Charter 
by relying on the International Bill or Rights to establish international standards and civilized 
I I I  See Gino J. Nddi & K. Magliberas, supra, note 99 at 947. 
I l 2  Naldi & MagIiveras, Ibid., suggest that this jurisdiction m y  extend to enable the Court to pronounce 
on regional human AFrican instruments such as the proposed South African DeveIopment Comrnunity (SADC) 
Human Rights Charter presently under considention. The present writer does not see why the jurisdiction of 
the Court should not extend to such sub-regional arrangements. This does not mean that the court should act 
in such a manner as to render these sub-regional arrangements redundant. It can at least assume appellate 
jurisdiction over them as a way of exercising al1 the plenary and pleninide of its powers. 
' I 3 ~ a k a u  Mutua, "Two Legged StwP', supra, note 50 at 354. 
siate practices against which no derogations are permitted. 
Where there is any dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter will 
be settled by the ~ o u r t . " ~  This challenge to the Court's jurisdiction may come by way of 
preliminary obje~tion"~ or anse in the course of considering the case on the merits. 
In addition to its contentious jurisdiction, an advisory jurisdiction is also conferred 
on the Court. At the request of a member state of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or 
any African organization recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any 
legal matter relating to the Afrcan Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, 
provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by 
the C~rnrnission."~ The Court is required to give rasons for its advisory opinions and every 
judge is entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting decision."' 
The proviso to Article 4(1) is far from clear. Under it, the Court is prevented from 
giving its advisory opinion on any subject matter if it is related to a matter k ing  examined 
by the Commission. It appears that this provision may preclude any reference from the 
Commission to the Court at the request of an individual or an NGO. But this might not be the 
case if the Commission is taken as an organ of the OAU, and the Commission itself is 
refemng the matter. Even if the Commission is not regarded as an organ of the OAU under 
' ''Article 3(2). 
' '%le  Protoc01 did not make any provision for preliminvy objection. but it is submitted that this does 
not preclude its use, given the fact that the issue of preliminary objection is procedural and cm be provided for 
by thc Court while drawing up its rutes which it has the power to do under Article 33. 
' 16~r t i c l e  4( 1 ). [Emphasis added]. 
Article 4(1), the Commission may still utilize its right of access under Article 5(a) to refer 
cases to the Court."8 This is more so since the Court is to "complement the protective 
mandatewH9 of the Commission. Moreover, at the time of reference to the Court. the matter 
is not, technically speaking. 'k ing  examined by the Commission" and therefore cannot come 
within the prohibitive reach of Article 4(1). 
In this regard, individuals and NGOs might have an indirect, probably delayed and 
more expensive, access to the Coun through the Commission. However, it appears that 
individuals or NGOs cannot do anything where the Commission rehises to refer the matter 
for the opinion of the Court. Article 4(1), therefore, appears unduly limiting, and perhaps 
intended to further stifle individual and NGO access. The fact that neither an individual nor 
NGO has direct access to the Court makes it more grave and ominous, especially as the 
jurisdiction of the Court in such cases is dependent on the consent of the affected (defendant) 
state. 
The Coun also has conciliatory junsdiction. To this end, the Court is enjoined to 
reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in accordance with the provisions 
of the African Charter.''' It is not clear how this will operate in actual practice. Perhaps. the 
1 LX Undcr Article 48 of the European Convention, the Ewopean Commission is one of those 
empowered ro bring cases before the European Court. The European Commission relies on Article 48 to refer 
matters to the Europem Court since the right to refer a case to the Court is also limited to the Commission and 
to concemed States. See Erik Friberg & Mark E. Villiger, 'The European Commission of Humm Rights" in R. 
St. J. Macdonald et al. (eds.), The Europeun Sysrem for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 605 at 614415. In fact, under Article 47 of the European Convention, the Court may 
not adjudicate on a case unless the case has first been processed by the Commission and did not result in a 
îiicndly settlement. See Paul Mahoney & Soren Prebensen, 'The European Court of Human Rights" in R St. 
J. Macdonald et al., Ibid, 621 at 624. 
' 19see Article 2. 
'%ee Article 9. 
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Court may, before entering into the merits of the case, initiate conciliatory moves. But. it is 
submitted that this should be with the consent of d l  the parties, as consent of al1 parties is a 
conditio sine qua non for any peaceful settlement. Without the consent of a Party, any 
purported amicable settlement would be nothing but an imposition. 
5.5.2. Right of Access 
The Protocol provides for two types of access: automatic and ~ptional.'~' The first 
type is automatic because it applies once a state has ratified or acceded to the   rot oc of.'^ 
The second type is optional in the sense that it depends on the discretion of the Court. and 
on the acceptance of the affected state, by a separate declaration, of the cornpetence of the 
Court to receive cases from NGOs and individua~s.'~ 
Article 3 1 )  provides an enumerated list of those entitled to automatic access to the 
Coun. They include, 
(a) the African Commission; 
(b) the S tate party which has lodged a cornpiaint to the Commission; 
(c)  the State party against which the cornplaint has been lodged at the Commission; 
(d) the State party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violations; and 
(e) African Intergovemmental Organizations. 




Also, by Article 5(2), when a State party has an interest in a case under consideration, it may 
submit a request to the Court to be pemùtted to join. It seerns that the Court has no discretion 
in the matter so long as the interest of the State party in the case is established to the 
satisfaction of the Court. The onus of establishing such an interest, however, ought to lie on 
the State party. 
With regard to the optional right of access, the Protocol provides that "the Court may 
entitle Non-Govemmental Organizations with observer status before the ~ommission, '~~ and 
individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34(6). Accordingly, 
Article 34(6) provides: "[ait the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State 
shall rnake a declmation accepting the cornpetence of the Court to receive cases under article 
5(3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 5(3) involving a 
state party which has not made such a declaration." In the light of this clear provision, Adma 
Dieng's euphoric assertion, without qualification, that "...Article 5 allows the Court to receive 
cases directly from NGOs and individual as well as State parties and African 
intergovemmental organi~ations"'~ is misconceived, or, at best, misleading. 
It has been observed that the condition subjecting NGOs and individuals' petitions 
to the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by the concerned state, was a compromise 
position which took into consideration the need to encourage African states to ratify the 
Protocol without necessarily accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain NGO and 
""~1-~heikh. Ibid. at 947 notes that some delegaiions wanted to confine the possibility of NGOs 
subrnitting cases to the Court to Afncan NGOs, but both the Experts' Meeting and the Conference of the 
Ministers of Justice rejected it and settled the article as  formulated. 
IEsee, M. Adama Dieng, supra, note 96 at 282. 
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individual petit ion^,"^ because as El-Sheikh has noted "[tlhe question of allowing NGOs and 
individuals to submit cases to the Court was one of the most complicated issues dunng the 
consideration of the Drufi Pr~tocol ."'~~ 
However, it has been forcefully and persuasively argued thai "[w]hile lirniting the 
access of NGOs and individuals to the Court may be necessary to get the states on board, it 
is nevertheless disappointing and a terrible blow to the standing of the Court in the eyes of 
most Africans. After dl, it is individuals and NGOs, and not the African Commission, 
regional intergovemmental organizations, or [Sltate [Plarties, who will be the primary 
beneficiaries and users of the Apart from blocking the real potential beneficiaries 
and users, this provision unduly limits the Court and may tender it virtually redundant. 
Perhaps, African states lost sight of the fact that the right of individual and NGO petition is 
in line with contemporary thought in this regard.'29 
It is arguable that the further restrictions on individuai and NGO access to the Court 
became necessary in view of the known tendency of the African Commission to dlow 
individuals who are not victims, and Ahican and non-Afncan NGOs to bnng petitions before 
"%ce Abdelsalm A. Mohamed. ''Individual and NGO Participation in Human Righb Litigation 
Before the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Lessons From the European and Inter-Arnerican 
Courts of Human Rights" (1999) 43 African Law Journal 201 at 203 (citations omitted). 
' 27~ l -~he ikh .  supra. noie 57 at 947. See dso, Andre Stemmet, supra. note 69 at 235. 
1 2 g ~ a k a u  Mutua, "Two Lcggcd Stooi". supra. note 50 at 355. 
'%r instance, Article 44 of the Europwn Convention has been amended by Protocol 9, which now 
extends to persons, NGOs and other groups the right to b h g  cases before the Court, 
it, so long as such petitions comply with Article 56 of the African Charter.'" Thus, Article 
34(6) of the Protocol is a veritable antidote to checkmate the gadfly NGOs who have been 
thoms in the flesh of many African States and governments. 
The Protocol equally erected another hurdle for NGO and individual access. This 
relates to the admissibility of cases brought by NGOs and individuals. When deciding on the 
admissibility of cases brought by NGOs and individuals under article 5(3), the Court shall 
take into account the provisions of article 56 of the Afrcan Charter which stipulates certain 
conditions or requirements that communications rnust meet before their submission to. and 
acceptance by, the Corn~nission.'~~ The implication of this may be that the Court will not heu 
petitions that do not meet these req~irernents.'~~ It is submitted that these restrictions are 
likely to undermine the effectiveness of the Court to a large extent. 
130 See for instance, Annene Pagnoutle (on behalfof Abdoulaye Mazou) v. Cameroon, Communication 
No. 39/90, (Aprii 1997) reported in (1999) 6 IHRR 819, which was submitted on behalF of the victim 
(Abdoulaye Mazou) by Annette Pagnuolie of Amnesty International. See also, Free Legal Assistance Group 
et cri. v. Zaire, Communication No. 25/89; Lawyers'Committee for Human Rights v. Zaire, Communication No. 
47/90; Les Temons de Jehovah v. Zaire, Communication No. 56/91; Union Interafrcaine des Droits de 
l'Homme v. Zaire, Communication No. 100/93, al1 reported in (1997) 4 IHRR 89. Communication 25/89 wcis 
filcd by the Free Legal Assistance Group, the Austrian Committee Against Torture, the Centre Haitien des 
Droits et Libertes, al1 members of the World Organization Against Torture. Communication 47/90 was filed 
hy  the Lwyers Committee for Human Rights New York. See also Commission Nationale des Droits de 
1 'Homme et des Libenes v. Chad, Communication No. 74/92, which was filed by La Commission Nationale 
des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertes de la Federation Nationale des Unions de Jeunes Avocats de France; 
Constirmional Rights Project and Civil Liberries Organisation v. Nigeria, Communication No. 1 O3A3, reported 
in (2000) 7 IHRR 259, filed by two Nigerian NGOs; Media Rights Agenda and Constitutionai Rights Project 
v. Nigeria. Communication Nos. 10993, 128/94, 130/94, and 152/96, reported in (2000) 7 IHRR 265, also filed 
by Nigerian NGOs. Almost d l  of these compiaints were brought by individuais or NGOs based within and 
outside ACrica, and who are not victims. It is doubtfiil whether any African state or govemment will consent to 
being dragged to the ACrican Court by an African NGO let done a non-African NGO which many African 
govemments consider as meddlesome interlopers- 
131Article 6. See supra at 2W203 for a discussion of these conditions under article 56 of the Afnean 
Charter. 
IJ2see Makau Mutua supra, note 50 at 355. 
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While there are many instances whereby the African Commission has allowed 
individuals and NGOs to submit to it written cornplaints against actions of States Parties that 
are in violation of the principles set forth in the Afrcan Charter, it should be noted that the 
African Court does not possess any powers to act in like manner without the prior consent 
of the state party concemed. This is because, while Article 56 of the Afncon Charter merely 
provides for conditions which non-state communications must meet in order to be admissible, 
Article 34(6) of the Protocol strips the Court of dl powers to entertain individual and NGO 
petitions. except when the state party against which the cornplaint is made has itself expressly 
consented to such a petition?' Consequently, the considerable latitude so far enjoyed by the 
African Commission in entertaining individual and NGO petitions is not available to the 
Coun. The full implication of this state of affain on the utility and usefulness of the Court 
would be better appreciated if viewed against the backdrop of the virtual absence of 
complaints by a state party against another state party before the African Commis~ion.'~ 
'33~t  is interesthg to note that the Governrnent Legal E ~ p e n s  Meeting on the Question of the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, held in Cape Town South Africa, in 
September 6-12, 1995, produced the Dr@ Protocol to the Afican Churter on Human and Peoples' Rights on 
the Establishment of an Afncan Court on Human and Peoples ' Rights, OAU/LEGIEXP/AFUHPR(I), reprinted 
in ( 1996) 8 R A D K  493, Article 6( 1 ) of which provides for an 'exceptional jurisdiction' under which "the Court 
may, on exceptional grounds, allow individu& non-govemrnentd organisations and groups to bring cases 
before the Court." According to Article 6(2) of this draft section, such non-state cornplaints need onIy comply 
with the conditions stipulated in Article 56 of the Afrcan Charter. This draft provision was, however, not 
included in the final Protocol. 
'%velyn Ankumah, supra, note 18 at 24 points out that ""[]O date, the Commission has not received 
communications submitted by a state against the other." 
5 S. 3. Composition 
Article 1 1 provides for the composition of the Court. It shall consist of eleven judges, 
nationals of member States of OAU, elected in an individual c a p a ~ i t y ' ~ ~  from among jurists 
of high moral character and of recognized practical, judicial or acadernic cornpetence and 
experience in the field of human and peoples' right~."~ Judges are elected for a six-year term 
and are subject to reelection once.'" No two judges shall be nationals of the sarne state." 
Al1 judges except the President shall perform their functions on a part-tirne basis. However, 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Govemment can change this arrangement at any time it 
deems appr~priate."~ It has been observed that this provision may not augur well for the 
integnty and independence of the Couda  
The independence of the judges is guaranteed in accordance with international law 
and they are to enjoy diplomatic imm~nities."~ A judge can only be removed or suspended 
from office if he or she cm no longer fulfill the conditions required to be a judge of the 
Court, a fact which is decided by the unanimous decision of the other judges of the court.'" 
"'~his has been interpreted to mean that they are not required to follow instructions frorn the sute of 
their nationality. See Naldi & Magliveras, supra, note 99 at 956. 
1 3 9 ~ e e  Article 15(4). 
"%akîu Mutua. supra. note 50 at 356. 
'"~ee  Article 17. 
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It is an improvement over the Afncnn Charter that the Protocol provides for gender 
representation in the composition of judges. Thus, article 14(1) provides that in the election 
of j udges, "the Assembl y shall ensure that there is adequate gender representation." l" 
However, since what constitutes 'adequate' gender representation is not defined, it therefore 
remains what the male dominated Assembly wants it to be. 
5.5.4. Enforcement Powers 
According to Article 27(l), where the Court finds that there has k e n  a violation, it 
may ''make appropriate orders to remedy the violation" and this includes "payment of fair 
compensation or reparati~n."'~ Both 'appropriate orders' and 'fair compensation' are not 
defined by the Protocol. This would seem to confer on the Court a wide margin of discretion, 
especially to make any orders it may consider necessary to remedy particular violations. In 
cases of extreme gravity and urgency, the Coun may, in order to avoid irreparable h m  to 
persons, adopt such provisional measures as it deems fit and neces~ary. '~~ Such provisional 
"'~nicle 14(3). There is no such provision in Ihe Afnean Charter regarding the Afiican Commission. 
This rittracted severe criticisms to the Commission. Until June 1993, shottly before its 14h Session, the 
composition of the Commission was al1 male. It was in 1993 that the first female Commissioner, Ms Vera 
Duartc Martins of Cape Verde was elected. In 1995, Ms. Julienne Ondtiel of Congo was also elected. 
Ankumah, slcpra, note 18 at 16-17 deplores this exclusion of those who constitute more than 50% of the 
population of Africa. It should be noted, however, that while article 14(3) of the Prorocal is an irnprovement 
on the African Charter with regard to gender representation, it falls short of enhroning gender equity. 
"Adequare gender representation" does not mean equal gender representation. Moreover, adequacy in this 
contcxt is what the Assembly deems it to be. it is worthy to note that the Assembly itself is composed 
exclusively of men. It is thcrefore doubtful if it will ensure equality in representivity. 
measures have been constnied to include injun~tions."~ 
The judgement of the Court, which should be delivered within ninety days after 
completion of deliberations and read in open court, is final and not subject to appeal. The 
Coun may, however, review its decision in the light of new evidence.'" After delivering its 
judgement, the Court notifies d l  the parties and transmits copies of the judgement to member 
States. The Council of Ministers, whose responsibility it is to monitor the execution of the 
judgement, is also n0tif5ed.l~~ 
The Court has no powers to execute its judgements. However, Article 30 contains an 
undenaking of States Parties to guarantee the execution of, and cornpliance with, the 
judgement of the Court in any case to which they are parties and within the time stipulated 
by the Coun. The Council of Ministers is saddled with the responsibility to monitor the 
execution of the Court's j~dgements. '~~ In its annual report to the Assembly of Heads of 
States the Court shall specify the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court's 
judgement.lS0 It has rightly k e n  pointed out that this provision is designed to be "a 'shaming' 
tactic that marks out the ~iolator."'~~ 
The effectivencss of this sharning tactic is questionable. Most African leaders seern 
1 4 6 ~ a k a u  Mutua, "Two Leggcd Stooi"'. supra, note 50 at 357. 
IJ7see Article 28. 
148 Sce generdly Article 29. 
149~rticle 29(2). 
L50~rticle 3 1. 
151~ak;iu Mutua, "Two k g g e d  Stoof*. supra, note 50 at 357. 
to have no shame. The brazen and callous manners with which they indulge in massive 
violations of human rights and the near total indifference and nonchalance with which they 
confront international condemnation. argue against such a tactic. It is noteworthy that the 
avalanche of international condemnation and criticism that followed the dubious trial of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, did not deter his subsequent unlawful and debauched execution in 1995 by the 
Nigerian govemment.ls2 Neither has it stopped the recent politically motivated occupation 
of fannlands in Zimbabwe widely believed to have been engineered by the govemment. This 
shows how ineffective the so-called shaming tactic can sometimes be. Shand Watson's well 
articulated view which eloquently elucidates this fact is worth quoting in extenso: 
It is unrealistic to expect that human rights implementation 
c m  be done by relying on the unilateral actions of the deviant 
govemments. They will not incur obligations voluntarily, nor 
will they comply unilaterally with the purported noms.... 
[Alny effective protection of human rights at the international 
level is inevitably dependent upon the availability of sanctions 
against deviant govemments .... Nonintrusive sanctions work 
where the govemment king criticized is sensitive about its 
international reputation and is prone to change its behaviour 
in response to criticism for noncompliance with international 
rules. This, however, is not likely to be the case when one is 
dealing with govemments engaged in substantial and flagrant 
violations of human rights. It is naive to think that criticism in 
the world press or in intemational organizations will affect 
those who are willing to kill large numbers of their fellow 
men, and who rose to power by means of violence and 
deceit . '53 
152 See genenlly, Omotoye Olorode, et al, (eds), Ken Saro- Wiwa and the Crises ofthe Nigeriun State 
(Lagos: Comrnittee for the Defence of Human Rights, 1998) 
'53~. Shand Watson. Thcory and Rcafity in the Intematiomf Prosection of Humn Rights (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999) at 49. He further notes that while non-intrusive sanctions such as 
diplornatic protest, public criticism, withdrawais of ambassadon, withholding of benefits etc are quite effective 
in maintaking cornpliance with rules which are well-established fa lata or niles which do not involve a high 
level of national interest, they cannot hope to provide sufficient motivation to change behaviour of govemments 
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The foregoing argument applies with equal force to the A f k  human rights system 
and argues against any enforcement of human rights that is solely based on a purported 
'shaming tactic.' African - and indeed most other world - leaders are known for their 
insensitivity and obduracy to international public opinion. Consequently, "the possibility of 
efficacious human rights noms king implemented [whether in Africa or elsewhere] by 
nonintrusive sanctions must be rejected. In order to induce states to comply with ... [human 
rights] noms ..., resort must be had to a regime of  sanction^..."'^ This stand may be 
pessimistic and cynical, but, as Mutua observed, "[tlhe modem African state, which in many 
respects is colonial to its core, has been such an egregious violator that skepticism about its 
ability to create [and comply with] an effective regional human rights system [devoid of 
i ntrusive sanctions] is appr~priate.""~ 
5.6. EFFECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION UNDER THE COURT 
5.6.1. Another Hope Betrayed? 
For those who had thought that the opportunity presented by the process of 
establishing a human rights court for Africa would be utilized by Afncan states to enthrone 
an effective human rights enforcement mechanism. the Protocol of the African Court of 
Hiimnn and Peoples' Rights as adopted has tumed out to be another hope betrayed. The first 
which are engaged in mass slaughter. See generally, Ibid chapter Ui (at 49-78) for an analysis of the value of 
coercion as a motivation to comply with human rights n o m .  
i 54 J. Shand Watson, Ibid. at 50. 
1 5 5 ~ a k a u  Mutua, "A Two Legged Stooi", supra, note 50 at 343. 
hope was betrayed in 1981 when, contrary to al1 expectations, the Afrcan Charter was 
adopted without providing for an adjudicatory body, notwithstanding the recommendations 
of the International Commission of Jurists as embodied in the "Law of Lagos."'56 
Limiting and making the right of access of NGOs and individuals dependent on the 
consent of the alleged state violator amounts to another painful betrayal of Africans in their 
greatest hour of need. The essence of a corpus of human rights noms should be to protect 
individuals (humans) from al1 sources of violations, and not to protect states.'" To expect 
that an Afncan state violator would readily give its consent to be sued in the Court for its 
hilure to fuIfill its economic, social and cultural rights obligations under the Charter is to 
expect the ideal which, as yet, has no precedence. 
It has been optimistically asserted that, even though individuals' and NGOs' access 
to the Court are dependent on the consent of the concemed states, such state consent would 
be a yardstick for measuring a state's willingness to protect human rights because, "states 
who are willing to gant the Court the competence to receive complaints from individuals and 
NGOs, would be providing an additional outlet for the protection of human r ight~ ."'~~  
Whiie sharing the (misconceived) optimism inherent in the above assertion, 
Abdelsahm Mohamed has noted that "the possibility exists that States may tend to use the 
IS6see supra. note 78 and accompanying texts. 
'57~alwu Mutua, "TM Legged StwP', supro. note 50 at 355 swtes ha: "[a] hurnan rights court is 
primarily a forum for protecting citizens against the smte and other state agencies." It is submitted chat while 
this staternent rernains tme of the current regime of international Iriw with regard to violators, international law, 
to be effective in the next c e n q  and beyond, shouid evoIve a system of accountability for violations of human 
rights that locates violations in dl actors regardless of whether they are States or non-state entities. The statist 
paradi-m of international Iaw is no longer in tune with current redities of hurnan rights violations. 
'58~l-~heikh. supra. note 57 at 95 1. 
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power granted thereunder to stifle, rather than encourage, the direct institution of actions by 
NGOs and individuals."'" It is, however, arguable that given the antecedents of these States, 
the likelihood of their using Article 34(6) to stifle individual and NGO petitions is more 
probable than possible. Human rights granted and recognized by international law k ing  the 
basic minimum standard, its observance and enforcement should not be seen as an added 
favour done by the state to its citizen. A court of human rights is, therefore, necessary 
primarily for the protection of individuals and not as a public relations stunt to the state. The 
denial of that basic right therefore arnounts to a huge betrayal of Africans and "a terrible blow 
to the standing and reputation of the Court .... 9 ,  160 
It is perhaps in recognition of this betrayal, and in reaction to it, that barely one year 
after the signing of the Protocol establishing the African Court of Human Rights, some sub- 
regional amngements are being made to establish human rights courts wherein the individual 
can have a direct access and right to sue hislher state. In a recently held meeting of Justice 
Ministers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a decision was 
taken to establish an ECOWAS Sub-regional Court where "citizens c m  sue their 
governments for perceived violations of (human) rights."16' The Court which will be a 
permanent coun will sit every working day. It is to be constituted of seven judges with not 
159~bdelsalam A. Mohamed. supra. note 126 at 203. 
'%&au Mutua. "Two k g g e d  StooP' supra. note 50 at 355. 
16'The Guardian Newspapers (Nigeria). Wednesday 27 October 1999. online at 
~http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/nn765419.h (Visited 525 PM, October 27, 1999). 
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more than one king norninated from one state.Iq This is a welcome development and is quite 
in line with the contemporary African drearn of human rights enforcement in Africa. 
5.6.2. Uncleared Minefields: Impediments to the Court's Effectiveness 
There are certain flaws inherent in the African human rights system that predate the 
establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. These were problems 
surrounding the Afrcan Charter and which greatly undermined its effectiveness and the 
viability of the entire African human rights system under the Commission. Consequently, it 
was argued that there is no sense in creating an institution which merely duplicates the 
weaknesses of the ~ o m m i s s i o n . ~ ~ ~  It was further argued that "[wlhat the OAU and the 
African regional system do not need is yet another remote and opaque bureaucracy that 
promises little and delivers nothing. If the Court is to be such a bureaucracy, then it would 
make more sense to expend additional resources and energy to address the problems of the 
African Commission ...."lbj 
It seems that the Court is not very much diffe~nt from the Commission and that those 
162 Ibid. States represented at the meeting include, Nigeria, The Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d' Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Maii, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Besides individuais suing their govemments 
for violations human of rîghts, the proposed court will have jurisdiction to adjudicatc inter-state hostilities and 
riny strite feeling aggrieved by the perceived il1 treatment from another may take recourse to the court for 
rcdrcss. It seems therefore that the jutisdiction of the court is not restricted to human rights vioIations. However, 
cases of state il1 treating another state m y  still corne within the ambit of human rights where, for instance, the 
cornplainant state is aggrieved by the treatment meted out to its nationds by the respondent state. 
1 6 3 ~ a k a u  Mutua, "Two Lcgged SfooP'supra, note 50 at 357. But see Anselm Chidi Oclinkalu. 
"Individuai Cornplaint Procedure" supra, note 75 at 400-401. 
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problerns which undermined the effectiveness of the Commission are still potenl and remain 
the greatest threats to the Court's effectiveness. The Afrcan Charter, which is the basic 
working instrument of the Court, has some extant active mines that still constitute a serious 
threat to the African Court. Apart from the clawback clauses, one normative land mine which 
is likely to impede the Court's effectiveness is the abstruseness of the economic, social and 
cultural rights provisions. These rights as contained in the Charter, are ill-defined and 
characterized by ~ncertainty.'~~ Faced with such vague provisions, it will be an uphill task for 
the Court to effectively enforce these rights, especially since the Court cannot ignore the 
express provisions of the Charter, which is its main source of  la^,'^^ for to do so would be 
ultra vires its powers and therefore a nullity. 
It is also worth noting that the Protocol did not effectively streamline the relationship 
between the Court and the Commission. In its Article 2, the Protocol states that the "Court 
shall ... complernent the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights ... conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
~ ights .  .?"' This complementary mle does not really make the Court separate and 
independent of the Commission and does not make for a clear demarcation of roles. Apart 
from foisting on the Court the image problems of the Commission, as some scholars have 
"'~ee infro. Chapter 6 For the discussion of the problern of the ambiguity of the Charter's provisions 
on economic, social and c u l t d  rights. 
16'see Article 7 which miikes the Charter the Court's main source of law. 
1 67 The Protocol in ttic last paragraph of its Premble also declares the conviction of the OAU member 
states that "the attainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' rights requires the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to complement and reinforce thefùnctions 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights." (Emphasis added). 
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feared,'68 it might lead to squabbles between the Court and the Commission as to which 
comes first in the hierarchy of precedence. Such a development is not unlikely, given that the 
Commission still retins its promotional as well as protective functions which the Court now 
complernents, a situation that rnight also lead to duplication of roles. 
Al1 these, coupled with the conditional access for individuals and NGOs as well as 
the lack of enforcement powers1" will in no small way impede the effectiveness of the 
African Court. They are al1 land mines laid in the two main operating instruments of the 
Court. (the Charter and the Protocol). They must first be identified and deactivated if the 
Court is to be an effective force in the protection of human rights in Africa, particularly. 
economic, social and cultural rights which, as is argued in the next chapter, constitute the 
fulcmm for a meaningful enjoyrnent of human rights in Africa. 
- - - - 
' " ~ e e  for instance, Makau Mutua, "A Two Lcgged StooP*, supra, note 50 at 360. 
169 See supra, at 230-233 for the discussion of the enforcement powers of the Court. 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AS THE CORNERSTONE OF 
THE AFlUCAN aUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
6.1. KNTRODUCTION 
In human nghts practice, but certainly not in discourse, the point that econornic, 
social and cultural rights are the only means of self-defence for the millions of the 
impoverished and marginalised groups al1 over the worldl is very often missed. Despite the 
international rhetoric on the equal relevance and indivisibility of al1 human rights, states 
have, in practice, paid less attention to the enforcementhmplementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights with its attendant impact on the quality of life and hurnan dignity of the 
citizenry.' African states, still living with the nightmares of slavery and colonial exploitation 
by the Europeans, have fared very well. and perhaps remain unsurpassed, in this reverie of 
rhetorical eloquence. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that African states ought to be at the vanguard of the 
' ~ e e  Rolf Kunnemann. "A Coherent Approach to H u m  Rights" (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 
323 rit 332. In his 1996 'Final Report' to the UN Commission on Hurnan Rights, Special Rapporteur Leandro 
Dcspouy cites the World Health Organization's characterization of 'extreme poverty' as 'the worid's most 
ruthless kilIer and the greatest cause of suffering on eartti.' He further notes: 'No other disaster compsired to 
the devastation of hunger which had caused more deaths in the past two years than were killed in the two World 
Wars together.' See UN Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Sociai Council, The Realization of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Find Report of the Speciai Rapporteur, EKN. 4/ Sub. U1996/13. Also, 
on July 1 1,2000. in his opening speech at the just conchded HIV-AIDS Conference in Durban, South a c a ,  
the South Afncan President, Thabo Mbeki, indicted poverty as a causal factor in the ravaging AIDS epidemic 
across the African Continent. 
' ~ e e  Nom Chomsky. 'The United States and the Challenge of Relativity" in Tony Evans (ed.). Hurnan 
RigCrts Fifi Years on: A Reappraiml (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 24 at 32-35. See also, 
Scott Leckie 'The UN Cornmittee on Economic, Socid and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: 
Towards an Appropriate Approach (1989) 1 1 Hrrman Rights Quarterly 522 at 525-526. 
enforcement of these rights in view of the deplorable socioeconornic conditions of life in 
Afnca. Accordingly, African states ought not to emulate the indusûialised states of the North 
who can afford the luxury of astounding rhetonc in the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights. Regrettably, African states have so far M e d  to match their words with 
appropriate actions.' Even where the leaders seem very active in affirming the satisfaction 
of economic, social and cultural rights as a precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, 
most of them have done so with the diabolical intention of using it as a ploy to suppress civil 
and political rights." 
In view of the indivisibility of human rights and the exacerbation of civil and political 
strife owing to worsening social and economic conditions of existence: it is more or less a 
fait accompli that the existing scant regard for, or lack of interest in. the enforcement of 
econornic, social and cultural rights in effect means that no aspect of human rights will be 
3 This may be attributed in part to the widespread and prevailing unwillingness of the international 
community to match its high-minded rhetoric with commensurate actions. In fact, notwithstanding al1 
prctcnsions to the contrary, there is evidence to support active undermining of the efforts of the developing 
countries to rcalize econornic, social and cultural rights by the developed countries, See, El Hadji Guisse, 
(Spccial Rapporteur), The Realbtion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Final Report on the Question 
of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Hurnan Rights Violations, E 1 CN.4 1 Sub.2 1 1997 1 8,27 June 1997, online 
3t ~http://www.derecho~.org/nizkor/irnpu/gui~se.htmI> (Visited 42.5 PM, January 3 1,2000), at pan. 16. 
kcpressive regimes in f i c a  have often claimed that they cannot allow basic civil and political rights 
in  thcir various states as long as there are prevailing economic hardships and the population is underfed and 
economically underdeveloped. While it is tme that economic development might lead CO the improvernent of 
thc civil and political rights as a result of improvement in the quality of life of the people, it cannot be shown 
h a t  the curtailment of the civil and political righis of the people cm, in any way, contribute to the irnprovement 
of thcir socioeconornic rights and developrnent. Its only contribution is the preservation of the repressive 
rcgimes in question. See Peter R. Baehr, "Concem for Development Aid and Fundamental Hurnan Rights: The 
Dilemma as Faced by the Netherlands" (1982) 4 Humcm Rights Quarterly 39 at 43-44. See also, Rhoda 
Howard, 'The Full-BelIy Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Politicai Rights? 
Evidence from Sub-Sahm AfiicaV* ( 1983) 5 Humn Rights Quarterly 467 at 468-478; Rhoda Howard, ''The 
Dilernma of Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa" (1980) 35 International Journal 724 at 725. 
' ~ e e  J. OIoka-Onyango, "Beyond ihe Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Smiggle for Econornic and Social 
Rights in Africa" (1995) 26 Cal@rnia Wment IntL L 3. I at 2. 
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realized in Africa Such a state of affairs, even if largely unintended, is brought about by the 
apparent neglect of a substantial part of an indivisible whole. Only a change of attitude and 
reiocation of emphasis, from neglect and discriminatory enforcement to respect and equal 
(balanced) enforcement, can lead to a meaninghil and desired result. 
To this end, the present chapter emphasizes the imperative of a holistic and non- 
discriminatory enforcernent of al1 human rights in Africa. While linking the failure of M c a n  
govemments to meet the socioeconomic rights of the citizens to the rampant cases of civil 
and political strife and crises of statdgovemmental legitimacy in Africa, it is contended that 
the ability of a govemment to guarantee and protect the economic, social and cultural nghts 
of the people, more than any other thing, determines the legitimacy of a govemment in 
con temporary Africa. 
Whereas many scholars and commentators have fingered underdeveloprnent and 
acute economic crises of African states as being responsible for their inability to enthrone 
enforceable economic, socid and cultural rights; it is argued here that these rights create 
development and are inextricable therefrom. Therefore, any quest for meaningîul 
development ought to be predicated on the effective protection, enforcement and realization 
of these economic, social and cultural nghts. Though not unmindhl of the economic realities 
of many African states, it is argued that such realities are relevant only to the degree to which 
these rights are enjoyed in those states and does not justify outright non-enforcement. 
Some factors militating against the realization of these rights are highlighted and 
6 See R. M. D'sa, ''The Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Problems and Prospects for 
Regional Action" (1987) 10 Australian Yeurbook of Intl. L t O1 at 1 14. 
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discussed. In strategizing the way forward, alternative enforcement approaches that will 
ensure a non-discriminatory and more effective enforcement of economic, social and cultural 
rights are discussed as a possible way out for ending the marginalization of these rights. It 
is concluded that without equal protection and enforcement of economic, social and cultural 
rights the drearn of effective protection and enjoyment of civil and political rights in Africa 
will continue to remain a nightmare. 
6.2. THE MPERATIVE OF A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT 
*'Perils to the part imperil the who~e. '~  
In spite of the ideological differences that led to the adoption of two international 
covenants with its attendant implications on the economic, social and cultural rights, the 
convergence of opinions, as expressed in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, recognizes the 
fu til i ty (to the advancement of humanity) inherent in entrenching the most impressive so- 
called civil and politicai rights without the corresponding econornic, social and cultural rights 
in a situation of want, destitution and misery. Long before Vienna, the üDHR had set the 
parameten for evaluating the legitimacy of govemmental actions by codifymg the hopes of 
the oppressed, and by supplying authoritative language to the semantics and rhetoric of their 
claims.qhe "Never Again" declaration after World War II encapsulates the resolve of 
' ~ b o w  Bondie-Simpson. "A Critique of the Africm Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (1988) 
3 1 Howard Law Jo~intal643 at 660. 
' ~ e e  Jose A. Lindgren Alves, 'The Dedaration of Hum;ui Rights in Pomwdernity" (2000) 22 H w ~ n  
Rights Qitarterly 478. 
humanity to banish human rnisery in al1 its ramifications, whether arising fiom physical 
abuse, (which, as a matter of practical reality, has socioeconomic dimensions), or €rom want. 
Therefore, if the essence of govemment is for the overall welfare and security of al1 
citizens, (and not for the protection of the privileged class), such govemmental imperatives 
cannot be said to be met only when the state assumes some definite enforceable obligations 
not to violate the civil and political rights of the citizens. Such an 'ostrichian' posture 
camouflages the various fonns of state abuse, against which the citizen must be protected, 
the apogee of which is the neglect of its citizens? This trite fact is not Iost even to those who 
were, and still are, opposed to encompassing economic, social and cultural rights within the 
framework of enforceable human rights. Thus, notwithstanding the staunch opposition of the 
Western states to encompass economic, social and cultural rights within the ambit of 
enforceable human rights, the de facto cornmitments of these states to a welfare ethos, apart 
from assuring a high degree of cornpliance to protecting the rights of their citizens,1° shows 
a recognition of the abject futility of purporting to protect the citizens from only civil and 
political abuses, while ignoring a more consuming and dehurnanising abuse." 
The realities of modem governance show that govemments are not passive 
9 In Larmi Kant v Union of lndia (19871 1 SCC 67, the Indian Supreme Court held that the right of 
children to Iife rind livelihood included the right to be protected by the state against emotionai and material 
ncglect. 
'Osce Richard Falk, 'The Challenge of Genocide and Genocidai Politics in an Era of Globaiisation" 
in Tim Dunne & Nicholas Wheeler, (eds.) Human Rights in Global Politics, (Cambridge: University Press, 
1999). 177 at 190 [hereinaîler "Challenge of Genocide"]. See also, Jack Donnelly, " H u m  Rights, Democncy 
rind Development" (1999) H u m n  Rights Quanerly 608 at 629-630. 
"11 should, however. be pointed out that the de facto cornmitment to welfarist ethos has become a 
victim of globdisation even in rich societies where the dismantiing of the institution of the welfare state is seen 
ris a necessary step for the efficacy of state management, thus transforming sociai exclusion and human misery 
into a new economic ideohgy. See Jose A. Lindgren Alves, supra, note 8 at 485. 
spectators, but active participants, in events that fundamentally impact on the ability of the 
people to lead a meaningful and dignified life.I2 Govemance ceases to be meaningful and 
relevant if the majority of the people are put in a situation where they cannot appreciate the 
value of life, let alone enjoy its benefits, and where they lack the appropriate mechanisms to 
compel a change. Under conditions where human survival needs are frequently not met, as 
in Africa, protection of human nghts ought to be more preoccupied with preventing 
govemmental abuse inherent in the mindless neglect of citizens." 
One important point often overlooked in contemporary human rights discourse and 
practice is that the greatest benefit of guaranteeing enforceable nghts is the assurance it gives 
to people that there are extant effective mechanisms to adjudicate any violations, or 
threatened violations of their tights. As events in most parts of Africa have shown, the 
absence of such mechanisms generally give the impression that resort to extra-legal 
(unconstitutional) means, such as armed rebellion, is the only effective way to improve one's 
condition or challenge govemmental abuse and neglect.I4 Events in most African countries 
'%ce Abubakar Momoh & Said Adejumobi, The Nigelion Military and the Crisis of Democratic 
Transition: A Stud'y in the Monopoly of Power (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organisation, 1999) at 21 1 (questioning 
the bais, rationale and justification for the existence of the state and its control over national weaith, and its 
overall responsibility where it fails to live up to its health, educational, employrnent and other social obligations 
to the people). 
'"ee Carol M. Tucker, "Regionai Human Rights in Europe and Afnca: A Cornparison" (1983) 10 
Syracuse J.  Intl. L & Cornm. 135 at 162. 
" ~ h i s  assertion holds m e  for d l  rights. Genenlly people have the tendency to develop means of 
cxpressing their gievances. Where they are denied an organised avenue, such as the courts or other mbunals, 
thcy invariably resort to extra-legal means. EssentidIy the gist of h u m  rights has dways revolved around 
maintaining a balance between the Haves and the Have-nots. Even the so-called civil and political rights, as a 
pseudonym for Western Liberaiism, emerged in different forrns, as Richard Falk points out, "as a centrist 
compromise that offered enough to those currently disadvantaged to discourage recourse to revolution while 
providing essential stability for existing social and econornic hierarchies." See Richard Falk, "Challenge of 
Genocide" supra, note 10 at 180. It seems that the denial of socioeconomic rights in Ahica have assurned 
revolutionary proportions '&in to the pre-revolution denial of civil and political rights in Europe, thereby 
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passing through one fom of conflict or the other tend to suggest that people are not fighting 
themselves, but are fighting poverty and govemmental criminal inaction in the face of utter 
destitution.15 This is due to many years of impoverishing neglect and owing to the absence 
of other viable ways of compelling a meaningfbl change. Since govemments are increasingly 
expected to meet the basic needs of their citizens, there is a growing tendency to demand 
results in militant terms, particularly, in the absence of a proper forum to compel 
governmental action! For as Callisto Madavo, World Bank Vice President for the African 
region. has pointedly observed: 
Africa's wars are not driven just by ethnic 
differences. As elsewhen, they reflect 
poverty, lack of jobs and education. rich 
naturd resources ihat tempt and sustain rebels, 
and [ineffective and insensitive] politicai 
systems .... r i  i7 
Even though the enthronement of an effective means of redress for the violation of 
al1 rights, whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural in nature, would not 
have prevented some inevitable conflicts, it is arguable that most of these conflicts are 
triggered and 1 or sustained by elements who fan the embers of the peoples' abject conditions 
justifying similar empowerment. 
"~otable examples in this regard are ihc intemecine htricidal conflicts involving different 
communities in Nigeria: Niger Delta and Ife-Modekeke conflicts, to mention onfy a few. Other examples are 
the Liberian, Sierra Leonean conflicts as well as the unending conflicts in Somalia. 
16 See Richard Falk, "Responding to Severe Violations" in Jorge 1. Dominguez, et al., Enhancing 
Global Human Rights (New York: McGraw-Hi11 Book Co., t 979), 205 at 226 [hereindter "Severe Viohtions'l. 
' 7 ~ e e  Callisto Madavo "Stand Back and Take a More Positive Look at Africa*' International Herald 
Tribune (Paris), Tuesday, June 6,2000, online at <http~/~~~. ihtcomlIEETKODAY~ledmadavo.html> 
(Accessed 2: 15 PM, June 6,2000). 
and depnvations.18 Apparently, a causal link exists between these conflicts. which are a 
people's violent resistance to their deplorable socioeconornic conditions,Ig and legal 
deprivations of perceived modes of effecting a change. Accordingly, it has been observed 
that: 
... the gap between what a people expect as king just and fair 
and what they aciually have can heighten a sense of unfair 
treatment and so develop a sense of deprivation .... Feelings of 
deprivation ... provide fertile grounds for mobilizing 
opposition and the affected group with the real potential for 
collective violence and social instability. Economic, social 
and political institutions that are perceived to have failed to 
address the conditions producing deprivation become victims 
of vicious campaigns that can lead to [violence] .... [Tlhe fear 
of unemployment and the strain of reduced economic security 
in people's private lives can [and do] create tremendous 
anxiety and agitation. Psychologicaily, reactions to 
unemployrnent, especially when it is rising, and its attendant 
strain of reduced economic security may create feu, 
frustration and agression .... Conceivably. the fear of social 
instability may increase the potential for violence.20 
The foregoing underscores the fundûmental link between protection of human rights 
of the people and stability, which in tum underlies the necessity of guaranteeing the 
protective enforcement of al1 human rights without exception. Since the different rights are 
interconnected and operate in support of each other, it goes without saying that the Full 
18see Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.), Comprehcnding and Marrering Afrcan Conflicts: The Search for 
Snstainable Peace & Good Goventance, (London: Zed Books, 1999) at 330-331. See genenlly, United 
Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on: The Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Afnca," reprinted in (1998) 10 RADIC 549 at 549-553. 
19see. Will H. Moore. et al.. "Land Reform, Political Violence and Economic Inequality-Political 
Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Andysis" (1996) 21 Intl. Interactions 335; Mato Ellina & WiII H. Moore, 
"Discrimination and Political Violence: A Cross-National Study With Two Time Periods" (1990) 43 W. Pol. 
Qitarterly 267 at 268-27 1. 
10 Al-Hassan Conteh, et al., "Liberia" in Adebayo Adedeji, supra, note 18, 104 at 1 18-1 19. 
realization of one set remains dependent on the nalization of the ~ther .~ '  In a state of 
instability resulting from the denial of basic economic, social and cultural rights, it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, to meaningfully redise civil and political rights, and vice versasu 
formidable 
Apart from instability resulting from socioeconornically induced civil strife, the non 
realisation of economic, social and cultural nghts remains an insurnountable obstacle to the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights. People can only truly be free from abuse and 
exploitation when they have what it takes to assert their nghts and free thernselves from the 
shackles of exploitive and oppressive d e .  Where, as in Africa, the vast majority are 
illiterate, ignorant and reeling under the heavy and crushing heels of poverty, they lack the 
requisite means and awareness to assert any rights, let alone enjoy them. Umozurike puts 
this point in perspective: 
A great impediment to the attainment of civil and political 
rights is constituted by illiteracy, ignorance and poverty. To 
the many rural dwellers in any African state, and indeed to the 
" ~ e e  Pierre De Vos, "Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and Economic 
Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution" (1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 7 1. The writer also notes that "[starving 
people may find it difficult to exercise their freedom of speech while a restriction of freedom of speech may 
makc it diîficult for individuals to enforce their right of access to housing." 
" ~ e e  Copenhagen Dechration on Social Dcvelupnent and Programme of Action of the Worùi S u m i t  
for Social Development, adopted March 12, 1995, UN Doc. AlCONF.16619 (1995), also available ar 
cgop h e r : / / g o p h e r . u n d p . o r g : 7 0 / 0 0 / u n c o n f s /  (Visited 18: 18 PM, June 6, 2000). 
paragraph 5 of which States: 
We share the conviction ihat social development and social justice are indispensable for the 
richievernent and maintenance of pexe and security within and among nations. in nini, socid 
development and socid justice cannot be attiiined in the absence of peace and security or in 
the absence of respect for al1 human rights and fundamentai freedorns. 
See also, Wesley T. Milner, Steven C. Poe & David Leblang, "Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and 
Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of the Empirical Landscape" ( 1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 403 at 4 13 
(undctscoring the inextricable Iink between abuses of personai integrity inhercnt in not k ing  free from wants 
and violations of politicai liberties). 
urban poor, the lack of awareness or means make it 
impossible for hem to assert their rights. They are very much 
at the mercy of their r ~ l e r s . ~ ~  
Iiiasmuch as rnaintaining an unflagging enforcement of civil and political rights is 
desirable, economic, social and cultural rights should also be given the same kind of 
committed and unrelenting enforcement? Where such a cornmitment is lacking. it deepens 
the feeling of collective injustice in society, especially by the majority, the more vulnerable 
members of the society, who are denied a recognised and accepted forum for the recognition 
and redressing of  injustice^.^' In addition, it makes a mockery of the so-called autonomy of 
the individual which is the linchpin of civil and political rights, for certain socioeconornic 
conditions must exist for there to be personal autonomy? That they can be likened to a 
Siamese twin is well illustrated by Raz, as follows: 
A person whose every major decision was coerced, extracted 
from him by threats to his life or that of children. has not led 
an autonomous life. Similar considerations apply to a penon 
who has spent the whole of his life fighting starvation and 
disease, and has no opportunity to accomplish anything other 
2 3 ~ .  Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Hunurn and Peopless' Rights (The Hague: Martinus 
Nij hoff, 1997) at 4 1. 
2 J Selby convincingly argues that "human rights do not stop at counting political prisoners any more 
than they stop at counting the unemployed. Human rights are about human needs - needs that extend from 
proper numtion, clothing, shelter, health c m  and education to participating in decisions that fiame our lives." 
See D. Selby, Human Rights (1987) at 77, quoted in R R. Akankwasa, "Human Rights Education and the Quest 
for Development: The Case of Ugandan Schools" (1999) 5 East Afican J. Peace & Human Rights 105 at 108. 
' I ~ h e  discovery of injustice as such depends upon the feeling that one has rights which are not being 
rcspected. See Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1988) 38 
Hastings L 1. 805 at 833. The feeling of injustice is heightrned when those who are making excuses of lack 
of resourccs for non-recognition of the people's rights to adequate nutrition, housing health, and education, as 
critical components of social existence are unabashedly flaunting the wealth amassed from their concerted 
fleccing of the people. 
%ee Daniel Wmer ,  "An Ethics of Human Righis: Two Interrelated Misunderstandings" (1996) 
Denver J.  lntl. L & Policy 395 at 4 1 1. 
than to stay dive ...." 
According to Raz, autonomy "affects wide-ranging aspects of social practices and 
institutions .... Almost d l  major social decisions and many of the considerations both for and 
against each one of them [whether civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural 
rights] bear on the possibility of personal autonomy, either instrumentally or inherentl~."~' 
The dangers of a selective and balkanised. as opposed to a holistic and unified, 
recognition of human dignity have not ken  lost on African states, although this remains 
large1 y a seductive international hetoric unmatched with domestic action. At least, the 
A frican Charter remains the testament of the collective recognition of the indivisibility of 
human rights and dignity. It would therefore seem that African states fully appreciate the 
necessity of a holistic approach to enforcement justified by their own circumstances. While 
this must be pursued at the international and regional levels, as the A f h n  Charter seeks :O 
do. the essential point of active enforcernent must be at the domestic level where the 
mechanism of enforcement will be within the easy reach of aggrieved citizens and, thus, be 
widely uti~ized.'~ Moreover, international protection or enforcement mechanisms are 
designed to be complementary in relation to domestic protection of human rights? And as 
27 Joseph Raz, "Rights-Based MoraIities" in Jeremy WaIdron, (ed.), Theories of Rights (1984), 182 
at 192, cited in Daniel Warner, Ibid. 
19 See Roman Wieniszewski, "National hplementation of Human Rights" in Man Rosas & Jan 
Hclgesen (eds. ), Hurnan Rights in a Chunging Easr- West Perspective (London: Pinter PubIishers, 1 !NO), 264 
at 279-284 (discussing the importance of  judicial remedy in national implementation of human rights). 
30 See Atlan Rosas & Martin Schenin, b'Implementation Mechanisms and Remedies" in Asbjom Eide, 
Catarina b u s e  & AiIan Rosas, (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rightx A Tentbook (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1995), 355 at 379. 
Theo van Boven pointedly observed. international procedures, 
can never be considered as substitutes for 
national mechanisms and national measures 
with the aim to give effect to human rights 
standards. Human rights have to be 
implemented first and foremost at national 
ievels." 
In effect, anything falling short of a holistic enforcement of human nghts at the 
domestic level not only rnakes nonsense of al1 the international and regional pretensions of 
African states, but also ridicules the A f M  Charter's recognition that "the satisfaction of 
economic, social and cultural nghts is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights."" Much more, a bifurcated enforcement cannot be said to be in keeping with the 
virtues of Africa's historical tradition and the values of African civilization which is one of 
the fou nding philosophies of the Charter." As demonstrated in Chapter Three, traditional 
Africa thrived on the holistic approach. Since African states subscribed to a Charter that took 
into consideration the importance traditionally attached to these rights, they ought to be 
estopped from merely paying lip service to it. 
Rather than the existing dichotomous approach to enforcement which marginalizes 
economic, social and cultural rights, action should be taken across the board to ensure a 
minimum level of enjoyment of al1 human righis. As argued in the next section, the excuse 
3 '~heo  van Boven. 'The intemtiond Sys~em of Human Righa: An Overview*' in Manual on Human 
Righis Reporting, UN Doc. HR/PUB/91/1, at 10. See also, Claude E. Welch, ''The Afncan Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment" (1992) 14 Humun Rights Quanerly 43 at 
57-58. 
" ~ e e  para. 8 of the Reamble to the Afncan Charter. (Emphasis added]. 
3 3 ~ e e  para 5 of the Preamble to ihe Afneon Charter. 
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of impossibility of performance owing to underdevelopment often put forward by African 
leaders and some scholars," plausible as it may seem, is palpably meretricious and does not 
represent the whole truth. It is too often an exaggerated rationalization for lack of political 
will used to whitewash the senseless fleecing of the masses, and the continued elevation of 
luxuty over necessity. 
6.3. RIGHTS AND THE ARGUMENT OF DEVELOPMENT 
The varying definitions of development can be likened to the proverbial definition 
of an elephant by three blindfolded men. For the first who touched the ear, an elephant is like 
the plantain leaves. The second who touched the legs said that an elephant is like a tree. For 
the third one who touched the tmnk, an elephant is like a wall. Accordingly, development is 
a concept with varying definitions that are as diverse and numerous as there are authors. 
However, development is often equated with econornic development which has corne to be 
"usually measured as economic growth, improved balance of payrnent, and other 
macroeconomic  variable^."^^ The level of development in a given country is detemined by 
the country's gross national product (GNP) pet- ~ a p i t a ~ ~  nd it is generally believed that 
-34 See for instance U. Oji Umozurike, "Afican Charter" supra, note 23 at 11 1. 
3 S ~ i ~ n  1. Skogly, 'Jtrucniral Adjustment and Development: Human Rights - An Agenda for Change" 
( 1993 1 15 Human Rights Quarterly 75 1 at 752-753 [hereinafter "Adjusrment and Devefopmenr"]. 
'%ut Wesley T. Milner, Steven C. Poe & David Leblang, have insightfuily observed that: 
Economic development, which is typicdly measured with per capita gross national product 
(GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP) variables, is not usually considered synonymous 
with the fulfilment of basic needs, in large part because the predominant measures fail to take 
into account economic inequality among citizens, For example, a country could have a high 
overail per capita GDP but also have a majority of the population living in poverty. 
economic development guarantees automatic improvement in other sectors and segments of 
society." 
Thus, the point is often made in many quarters, with unwavering tenacity, that 
development of Afnca, and indeed of ail Third World countries, is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, precondition for the effective enjoyment of human rights, particularly, economic, 
social and cultural rights? Accordingly, it has been contended that African states cannot 
reasonabl y be expected to ful fil1 their economic, social and cul turai obligations under the 
African Charter given their implacable socioeconomic woes resulting frorn 
underdevelopment and "existing patterns of international t~ade ."~~ Also, it has been variously 
propoundcd that since African states are too poor to redise economic. social and cultural 
rights40 it suffices if these rights are treated as directive principles of state policy? 
Therefore, these conventional rneasures can sometimes rnask the true underlying extent of 
development. 
Sce Wesley T. Milner, Steven C. Poe & David Leblang, supra, note 22at 4 1 1. See also, Danilo Turk, 
"Devclopment and Human Rights" in Louis Hcnkin & John L. Hargrove, Human Rights: An Agenda for the 
Nrxr Cenruy (Washington, DC: ASIL, 1994), 167 at 17 1- 173. 
'7~anilo Turk, Ibid. at 753. 
38 See Peter R. Baehr, supra, note 4 at 43. Sometimes, this point assumes an ambivalent dimension with 
reprcssive regimes arguing that they cannot allow basic civil and political rights in their states as long as the 
population is underfed and economicdly underdeveloped. The implication is that the satisfaction of civil and 
political rights is dso dependent on economic dcvelopment. 
3 9 ~ c e  R.M .  D'Sa supra. note 6 at 1 14 (citations omitted). 
''~inasse Halie, "Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the Implication of Econornic Priority" 
( i 986) 19 Vanderbilt J. Transni, L 299 at 300-30 1 [hereinafter "Economic Priority"]. See dso, U. O. 
Umozurike, 'The Significance of the Afncan Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" in Awa U. Kaiu & Yemi 
Osinbajo, Perspectives on Human Rights (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice, 1992)' 44 at 48 [hereinafier 
"Significance of the Charter"]; Richard Gittleman, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A 
Legal Analysis" (1982) 22 Virginia J.  Intl. L 667 at 687. 
4 1 U. Oji Umozurike, bbAfican Charter" supra, note 23 at I 10. Indeed there are a number of studies 
demonstnting that economic development has a strong, positive impact on the fulfilment of basic human needs. 
in his study, Han Park came to the conclusion that econornic development is the strongest predictor of improved 
Undoubtedly, African states, if not the poorest, are arnong the mosi impoverished 
states of the world. Therefore, an argument that they are too poor to redise, the often 
ascribed resource intensive, economic, social and cultural rights cannot but be weighty. 
Ho wever, these arguments, w hich have more or less become seductive rhetoric, often 
proceed from two interrelated but erroneous and misleading suppositions. Fint, that 
economic, social and cultural rights are resource intensive and require govemment's direct 
intervention, unlike civil and political rights which do not involve government expenditure, 
but merel y entai1 govemment's forbearance from interfering with the rights of the people?2 
Secondly, that African states' underdevelopment is enough excuse to justify nonenforcement 
of economic, social and cultural rights but not civil and political rights. 
A close scmtiny of the relevant provisions of the A f k a n  Charter shows that it does 
not impose separate or more onerous obligations on States Parties with respect to economic. 
social and cultural rights." The Charter's provisions on these rights are mild and modest. For 
instance, on the right to education, it merely provides that "every individual shall have the 
right to education" but does not make it free. This does not impose a more resource intensive 
obligation than the right to a fair trial. Then why should a state be justified in not providing 
necessary medicai or educational facilities, but not be exculpated for failing to provide the 
basic needs achievement. See Han S. Park, ''Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies" (1987) 9 Human 
Riglirs Qttarterly 405 at 4 10-4 13. See dso, Bruce E. Moon & William i. Dixon, "Politics, the Stace, and Basic 
Human Needs: A Cross National Study" (1985) 29 American Journal of Political Science 661 at 689-690. 
While economic development may lx the strongest evidence to predict the meeting of basic needs, it does not 
follow that basic needs are actually met, as events in the industridised countries have shown. 
4' The resource intensive argument has been laid to rest in Chapter Two above. 
43 See Carlson Anyangwe, "Obligations of States Parties to the Aftlcan Charter on H u m  and Peoples' 
Rights" ( 1998) 10 RADlC 625 at 642. 
necessary machinery for law enforcement, fair trial or dignified prison conditions? 
One possible explanation appears to be that provision of equitable and satisfactory 
conditions of work, education and health are not regarded as important as law enforcement 
or fair trial even though the absence of the former exacerbate those conditions that 
necessitate the latter. Again, the people's poverty and lack of political consciousness. owing 
to the neglect of these rights, provide the enabling environment for the perpetuation of the 
mling elites in power? How else can one exercise the nght to participate freely in the 
govemment of one's country if one has been disenfranchised by lack of education and thus 
cannot engage in meaninghil political discourse, or make informed choices. No doubt being 
kept perpetudilly poor and uneducated benefits the mling class who look upon such people's 
right to vote as a commodity to be sold and bought for the ruler's personal use? 
If the reason for marginalizing the enforcement of these economic, social and 
cultural rights is for lack of development, how does the state intend to develop where the 
overwhelming majority of the citizens are illiterate. According to a report to üNESCO, 
%tienne Mureinik, "Beyond A Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution" (1992) 8 
SAJHR 464 at 466, forcefully argues: "If judges decide that no one may be imprisoned without fair trial, and 
thcrefore that an order of habeas corpus must issue to secure the release of a person detained without trial, the 
effect is to burden the state with massive costs of a criminal justice system. The effect is to require the state to 
pny the salaries of judges, prosecutors rurd their administrative staff* to build court houses, and much more.... 
It is true, of course, that judicid protection of personal liberty does not expressly compel the state to commit 
resources. The state could instead refrain from prosecuting; but that would put it in breach of its duty to 
mointain peaceful order. and in a prospering society this option is in any event not a reai possibility. Judicial 
protcction of personal liberty consequently makes considerable expenditure inevitabIe." 
"sec Richard Falk, "Severe Violations" supra, note 16 a< 226 (notes that the "[tlhe deprivation of 
basic human needs can be used to achieve explicit political ends..."). This may involve denying such 'benefits' 
(as these rights are often regarded) to an eth~caily distinct antagonistic component of the population as a rneans 
of sctiling ethnic conflicts or to punish a segment of the population for supporting the opposition. 
56 See Carol M. Tucker, supra, note 13 at 164 (noting that "[ajdvantaged classes will be threatened by 
ri human needs approach thrit transfers income to benefit the poor"). 
"[n]ational development hinges on the ability of working populations to handle complex 
technologies, and to demonstrate inventiveness and adaptability, qualities that depend to a 
great extent on the level of initial educa t i~n . '~~  Accordingly, the realisation of the right to 
education and other econornic, social and cultural rigbts are, as Booysen rightly observed, 
"a prerequisite for the creation of ~ea l th '*~  and developrnent and, as such, there cannot be 
any development without tt1em.4~ 
It is arguable that even if underdevelopment is such a potent factor, it merely goes to 
the extent to which these rights can be realised and does not justify outright non- 
enforcement. Accordingly, underdevelopment does not justify enforcement in parts, which 
itself is &in to a (wo)man with more than one child consistently feeding one to the neglect 
of others simply because there is not enough money to feed them d l .  In any case, it is on 
record that many African states are richly endowed to such an extent that, under appropriate 
conditions, including the effective enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights, they 
would have attained a level where basic survival needs would have been met.' However, due 
" ~ e e  Odile Jacob (ed.), Report to UNESCO of the international Commission on Educationfor the 
Twen y-firsr Century: The Treasure Within, Paris, 1996, c hap. 8, ci ted in Mustapha Me hedi, The Realization 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Realization of the Right to Education, Including Education in 
Hliman Rights, Working Paper Presentcd to the 50th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, EICN.41Sub.U l998/lO, June 3, 1998, available online at 
ch ttp:l/www.unhchr.ch/HuridocdalHur ... 8e7c 18036642005 le693?0pendocumeni>. (Visited 5:48 PM, 
Fc bruary 1 ,2000). 
'"~ercules Booysen. 'The Dilemma of International Economic Human Rights: Their Improvement 
Through an Integnted System Approach" (1998) 23 SAYIL 93 at 109. 
49 This much is implied in ArticIe l(1) of the üN General Assembly Declararion of the Right to 
Development, G.A. Ra. 411133, 1986, UN. Doc. A/41/925 & Corr- 1. See Sigrun 1. Skogly, "Adjusment and 
Developmenr" srrpra, note 35 at 753-754. 
'%sic survivd needs in this context "reref to the minimum requirements for susrairing physical life. 
that is, health, food, housing, ciothing, work hteracy." See Richard Falk, "Severe Violations" supra, note 16 
at 225. See also, Frances Stewart, "Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights and the Right to Development" 
to maladministration and the mind boggling kleptomania of miers, past and present, most of 
whom are (were) ticher than their states:' available resources were squandered. Thus, "it is 
not scarci ty (of resources) which is the fint problem, but maldistributi~n"~~ or inequitable 
"allocation of resources ... [and] provision of government controlled benefit~."'~ Also, as 
Richard Falk forcefully argues, 
[available] research strongly suggests that 
most Third World countries possess the 
resources to eliminate poverty and satisfy 
basic human needs if their policy makers were 
so in~l ined .~  
Thus. the often asserted 'underdevelopment' of African states is not "something akin 
( 1989) 1 I Httman Rights Quarterly 347 at 35 1. 
5 1 J. O loh  Onyango, supra, note at 5,  notes that the late Mobutu Sese Sekou wa Zabanga of a r e  "is 
bclicvcd to have amiissed a fortune far in excess of his country's national debt, bankmpting what must have be 
one of the richest nations on the continent." Zaire has a naturai endowment of a host of minerd riches which 
includes extensive rcserves of gold, dimond, copper, cobalt and zinc. See infia, note 76 for Afe BabaloIa's 
cxposurc of how some Nigerians stashed over 30 billion US dollars in European and North American banks. 
52 Carol M. Tucker, supra, note 13 at 162. 
5 3 Minasse Halie, "Human Rights, Stability, and Development in Africa: Some Observations on 
Concept and Redity" (1984) 24 Virginia J. IntL f. 575 rit 578 [hereinafter, "Stability and Development"]. See 
also Yoko Yokota, "Reflections on the Future of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in Burns H. Weston 
8: Stephen P. Marks (eds.), The Future of lntemational Human Rights (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
1999), 20 1 at 2 15 (noting the widesptead tendency of many govemments in developing counuies not to mdce 
the best availabte use of resources for irnproving the general living conditions of their people. "Instead, they 
misrillocate their scarce resources for unnecessary large military expenditure and personai luxury, and waste 
them also by compt practices"). 
' " ~ e e  Richard Falk. "Severe Violations" supra. note 15 at 225. See also. Graciela Chichilnisky, 
"Development, Basic Needs, and the International Order" (1977) 3 1 Journal of International Affairs 275. See 
also, UNDP, Human Development Report, 1990 at 4,  (states that: "Developing countries are not too poor to 
pay for human development and take care of economic growth." It listed some frictors inhibiting the realisation 
of human development in developing countries. These include, disoriented nationai priorities, debt repayments, 
very high rnilitary spending, inefficient parastatals, unnecessary government controls). 
to an original state of nat~re."~' The prevailing state of affairs in many African States today 
is not actually the result of lack of the wherewithal to satisS, the socioeconomic rights of the 
people, at least to a minimum level of human dignity. It is the direct consequence of an active 
process of irnp~verishment~~ In some cases, even international loans and gants, purportedly 
secured or given to provide certain essential facilities, have ended up lining private pockets 
and being used to secure safe nests for the advantaged class, or king spent to protect the 
advantaged class from the ire of the dispossessed, al1 in the name of 'sec~rity.'~' It is, 
theref'ore, totally unacceptable and unconscionable for those who squandered, and are still 
squandenng, developmental opportunities, or indeed any other penon on their behalf, to rely 
on the same conditions they themselves created as a legitimate ground for marginalizing the 
enforcement of the economic, social and cultural nghts of the people. 
It is debatable that some governments' wrong policies, maldistribution and 
inequitable allocation of resources might have ken prevented or reconsidered had there been 
an effective regime of legally enforceable or justiciable economic, social and cultural rights. 
In such a situation, it might have provided an oppominity for accountability to cal1 on the 
govemment of the day to justify, for instance, the anti-people conditionalities, andor account 
for the expenditure of, contemplated or secured, international loans, whose burden 
5s George Kent, "Globdization and Food Security in Afiica" online at 
c h  ttp://www2.hawaii.edu/-kent/globaFeb99.htmb. (Visited 4:24 PM, Jrinuary 3 1,2000) [hereinafter "Food 
Secu riry"]. 
S7~ignin 1. Skogly. "Adjustment und Development* supra, note 35 at 753, relying on UNDP Humon 
Development Report of 1990, at 128- t 60, writes: 'It is now wideiy recognised that assistance towards economic 
developrnent does noc necessarily improve income distribution, education, or heaith for the majority of people 
in Africa." 
significantly erodes the socioeconomic rights of the poor and the most vulnerable gro~p.~* 
The certainty of such justification is likely to improve accountability and the quality of 
govemance, for as Mureinik convincingly argues. 
a decision maker who is aware in advance of the risk of king 
required to justify a decision will aiways consider it more 
closely than if there were no risk. A decision maker dive to 
that risk is under pressure consciously to consider and meet 
al1 the objections, consciously to consider and thoughdully to 
discard ail the alternatives, to the decision contemplated. And 
if in court the government could not offer a plausible 
justification for the programme that it had chosen ... then the 
programme would have to be stnick dowd9 
While not denying the reality of the severe economic downtum presently facing many 
African States, which substantiaily impair their financial ability, it is submitted that it is not 
really this somewhat grim econornic situation, but the lack of political will and the diabolical 
machinations of the ruling elite, that have so far prevented them from according econornic, 
social and cultural rights the same level of emphasis in enforcement accorded to civil and 
political rights. For one thing, the introduction of a regime of judicially enforceable 
economic, social and cultural rights in South Africa has not, so far, paralysed the state 
developmentally or conduced to a new state of underdevelopment. In addition, it has neither 
been shown that South Afnca is overwhelmingly endowed with resources over and above 
every other African state, nor that the comrnitted enforcement of economic, social and 
%ee Jmes P. Grant, The State of d e  World's Children (Oxford: Oxford University Ress, 1989) at 
16-17. 
5 9 ~ e e  Etienne Mureinik, supra. note 44 at 471-472. According to Mureinik, the court might intervene 
to quash ri legislation which created fourteen departrnents of health if it found muItiple bureaucraties to be a 
senseless squandering of precious resources. The court might ais0 intervene "if the annual Budget appropriated 
funds to build a replica of St. Peter's, [as Houphet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire did]. or pertiaps a nuclear submarine 
bcfore the rights of education promked by the constitution had been delivered." Ibid. at 472. 
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cultural rights, equai to that accorded to civil and political rights, will have any more direct 
bearing on the developmental conditions of the States than the financial implications of 
enforcing civil and political rights. 
It is noteworthy that underdevelopment has not been shown to have affected "services 
which are of concem to the richer and more powerful sections of the society, such as... 
prestige development projects,'" nor induced any cuis in rnilitary spending? This rnakes it 
al1 the more difficult to sustain the lack of development argument as the major reason for the 
prevailing marginalization of the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. Also, 
it makes underdevelopment a smokescreen for what apparently is the lack of political will 
as well as deliberate political action and I or inaction. 
Therefore, instead of the preoccupation with lack of development, as if it were an 
original state of nature, attention ought to be shifted to the likely dominant factors working 
against the realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights in Africa, some of which 
are apparently nt the root of the so-called underdevelopment. Some of those factors will be 
addressed in the next section. 
'O~ee James P. Grant, supra. note 58 at 16. In 1995 the Ugandan govemment evicted 'peasants' fiom 
their land in Kibaie district, western Uganda to d e  way for national parks, thus dispossessing them of their 
mcans of livelihood and security to rn&e way for prestige projects. See A. A, Akankwasa, supra, note 24 at 
113. 
6 1 See UNDP, Human Development Report, 1990 at 4 (noting that "more than half the spending [in 
national budgets of developing countries] is swallowed by the rnilitary, among other vices). 
6.4. FACTORS MILïïATING AGAINST REALJZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CHARTER 
The problems bedevilling the non-realization and enforcement of the economic, 
social and cultural rights under the African Charter can be attributed to the ungodly alliance 
of some internal and external factors. The internal factors stem from the normative flaws of 
the Charter itself and the nature of its provisions on economic, social and cultural rights, 
while the extemai ones are a potpoum of forces plaguing the ability of States Parties to fulfil 
their economic, social and cultural obligations under the Charter. No attempt is made here 
to address al1 the multifarious impediments to the effective enforcement of the economic, 
social and cultural rights in Africa. As a result, the factors discussed do not, by any means. 
represent the totality of al! the problerns, some of which predate the modem African states. 
The havoc wreaked by the Cold w d 2  and the horrendous impact of historical factors such 
l is slavery and coloniali~rn~~ are consciously Ieft out, but by no means ignored. 
"FO~ a brief insight into the atrocities of the Cold War. see Adebayo Adedeji, "Comprehending 
African ConfZicrs" in Adebayo Adedeji, supra, note 18 at 9-10. 
6 + h e  mgic  impact of slavery and colonialism in the economic exploitation and culturai bastydization 
of Africa has ken sufficiently set out elsewhere. See genenlly, Waiter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 198 1); Walter Rodney, Wesr Africa and the Atlantic Slave 
Trade (Nairobi: Historical Association of Tanzania, 1967); Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story 
of Greed Tewor, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co,, 1998); Philip Curtin, Deuth 
by Migrarion: Errrope's Encounter with the Tropical World in the 19th Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
6.4.1. Content and Scope of Charter Provisions on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
The normative inadequacies of the Afncan Charter, particularly the provisions on 
economic, social and cuiturai rights have commanded the attention of many s c h ~ l a r s . ~  In 
addition to al1 other short comings hampering the effective realization of the Charter's 
provisions, a serious obstacle to the enforcement of the Charter provisions on economic, 
social and cultural rights is their lack of conceptual clarity and the ensuing uncertainties. 
However, the problem of abstruseness and definitional imprecision of economic, social and 
cultural rights is not iirnited to the Afrcun Charter but constitutes a noted problem inherent 
in economic, social and cultural rights in general. Scholars have largely acknowledged that 
the ill-defined nature and the vagueness of the content of economic, social and cultural rights 
impact negatively on their enforcement? 
Yozo Yokota has attributed the lack of clarity both in content and scope to the 
relative novelty of these rights and their not king 'well and clearly defined? Gomez writes 
that "the noms [of economic, social and cultural rights] are vague because they have not yet 
%e genedly Mdcua Mutua, 'The Ahican Human Rights Court: A Two Legged Stool?" (1999) 2 1 
Hltman Righrs Quurterly 342-363 [hereinafter "Two Legged Stoor']; M h u  wa Mutua, 'The African Human 
Rights S ystern in a Comparative Perspective" ( 1993) 3 Review of Afican Comm. On Human & Peoples ' Rights 
5 [hereinafter "Comparative Perspective"]; J. Oloka Onyango, supra, no te 5 at 5 1 ; R. M. D'Sa, supra, note 6 
ar 1 t 3- 1 15; George William Mugwanya, "RdiWng Universai Hurnan Rights N o m  Through Regional Human 
Rights Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System" ( 1999) 10 lndiana Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 35-50; 
Wolfgring Benedek, 'The African Charter and Commission on Hurnan and Peoples' Rights: How to Make it 
More Effective" ( 1993) 1 1 Netherlandr Quarterly Human Righrs 25. 
%ke Brigit C. A. Toebes, The Right io Health as a Human Right in International Luw (Antwerpen: 
Intersentia - Hart, 1999) at 6 [hereinafter, "Right to Health"]; Yoko Yokota, supra, note 53 at 205-206; Brigit 
Toebes, 'Towards an improved Understanding of the International Human Right to Health" (1999) 21 Hunzun 
Righrs Q~tarrerly 66 Irit 66 1-662 [hereinafter, b'Internatio~l Human Right to Health"]; Mario Gomez, "Socid 
Economic Rights and Human Rights Commission" (1995) 17 Human Rights Quanerly 155 at 161. 
66 Yozo Yokota, Ibid at 205. 
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received sufficient attention from the courts, academics, or other agencies. Civil and political 
rights, on the other hand, have long been the subject of interpretation by courts and other 
agencies, and have thus acquired a degree of ~larity.''~' 
The AfBcan Charter's provision on the right to healtl~'~ is a typical example of such 
rights characterised by conceptual ambiguity. It entitles individuals to enjoy "the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health" without prescribing the standard of health, 
whether national or internationa1.6~ or defining what is meant by "the best attainable state." 
Given this uncertainty, the Charter's right to health might mean everything or nothing to 
States Parties depending on how a state constmes it. Often, it is constmed to impose an 
unlimited obligation to provide free medical services. This appears to have informed the 
thinking that "[elven if govemments employ the services of modem doctors as well as 
traditional healers [sic], it seems quite impossible for them to carry out the ~bligation."~~ In 
ail fairness, it is by no means clear to what individuals are entitled under the Charter's right 
to health provisions. Likewise, the extent of obligation thereby imposed on States is far from 
clear. A comparable measure of uncertainty also surrounds the right to health provisions of 
67 Mario Gomez, supra, note 65 at 161. Gomez may be speaking the minds of no few scholm when 
hc Eisserts that "[gliving clarity and content to these standards [rights] is one of the major tasks awaiting the 
human rights movement." 
6X Article 16 of the Charter. It provides: (1)  Every individual shdl have the right to enjoy the best 
attainiiblc state of physical and mental hedth; (2) State Parties to the present Charter shdl take necessary 
mesures to protect the health of their people and ensure that they receive medicd attention when they are sick 
6 9 ~ .  O. Urnozurike, 'Yignif;cance of the Afrcan Charter." supra, note 40 at 48. 
the International Covenanr on Economic Social and Cultural Rights? 
Similar uncertainties and arnbiguities surround other economic, social and cultural 
rights provisions of the Charter. The right to work under Article 15 merely entitles 
individuals to "work under equitable and satisfactory conditions" and to "receive equal pay 
for equal work." Such a shallow provision is more or less meaningless to the teeming 
numbers of unemployed. States Parties are neither obligated to provide, nor obliged to 
initiate measures to create jobs. Wone still, Article 15 does not confer any right on the 
unemployed person. 
By the same token, the right to education under Article 17(1) is shrouded in laconic 
ambiguity. It tersely provides: "Every individual shall have the right to education." In the 
context of economic, social and cultural right, such a provision is not only ambiguous for 
what i t  says, but also vague for what it omits to state. The obligation imposed on a State 
Party is as indeterminate as it is nebulous. Arnidst these uncertainties in content and scope 
of the economic social and cultural rights, it is hardly surprising that economic, social and 
cultural rights are still thriving in non-enforcement. 
6.4.2. Lack of Effective Enforcement and Promotion 
Another impediment to the enforcement and realization of the economic, social and 
cultural rights under the Charter is the absence of effective and efficient promotion and 
- -  
" ~ o r  an auernpt to dari@ the scope and implications of the right to health under the International 
Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultuml Rights, see Brigit Toebes,"intematioriol Human Righr IO Henlth," 
supra, note 65. 
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enforcement. Notwithstanding the apparent lack of clarity and vagueness of the Charter's 
provisions on economic, social and cultural rights, it is arguable that sufficient attention fiom 
the relevant enforcement and promotion agency would have clarified some of the apparent 
ambiguities by shedding some light on the dark faces of the Charter's provisions. However, 
this appears not to have been the case. Not only has the Commission not so much bothered 
with the promotion and enforcement of economic, social and cultural nghts, its decisions and 
pronouncements. where they do exist, remain "fomulaic" and "do not reference 
jurisprudence from national and international tribunals, nor do they fire the imagination."" 
Both in promotion and enforcement, the Commission seems to have concentrated al1 
its efforts exclusively on the civil and politicai rights to the detriment of economic, social and 
pol itical rights. The shortcomings of the Commission, and the likel y ineffectiveness of the 
African Court on Human Rights, in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights 
have been already k e n  fully addressed in the preceding chapters. Suffice it to say that with 
an effective and efficient promotion, individuals would have been more alert to their rights 
and the extent of the protection accorded by the Charter. In the absence of such promotion, 
individuals are less likely to assert their rights, even if couched in superlative clarity. 
6.4.3. Inept and Corrupt Leadership 
One of the greatest problems hampering the enforcement and realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights in Africa is inept, often compt and exploitative, leadership. It is 
7 2 ~ a k a u  Mutua. T w o  Legged Stooi" supra. note 64 at 348. 
a truism that the destiny of a people is collectively tied to the quality of their leadership. 
While colonidism left Africa and Africans socioeconomically bruised (and bruising), the 
ineptitude and corruption of past and present govemment leaders and officials of some 
African states have left the people socioeconomically battered and monally wounded. Thus, 
George Kent's observation that "[s]ome (African states) have had compt govemments that 
exploited their own people as viciously as any outsiders have ever d~ne" '~ can hardly be 
controverted. in many African states kleptocrafy has been elevated to a state art and adorned 
with the toga of officialdom, apparently as a recognised new fom of govemment. As a result, 
resources that should have k e n  utilised to provide basic facilities have k e n  filched and 
transferred into Western banks by high-ranking leaders and officials." Urnozurike justifiably 
regards this as "a high-ranking cause of underdevelopment, resulting in malnutrition, lack 
of healthcare and other de privation^."'^ In this regard also, Afe Babalola lamented: 
It is ... no understatement to say that Africa has k e n  
impoverished and destabilised by the kleptocracy of its elite 
in both business and govemment circles. For exarnple, it has 
been stated in a leading European journal, The Financial 
Times. in 1992, that three hundred Nigerians own over 30 
billion US dollars in European and North American banks. 
Similar cases of mind boggling foreign accounts belonging to 
other African citizens abound. It is also an open secret that 
there are some Afncan Heads of State[,] past or present, 
I3~eorge Kent. "Food Sccuriry". supra. note 55. 
'kJ. Oji Urnozurike, "Afncnn Charter" supra. note 23 at 48. The former Nigerian rnilitary Head of 
State. Gened  Sani Abacha, is believed to have stzished away billions of dollars in foreign accounts in severai 
parts of the world. The present Nigerian civilian govemment has ken making efforts to recover Abacha's Ioot. 
Sec, Vanguard, "How we Frued in the h t  One Year, by Obsisanjo: Being the Text of President Olusegun 
Obasanja's May 29 Broadcast Commemorating One Year of Civil Rule in the Country," available online at 
chttp:llwww.vanguardngr.comMTK206200lf66.h. (Accessed June 13,2000). 
whose assets in various parts of the globe, if valued, would be 
more than the yearly eamings of their respective countries? 
Arguably, official corruption impacted negatively on the quality of leadership. In 
most cases, it created the impression that there is no difference between state and private 
funds o f  the rulen and that politics is a winner-take-al1 affair with respect not only to 
patronage and the prerogatives of office but also to the nation's wealth and resources? 
Notably, it attracts the wrong kinds of persons to leadership and raises the political stakes as 
politics becomes a 'do or die' affair. Also, it engenders nepotism in addition to king a 
breeding ground for ethnic animosities, hatred and conflicts. As Frederick Forsyth pointedly 
observed, "political power means success and prosperity, not only for the man who holds it 
but for his farnily, his birth place and even his whole region. As a result, there are many who 
will go to any Iength to get it and having got it, will surpass themselves in order to keep it."" 
In the pursuit of selfishly compt interest, economically oriented proactive policies 
necessary for economic growth and social well-being are sacrificed for other policies that 
parantee more money to the political leadership of the day and its lackeys. The interests of 
the people are pursued only to the extent that they coincide with the selfish interest of those 
in power. In such an atmosphere of endemic corruption, it becomes diffïcult, if not 
7 6 ~ f e  Babalola. "Legal and Iudicial System and Cornplion," in AfBca Leadership Forum Corruption, 
Democracy and Human Rights in West A m ,  Republic of Benin, 19-21 September, 1994 (Ibadan: Intec 
Printers. 1994) at 93-94, quoted in U. Oji Umozurike, fbid. See also, f .  Oloh-Onyango, supra, note 3 at 3 
(noting how Mobutu's corruption and vice directly impinged upon the people of Zaire's econornic and sociai 
humlin rights to adequate heaith care, sufficient food and appropriate shelter). 
n~egun Odunuga "Achieving Good Govemance in Post-Conflict Situations: The Diaiectic Between 
Conflict and Good Governance" in Adebayo Adedeji , supra, note 17,41 at 44. 
"~rederick Fonyth. The Making of an Afncan Legcd: The BiBfm Story (London: Penguio Books, 
1977) at 25. 
impossible to put in place or maintain the facilities necessary for the enforcement and 
realization of any human nghts, particularly economic, social and cultural rights. There is no 
doubt that widespread corruption in Afnca or elsewhere equally affects the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights since those emboldened enough to cal1 for accountability and 
transparenry in the conduct of public affairs are regarded as 'secunty risks,' or as enemies 
of the 'people,' and even imprisoned for inciting (or attempting to incite) the people against 
the g~vemment.'~ 
It must be stressed that the unbridled debauchery of most African mlers would not 
have been such a huge success without outside support and interference. As the Igbos of 
Nigeria say, when an individual is dancing alone at the centre of the road, hislher drummers 
must be somewhere in the bush. One must, therefore, not fail to highlight the influence of 
extemal forces in propping up most of the debauched rulers across the African continent. In 
this regard, the era of the Cold War was notable for the nihilistic cornpetition between the 
United States and the Soviet Union to outdo each other in keeping the most compt African 
nilers in power. As Adebayo Adedeji succinctly stated: 
The exigencies of the Cold War Era did compel the two 
competing major powen (USA and USSR) to support 
[compt and] repressive regimes and to prop them up in 
power so that the opposite side of the East-West divide would 
not take conuol. The Arnerican support for Siad Barre to 
continue to repress and suppress the Somalians sowed the 
seed of the country's tragic disintegration. Similarly, the 
Soviet support[ed] Mengistu Haile Mariam to decimate the 
7 9 ~ e e  Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1995) at 7, 34-36 for documented accounts of suppression of freedom of expression of some 
governments critics in some African countries. See also, Amnesty International, Amnesty Internarional Report 
1999 (London: Amnesty internationai Publications, 1999) at 236-237 for accounts of repression of freedom of 
cxprcssion in Liberia following criticisms for the handling of public affairs. 
Ethiopian people .... These two are unfortunate examples of 
the havoc of the Cold War." 
In addition to propping up corrupt rulers, the Cold War also ensured the continued 
influx of extemal loans to many African rulers despite their known distinction in 
mismanagement. As a result, many African states incumd huge debts, which were more or 
less pay offs to maintain ideological loyalty and did not in any way contribute to economic 
development of the people. However, the servicing of these spurious debts, as the next 
section shows, is one of the greatest hindrances to the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights Africa. 
6.44. Debt and Structural Adjustment 
Many Afrkan states, like other developing countries, are carrying a heavy debt 
burden which styrnies any meaningful economic development. Debt and debt-servicing have 
progressively impoverished, and are still impoverishing, many African states and peoples, 
systematically preventing them from recording any significant achievement in the 
enforcement, or exercise and enjoyment, of their basic rights." According to the 1992 UNDP 
Miman Development R e p o ~  "[iln 1983-89, rich creditors received a staggering 242 billion 
' O ~ d e b a ~ o  Adedeji. supra, note 62 at 9-10, One other example is worth n0ting.h spite of the weleli 
known griift of Mobutu Sese Sekou wa Zabanga, believed to have amassed a fortune fa in excess of his 
country's nationai debt, seved attempts made to overthrow him were scuttied by the United States. 
" ~ e e  El Hadji Guisse. supra, note 3 at para. 54. 
WS dollars] in net transfers on long term lending from indebted developing ~ountries.''~ The 
greatest impact of this transfer, according to George Kent, "is in sub-Saharan Africa where 
the debt load is approximately equal to the region's cumulative gross national pr~duct."'~ 
This situation has led the states involved into debt crises, necessitating the current 
seemingly inconclusive moves for alleviation or renegotiation of their debts. Servicing these 
debisva some of which are "merely a series of fictitious operations bringing no benefit to the 
populations concemed, which they are nevertheless called on to repay,"'' greatly incapacitate 
the states involved. They also undermine the prospects of the affected states to provide even 
the most basic of the facilities necessary for the fulfilment of their economic, social and 
c u i ~ r d  rights obligations. Apart from the virtual drymg up of foreign capital and re~erves,'~ 
debt servicing has had "especially negative impacts on the poor and their children, obliging 
them to do without food subsidies and health and other services, and often pressing hem into 
83 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) at 45. The report also noted yerirly debt-related net transfers of $50 billion from 
devcloping to industrial countries up to the year of the report (1992). See the overview of the report, available 
at <http:llwww.undp.org/hdrole920ver.hun>. (Visited 4: 40 PM, June 19,2000). 
" ~ e o r ~ e  Kent, "Food Securify" supra, note 55. Curiously, in spite of sevenl y e m  of debt servicing. 
these loans, some of which rire of doubtful vdidity, are not about to be paid off. On the contrary, the debt 
increrises as it is repaid. Even new loans obtained in the name of development end up k ing  used to service 
cxisting debts. Painfully, most of the loans have ken ,  of doubtful vdidity and for questionable purposes. In 
some crises, the loans are "rnisappropriated by those responsible for rnanaging them. to be redeposited in the 
banks of the creditor countries [often to their knowledge and condonation] or reinvested in cornpasiies in those 
srune countries."See El Hadji Guisse, supra, note 3 at para 57. These reprehensible acts are partly, if not largely, 
responsible for the debt crisis currently facing Afiica. 
%ligeria currently spends US$3Sbillion (more than 40 penxnt of its 2000 budget) annudly to service 
its debt burden of about US$33 billion. See Laolu Akande, "Ahead Visit, Clinton Begins Debt-Pardon Cnisade 
for Nigeria" The Guardian, Thursday. July 13, 2000, available online at 
chttp:llwww.ngrguardiannews.com/news2lnn79 1404.htmi> (Accessed 1 1: 32 AM, July 13,2000). 
R 5 ~ l  Hadji Guisse, lbid. at para 57. 
"see Yerni Osinbajo & Olukonyisola Ajayi. "Human Rights md Econornic Development in 
Dcvcloping Countries" (1994) 28 International La~yer 727 at 73 1. 
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exploitative working conditions."" The devastating impact of debt servicing on the poor is 
not mitigated by international development assistance. because, as George Kent penuasively 
argues, "[tlhe amount of money going from the [Slouth to the m]orth for debt servicing 
greatly exceeds the current amounts of official development assistance going from the 
[Nlorth to the [Slouth. Moreover, offcial development aid is likely to benefit the rich and 
the middle class than the poor ... [since it] does not concentrate on the most needy either 
wi thin coun tries or among countries."'' 
In response to the economic pressures resulting from the heavy debt burden and the 
virtuai drying up of foreign reserves, many African states adopted the pemicious structural 
adjustment policiesx9 of the international Monetary Fund (MF) and World Bank which 
appear to have worsened their economic circ~mstances.~ As part of the policy adjustments, 
these countries have had to reduce their imports. devalue their currencies. deregulate capital 
movements, privatise State public utilities. dismantle social programmes by cutting 
87 George Kent, "Food Securiîy" supra, note 55. 
89 Structural adjusunent has been defined as "reforms of poticies and institutions covering micro- 
economic (such as taxes and titnffs), mcro-economic (fiscal policy) and institutional interventions - these are 
changes designed to improve resource allocation, increase economic efficiency, expand growth potential and 
increase resihence to shocks." See World Bank, Structural Adjustment and Poverty: A Conceptual, Empirical 
cznd Policy Framework, February, 1990 at 22, cited in Sigrun 1. Skogly, "Adjustment and Development" supra, 
note 35 at 755. According to Skogly, "[tjhe premise of structural adjustment conditions is that certain economic 
factors should be altered in a given country to ensure better economic performance with a view to repay debt 
and debt servicing, to achieve a better balance of payment situation, and to achieve a healthier economy in 
generai." Ibid at 756. See also, Caroline Thomas, "Intemationai Financial Institutions and Social and Economic 
Human Righis: An Expioration" in Tony Evans , supra, note 2, 161 at 167(w~ites that "[tlhere was an unspoken 
agreement that adjustment and debt repayment would be rewarded by inflows of new tinance and investment"). 
Howcver. instead of Ieading to a healthier economy, the adjustrnents policies of the IMF and Wotld Bank have 
merely ushered in a comatose economy which greatly depends on the iife support of trickiing international aid. 
w ~ e e  Yemi Osinbajo & Olukonyisola Ajayi, supra, note 86 at 73 1. 
govemment expenditures on social services, such as health care, education and removal of 
subsidies on market staples, and provide "national treatment" to foreign investors?' 'These 
provisions," according to Chossudovsky, "are often coupled with a 'bankmptcy programme' 
under the supervision of the World Bank with a view to 'triggering the liquidation of 
competing national enterprises?"' Oloka-Onyango perspicaciously put the effects of 
structural adjustment on the economic, social and cultural rights in perspective as follows: 
In more specific ways, structural adjustment affects working 
conditions and the right to work through ntrenchment as a 
result of deindigenization, privatisation and the liberalization 
of trade controls. The extent of available health care and its 
costs is severely affected by the introduction (as in 
Zimbabwe) of user fees, which is an additionai burden on 
people who are already impoverished and exist largely in a 
subsistence economy. The nature of educational services and 
their accessibility is affected by the increase in fees for 
tuition .... Finally, the ability to provide food and combat 
poverty is affected by the overall concentration on export 
crops and rernoval of subsidies for market ~ t a p l e s . ~ ~  
In addition to the austerity measures which unleash sweeping impoverishment and 
pauperization on the majority of the people, Osinbajo and Ajayi have also echoed the 
"deleterious consequences" of structural adjustment for the majority of the countries leading 
to, "a severe deterioration in the abilities of these countries to uphold the economic and 
" ~ e e  Gcorge Kent, "Food Securiry" supra, note 55. See also Michel Chossudovsky, 'World Trade 
Organisation (WTO): An Illegal Organisation that Violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" 
rivailable online rit <http:l/www.derechos.org/ni~orldodrirti~~10s/~h0~~~dov~kye.html>. (Visited 4: 17 PM, 
J a n u q  3 1,2000). 
" ~ i c h e l  Chossudovslq, Ibid. 
9 3 ~ .  Oloka-Onyango, supra, note 5 at 27 (citations ornitteci). Zimbabwe used to provide fke education 
for d l  until adherence to iMF structural adjustment programme brought it to an end. See Maria Nzomo, 'The 
Political Economy of the African Crisis: Gender Impacts and Responses" (1996) 51 Intl. J. 78; Bharati 
Sadasivam, 'The Impact of Structurai Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Hurnan Rights Agenda*' 
( 1997) 19 Human Rights Quurterly 630 at 64 1. 
social rights of their people~."~ Besides, 
[t] he fundamental objectives of providing education, health 
care, housing, and domestic control of their economies have 
been abandoned, since SAPs by definition result in cut backs 
in funding of such programs. Pnvatization and de- 
indigenization, especially when carried in conjunction with 
debt-equity swaps, have created the potential for the loss of 
indigenous control of critical areas of the economy. Faced 
with standards of living well below poverty levels, the 
citizenry has usually responded with strikes, rioting, and other 
forms of dissent, which have almost dways been met with 
suppression by force or draconian legislation ..." 
The obvious impact of structural adjustment programmes is to reduce the capacity of 
the states to meet their human nghts obligations.% Evidently, in Afnca and elsewhere, 
structural adjustment programmes adversely affect not only economic, social and cultural 
rights, but also civil and political rights.* Even though the impression is usually created that 
94 Yemi Osinbajo & Olukonyisola Ajayi, supra, note 86 at 73 1. 
g51bid. (Ernphasis added]. In Ghana, Senegai, Nigeria and Zambia, the ruling regimes resorted to 
rcpression to impiement adjusment programmes, See Lawrence Tshuma, 'The Impact of IMFNorld Bank 
Dictritcd Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes on Human Rights: Erosion of Empowerment Rights" 
in Pearson Nherere & Marina dTEngelbronner-Kolff, (eds.), The lnstirutionalisation of Human Rights in 
Solithent Africa, (Copenhngen, Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1993). 219 at 229. Even with al1 the 
repressions and dehumanization of the majority, the iMF is liugely insulated from what is happening in the 
affectcd states, and the affected people have no way of holding IMF accountabie for its actions. For the need 
for accountability and a human rights policy for the iMF and World Bank see, Daniel D. Bradlow, 'The World 
Bank, the M F ,  and Human Rights" ( 1996) 6 Trumnl. L & Conremp. Problems 47-90. It has been argued that 
womcn suffer most both from the economic crisis and from the adjustment policies. See Christine Chinkin & 
Shclly Wright, 'The Hunger Trap: Women, Food, and Self-Determination" (1993) 14 Michigan J. h l .  L 262 
rit 3 13. See also, Bharati Sadasivam, supra, note 93. 
% ~ e e  Lawrence Tshwna Ibid at 227. See generally, Sigrun 1. Skogly. "Human Rights and Economic 
Efficiency: The Relationship Between Social Cost of Adjusment and Human Righîs Protection" in Peter Baehr, 
Hilde Wey. Jacqueline Smith & Theresa Swinehart (eds.), Human Rights in Developing Countries: Yearbook 
1994 (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1994) at 43-65 [hereinafter "Economic 
Eficienq"]. 
" ~ e e  Lawrence Tshuma, Ibid at 230. See aiso, Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, 'The I.M.F. 
and Econornic and Social Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985" (1986) 8 Human Rights 
Quarterly 227-269, for exploration of the violations of al1 human rights following the adoption of structurai 
adjustrnent policies in Argentina. 
the adoption of the structural adjustment policies will improve the economic fortunes of the 
affected states and subsequently reduce their debt burdens, the adjustment policies have 
merely wonened the state of economic min of the states, leading a UN Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights Special Rapporteur to conclude that the adjustment policies "are actually 
means designed to recover the sums owed to the wealthy countries without any concem for 
the debtor co~ntnes."~~ Tragically, the debts have increased exponentially instead of 
decreasing," thereb y making the attempt at debt control and recovery such an undisguised 
"failure as blatant as it is significant."'" 
With the track record of inflicting enormous inhuman and counter-productive 
suffenng on the populations of the affected countries, structural adjustment sustains an 
atmosphere of deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights by ensuring that none of 
these rights are observed or protected by the state. Structural adjustment measures are 
externally induced by actors who are not accountable to the suffering and pulverized 
people.'" Despite the astounding failures of the adjustment policies, not to repeat the 
9 a ~ l  Hadji Guisse, supra, note 3 at para. 66. 
Y9 Sec Peter Bachr, Maine Sadiwa &Jacqueline Smith (eds.), Human Rights in Developing Countries: 
Ymrbook 1996 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International* 1996) at 394 (noting the exponentiai increase in the 
debt of Uganda since its adoption of structural adjustment policies). 
'%l Hadji Guisse, supra. note 3 at para, 63. For a mon detailed exploration on the impact and ffailures 
of structural adjustment policies in Africa see Aderanti Adepoju, (ed.), The Impact of Structural Adjrtstrnents 
nri the Population of Africa (London: James Currey, 1993); Adebayo Olukoshi, (ed.), Crisis and Adjusrment 
in the Nigerian Economy (Lngos: JAD hblishers, 199 1); Adebayo Olukoshi, (ed.), The Politics of Structural 
Adjirstrnent in Nigeria (London: James Currey, 1993); Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura & Arve Ofstad (eds.), 
A rr th0 rira rianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Re$iorrn in Afnca (Uppsala: SLAS, 
1 992). 
'o'The aonornic and technicd reasons uwdly advanceci by the ïMF and the World Bank are fraught 
with political implications even though the initiators of such decisions (the IMF and the World Bank) are not 
subject to the peoples' political control. Such actions render the exercise of sovereignty meaningless, as the 
people are controlled and rnanipulated from remote centres of authoncy beyond their immediate borders and 
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dehumanization of the populations, many Afncan states are still k ing  goacled into adopting 
them, as a precondition for rescheduling or cancelling their debtdm One is, therefore, 
tempted tn agree with the suggestion that "perpetuating the debt of the developing countries 
is the result of a deiiberate and political decision designed solely to frustrate any attempt by 
the developing countries and their peoples to achieve econornic and social progress."la The 
fact that "countries that oppose the measures suggested by the institutions (themselves agents 
of neo-colonial interests) do not receive any financial a~sis tance"~~ arnply lends credence to 
the suggestion. 
Just as debts and structural adjustments are vital instruments sustaining the continued 
deprivation of econornic, social and cuiturai rights of the people, there are growing fears that 
globalization will do more in further exacerbating human suffering and erosion of 
1 achievement in the 
Military and Monetary 
socioeconornic rights.loS Be that as it may, African states' relative 
outside their control. See generdly Anne Orford, "Locating the International: 
Interventions After the Cold War" (1997) 38 Harvard Intl. LJ. 443 at 451-450. 
102 For instance, the United States, through its Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, recently announced 
thrit it would support Nigeria's bid for debt rescheduling only if Nigeria accepts the structural adjustment 
policies of the IMF and "manages to keep up with the ierms of [the] programme with the International Monetary 
Fund." Sec Stephen Fidler, "Nigeria Wins US Debt Backing" Financial Times, June 12, 2000, at 
~http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagenme=Vie~&~=Arti~Ie&~id=FT3DVHNGE9C&1ive=~e&~~e0ve~ 
dctemplate=IXLZKNNP94C> (Last Updated June 12, 2000; Visited June 12, 2000). See also, Arthur 
Obayuwana, "U.S. Links Support for Debt Relief to IMF Conditions" The Guardian, Tuesday, June 13,2000, 
oniinç at <http:/lwww.ngrguardiannews.comUnn788402.h. (Visited June 13,2000). 
103 El Hadji Guisse, supra, note 3 at para. 59. 
'*~igrun 1. Skogly, supra, note 35 at 756. 
105~onternponry human riais aholarship is awash with scathing criticisrns and condemnation of the 
impact of globalization on the redization of econornic, social and cuitural rights in both developed and 
developing states. For some of these works see, Robert McCorquodale & Richard Fairbrother, "Globalization 
and Human Rights" (1999) 21 Human Righrs Quaneriy 735-766; J. Mittleman, (ed,), Globalizution: CnSical 
RefTections (Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner, 1996); Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalization ofPoverry= 
Impacts of IMF and World Bank Refonns (London: Zed Books, 1997); C. Thomas & P. Wilkin, (eds.), 
Globalizution and the South (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); George Kent, supra, note 5 1; Caroline Thomas, 
275 
enforcement of civil and political rights shows that where the international will does exist 
greater achievements will be made in the enforcernent of economic, social and cultural rights. 
6.4.5. International Apathy 1 Hostility 
One of the greatest impediments to the enforcement and realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights in Africa is the indifference, and even hostility, of the international 
community towards enforceable economic, social and cultural rights. This international 
lethargy dates back to the period before the adoption of the two international covenants, and 
eventually saw to the adoption of two covenants instead of one. Whatever lip service that was 
paid to the notion of economic, social and cultural rights during the Cold War eventually 
snowballed into indifference and apparent hostility since the end of the Cold War.'" 
Following on the heels of the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of Cold War signalled the 
end of an era of active support to the cause of economic, social and cultural rights. It also 
deprived economic, social and culturai rights at the international stage of the support of a 
superpower. More or less. the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union seem 
to have discredited the ideology that emphasizes economic, social and cultural rights. Even 
sripra, note 77; Michel Chossudovsky, "World Trade Organization" supra, note 91. See also UNDP, 
"Global ization with Human Face," Human Development Reporr, 1999, particularly Chapter One, available 
online at <http://www.undp.org/hdro/99.htm>. (Visited 1 1 :  54 AM, June 23,2000). 
I %ut see. George William Mugwanya, supra, note 64 at 38 (celebhng the end of cold war as having 
libemted international efforts to promote human rights from ideological conflicts and politicai sloganeenng). 
Such euphorie cetebrations are rather uncalled for. The end of cold war merely shifted ideoiogical battle fronts, 
making it more covert and dangerous. To the detriment of econornic, social and cuitural rights, it enthroned a 
mentality of ideologicai victors and vanquished, making the 'victors' more entrenched in their ways which are 
detrimental to the enforcement of economic, sociai and cultural rights. 
without expressly saying so, it was regarded as a remarkable triumph for the liberal ideology 
that emphasises civil and political rights to the exclusion of economic, social and cultural 
rights. 
The 'victory' of liberal ideology following the end of the Cold War brought about the 
current development or thod~xy,~~ based on econornic and political liberalism, which is king 
sold as the best method for maximizing global welfare.lo8 Yet, as Caroline Thomas 
insightfully points out, "the evidence of such a claim is lacking, resting largely on the 
perceived absence of alternatives. [Per contra,] evidence against seems to be rno~nting."'~ 
Even the supporters of the neoliberal market economics have had to admit its abysmal failure 
io assist the poor and improve the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. Rather, 
they have questioned its potential in this regard."" Hence, despite al1 the praises for the 
market system of wealth creation as the most effective that humanity has yet devised,"' "it 
remains an imperfect force since two-thirds of the world's population have gained little or 
no substantive advantage from rapid economic growth. [Even] in the developed world, the 
lowest quartile has witnessed trickle-up rather than trickle-down.""' It is therefore doubtful 
107~aroline Thomas, supra, noie 89 at 164. 
'"lbid. See also B. Crossette, "UN Survey Ends World Rich-Poor Gap Widening" New York Times, 
July 15, 1996 at 55, (noting the globai inequality which continues to charactetize the global social order). 
' 'O~ee G. Lean & Y. Cooper, 'The Theory Was That As The Rich Got Richer We'd Al1 Benefit. But 
It Hasn't Worked" Independent on Sun&, July Si, 1996 at 52-53. 
I l  1 The theory has been that in a liberal market economy, the rich would invest their money and create 
new jobs. As a result, wedth would trickle down and everyone would benefit, The enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights would be, therefore, enhanced and ensured for dl. However, its major achievement 
remriins the continued sacrifice of distributional equity on the alta- of rapid capital accumulation. 
"'~aroline Thomas, supra, note 89 at 165 (notes and citations omitted). 
whether the market economy is really capable of delivering economic and social rights for 
the majority of humanity.li3 
In view of the remarkable role played by extemal pressures in the establishment of 
the African Charter on Humun and Peoples' ~ igh t s , "~  one cannot underestimate the impact 
of such pressures on the overall improvement of the human rights situation in Africa While 
this has so far worked very well in ensuring a somewhat moderate level of cornpliance with 
regard to civil and political rights, including entrenching those rights as enforceable rights 
in the various constitutions, such outside pressures have been lacking with regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights. Even transnational human rights organisations such as 
Hiiman Rights ~atch,"' Amnesty International,' l6 lnterights and Article 19,117 to mention a 
few, have not nsen to the occasion to defend or to report the massive violations of economic, 
" h e  UNDP Human Development Repon 1996 shows quite clearly that the gap between the rich and 
the poor is widening within States and between them. See genedly, UNDP, Human Development Report, 1996 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
'"sec supra, Chapter one at 24-25. 
"'~utnan Rights Watch is transnational NGO that conducts regular, systematic investigations of 
human Rights abuses in some seventy countries rifound the world. Their goal is to hold governments 
accountable for violiiting the riehts of their people. Human Rights Waich began in 1978 with the founding of 
i ts HeIsinki division. Presently, it includes five divisions covering Africa, the Amencas, Asia, the Middle East, 
as well as the signatories of the Helsinki accords. See Human Rights Watch, Hunrun Rights Watch World Report 
1998 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) at vii. 
116 Founded in 1961, Amnesty International is a 'worldwide voluntary activist movernent working 
towards the observance of al1 human rights as enshrined in the Universai Declantion of Human Rights and other 
international standards.' See Amnesty International, Amnesty Interncttional Report 1999 (London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 1999) at ii. There are more than 4,300 Amnesty International groups in more than 
105 countries and territories in Africa, the Amencas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. For the history of the 
founding of Amnesty Internationai see Marie Staunton et al., 7ï1e Amnesty Intentational Handbaok (Claremont: 
Hunter House, 199 1 ) at 5-8. 
1171nterighrs (international Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Righu) and Article 19 are 
London based internationai NGOs. 
social and cultural right~.' '~ Thus, while there is aiways a hue and cry whenever there are 
perceived violations of civil and political rights, the impression is conveyed (albeit by 
silence) that in the field of economic, social and cultural rights, al1 is fair - a situation that has 
encouraged irnpunity and emboldened perpetrators. Without the international cornmunity 
raising an eyebrow in the face of massive denials of socioeconomic rights, the govemments 
of several African states continue to disregard and deny the enforcement and justiciability 
of these rights, prefemng to rnisuse or squander resources (some even engaging in fratncidal 
and senseless wars) while putting up a facile and spurious defence of 'lack of development.' 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the modest efforts of some African states and 
govemments, and indeed most other states in the international community. with respect to 
the enforcement of civil and political rights would not have come about without the pressures 
of the international cornmunity, - states and civil society. Similarly, it is arguable that 
commendable efforts would have been made in the enforcement and realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights if there had been pressures commensurate with that exacted in 
relation to civil and politicai rights  violation^."^ Unfortunately, economic, social and cultural 
rights remain the province of unchecked impunity where aimost every state is tainted and 
without any moral high ground from which to criticize others. 
en  fric an and African based NGOs largely have been as unconcerned as international human rights 
organisations in this regard. This is unfortunate for as Scoble has rightly observed. whiie underscoring the 
importance of h u m  rights NGOs, human rights are not "given"; they are "taken" through siruggle against the 
political dite. See Harry M. Scoble, " H u m  Rights Non-Govenunental Organisations in Black Africa: Their 
Problerns and Prospects in the Wûke of the Banjul Charter" in Claude E. Welch & Ronald 1. Meltzer, Human 
Righrs and Development in Afiica (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984) at 177. 
'I91n spite of ail pretensions. human righis and Iaw, especially international Iaw, remain what a 
community, or its powerful members, say they are. See John O'Manique, "Development, Humm Rights and 
Law" ( 1992) Human Rights Quarterly 383 at 405-406. 
Apart from widespread international apathy, there appears to be a deliberate effort 
of industrialized countries to undermine or scunle the efforts of developing countries. notably 
African states, towards the implementation, enforcement, and realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights. The aversion of some Western states to enforceable economic, social and 
cultural rights,12* plays itself out fully in their various tactics to undermine the efforts of 
developing (African) states. This has ken achieved through direct involvement, or by proxy, 
using as agents, multinational corporations and 1 or international financial institutions. and 
lately the World Trade Organization (WT0).12' In his 'Final Report' on the question of 
irnpunity of perpetraton of human rights violations (economic, social and cultural rights), 
UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur, Mr. El Hadji Guisse noted: 
During the discussions on the methods of implementing 
economic, social and cultural rights, ... the representatives of 
"O~ccordin~ to Philip Alston, the United States has ihrough the Regan and Bush administrations 
rejectcd the notion of economic, social and culturai rights. See Philip Alston, "US Ratification of the Covcnant 
on Economic, Sociai and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy" (1990) 84 American J. Intl. 
L 365 [hereinaftcr "U.S. Ratification"]. 
III Notable tactics usually adopted in this r e g d  include, perpctuation of indebtedness and initiation 
of critastrophic cconomic poIices (see El Hadji Guisse, supra, note 3 at para 60; Rhoda E. Howard, "Civil 
Conflict in Sub-Saharan Afiicsi: Internally Generated Causes" ( 1996) 5 1 Inrl. J. 26 at 32; Anne Orford, supra, 
note IO1 at 464-475); pressuring the various couniries to open up their borders to permit the dumping of 
products which end up stifling the local industries (sec George Kent, supra, note 5 1); toppling regimes that are 
opposcd to their pernicious mtics (sec= Mande K. Sacharoff, "Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be 
Hcld Accountable for Human Rights Violations?" (1998) 23 Brook. J. I d .  L 928-964, for accounts of an 
instance where a regime was toppled for insisting on improving the lots of the people); and exporting hanful 
and hrizardous waste which imperil the health of the recipient states, while at the same time goading them to 
cut back on health care (See James H. Colopy, "Poisoning the Developing World; The Exportation of 
Unrcgistered and Severely Restricted Pesticides horn the United Strites" ( 1995) 13 UCLA J. Envtl. L & Policy 
167 rit 17 1 - 18 1 ). The curent United States Treasury Secretary, as World Bank Chief Economist, in an infamous 
interna1 World Bank merno, wrote: 
1 think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the Iowest wage country 
is impeccable and we should face up to that .... I've always thought that under-populated 
countries in PSnca are vrisiiy under-polluted; their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently 
[high] compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City. 
Sce, Let Them Eat Pollution, Economist (London), February 8,  1992 at 66, See aiso, Pollution and the Poor, 
Economist (London), Febmary 15, 1992 at 18. 
several developing countries expressed the fear that the 
inevitably slow progress in realizing those rights might be 
taken for unwillingness on their part. They had not reckoned 
with the developed couniries' detemination to undemine any 
possible bmis for a truly fair world economic order where 
economic, social and cultural rights would have a fair chance 
of being realized. It was soon observed afterwards that the 
fears of the former and the hypocnsy of the latter very rapidly 
became a source of massive grave violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights .."ln 
The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that economic, social and cultural rights 
would have fared better in many African states but for the hostile indifference, if not naked 
hostility, of sorne 'god-father' 'developed' states who would neither allow the enforcement 
of these rights, nor permit others to do so. Even without outwardly thwarting the efforts of 
developing states, the developed states' insidious insistence on non-enforcement of 
economic, social and cultural rights, remains a disincentive to the enforcement of these rights 
in Africa. Given the 'resource intensive' mythology surrounding economic, social and 
cultural t-ights, developing states are cowed to walk on territories where developed states fear 
to tread. Examples of rich states without enforceable economic, social and culturai rights not 
only discourage less endowed states, but provide sufficient justification for others committed 
to non-enforcement. 
When the foregoing is considered dong with the problems earlier discussed. it 
becomes apparent that it may still be some time before economic, social and cultural rights 
are directly enforced in many Afncan states. M i l e  direct judicial enforcement of al1 rights 
should be the ultimate goal, other alternative, but equally effective. means or approaches to 
17' -El Hadji Guisse, supra, note 3 at para 16. [Emphasis added]. 
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enforcement should be explored. The essence of this is to give reprieve to the victims of 
econornic, social and cultural rights. so as to put a cap on the gaping hole of prevailing 
impunity. At least, that may serve to arrest some of the disturbing implications of neglecting 
enforcement. 
6.5. CONSEQUENCES OF CONï'lNUED MARGDJALJZATION OF ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
Certain consequences are discemible from the continued marginalization of the 
enforcernent of economic, social and cultural rights. In the first instance, not many can 
dispute the uselessness of a right without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remediwn is a hallowed legd 
principle. Thus, a right existing without a remedy is rather contradictory in tems and serves 
no useful purpose. As Henry Shue succinctly observed, "to enjoy something only at the 
discretion of someone else, especidly someone powerful enough to deprive you of it at will, 
is precisely no? to enjoy a right to it."lu The notion of a non-enforceable right is nothing but 
a negation of the very concept of ~ i g h t . ' ~ ~  Continued marginalization of the enforcement of 
economic, social and cultural rights, especiaily in domestic junsdictions, not only denies their 
character as rights, but also dresses thern in the deceptive garb of luxuries, which they 
certainly are not. A further implication is that it is symbolic and symptornatic of the 
123 Henry S hue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Afluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980) at 78. 
174 According to Dinah Shelton, "[a] strrte that fails to protect blly individu& against hurnan rights 
violations or that otherwise vioiates remdial rights comrnits an independent, further violation of internationally 
-recognized human rights." See Dinah Shelton, Remedies in Intentational Human Rights Law (Oxford: 
University Press, 1999) at 37. 
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continued marginalization, and relegation to second class citizens, of those most dependent 
on such rights for basic sur~iva l . '~  
For a region that has staked its integrity on the adoption of a document which gives 
equal prominence to al1 aspects of human rights, the continued adoption of a contradictory 
posture at the domestic level is nothing but an exercise in self ridicule. Such a position 
remains a source of opprobrium both at home and abroad. It also casts the Charter in a bad 
light for proclaiming that which it cannot guarantee. As such, the African claim (that the 
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is the precondition for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights) in international fora rings hollow and remains exposed for what it 
is: a mere apologisrn for insensate and inexcusable violations. 
Besides, the continued marginalization of economic, social and cultural rîghts 
deepens the collective feeling of betrayal of the African hoipolloi given the near total erosion 
of their traditional system by the exigencies of the modem state which do not offer a suitabie 
replacement. This feeling of betrayal manifests itself in various forms, including lack of faith 
in the process of governance by the majority of the people. With the virtual destabilisation 
of the traditional system which ensured the welfare of every member of the cornrn~nity,'~~ 
the modem state's failure to adequately ensure the socioeconomic well-king of the people 
portray it in a bad light, as a remote centre of power that has no modicum of relevance to the 
lives of the people. Where govemance and its processes do not impact positively on the 
125 See Sigmn 1. Skogly, "Adjuszmenr and Development," supra, note 35 at 770 (discussing the 
ndvantages of effective recognition of al1 human rights, especially economic, social and cultutal rights). 
1 Z6 See sirpra, Chapter Three on the protection of economic, social and cultural rights in traditional 
Africri. 
masses, rhey see govemments more as the problem than as a solution. 
Accordingly, one of the most serious consequences of the continued marginalization 
of economic, social and cultural rights is the prolongation, if not perpetuation, of the existing 
crisis of state and governmental legitimacy in Africa. It is a trite fact that people hold 
minimum expectations of their state and govemment. The expectations are "the irreducible 
duties of any ruling apparatus to its subjects, such that a failure to discharge these duties 
vitiates the legitimacy of the regime S assertion of authority."ln When such expectations are 
not met, it fuels the general level of disaffection and dissatisfaction that may lead to the fa11 
of the government, either by constitutional or extra-constitutional means. As Jack Donnelly 
persuasively argues. 
[tlhe link between a regime's ability to foster development 
(prosperity) and the public's perception of the regime's 
legitimacy is close to a universai, cross-culturd political iaw. 
Whatever a ruling regime's sociological and ideological 
bases, its sustained or severe inability to deliver prosperity, 
however that may be understood locally, typically leads to a 
serious political challenge.128 
Donnelly's argument. while valid for al1 societies, rernains particularly apt for Afnca 
More than anything else, the inability to hilfill the basic socioeconornic rights of the people, 
has been a recumng reason advanced by African military political adventurers for toppling 
existing govemments. The noise of the jubilating masses hardly dies down before the 
socioeconomic rights of the people are subjected to the same, if not a more heinous fate. As 
1 27 Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegirimacy in international Law (Oxford: Chrendon Press, 1999) 
at 2 1 [Emphasis added]. 
'"lack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Democracy, and Development" (1999) 21 Humun Rights Qunnerly 
608 at 609. [Emphasis added]. 
has been argued earlier, apart from the ordinary removal of an incurnbent govemment, the 
continued deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights sometimes leads to popular 
insurrections, and civil ~ a r . ' ~ ~  In such situations, existing governments are perceived as 
having outlived their usefulness as a result of the deterioration of the basic socioeconomic 
rights of the people.t30 As in the case of Somalia, crisis generated by an attempt to oust an 
incumbent government threatens the very foundations of the state and might lead to its 
disintegration. 
In the ensuing crisis of legitimacy, whether of govemment or state, political stability 
is sacrificed. Without stability, maintaining law and order is well nigh impossible, and as 
such. civil and political rights will be cast overboard, especially where people are displaced 
as refugees. Economic activities are also truncated, thus impenling al1 development efforts. 
Even in the absence of a full blown civil conflagration, the very situation of want and 
deprivation creates an atmosphere that is not conducive to the enjoyment of civil and political 
'% its 1979-80 annud report, the Inter-Arnericm Commission on Hurnan Rights noted ihe existence 
of an "orgmic rclationship between the violation of rights to physicd security on the one hand, and neglect of 
cconomic and social rights ... on the other." It further noted that "neglect of economic and socid rights, 
çspccially when political participation has been suppressed, produces the kind of social polarization that leads 
to acts of terrorism by and against the govemment" See Inter-Amencan Commission on Human Rights, Annual 
Reipon, 1979-80, rit 15 1. The Commission reitemted this point in its 199 1 Annuai Report, at 305, where it 
commented that "it is evident that in many cases poverty is a wellspring of political and sociai conflict." See 
dso. Anne Orford, supra, note 102 at 45 1-455 (noting the role of economic crisis in the loss of legitimacy of 
the Yugoslavian federal government which snowbailed into the fratricidal civil confiict). But see, Wesley T. 
Milner, Steven C. Poe & David Leblang, supra, note 22 at 412 (arguing that "people at the lowest level of needs 
tiilfilment would have neither the wherewithal nor the energy to pose threats to a regime, no matter how 
displeased they were with the satus quo"). 
"O~ost conflicts in Africa have their mots in the deterioration of the basic socioeconomic rights of 
the people. Such conditions, it has been observed, rnake the deprived a willing tool in the hands of some self- 
serving politicians and elites. Many a time, in order to attract widespread support, appeals are made using the 
abject conditions of the peopIe which may be couched in ethnic or regional terrns. The civil wars in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and to an extent Angola owe their origin, and or continuation to this. See generaily, Adebayo 
Adedeji, supra, note 18. See dso, Okwudibia Nnoii, (ed.), Ethnic CorrfIicts in Apca (Nottingham: CODESRIA, 
1998). 
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rights, or any other rights for that matter. As Donnelly rightly observed, "those living on the 
economic edge or with no realistic prospect of a better life for their children are much less 
likely to be willing to accommodate the interests and rights of ohers.""' Thus, in the absence 
of measures that are likely to ensure the realization of al1 rights. protecting only civil and 
political rights without economic, social and cultural rights would be tantamount to making 
ropes out of sand. 
6.6. STRATEGIZING THE WAY FORWARD 
6.6.1 . Rejection of the Western Mode! 
Substantial progress towards the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights 
in Africa may continue to elude Afncan states unless there is a committed rejection of the 
Western paradigm which sees civil and political rights as the only rights worthy of 
enforcement. Whiie the West can afTord to maintain such a model given their attainment of 
an appreciable standard of living that in tum provides the enabling environment for the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights, African states cannot afford it without facing 
widespread civil and social strife. Already, by adopting a Charter that departed markedly 
from the existing European Convention and Inter-American Convention, African states w il1 
be taken to have recognised the inadequacies of the two systems for their purposes. A 
rejection of the Western model, therefore, merely requires practical cornmitment to the noble 
intentions expressed in the Charter. 
"'~ack Donnelly. supra. note 128 at 610. 
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Such a practical cornmitment does not necessarily entai1 guaranteeing the maximum 
enjoyrnent of al1 the Charter's provisions on economic, social and cultural rights. Rather, it 
advocates the necessity of judicial, legislative and executive actions k ing  taken to ensure 
equal enforcement of al1 rights - an equal enforcement that ensures the minimum enjoyment 
of al1 human rights. It is more or less a cal1 to adopt the South African approach without its 
deficiencies. To achieve this undoubtedly requires considerable political cornmitment and 
w ill, the lack of which have remained the bane of economic, social and cultural rights. 
In the absence of a legislative action permitting the enforcement of economic, social 
and cultural rights, national courts, the African Court on Human Rights, national human 
rights commissions, (where they exist), and the African Commission should exploit 
al ternative ways or approaches to give effect to the economic, social and cultural rights. 
Some viable alternative approaches include, but are not limited to, the ones discussed below. 
6.6.2. Alternative Enforcement Approach 
indubitably, the best way to effectuate any human rights provision is by subjecting 
it to direct judicial scr~tiny.'~* However, for economic, social and cultural rights, such a 
procedure is lacking in many African States. Given the necessity of ensuring effective 
protection of human dignity (which presupposes the enjoyment and protection of al1 rights 
 h  hile the importance of  judicial remedies as the principal guarantees of  human rights rnay not be 
questioned, it should be noted that it is not without its limits. Sometimes, given the costiy, time consuming and 
procedure laden nature, individuais m y  prefer other administrative means of  settling their disputes. There is, 
in fact, growing evidence of individuals preferring non-judicial remedies. See Roman Wieniszewski, supra, note 
29 at 279. To this end, approaches to be discussed below are amenable to boih judicial, quasi-judicid and 
administrative measures. 
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without discrimination), alternative means ought to be utilized to give effect to economic, 
social and culturai rights provisions. In the absence of direct judicial enforcement, other 
(judicial and administrative) means of giving effect to the economic. social and cultural 
rights provisions of the Charter are hereunder discussed. 
6.6.2.1 . Integrated / Concerted Approach 
The economic realities in Africa today clearly demonstrate that the enjoyment of civil 
and political rights cannot be divorced from economic, social and cultural rights given the 
interrelatedness, interconnectedness and indivisibility of these rights in real life. The fact that 
these economic, social and cultural rights are regarded as mere aspintions in domestic 
constitutions and largely ignored at the regional level means that there is as yet no hope for 
their direct judicial enforcement as independent rights, except in South Afnca. 
It is the opinion of the present writer that economic, social and cultural rights can and 
should be enforced if the domestic courts and the African Coun of Human Rights (when it 
becomes operational) as well as the African Commission, and national human rights 
commissions, where they existqU3 can give teeth to them through a concerted and integrated 
approach to human rights enforcement in Afnca. This presupposes a recognition of the 
1 3 3 ~ y  the end of 1999. fifteen Afncan countries had established national hurnan rights commissions. 
They inciude, Benin. Cameroon, Chad, Ghma, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South 
Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. Plans are underwriy to establish such commissions in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania. Many of the commissions have remained an administrative outpost for the govemment of the day and 
have proved to be a disappointment, Many have very limited and flawed mandates with limited ability to 
investigate, monitor or make public statements. However, some, like the Ghanaian, Senegalese, South African, 
and Ugandan commissions appear very promising in their activities so far. For an account of the activities of 
some of these commissions, see Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Warch World Report 1999 at 12-13. 
indivisibility of rights as enshrined in the Afican Charter and as obtained in traditional 
Afnca. The essence of this is underscored by the following statement of C.A. Oputa, retired 
Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court: 
The fundamental rights provisions of our Constitution 
(dealing with civil and political rights) cannot be appreciated 
let alone enjoyed in a state of utter illiteracy and abject 
poverty. To attain tme liberty and freedom the average 
[citizen] must need to have equal access to direct housing and 
health services. If these opportunities are not equal and, or 
equally accessible, then talk of liberty, of equality or even 
justice will be a far cry .... 'Y 
The concerted and integrated approach envisaged here is one that seeks to enforce 
economic, social and cultural rights through the much recognized civil and political rights. 
Using this method, cconomic, social and cultural rights are ensured, developed and enforced 
through case law and procedures relative to civil and political right~."~ This is a more or less 
functional or interpretative approach, and is in accord with the practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights. As explained earlier (in Chapter Two), under the European system 
of human rights, States Parties' obligations with respect to socioeconomic rights are, in the 
words of Matti Pellonpaa, "of a somewhat less straightforward nature, and the international 
supervision far less effective ...."136 In the absence of judicid enforcement for rights provided 
under the European Social Charter comparable to rights provided under the European 
%.A. O p t a  bbCommentzuy" in A.G.O. Agbaje. (ed) Al1 Nigerian Judges Conference Papers 1982. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) at 290. 
"%ee Bard-Anders Andreassen, "Article 2 2  in Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjom Eide (eds.), The 
Universal Decirration of Human Rights: A Common Standard ofAchievernent (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1999). 453 at 487. 
"?Marti Pellonpaa "Econornic. Social and Cultural Rights" in R. St. Macdonald, et al.. (eds.) The 
Ettropean Systemfor the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 1993). 855 at 857. 
Convention on Human Rights. the European Court assumed a dynamic mode of interpretation 
that seeks to effectuate the socioeconomic rights provided under the Social Charter. 
Consequently, in Johana Airey v. The Republic of lreland"' the European Court of 
Human Rights noted that 'there is no water-tight division' between the classical civil liberties 
covered by the European Convention, on the one hand. and socioeconomic rights covered 
by the Social Charter. In emphasizing the right to free legal assistance as a social dimension 
of the right to fair trial (Article 6), the Court said: 
Whilst the Convention [the European Convention on Human 
Rights] sets forth what are essentiaily civil and political 
rights, many of them have implications of a social or 
economic nature, The Court therefore considers, like the 
Commission. that the mere fact that an interpretation of the 
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and 
economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such 
an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating 
that sphere from the field of the Convention.13' 
In that case the applicant's effective access to coun was rendered impossible in 
breach of Article 6 of the European Convention. Ms. Airey wanted a legal separation from 
her husband but could not afford a lawyer to represent ber in the complicated legal 
proceedings before the High Court. Since access to court could not be secured by simpler 
proceedings, a right to demand from the state a certain kind of service was derived from 
Article 6 guaranteeing the right to fair trial. The Court rejected the Govemment's argument 
that "the [European] Convention should not be interpreted so as to achieve social and 
137 Judgement of October 9, 1979, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 
32. Also reported in [1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 305. 
13'lbid. para 26. Also, [L979] 2 E.H.R..R. 305 at 3 16-3 17. (Ernphasis added) 
economic developments in a Contracting  tat te."'^^ 
Also, in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland,'" the Court advanced somewhat hirther 
in extending the protection under Article 6(1) and Article 14 (on non-discrimination) to 
econornic and social rights. It noted: "today the general nile is that Article 6( 1 ) does apply 
in the field of social insurance, including even welfare assistance."141 This approach was also 
applied in the cases of Feldbrugge v. The Netherl~nds'~~ and Deurneland v. G e n n ~ n y > ~  
concerning health insurance allowances (a social security benefit) through the application of 
Article 6( 1) of the European Convention. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has equally applied the integrated approach in a 
case conceming unemployment benefits through the application of Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (on non-di~crimination).~" An 
integnted approach may also be inferred from the Human Rights Committee's elaboration 
on the 'social dimension' of the nght to life. In its General Comments No. 6, on the right 
140 Judgement of lune 24, 1993, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 
263. Also reported in [1993] 16 E.H.R.R. 405. 
'"'ibid at para. 46. See also, Salesi v. italy, ludgement of Febmary 26. 1993, Publications of ihe 
European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 257-E. 
'J2~udgement of May 29. 1986, Publications of the European  COU^ of Hurnan Rights, Series A. No. 
99. AIso reported in [1986] 8 E.H.R.R. 425. 
143 Judgement of May 29, 1986, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 
100. Also reported in [L986] 8 E.H.R.R. 448. 
'U~waon-de Vries v. The Netherlandc. Communication No. 182J1982 of the Hurnan Rights 
Cornmittee. 
' 45~enen l  Comment 6 (Sixteenth Session, 1982.37 UN GAOR Supplement No. 40 (AL37f40). annex 
V., reprinted as Annex 3 in Asbjorn Eide, et ai., (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Righrs: A Tentbook 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 454-455. 
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to life, the Cornmittee noted the desirability for States to take "ail possible measures to reduce 
infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to elirninate 
malnutrition and epidemic~."'~ 
Using the integrated approach, therefore, a public-health system falling below a 
certain minimum standard of quality could be interpreted as a breach of a state's obligation 
to protect the right to life. In Tavares v. France,'" the European Commission deait with the 
issue of whether public health services falling under a certain quaiity standard and thereby 
contributing to the death of a patient could be classified as a violation of the deceased's right 
to life under Article 2 of the European Convention. Although the Commission did not find 
the respondents liable in this case, it clearly demonstrated that regulatory measures aimed at 
protecting life with regard to the hospital system are inherent in the Convention's protection 
of the right to life.lq 
Following examples such as these, the domestic courts, the African Court, and the 
African Commission can enforce economic, social and cultural rights through the civil and 
political nghts. Using this integrated and concerted approach, for instance, the nght to health 
can be enforced through the nght to life for it is absurd to claim to have a right to life if the 
individual is so poor that s/he cannot fiord the cost of adequate medical treatment to enable 
him/her to enjoy the right to life. Thus, it may amount to unlawful and arbitrary deprivation 
14"bid. at para 5. 
l"~pplication No. 16593f90, decision of 12 September 1991 (unpublished). reported by Matti 
PelIonpaa, supra, note 136 at 865. 
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of lifeId9 if the victim does not have access to adequate and sufficient medical facilities or 
treatrnent?' 
Also, the integrated and concerted approach can be used to enforce the right to 
education through the right to freedom of expression and the right to participate in the 
governance of one's country. It is a fact that in Africa, as one of the legacies of coloniaiism, 
the affairs of many states are conducted in official language(s) that are different from the 
peoples' original language. Again, most states have laws imposing a minimum qualification 
as a precondition for aspinng to elective positions. The implication is that those who lack the 
requisite qualifications and basic education are both disbarred from participating in the 
govemance of their respective countries. and even participating in the affairs (and national 
discourse) of the state. 
In fact, the foregoing example constitutes a proper ground for invoking the right to 
freedom from discrimination, for those who do not meet the imposed minimum 
qualifications for aspiring to elective offices due to their educational incapacities are properly 
victims of state sanctioned discrimination. It is also discrimination simpliciter against those 
who Iack the basic education to understand the national discourse which is conducted in a 
language other than the local language(s). As such, the 'victims' can enforce their rights to 
education through the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to freedom of 
expression, and the right to participate in the govemance of one's country. 
' 4 9 ~ e e  Article 4 of the Afican Charter. Sec also Section 33 of the Constitution of the Federai Republic 
of Nigeria. 1999; Section 1 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afiica, 1996. 
"O~ee Matti Pellonpaa. rupm. note 136 at 868-869 (arguing that right to life presupposes a certain 
minimum level of health services, and that respect for pnvate and family life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention may in certain circumstiuices oblige the state to provide housing to the homeless). 
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Admittedly, the vagueness and lack of clarity, in scope and content. of some of the 
economic, social and cultural rights provisions under the Afrcun Charter militate against 
their enforcement. However, uslng the integrated and concerted approach. the obstacles 
posed by the vagueness and lack of claity may be avoided since it does not really involve 
the interpretation of these rights but a practical effectuation of their spirit and substance. 
Apart from that, such integrated and concerted approach will be in keeping with the holistic 
traditional African philosophy and conception of rights, "the vimies" of which are the 
"historical tradition and values of African civilization [that] inspireid] and charactenze[d the] 
reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights" in the African ~hurter."' 
This rnay be considered an interim measure which does (and should) not foreclose 
the growing calls for the amendment of the Charter to strengthen its normative and 
institutional frmework. Is2 To those arnendments should be added a rethinking and possible 
amendment of the Protocol of the African Court to provide for direct individual access. It 
is not part of Afnca's traditional heritage that a penon against whom a cornplaint is to be 
made must first give his consent. The fact that a State is now in that position does not change 
anything. 
- - -  - - - - 
lSLsee para. 5 of the Prearnble to the African Chaner. 
152 See Makau Mutua "Two Legged StooP' supra, note 64 at 358. 
6.6.2.2, Minimum Threshold Approach 
The 'minimum threshold appr~ach ' '~~  to implementation is a terni employed to 
describe the Inter-American Commission's attempt to give effect to economic and social 
rights, even though not provided in the C0nventi0n.l~~ The emphasis of this approach is on 
equal recognition and implementation of al1 human rights. As explained by Cnven, "[rlather 
than creating any a prion hierarchy of nghts or emphasizing categorical differences in 
implementation, the minimum threshold approach advocates the necessity of action k ing  
taken across the board to ensure for al1 a minimum level of enjoyment of the whole range of 
hurnan rights."'" 
The Commission had in 1980 deterrnined that State Parties should "stnve to attain 
the economic and social aspirations of its people by following an order that assigns priority 
to ... the 'rights of survival' and 'basic needs.'"'" Later in 1993, the Commission, explained 
that the obligation to observe and defend human rights of individuals in the American 
Declaration and the American Convention "obligates [states], regardless of the level of 
economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of these right~." '~ 
lS3see Bard-Anders Andreassen. Tor Skalnes, G. Alan & Hugo Stokke, '*Assessing Human Rights 
Performance in Developing Countries: The Case for a Minimal Threshold Approach to Economic and Social 
Rights" in Bard-Anders & Asbjorn Eide (eds.), Human Rights in Developing Countries 1987/88 (Copenhagen: 
,4kademisk Forlag, 1988) at 333. 
'?Sec Chûpter Two for a discussion of the sute of economic. social and culturai rïghts under the Inter- 
American human rights system. 
1S5~atthew Cnven. 'The Protection of EconoMc, Social and Culhuai righis under the Inter-Arnerican 
System of Human Rights" in David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone (eds.), The Inter-American System of 
Hrtman Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 289 at 3 17. 
'%ee Inter-Amencan Commission, Annual Report, 1979-80. at 15 1 - 153. 
'57~nter-~mencan Commission, Annual Reporz, 1993 at 524. 
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As recognized by the Commission, the minimum threshold approach encapsulates a 
number of basic principles which are fundamental to the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights. Arnong other things, this approach "assumes that in the creation and 
implementation of economic and social policies, States should place emphasis, as a priority, 
upon assisting the poorest and the most vulnerable in so~iety." '~~ In order to redise the 
minimum threshold, the Commission is to "pay close attention to the equitable and effective 
use of available resources and the allocation of public expendinires to social programs that 
address the living conditions of the more vulnerable sectors of society.. .."'59 
Although, for the most part, the Commission's pronouncements seem to be hovering 
in the region of the abstnct, since the Commission has not put itself in a position whereby 
alleged violations of economic, social and culturd rights are brought before it, the threshold 
approach appears to hold a potential which, if exploited, will advance the cause of economic, 
social and cultural rights. In the hands of a viable human rights commission, national or 
regional, it holds a promise of k ing  exploited to require state accountability for those 
policies which entai1 a decreased observance of economic. social and cultural rights, such as 
structural adjustment policies. Also, the minimum threshold approach may be used by a court 
or a commission to ensure that a state party does not arnass instruments of torture in the name 
of state secunty while paying lip service, for instance, to necessary measures to protect the 
health of the people. In this case, a court or a commission can inquire into the adequacy of 
measures taken in the light of the 'equitable and effective use of available resources.' 
'58~ulatthew Cnven. supra, note 155 at 3 18. 
' 5 9 ~ n n u a l  Repon, 1993 at 533. 
Moreover, using the minimum threshold approach, the African Commission or the 
African Court could set up country-specific ihresholds measured by indicators to determine 
what amounts to. for instance. 'the best attainable state of physical and mental health' or 
what amounts to 'necessary measures to protect the health of their people.' This baseline 
approach could also be used to set up benchmarks to measure the 'equity' and 'satisfaction' 
in 'equitable and satisfactory working  condition^."^ With the aid of such indicators, it would 
be easier to ascertain or monitor when a state fails to fulfil its 0b1igations.l~~ Admittedly, 
fixing a minimum threshold is more of an administrative duty properly exercisable by a non- 
judicial body like the Commission. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable for a court to embark 
on such an exercise. A court can always encompass such an exercise within its notions of 
faimess and equity. After d l ,  the category of faimess is never closed and c m  be expanded 
to embrace new situations. 
One obstacle against involving the courts in the fixing of minimum standards for the 
minimum threshold approach is that such an exercise is necessarily a matter of policy which 
IMsee Article 15 of the African Charter. 
'"SCC Bar-Anders Andreassen, et id., supra, note 153 at 34l(noting rhat when the rhreshold approach 
is ridopied "[tlhe scope of violation of socio-economic rights would then refer to the percentage of the 
population not assured of this minimal threshoId, in the first instance, and further involve the question of 
whcther such faiture of minimal threshold assurance is evenly or unevenly distributed by group, defined by 
cthnicity, race, occupation etc). Philip Alston must be making a case for the minimum threshold approach when 
he stated thus: 
The fact that there must exist such a [minimum] core [content of each right that canot  be 
diminished under any pretext] .., would seern to be a logical implication of the use of the 
terminology of rights. In other words, there would be no justification for eievating a "clairn" 
to the status of a right (with al1 the connotations that concept is generdly assumed to have) 
if i ts  normative content could be so indeterminate as to allow for the possibility that the right 
holders possess no particular entitiement to anything. Each right must therefore give rise to 
an absolute minimum entitiement in the absence of which a state party is to be considered to 
be in violation of it[s] obligations. 
Sce Philip Alston. "Out of Abyss: The Challenges Conhnting the New UN. Cornmittee on Econornic, Sociai 
and Cultural rights" (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarîerly 332 at 352-353. 
the ought to be left for the executive and the legislature. It is not denied here that the 
allocation of resources is a policy decision and that decisions on economic, social and 
cultural nghts may likely revolve around priorities in the allocation of resources. Also, it is 
admitted that it is not for the courts to decide for the executives and the legislatures on how 
best to apply available resources in any given set of circumstances. 
At the outset it can be confidently stated that obstacles such as the above stated, are 
more apparent than real. Hence, objections in respect of the courts' involvernent are largely 
misplaced. There is nothing atypical in the courts offering directions and making policy 
decisionsf6' or decisions that impact on the application of resources. On the issue of policy, 
there is evidence attesting to the courts' use of policy arguments in deciding issues before it. 
Some notable judges, Lord Denning and Lord Diplock, have, on separate occasions, 
expressly alluded to their consideration of policy issues in detemining cases before them.163 
The difference with respect to the courts' involvement in the minimum threshold approach, 
therefore, would "be one of degree and not kind."'" 
As to the courts' decisions impacting on the application of resources, it cannot be 
denied that most civil and political rights decisions of the courts affect the government's 
allocation of resources. For example, where the court finds the state liable for violating a 
citizen's right to personal liberty and awards damages for unlawful detention, it cannot be 
I6+ See David Kinley, The European Convention on Humun Rights: Cornplionce Without Incorporation 
i Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993) at 6- 10. 
163 For Lord Denning's see Magot & Sr. Meilons Rural District Council v. Newport Corp. [ 19501 2 
Al1 E.R. 1226 at 1235- 1237; Spartan Steel & Alloys W. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Lrd [ 19731 1 Q.B. 27 at 
36. For Lord Diplock's see, O'Reilly & Ors, v. Mackman & Ors. [1983] 2 A.C. 237 at 285. 
I %avid Kinley, supra, note 162 at 9 (citations ornitted). 
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denied that such a decision has some implications on the state's application of resources. 
Also, a court may find the state liable for violating a citizen's right to fieedom of expression, 
where, for instance, the state fails to protect the citizen from counter demonstrators while in 
the lawful exercise of hisher freedom of expression. In this case, lack of resources to recruit 
and equip police officers will not avail the state. In addition to the financial implications of 
paying damages, the decision will certainly entai1 considerable expenditure on the part of the 
state to recruit, train, and equip law enforcement agents. Yet, at the time of making the 
decision, the coun was supposedly not making decisions on the allocation of resources. 
In advocating for the courts' involvement in fixing minimum standards for the 
minimum threshold approach, therefore, one is not advocating an entirely novel practice, but 
an extension of the already existing practice to adequately cover economic, social and 
cultural rights. Even if it were to be an entirely new practice, the fact that it had not been uied 
before is no sufficient reason for its rejection. It is untenable to argue that the courts are not 
sufficiently equipped to carry out such functions. Assuming, but not conceding, that the 
courts are not sufficiently equipped, the earlier they are equipped the better. The courts are 
put in place to serve the interests of the society. Those interests are always shifting and 
expanding, and can always be shifted and expanded, to cover new situations in accordance 
with the changing times. 
The minimum threshold approach may also be used by the Commission or the Court 
to reinforce the integrated approach and make it more effective. Thus, a State Party cm be 
held to be in violation of the right of an individual to 'respect of the dignity inherent in a 
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human being'165 where the individual has k e n  made to live below the threshold set for the 
defendant State Party. In this way, it would be more diffcult for a state or government to set 
up lack of development as a defence because the state's minimum threshold would have 
factored in the state's financial abilities. 
If these two (integrated and minimum threshold) approaches are combined 
effectively, economic, social and cultural rights provisions under the Charter will most likely 
receive increased, greater and perhaps effective protection even in the absence of national 
judicial enforcement. This should however not foreclose the ultimate aim of achieving 
directly enforceable economic, social and cultural rights both at the regional level and in the 
domestic jurisdiction of States Parties to the Afncan Charter. As such, the combined use of 
the integrated and minimum threshold approaches should only be a starting point in the 
overall effort to give the economic. social and cultural rights provisions under the African 
Clinrter their pride of place. 
'"sec Article 5 of the Afiican Chorfer. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time the Afncan Charter made its entmce ont0 the international human rights 
scene. it was both welcomed and celebrated: embraced because it came when the egregious 
abuses of human dignity were reaching epidemic proportions across the continent; and 
celebrated as a unique conceptualisation of human rights because of the radical nature and 
novelty of its provisions. By providing for an enforceable economic, social and cultural 
rights, the Charter took the centre stage in elevating the status of these rights on the 
international human rights scene, and took a staunch stand for the indivisibility of rights. 
Emerging from a region which had traditionally maintained an undivided philosophy 
of life, wherein life was seen as a holistic, and not compartmentaiized concept, the African 
Charter is justified in taking such a strong stand for the indivisibility of rights by adopting 
a holistic concept of human rights. Apart from the traditional links, the African continent's 
slavery and colonial experience must have taught great lessons, notably that human rights 
abuses can assume various shapes, and are not just limited to civil and political abuses. Thus, 
it was rightly conceived that the denial of economic, civil and cultural rights cm be just as 
dehumanising as the deprivation of civil and political rights and freedoms. Hence, the need 
to establish a human rights regime which was designed to be a quintessence of the totality 
of humankind's attempt to reclaim humanity from the precipice of oppression, misery and 
want. This means equal emphasis on what it takes to be human, which in mm translates into 
promoting and protecting d l  human rights without exception. 
However, while the Charter has been exemplary in its provisions. its implementation 
and enforcement have k e n  less than satisfactory. While the Charter imposes on State Parties 
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absolute and immediate obligations to take action to ensure that the rights it guarantees are 
respected, in practice, however, the econornic. social and cultural rights provisions are 
discrhinated against in enforcement and perfimctonly treated as if they are rnere luxuries 
which can be attained once everything else is guaranteed. Such a contemptuous attitude to 
economic, social and cultural rights manifests itself in the status accorded to these rights in 
domestic jurisdictions of most African states where they are regarded merely as non- 
justiciable aspirations. With social and economic conditions of existence in Africa 
exacerbating civil and political stnfe, a modest attempt has been made in this thesis to 
critically examine the existing situation and to refocus attention on the dilemma inherent in 
the continued neglect and rnarginalization of the enforcement of economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
As has been shown, the enforceability problems surrounding economic, social and 
cultural rights are not limited solely to the African system, but are a general plight of these 
rights in the international and regional human rights system. For the most part. the 
discrimination against the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights is rooted in 
the divisive ideological altercations between the East and the West. Also, it is a product of 
numerous misconceptions on the basis of which economic, social and cultural right are 
thought to be different from civil and political rights and therefore not amenable to the same 
mode of enforcement. 
It has also been shown that, by providing for equally enforceable civil and political, 
as well as economic, social and cultural rights, the Afican Charter not only recognized the 
importance traditionaily attached to these rights, but also truly reflected the virtues of 
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Africa's historical tradition and values of African civilization. However, while traditional 
Africa recognized, both in practice and in theory, the importance of these rights for the 
continued harmonious existence of society, modem AFnca currently pays only lip service to 
îhem. Thus. whatever value the inclusion of these rights would have had is lost in the fact 
that these rights, not being accorded full relevance in practical terrns, are relegated to a 
second class, and non-justiciable position in most dornestic jurisdictions. With the notable 
exception of South Africa, economic, social and cultural rights remain, for the most part. 
mere aspirations in the domestic jurisdiction of States Parties to the African Charter. The 
status of these rights has been revealed through a modest cornparison of Nigeria and South 
Africa, a juxtaposition w hich exposed the dissonance and hypocrisy inherent in purponing 
to uphold the Charter at the regional level while refbsing to give effect to its essence at the 
national level. 
An attempt was also made to trace the implementation I enforcement problems of 
these rights to the weak enforcement machinery set up by the African Charter. As always, 
it is not enough to make provisions for noms regulating the conduct of States if these noms 
are not anchored on effective institutions to ensure their realization. Regrettably, the African 
human rights system is anchored on weak institutions whose unwillingness for enforcement 
further compounds the problems for economic. social and cultural rights. While it was hoped 
that the system would be strengthened by the addition of a court, it has k e n  shown that the 
mere addition of a court will not make any difference, especially where the access of 
individuals and NGOs are completely dependent on the consent of a defendant State Party. 
It is emphasized that unless genuine efforts are made to enforce economic, social and 
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cultural rights, realization of human rights in Africa will remain illusory, due to the 
inextricable link between the prevalent social and civil strife and the denial of effective 
outlets for redress. While acknowledging the economic woes of many African States, it is 
submitted that these do not constitute sufficient reason to discriminate against economic, 
social and cultural rights since al1 rights entai1 considerable expendinire on the part of the 
state. As a creative way to ensure the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. 
the integrated and minimum threshold approaches have k e n  offered. 
The need for a change of attitude towards economic, social and culturai rights cm 
hardly be overstated. The present practice whereby these rights are regarded as mere 
aspirations flies in the face, and negates the very essence of the A f h n  Charter. Enforcing 
civil and political rights without economic, social and cultural rights is tantamount to mnning 
an exclusionary poiicy, that excludes that section of the society for whom autonomy means 
little without the basic necessities of life. More importantly, apart from enforcing less than 
what i t  takes to be a full person, it leaves a vast majority of the people without their only 
means of self defence. A society that insists on the continued dehumanisation of its majority 
is doomed. 
[Tlo rnargindize rights Decause] some 
lawyers ... consider [them] as non- 
justiciable, is to accept bias in favour of the 
powenul; it is to accept a tnuicateà view of 
humanity; it is üke thmwing a rope of smd 
to the poor and the dispossesseci. 
Kader Asmal, "Vic tims, Survivors and Ci tizens: Human Rights 
and Reconciliation in the South African Context" ( 1993) f East 
Afncan Joumal of Peace & Human Rights 1 at 19. 
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AFIUCAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 
Adopteà at Nairobi, Kenya on 26 June 1981 
Entry into Force: 21 ûctober 1986 
The African States members of the Organization of Afncan Unity, Parties to the 
present convention entitled "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights", 
Recalling Decision 1 15 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of States and Govemment 
ai its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the 
preparation of a "preliminary draft on the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and 
peoples' rights"; 
Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that 
"freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of 
legitimate aspirations of the Afncan peoples"; 
Reafiming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to 
eradicate al1 forms of colonialism from Afnca, to CO-ordinate and intensify their cooperation 
and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Afnca and to promote international CO- 
operation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; 
Tnking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of 
African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection of the concept of 
human and peoples' rights; 
Recognizing, on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes 
of human beings, which justifies their national and international protection, and on the other 
hmd that the reaiity and respect of peoples' rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; 
Comidering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance 
of duties on the part of everyone; 
Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to 
development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from econornic, social 
and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of 
economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights; 
Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which 
are still stniggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eiiMnate 
coIonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, Zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign 
military bases and d l  forms of discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, 
colour, sex, language, religion or political opinion; 
Reaffiming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and 
freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the 
Organization of Afncan Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United 
Nations; 
FirmLy convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples' rights and 
freedoms taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and 
freedoms in Africa; 
Have agreed as follows: 
PART 1 
RIGrnS AND DUTIES 
CHAPTER 1. HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 
Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory 
conditions. and shall receive equal pay for equal work. 
Article 16 
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health. 
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the 
health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick. 
Article 17 
1. Every individual shall have the right to education. 
2. Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his cornmunity. 
3. ........................................................*............... 
